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Abstract
It is expected that future IP devices will employ a variety of different net-
work access technologies to gain ubiquitous connectivity. Currently there are
no authentication protocols available that are lightweight, can be carried over
arbitrary access networks, and are flexible enough to be re-used in the many
different contexts that are likely to arise in future Internet remote access. Fur-
thermore, existing access procedures need to be enhanced to offer protection
against Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, and do not provide non-repudiation.
In addition to being limited to specific access media, some of these protocols
are limited to specific network topologies and are not scalable.
This thesis reviews the authentication infrastructure challenges for future
Internet remote access supporting ubiquitous client mobility, and proposes a se-
ries of solutions obtained by adapting and reinforcing security techniques arising
from a variety of different sources. The focus is on entity authentication proto-
cols that can be carried both by the IETF PANA authentication carrier and by
the EAP mechanisms, and possibly making use of an AAA infrastructure. The
core idea is to adapt authentication protocols arising from the mobile telecom-
munications sphere to Internet remote access. A proposal is also given for In-
ternet access using a public key based authentication protocol. The subsequent
security analysis of the proposed authentication protocols covers a variety of as-
pects, including: key freshness, DoS-resistance, and “false-entity-in-the-middle”
attacks, in addition to identity privacy of users accessing the Internet via mobile
devices.
This work aims primarily at contributing to ongoing research on the au-
thentication infrastructure for the Internet remote access environment, and at
reviewing and adapting authentication solutions implemented in other spheres,
for instance in mobile telecommunications systems, for use in Internet remote
access networks supporting ubiquitous mobility.
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The aim of this chapter is to provide an introduction, and also to present
the overall structure of the thesis. Section 1.1 provides the motivation and main
challenges addressed by the thesis. Sections 1.2 and 1.3 describe, respectively,
the principal contributions and the structure of this thesis. In fact this thesis
is divided into three main parts: Part I — Overview of Entity Authentication,
Part II — Internet Remote Access Authentication, and Part III — Internet
Authentication Protocols & Assessments.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Challenges
It is expected that future IP devices will use a variety of network access technolo-
gies to support ubiquitous connectivity, and security is clearly a very important
factor in these scenarios. According to the Pioneering Advanced Mobile Privacy
and Security (PAMPAS) Project [82], “the increasing heterogeneity of the net-
working environment is one of the long-term trends which requires new security
approaches”.
The main challenges include the investigation and development of unified,
secure and convenient authentication mechanisms that can be used in access
networks. In this context, authentication and key agreement are the central
components of secure access procedures for heterogeneous network access sup-
porting ubiquitous mobility. By heterogeneous network access we mean to cover
the situation where arbitrary network types are being accessed, through diverse
interfaces, by a number of users located in various places, in different situations
and with a variety of preferences. By ubiquitous mobility we mean the capability
for providing a universal and ever-present global mobility service to a valid user
via a variety of different networks.
For example, one future requirement identified by the Security for Hetero-
geneous Access in Mobile Applications and Networks (SHAMAN1) Project is
to provide flexible security means for accessing heterogeneous mobile networks,
including not only GSM [179], GPRS [61] and UMTS [8], but also WLAN [71],
Bluetooth2, and other network technologies. Moreover, “heterogeneous net-
work access control security” received the highest rating value in the list of
open research issues for future mobile communication systems produced by the
PAMPAS Project [82].
Currently there are no authentication protocols available that are lightweight,
1http://www.ist-shaman.org/
2www.bluetooth.com
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can be carried over arbitrary access networks, and are flexible enough for use
with all the various access technologies likely to be deployed to support fu-
ture ubiquitous mobility. Furthermore, existing access procedures need to be
made resistant to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks; they also do not provide
non-repudiation. In addition to being limited to specific access media (e.g.
802.1X–2004 [84] for IEEE 802 links), some of these protocols are limited to
specific network topologies (e.g. PPP [168] for point-to-point links) and are not
scalable.
1.2 The Contribution of this Thesis
This thesis reviews the authentication infrastructure challenges for future het-
erogeneous Internet remote access supporting ubiquitous client mobility, and
proposes a series of new solutions by adapting and reinforcing security tech-
niques arising from a variety of different sources.
Firstly the thesis provides background information on security services, and
establishes a general entity authentication model. In order to highlight the issues
involved, we next focus on the mechanisms most widely discussed in the context
of Internet authentication for remote access. The advantages and disadvantages
of these schemes are assessed and compared. Much of this information is based
on existing work in the Internet entity authentication literature.
Secondly the thesis defines the problem domain, establishes the usage sce-
narios, and defines the requirements for authentication mechanisms for Internet
remote access. The authentication services and properties needed to address the
threats and to achieve the desired implementation features are then specified.
Finally, after the selection of a common target transport environment, this the-
sis proposes, evaluates and compares four new Internet authentication schemes
for heterogeneous remote access, designed to meet the established requirements.
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The focus of this thesis is on authentication protocols that can be carried
both by the IETF Protocol for carrying Authentication for Network Access
(PANA) [65, 151] authentication carrier and Extensible Authentication Pro-
tocol (EAP) [13] mechanisms, and possibly making use of an Authentication,
Authorisation and Accounting (AAA) infrastructure, e.g. the Diameter protocol
[34]. The core idea is to adapt authentication protocols arising from the mobile
telecommunications sphere to provide security mechanisms for heterogeneous
Internet remote access. A new proposal is also given for Internet access using a
public key based authentication protocol.
The security analysis of the proposed authentication protocols is performed
using a threat modelling technique described in Chapter 4 of Howard and
LeBlanc [81, p69-124]. The analysis addresses a variety of aspects, including:
key freshness, DoS-resistance and resistance to “false-entity-in-the-middle” at-
tacks, in addition to identity privacy of users accessing the Internet via mobile
devices.
1.3 Organisation of this Thesis
This thesis is divided into three main parts. Part I is a preliminary part contain-
ing this introduction, background material regarding cryptographic techniques,
and a technical overview of entity authentication. Part I also includes a review of
existing authentication protocols relevant to this thesis. Part II covers Internet
remote access authentication, establishing the problem domain, usage scenarios,
requirements, and service properties for new Internet remote access authentica-
tion mechanisms. Part III contains the four new protocols, and assesses them
using the formal threat modelling process mentioned in section 1.2.
Part I consists of Chapters 1, 2 and 3. Chapter 2 provides background on se-
curity services and cryptographic techniques, in addition to a technical overview
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of entity authentication. A number of properties of authentication protocols,
such as temporality, implicit key authentication, and key freshness establish-
ment, are identified. A general model for entity authentication mechanisms is
given. The techniques, definitions and schemes discussed in this chapter are
used throughout this thesis.
In Chapter 3, we review authentication protocols in the context of Internet
remote access. Different perspectives related to Internet remote access are dis-
tinguished. We then describe a number of possible approaches to constructing
authentication protocols, and divide initial authentication for Internet remote
access into two parts. The need for a higher layer authentication procedure
for heterogeneous Internet access is discussed. Possible tunnelled authentica-
tion mechanisms are considered, and a wide range of potential alternatives are
reviewed. We then summarise some of the existing authentication protocols
relevant to this thesis, including legacy processes, public key based procedures,
and mobile telecommunications methods.
Part II consists of Chapters 4, 5 and 6. In Chapter 4, the problem domain
for Internet entity authentication is established. In addition, a number of au-
thentication scenarios for Internet remote access are described; the first two of
them are categorised in terms of the layer of the protocol stack in which secu-
rity is provided. Next we depict a scenario covering the absence of lower layer
security. We then describe further scenarios involving respectively mobile IP,
personal area networks, and limited free access.
In Chapter 5 we develop means to assess entity authentication protocols
against Internet remote access requirements. We define two main sets of re-
quirements, namely security and implementation requirements. To establish
the security requirements we analyse and compare potential risks associated
with entity authentication protocols, examining a number of aspects of entity
authentication security for Internet remote access. To obtain the implementa-
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tion requirements we analyse and compare features such as complexity, flexibility
and performance. The result of this critical analysis is used later in the thesis to
determine the security and implementation services and properties required of
new entity authentication schemes for Internet access. In Chapter 6, we discuss
the selection of the PANA protocol as the target environment for transporting
the new Internet authentication schemes proposed here. This chapter describes
the PANA protocol in more detail, as well as explaining the reasons for its choice
as the transport environment.
Part III consists of Chapters 7 to 11. Chapter 7 presents a proposal for
combining the Global System for Mobile communication (GSM) [179] authenti-
cation mechanism with PANA, which we call PANA/GSM. This scheme adapts
the security techniques used in GSM to PANA. Chapter 8 presents a new
means of combining the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS)
Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) mechanism [8] with PANA, which
we call PANA/UMTS. This scheme adapts the security techniques used in
UMTS to the PANA environment. Chapter 9 presents a proposal for com-
bining the Liberty Alliance Project and Third Generation Partnership Project
(3GPP) Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA) security mechanisms [11]
with PANA, which we call PANA/Liberty. This scheme adapts the security
techniques used in Liberty and 3GPP GAA to the PANA infrastructure. Chap-
ter 10 presents a fourth new scheme that combines the Internet Key Exchange
version 2 (IKEv2) [49] public key based authentication mechanism with PANA,
which we call PANA/IKEv2. This scheme adapts the security techniques used
in the IKEv2 public key based scheme to the PANA framework.
In Chapter 11, we perform threat modelling and comparative analyses of the
four new Internet entity authentication techniques proposed in this thesis. The
goal of this chapter is to determine which of them are secure, lightweight, flexible
and scalable methods allowing a client to be authenticated in a heterogeneous
Internet access environment supporting ubiquitous mobility.
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Finally, in Chapter 12, we summarise the findings of the thesis. In addition,
suggestions for future work are provided.
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The aim of this chapter is to provide background information on security
services and cryptographic tools, together with a technical overview of entity
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authentication. Section 2.1 describes the set of basic building blocks used in se-
curity protocols, including the security services and mechanisms, in addition to
the (symmetric and asymmetric) cryptographic techniques of relevance to this
thesis. Section 2.2 identifies a number of basic concepts underlying authentica-
tion, and describes important properties of entity authentication protocols, such
as temporality, implicit key authentication and the provision of key freshness.
Section 2.3 provides a general authentication model. The techniques, definitions
and schemes discussed in this chapter will be used throughout this thesis.
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2.1 Security Building Blocks
The art of war teaches us to rely not on the chance of the enemy’s not attacking,
but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.
- The Art of War, Sun Tzu
When designing a security protocol, it is important initially to outline its
security goals. In order to meet each of these goals, one or more security services
need to be provided. A series of fundamental building blocks can then be
deployed to implement these security services.
The set of basic building blocks used in security protocols includes algo-
rithms. Cryptographic algorithms are specific instances of security mechanisms.
A security mechanism is a general term encompassing protocols, algorithms,
cryptographic tools and even non-cryptographic techniques. One or more mech-
anisms can be used to build a security service. One or more security services
may be provided by a security protocol.
Figure 2.1 illustrates this idea. A typical security protocol provides one
or more services. Services are provided using security mechanisms. As stated
above, cryptographic algorithms are one very important category of security
mechanisms1.
SSL
Signatures Encryption Hashing
DSA RSA RSA AES SHA1 MD5
Services (in 
security protocol)
Mechanisms
Algorithms
Figure 2.1: Security building blocks
1Peter Gutmann’s Crypto Tutorial, http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/tutorial/ in-
dex.html.
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In this section, therefore, we first define the security services of relevance to
this thesis (subsection 2.1.1). In subsection 2.1.2, some of the mechanisms which
can be used to provide the security services are listed. In subsection 2.1.3, the
basic cryptographic techniques used throughout this thesis are briefly described.
2.1.1 Security Services
There are six main security services which are of importance when designing
security protocols, and are consequently relevant to this thesis. They are: con-
fidentiality, authentication, integrity, non-repudiation, access control, and avail-
ability [170, p9-11].
According to [137], ‘it is important to note that all these services can be pro-
vided by a variety of different techniques, not just cryptographic means. This
is one reason why it is important to distinguish between cryptographic tech-
niques, designed to provide services, and the services themselves. Identifying
which security services are needed comes from a requirements analysis of a sys-
tem — deciding which cryptographic techniques should be employed to provide
the services, and how they should be managed, is an implementation decision’.
The following definitions are based on those given in [39, 64, 72, 107, 132,
155, 170]. It is worth observing that these services are often combined. For
instance, entity authentication can be used to support access control.
2.1.1.1 Confidentiality
Confidentiality means keeping information secret from all but those who are
authorised to see it [132]. In other words, it means that the assets of a com-
puter system and transmitted information and/or data are protected against
disclosure to unauthorised entities. Possible methods of confidentiality compro-
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mise include printing, displaying, and other forms of disclosure, such as simply
revealing the existence of the information.
In summary, confidentiality services protect against information being dis-
closed or revealed to entities not authorised to have that information.
2.1.1.2 Authentication
Authentication is a service related to identification. However, although the
terms identification and entity authentication are used synonymously by a num-
ber of authors, e.g. Menezes, Oorschot, and Vanstone [132, p386], in some places
elsewhere in the literature, identification refers to learning a claimed or stated
identity whereas entity authentication is the corroboration of a claimed identity.
That is, identification involves learning an identifier (possibly a pseudonym) for
an entity, e.g. a communicating party, whereas entity authentication is about
verifying that this identifier does indeed belong to the entity who has claimed
it. This thesis will use these latter definitions for these two terms.
Authentication applies to both entities and information. Two parties enter-
ing into a communication should authenticate each other. Information delivered
over a channel should be authenticated, for instance, as to its origin, date of
origin, and data content [132, p4]. For these reasons, this service is usually
subdivided as follows (see section 2.2):
• Entity authentication ensures that an identity presented by a remote party
participating in a communication connection or session is genuinely asso-
ciated with that party [64]. It is ‘an ability to verify an entity’s claimed
identity, by another entity’ [72].
• Message authentication, otherwise known as data origin authentication,
provides evidence to an entity that the source of a received message is as
claimed [107]. The message authentication service thus provides confir-
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mation of the source of a data unit. However the service in itself does
not provide protection against duplication or modification of data units.
Nevertheless one may argue that, implicitly at least, a message authenti-
cation service also provides data integrity since, if a message is modified,
in some sense the source has changed.
According to Menezes, Oorschot, and Vanstone [132, p385], a major differ-
ence between entity authentication and message authentication is that message
authentication provides no timeliness guarantees with respect to when a message
was created, whereas entity authentication involves corroboration of a claimant’s
identity by a verifier through actual communications with the claimant at the
instant of execution of the protocol. Conversely, entity authentication typically
involves no meaningful message being transferred other than the claim of being
a particular entity, whereas message authentication does. Nevertheless, entity
authentication is often combined with key establishment; that is, as a result of
executing a protocol, not only is one or both of the parties authenticated, but
a secret key (known to be authentic and fresh) is established between the two
parties.
2.1.1.3 Integrity
Integrity ensures that information has not been altered by unauthorised means
[132, p3]. In other words, it means that the assets of a computer system,
transmitted information and/or data can be modified only by authorised parties
and only in authorised ways. Data integrity services therefore are ‘safeguards
against the threat that the value or existence of data might be changed in a way
inconsistent with the recognized security policy’ [64].
To protect the integrity of data sent via untrusted communications chan-
nels, one must have the ability to detect data manipulation by unauthorised
parties. Data manipulation includes writing, changing, changing the status,
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deleting, substituting, inserting, reordering, and delaying or replaying of trans-
mitted messages [64]. The Clark-Wilson model [39] defines integrity as those
qualities which give data and systems both internal consistency and a good cor-
respondence to real world expectations for the systems and data. Controls are
needed for both internal and external reliability.
2.1.1.4 Non-Repudiation
Non-repudiation prevents the denial of previous commitments or actions [132].
In other words, it is the ability to prove that an action or event has taken place,
so that this event or action cannot be repudiated later. A non-repudiation
service provides protection against a party to a communication exchange later
falsely denying that the exchange occurred. Non-repudiation of receipt or trans-
mission provides the sender or the receiver, respectively, with the means to
establish that a message was indeed received or transmitted.
According to Ford [64], a non-repudiation service, in itself, does not eliminate
repudiation. He states that ‘it does not prevent any party from denying another
party’s claim that something occurred. What it does is ensure the availability of
irrefutable evidence to support the speedy resolution of any such disagreement.’
For example, one entity may authorise the purchase of property by another
entity and later deny such authorisation was granted. A procedure involving
examination of evidence of the authorisation by a trusted third party would
typically be needed to resolve the dispute.
2.1.1.5 Access Control
Access control restricts access to resources to authorised entities. The goal of an
access control service is to protect against unauthorised access to any resource,
e.g. a computing resource, communications resource, or information resource
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[64]. Unauthorised access includes: unauthorised use, disclosure, modification,
destruction, and issuing of commands. This service requires that access to the
protected resources be controlled.
2.1.1.6 Availability
Availability services require that computer system assets be available to autho-
rised parties when needed. A variety of attacks can result in the loss of, or
a reduction in, availability. Some of these attacks are amenable to automated
countermeasures, such as authentication and encryption, whereas others require
some sort of physical action to prevent or recover from the loss of availability of
the elements of a distributed system [170].
2.1.2 Security Mechanisms
A mechanism is a general term encompassing protocols, algorithms, and non-
cryptographic techniques (e.g. hardware protection and procedural controls) to
achieve specific security objectives [132, p33]. In order to provide and support a
security service, one or more security mechanisms are often combined. ISO 7498-
2 [86] divides security mechanisms into two types: specific security mechanisms,
i.e. those specific to providing certain security services, and pervasive security
mechanisms, i.e. those not specific to the provision of individual security services
[43, p33].
ISO 7498-2 then defines and describes eight types of specific security mecha-
nism and five types of pervasive security mechanism. The eight types of specific
security mechanism are: encipherment, digital signature, access control, data in-
tegrity (which includes message authentication codes), authentication exchange,
traffic padding, routing control, and notarisation. For a more detailed descrip-
tion of the concepts underlying security mechanism standards see, for example,
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Dent and Mitchell [43].
Four very important cryptographic security mechanisms relevant to this the-
sis are as follows:
• Encipherment is used to provide confidentiality; encipherment (or encryp-
tion) can also be used to help provide authentication and integrity services.
• Digital signatures are used to provide authentication, integrity protection,
and non-repudiation services.
• Message authentication codes (MACs) are used to provide integrity protec-
tion and message authentication; MACs can also be used to help provide
entity authentication services.
• Authentication exchanges are used to provide entity authentication and
authenticated session key establishment.
In this thesis, a variety of different security mechanisms are discussed. It
is important to observe that no single mechanism can provide all the security
services.
Because of their importance, the next subsection focuses on the development,
use, and management of cryptographic tools used as components in security
protocols.
2.1.3 Cryptographic Tools
In this subsection we first outline the role of cryptography and its use of keys.
After that, we briefly describe some of the basic symmetric and asymmetric
cryptographic techniques used to provide security services. We also give defini-
tions used throughout this thesis. We briefly describe each cryptographic tool
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of importance to this thesis in terms of what they are, rather than the details
of their operation.
2.1.3.1 Cryptography
Cryptography, from Greek kryptos (hidden), and graphein (to write), is ‘the sci-
ence of designing of cipher systems’ [155, p8]. Cryptography is thus ‘the study
of mathematical techniques related to aspects of information security such as
confidentiality, data integrity, entity authentication, and data origin authen-
tication’ ([132, p4]). For a more thorough introduction to all the necessary
cryptographic concepts see, for example, [132].
Cryptography involves applying an algorithm (a specified sequence of com-
putational steps) to a data string to obtain a cryptographically protected version
of the data string. Depending on the type of algorithm, the data string may or
may not be recoverable from the transformed version. The operation of the al-
gorithm almost always also takes as input a key (a sequence of symbols), which
parameterises the operation of the algorithm.
Cryptographic algorithms can be divided into two main classes: symmetric
and asymmetric techniques. These two classes are discussed in the following
sections.
2.1.3.2 Symmetric Cryptography
Symmetric (otherwise known as secret key or conventional) cryptography in-
volves algorithms where the same key (a secret key), or two keys which can
be easily computed from each other, are used as input to both the originator’s
and the recipient’s transformation. Only the originator and the recipient know
the shared secret key, which needs protection against accidental or malicious
disclosure.
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Therefore, in a symmetric cryptographic scheme, communications security
depends on the strength of protection for the shared secret key. In fact, as
mentioned in [87], ‘without knowledge of the secret key, it is computationally
infeasible to compute either the originator’s or the recipient’s transformation’.
There are a number of different types of symmetric cryptographic technique,
including encryption schemes, cryptographic hash functions, and message au-
thentication codes.
Symmetric Encryption Symmetric encryption, or secret-key encryption, is
a symmetric cryptographic technique which can be used to provide confidential-
ity services. It uses either a single key for both the encryption and decryption
transformations, or a pair of keys for encryption and decryption, where one is
easily derived from the other [88]. According to Menezes et al. [132], the en-
cryption is said to be symmetric if, for each associated encryption/decryption
key pair, it is computationally ‘easy’ to determine a decryption key knowing
only the encryption key, and vice versa.
There are two frequently used types of symmetric encryption scheme, namely
block ciphers and stream ciphers:
• A block cipher is an encryption scheme which breaks up the plaintext to
be transmitted into strings, or blocks, of a fixed length (e.g. of 64 or 128
bits) and encrypts them one block at a time [89].
• Conversely, a stream cipher is an encryption mechanism in which, using
a running key or a fresh one-time-pad key stream, an encryption encrypts
a plaintext in bit-wise or block-wise manner [90].
As stated by Mitchell [137], a block cipher algorithm possesses two related
operations — an encryption operation, which will take as input a block of plain-
text and a secret key and output a block of ciphertext, and a decryption opera-
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tion which, when given the same secret key, will always map a ciphertext block
back to the correct plaintext block.
Also according to Mitchell [137], ‘the best known [block cipher] is almost
certainly the Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm’ [140]. This algorithm
has been a de facto standard for over 20 years. However, DES secret keys only
contain 56 bits, which means that, with modern technology, it is possible to
search through all possible keys until the correct one has been found. As a
result, DES is decreasingly often used, at least in its basic form — however,
the use of DES in a compound form known as ‘triple DES’, with two or three
different DES keys, has given the algorithm a new lease of life.
Another block cipher of increasing importance is the so called Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm, which was developed as a replacement
for DES. Rijndael [42] was chosen as the AES and published as FIPS 197 [142].
This algorithm uses much longer keys than DES (of at least 128 bits) and also
has a 128-bit block length, as opposed to the 64-bit blocks used by DES. One
other block cipher algorithm of importance in a mobile context is KASUMI [9]
(based on MISTY1 [130]), an algorithm with a 128-bit cipher key length that is
incorporated into the 3GPP specifications (see section 3.5.3).
An example of a stream cipher is the A5 algorithm used in GSM (see section
3.5.1). Another example is the Ron’s Code #4 (RC4) algorithm [164], which
was designed by Rivest in 1987 and is one of the stream ciphers most widely
used in software applications. A stream cipher is different from a block cipher in
that data is encrypted ‘bit by bit’. As described in [137], the major component
of a stream cipher algorithm is a sequence generator, that takes a secret key as
input and generates a pseudo-random sequence of bits as output. This sequence
is bit-wise ex-ored with the plaintext bit sequence to derive the ciphertext.
Decryption uses exactly the same process as encryption.
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Cryptographic Hash Functions Hash functions can be used to help provide
integrity and authentication services, although, since they do not use a key,
they are typically used in conjunction with other security algorithms. ‘A hash
function is a computationally efficient function which maps strings of bits to
fixed-length strings of bits’ [91, 132]. Hash functions take a message as input and
produce an output referred to as a hash-code, hash-result, hash-value, message
digest, or just a hash.
Cryptographic hash functions must satisfy three properties, namely that it
must be computationally infeasible to find: (i) for a given output, an input
which maps to this output; (ii) for a given input, a second input which maps to
the same output; and (iii) two different inputs which map to the same output.
Hash functions form an important part of almost all commonly used digital
signature schemes. There are a number of types of hash function, including
those based on block ciphers, those based on modular arithmetic, and dedicated
hash functions. One well-known and widely used example of a hash-function is
the Secure Hash Algorithm revision 1 (SHA-1) function, defined in FIPS 180-1
[139], which gives a 20-byte output. Another well-known example is the MD5
message-digest algorithm, defined in RFC 1321 [162], which gives a 16-byte
output. The use of this latter cryptographic hash function is not recommended,
since MD5 has been broken by Wang and Yu [180]. For cryptographic hash
function standards, see for example [91, 92, 93, 94].
Message Authentication Codes Message Authentication Codes (MACs)
are symmetric cryptographic techniques which can be used to provide both
data origin authentication and integrity services. The data originator inputs
the data to be protected into a MAC function, together with a secret key. The
resulting output, a short fixed-length bit string, is known as the MAC. This
MAC can be sent or stored with the data being protected.
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The MAC verifier uses the same secret key to recompute a MAC value on
the data. The data is only accepted as valid if the recomputed MAC agrees
with the value sent or stored with the data. There are a number of widely used
mechanisms for computing MACs; see for example [132]. Many of them are
based on either block ciphers or cryptographic hash functions. An example of a
MAC mechanism using cryptographic hash functions is the Keyed-Hashing for
Message Authentication (HMAC2) method [123]. There are also standards for
such schemes, notably ISO/IEC 9797 parts 1 and 2 [95, 96].
2.1.3.3 Asymmetric Cryptography
An asymmetric cryptographic technique uses two related transformations, namely
a public transformation and a private transformation. The two transformations
have the property that, given the public transformation, it is computationally
infeasible to derive the private transformation [87].
Diffie and Hellman [45] first introduced the concept of asymmetric cryptog-
raphy in 1976. Asymmetric (or public-key) cryptography involves the use of key
pairs, where each pair is made of a public key and a private key. The private
key (which defines the private transformation) is kept secret by its owner, while
the public key (which defines the public transformation) can be freely shared
with everyone in the communications system.
Key Management In a large network, the number of key pairs that must be
selected in order to support use of an asymmetric cryptosystem may be consid-
erably smaller than the number of keys required to support use of a symmetric
cryptosystem [132, p32]. But whilst asymmetric cryptography does not, like
symmetric cryptography, rely on the sender and receiver agreeing on a shared
2RFC 2104 [123] specifies HMAC using a generic cryptographic hash function (denoted by
H); the specific instantiation of HMAC using the MD5 or SHA-1 cryptographic hash function
is known, respectively, as HMAC-MD5 or HMAC-SHA1.
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secret, the user of a public key must nevertheless ensure that the correct key is
used.
That is, although confidentiality is not important for the public key, it is
important to ensure its origin and integrity. Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs)
are used for this purpose. PKIs are systems consisting of trusted third parties
(TTPs)3, together with the services they make available to provide certified
public keys. The concept of a PKI has been introduced as a means to generate,
distribute and manage ‘public key certificates’ [64].
In a PKI, Certification Authorities (CAs) issue digitally signed certificates
which bind a public key to an identifier and possibly other information (e.g. the
certificate expiry date). ‘In fact, a CA is a centre trusted to create and assign
public key certificates. Optionally, the CA may create and assign keys to the
entities’ [98]. X.509 [108] is a widely adopted standard specifying the format of
public key certificates. Standards also exist for other aspects of the operation
of a PKI; see, for example, IETF PKIX4.
There are a number of different types of public-key cryptographic tools,
including encryption schemes, digital signature mechanisms, and key establish-
ment techniques.
Asymmetric Encryption Asymmetric encryption algorithms can be used to
provide confidentiality services. In an asymmetric encryption scheme, the public
key is used for encryption and the private key for decryption. The best known
algorithm for public key encryption is RSA, which was proposed in 1978 by
Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman [163]. There are a number of standards describing
how to use public-key encryption, including the use of RSA; see, for example,
[83, 99].
3A Trusted Third Party (TTP) is a security authority, or its representative, trusted by
other entities with respect to security related activities [97].
4http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/pkix-charter.html
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Digital Signatures A digital signature is a cryptographic mechanism which
can be used to help provide entity authentication, data origin authentication,
integrity and non-repudiation services. ITU-T X.800 [107] defines a digital
signature as ‘data appended to, or a cryptographic transformation of, a data
unit, that allows a recipient of the data unit to prove the source and integrity
of the data unit and protect against forgery’. ‘The process of signing entails
transforming the message and some secret information held by the entity into a
tag called a signature’ [132, p22].
A signature mechanism consists of two components, namely signing and
verification algorithms. The signing algorithm involves the transformation of
the message into a signature, using the signing entity’s private key. For a digital
signature mechanism to work, there is a need for a verification process, so that
it is possible to verify whether a signature on a message was genuinely created
by the claimed entity.
This verification process takes as input the signature, the message, and the
signer’s public verification key, and outputs an indication as to whether or not
the signature on the message is valid. Typically a digital signature functions as
a check value on data. That is, when sending a digital signature on data, both
the data and the signature need to be transmitted. Signature mechanisms do
exist where part or all of the data can be recovered from the signature itself,
but these are less commonly used.
Many digital signature schemes have been proposed over the last 25 years
(for example, see [132]). For digital signature standards, see for instance [97,
100, 101, 141].
Key Establishment Schemes A key establishment mechanism is a process
whereby a shared secret key is made available to two or more parties, typically
for subsequent use with a symmetric cryptographic algorithm, such as an en-
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cryption or MAC scheme. Key establishment schemes can be broadly subdivided
into two kinds of mechanisms [132]:
• key agreement mechanisms — key establishment techniques in which a
shared secret is derived by two or more parties as a function of information
contributed by, or associated with, each of the parties, (ideally) such that
no party can predetermine the resulting value (see, for example, the Diffie-
Hellman key agreement algorithm [45]); and
• key transport mechanisms — key establishment techniques where one
party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it
to the other(s). Key transport mechanisms directly employ asymmetric
or symmetric encryption.
Asymmetric cryptography based key establishment techniques, including
both key agreement and key transport mechanisms involving various combina-
tions of encryption and signatures, are standardised in ISO/IEC 11770-3 [102].
Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone [132] state that authenticated key
transport may be regarded as a special case of message authentication with
confidentiality, where the message includes a cryptographic key. Key establish-
ment protocols involving authentication typically require a set-up phase whereby
authentic and possibly secret initial keying material is distributed.
Key pre-distribution mechanisms are key establishment protocols whereby
the resulting established keys are completely determined a priori by initial key-
ing material. In contrast, dynamic key establishment mechanisms are those
whereby the key established by a fixed pair (or group) of users varies on subse-
quent executions. Dynamic key establishment is also referred to as session key
establishment [132, p490–491].
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Many key establishment protocols based on public-key techniques (see, for
example, [132, p515–524]) employ digital signatures for message authentication.
Additional variations beyond key transport and key agreement exist, including
various forms of key update, such as key derivation [132, p490]. In this case,
the nature of the derived keying material depends on whether or not perfect
forward secrecy is required.
As stated by Harkins and Carrel [76], perfect forward secrecy refers to the
notion that compromise of a single key will only permit access to data pro-
tected by that key. For perfect forward secrecy to exist, the key used to protect
transmission of data must not be used to derive any additional keys, and if the
key used to protect transmission of data was derived from some other keying
material, that material must not be used to derive any more keys.
2.2 Authentication: Basic Concepts
We cannot enter into alliance with neighbouring princes until we are acquainted
with their designs.
- The Art of War, Sun Tzu
This section identifies a number of basic concepts relating to authentication,
and also describes certain key properties of entity authentication protocols. We
first state a number of concepts and thoughts related to the identification pro-
cess (section 2.2.1); we then mention the distinct senses of authentication, and
describe various different approaches to authentication, categorised by the type
of evidence involved (section 2.2.2). Section 2.2.3 next defines what we mean
here by an authentication protocol, and lists its possible states. In sections 2.2.4
and 2.2.5, certain basic properties of authentication protocols, including tempo-
rality, implicit key authentication and key freshness establishment, are briefly
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described.
2.2.1 The Identification Process
The concepts and definitions described in this section were mostly stated by
Clarke [40, 41]. The term entity encompasses all manner of real-world things,
including objects, devices, animals, people, and ‘legal persons’ such as corpo-
rations, trusts, and incorporated associations. An entity has a range of char-
acteristics, features or attributes. An identity is a particular presentation of
an entity. An entity does not necessarily have a single identity, but may have
many. Therefore individual entities of all kinds may have multiple identities,
rather than just one.
An identifier is one or more data-items concerning an identity that are suffi-
cient to distinguish it from other instances of its particular class, and that is used
to signify that identity. Conventional identifiers such as names and codes are
associated with identities rather than with entities. However, some identifiers
are not only capable of distinguishing between identities, but can only charac-
terise the entity itself, e.g. biometrics, because they measure some feature of
the individual, or of the individual’s behaviour. Identification is therefore the
process whereby an identifier is acquired, and an association achieved between
an identity and stored information, e.g. in a database.
Identity authentication is the further verification process, whereby a suf-
ficient degree of confidence is established that the identification process has
delivered a correct result; this can be performed by collecting multiple iden-
tifiers, acquiring knowledge that only the right entity is expected to have, or
inspecting tokens that only the individual entity is expected to possess. Also
known as entity authentication, identity authentication then refers to a process
designed to cross-check against additional evidence the identity signified by the
identifier acquired during the identification process. An item of evidence in this
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context is usefully referred to as an authenticator or a credential.
It is important to state that the concept of certainty of identity is an unreal-
isable hope, because all identification and authentication techniques are subject
to error. In addition to accidental errors, all are capable of being circumvented
with varying degrees of ease. False inclusions arise, including successful mas-
querades, and the tighter that the tolerances are set, the greater is the frequency
of false exclusions. Rather than the naive concept of proof of identity, the focus
of this thesis is thus on evidence of identity.
2.2.2 Authentication and Credentials
As explained in section 2.1.1, in the context of communications security the term
authentication has two distinct senses. One is message authentication, which is
concerned with verifying the origin of received data, and, typically, involves a
process for confirming the integrity of the data.
The other sense is entity authentication, described in section 2.2.1, where
one entity (the verifier) gains assurance, through acquisition of corroborative
evidence and/or supporting credentials, that the identity of another entity (the
claimant) is as declared at the instant of execution of the mechanism, thereby
preventing impersonation [155, p92]. This thesis will focus on authentication
in this second sense. Thus in the remainder of this thesis, the word authenti-
cation, when used without further clarification, is always used to mean entity
authentication.
When the claimant is a human user, the credentials can be categorised into
one of “something you know” (e.g. a password), “something you have” (e.g. a
token or smart card), or “something you are or you do” (e.g. biometrics), lead-
ing respectively to three approaches to user authentication: proof by knowledge,
proof by possession or proof by property [38, p119–124]. There is also an alter-
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native approach based on user location (“where you are”), e.g. in a physically
secured terminal room of a bank [155, p93].
When the claimant is a machine, authentication processes can be divided into
two types: cryptographic (or strong), e.g. challenge-response mechanisms, and
other (or weak), e.g. password schemes. Some authors, like Menezes, Oorschot
and Vanstone [132], include here a third authentication type, making a distinc-
tion between weak, strong, and zero-knowledge based authentication.
Zero-knowledge authentication protocols are similar in some regards to the
challenge-response protocols, but are based on the ideas of interactive proof
systems and zero-knowledge proofs, employing random numbers not only as
challenges, but also as commitments to prevent cheating. For further details see
[132, p405–417].
2.2.3 Authentication Protocols
As described in section 2.1.1.2, authentication can be summarised as identifica-
tion plus verification. Identification is the procedure whereby an entity claims a
certain identity (“Who are you?”), while verification is the procedure whereby
that claim is checked (“Can you prove it?”). Thus the correctness of authenti-
cation relies heavily on the verification method employed.
When the verification method is based on cryptography, authentication tends
to rely on an exchange of messages between the pair of entities through a com-
munications medium. This exchange is called an authentication protocol.
An authentication protocol is a special type of communications protocol,
i.e. a precisely defined sequence of communication and computation steps. A
communication step transfers messages from one entity (the sender) to another
(the receiver), while a computation step updates an entity’s internal state.
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Two distinct states can be identified at the verifier upon termination of an
authentication protocol, one signifying successful authentication and the other
failure. These states will be useful in two subsequent steps called authorisation,
which is the “act of determining whether a requesting identity will be allowed
access to a resource”; and accounting, which is “the act of collection of infor-
mation on resource usage for the purpose of capacity planning, auditing, billing
or cost allocation” [34].
2.2.4 Temporality
Authentication protocols provide assurance regarding the identity of an entity
only at a given instant in time. Thus the authenticity of the entity can be
ascertained just for the instance of the authentication exchange. If the continu-
ity of such an assurance is required, use of additional techniques is necessary.
For example, authentication can be repeated periodically, or the authentication
protocol could be linked to an ongoing integrity service. In the latter case, the
authentication protocol needs to be integrated with a key establishment mech-
anism, such that a by-product of successful entity authentication is a shared
secret, a session key, appropriate for use with an integrity mechanism used to
protect subsequently exchanged data [132, p385-388].
Therefore, when an entire communication session has to be authenticated,
typically the initial message exchange will serve to set up a session key between
the entities. Further messages are then protected by an integrity mechanism
employing the session key. In this case, an authentication protocol meets its
objective if it can be demonstrated that it establishes a fresh session key, known
only to the participants in the session and possibly some TTPs [72]. The next
section discusses this in more detail.
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2.2.5 Implicit Key Authentication and Key Freshness Es-
tablishment
Following [136], we next consider the case where a protocol simultaneously pro-
vides entity authentication and session key establishment, and this session key
is used to protect data subsequently transferred. See section 2.1.3.3 for details
regarding key establishment schemes.
Implicit key authentication is the property whereby one party is assured
that no other party aside from a specifically identified second party (and pos-
sibly an additional identified TTP) may gain access to a particular secret key.
Key confirmation is the property whereby one party is assured that a second
party actually has possession of a particular secret key. Explicit key authenti-
cation is the property obtained when both implicit key authentication and key
confirmation hold.
A further property, useful in some applications, is key freshness. ‘A key
is fresh (from the viewpoint of one party) if it can be guaranteed to be new,
as opposed to possibly an old key being reused through actions of either an
adversary or authorized party’ [132, p494]. In other words, key freshness is
the property that the party to a key establishment process knows that the key
is a ‘new’ key. Above all, the party should have evidence that the messages
received during the protocol by which the key has been established are ‘fresh’
messages, i.e. they are not replays of ‘old’ messages from a previous instance of
the protocol.
The absence of key freshness would enable an interceptor to force the verifier
to keep re-using an ‘old’ session key, which might have been compromised. It
would therefore seem reasonable to make key freshness a requirement for most
applications of key establishment protocols.
To conclude this discussion, we note that the two critically important prop-
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erties for most key establishment protocols would seem to be implicit key au-
thentication and key freshness. Explicit key authentication is not always so
important, and is, in any case, reached once a party receives evidence of use of
a key.
2.3 General Authentication Model
The provision of an entity authentication service “almost inevitably involves a
series of messages being exchanged between the parties concerned, each transfer
of a message being known as a pass of the protocol. Such a sequence of messages
is normally called an entity authentication protocol, or simply an authentication
protocol (we use this shorter term throughout). For historical reasons, the
term ‘authentication mechanism’ is instead used throughout ISO/IEC 9798.
However, the term authentication protocol is used almost universally elsewhere”
[43, p196].
A general model for authentication protocols taken from ISO/IEC 9798-1 [87]
is shown in Figure 2.2. In this picture, the lines indicate potential information
flows. Entities A and B may either directly interact with the trusted third party
TP, indirectly interact with the trusted third party through B or A respectively,
or use some information issued by the trusted third party.
TP
 A  B
Figure 2.2: Authentication model
According to ISO/IEC 9798-1 [87], it is not essential that all the entities and
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exchanges are present in every authentication mechanism. For unilateral au-
thentication, a type of authentication which provides one entity with assurance
of the other’s identity but not vice-versa, entity A is considered the claimant,
whereas entity B is considered the verifier. For mutual authentication, a type
of authentication which provides both entities with assurance of each other’s
identity, A and B each take the roles of both claimant and verifier.
To meet the goals of an authentication protocol, the entities generate and
exchange standardised messages. It takes the exchange of at least one message
for unilateral authentication and the exchange of at least two messages for mu-
tual authentication. An additional step may be needed if a challenge has to
be sent to initiate the authentication exchange. Additional steps may also be
needed if a TTP is involved.
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The aim of this chapter is to review authentication protocols in the context
of Internet remote access. Firstly, a variety of different perspectives related to
Internet remote access are distinguished; we also describe a number of possible
approaches to constructing authentication protocols (section 3.1). Secondly, we
divide the initial authentication and key establishment processes for network
access into two parts. The need for a higher layer authentication procedure in
the first phase is discussed. Possible tunnelled authentication mechanisms are
considered, taking into account the vulnerabilities arising from their use, and
possible solutions to these problems (section 3.2). We then summarise a number
of existing authentication protocols relevant to this thesis, including legacy pro-
cesses (section 3.3), the EAP architecture (section 3.4), mobile authentication
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methods (section 3.5), tunnel and key generation schemes (section 3.6), com-
pound tunnelled alternatives (section 3.7), public key based procedures (section
3.8), the AAA backend infrastructure (section 3.9), and the Liberty Alliance
Project architecture (section 3.10).
We focus here on the use of the EAP architecture as a format to carry
authentication information, not only on Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) links
but also on wired IEEE 802 networks, wireless Local Area Networks (LANs),
and the Internet. The definitions and schemes discussed in this chapter will be
used throughout the remainder of this thesis.
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3.1 Internet Access and Authentication
In most cases, network access requires some form of authentication of the end
user to the network. Hence, many networks require entities to provide their
credentials before being allowed access to network resources. Network resources
could include: basic network access (sometimes meaning Internet access), ac-
cess to LAN services (such as printer servers, file servers, database servers), or
more specific communication services in the network (e.g. electronic mail, FTP
connections, web servers), or even a certain grade of service (e.g. free vs. paid
services).
We explain here the basic concepts underlying Internet remote access and the
authentication process involved. Section 3.1.1 distinguishes between two differ-
ent types of Internet remote access. Section 3.1.2 describes possible approaches
to constructing authentication protocols for network access.
3.1.1 Internet Remote Access Perspectives
The term remote access has two distinct meanings in the context of network au-
thentication. This is illustrated by contrasting definitions of authentication for
network remote access present in two standards documents: namely ISO/IEC
18028-4 [103] and the IETF PANA RFC 4016 [151].
The ISO/IEC document considers authentication for network remote access
from the point of view of a roaming user that already has access to a public
network, such as the Internet. This user wishes to connect to a specific remote
network and use its resources just as if a direct LAN link existed. Thus, in this
case, the user does not need to be authenticated to achieve Internet network
connectivity, since such access is already available, but instead needs to be
authenticated in order to gain access to a remote network using the Internet.
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By contrast, the IETF PANA Working Group (WG) document considers
authentication for network remote access from the point of view of a roaming
entity A (a user or a device such as a notebook computer, or a Personal Digital
Assistant (PDA), acting on behalf of a user) that needs to be authenticated
to an entity B within an access network in order to be provided with network
connectivity. This viewpoint is shown in Figure 3.1, where entity B, which
belongs to the access network, authenticates remote entity A (i.e. its identity,
signified by the recorded identifier), using credentials held by A, to provide
Internet network connectivity. This perspective is very similar to GSM and
3GPP scenarios, where a user owning a device (a mobile station) needs to be
authenticated because she is provided with connectivity in a telecommunications
network.
entity A
credentials
access network
entity B
Figure 3.1: Authentication for Internet remote access
This thesis will focus on authentication for network remote access in the
second sense. Thus the term authentication for Internet remote access is used
in the text below to avoid any ambiguity.
3.1.2 Authentication Approaches
When a remote entity attaches to a visited network it has never been in contact
with before, typically the network wants assurance that it will be properly paid
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for the services granted to the entity. In addition, the entity may want assurance
that the network will not tamper with any data that the entity transmits via
the access network. This requires some form of authentication between the two
parties, which can be carried out in a variety of ways. The general authentication
model discussed in section 2.3 supports a number of alternative approaches,
including unilateral and mutual authentication, with or without making use of
a TTP.
The typical scenario for network remote access is the case where a subscription-
like relationship exists between the remote entity and a home network, which
involves the prior set-up of security information, such as algorithms and keys.
The cryptographic mechanisms used in the authentication protocol lead to an-
other means of classifying techniques, i.e. between methods based on symmetric
or asymmetric cryptography. As explained in the SHAMAN Final Technical
Report1, “whereas the former (method) requires the involvement of the home
network during the initial authentication process between the remote entity
and the visited (access) network, the latter allows for architectures that avoid
an on-line involvement of the home network, since the authentication protocol
may then be based on certificates”. In this latter case, however, a public key
infrastructure is required to support certificate verification.
Another distinction can be made between one-step and two-step schemes.
Whereas the former use a single protocol for mutual authentication, the latter
use two separate authentication protocols, one for network authentication and
the second for authentication of the remote entity. In this latter case, the
network authentication protocol is typically executed first and is then used
to create a protected tunnel through which the remote entity authentication
protocol is run. In particular, such a tunnel provides confidentiality protection
for the remote entity identity and other access negotiation information against
active attacks during the initial access phase.
1http://www.ist-shaman.org/
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Finally, in addition to the subscription-based cases, alternative remote access
scenarios can be considered, where payment is provided by means other than
relying on the subscription relation between the remote entity and a home net-
work. For example, this could be achieved using credit cards or various forms
of electronic money, leading to quite different security architectures, e.g. the
frameworks for secure mobile commerce described by Knospe and Schwiderski-
Grosche [120, 121, 122]. These scenarios, however, are outside the scope of this
thesis. The authentication scenarios covered by this thesis will be discussed in
more detail in Chapter 4.
In the next section we discuss the two basic phases into which the initial
authentication process for Internet remote access can be divided.
3.2 Initial Authentication
From an architectural point of view, the process of initial authentication and
key establishment for Internet remote access can be divided into two phases, as
shown in Figure 3.2. The first phase takes place between the remote entity and
the access network, and the second phase between that network and a backend
AAA2 infrastructure (discussed in section 3.9).
(Visited) 
Access 
Network
 
I nit ial Authent icat ion & Key Establishment
Backend AAA (Home)
Infrastructure
Remote
Entity
Second PhaseFirst Phase
Figure 3.2: Internet authentication
2AAA is an acronym for Authentication, Authorisation and Accounting, which is a term
used to describe the backend framework for applications such as network access or IP mobility
[34].
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One standardisation forum addressing the first phase is the PANA working
group (see section 3.7.5 and Chapter 6). The main goal of this working group
is to design a protocol that transports authentication data between a remote
entity seeking access to a network and another entity located in the access
network. More specifically, the objective of PANA is to devise a simple model,
independent of the access network type, for transferring user authentication
information to the access network and, optionally, to the AAA infrastructure.
The protocol used by PANA is EAP (see section 3.4), which was originally
designed for use with the Point-to-Point Protocol [168] (see section 3.3.2).
EAP does not specify any authentication method, but is simply a transport
mechanism, allowing concrete authentication methods for EAP, such as legacy
authentication protocols, public key based authentication procedures, and even
methods from the mobile telecommunications area, to be defined separately.
We discuss these specific authentication schemes in more detail in the following
sections.
Although this thesis focuses on the first phase of the Internet authentication
process, it is also important to consider the second phase, and in particular how
it may be combined with the first phase. Therefore we also describe (in section
3.9) certain specific AAA backend protocols, i.e. RADIUS [161], Diameter [34],
and Diameter EAP Application [59].
3.2.1 A Higher Layer for Internet Authentication
One simply way to carry out the first phase of the internet remote access au-
thentication process, i.e. the authentication exchange between the remote entity
and the network, is as follows. The remote entity establishes a connection with
an entity in the access network, e.g. a user with a PC connects to the telephone
network using a modem, and employs PPP authentication [168] to set up a dial-
up connection to an Internet Service Provider (ISP). This direct connection may
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exist for as long as is necessary, and functions somewhat like a leased line which
is only active on demand. It may also become a permanent connection when
Direct Subscriber Line (DSL3) or other broadband technology is used. Another
example would be the use of IEEE 802.1X [84], which provides port-based net-
work access control with peer authentication in point-to-point LAN or WLAN
segments. IEEE 802.1X can be used to authenticate a remote entity to an IEEE
802.11 network.
Using today’s technology, as in the examples above, authentication is gener-
ally performed at the time of link establishment. Moreover, authentication for
Internet remote access is usually tied to the access technology itself. As a re-
sult, specific authentication schemes are implemented that depend on the type
of network being accessed. The examples above show this access technology
dependence in the case of the use of IEEE 802.1X by Wireless Internet Service
Providers (WISP) for authenticating an entity to an IEEE 802.11 network, and
PPP authentication in the case of a dial-up connection to an ISP.
However, according to Ohba et al. [144], authentication for Internet remote
access may be performed at a higher layer, either at the network (IP) or the
application layer. More evidence on why higher layer authentication is needed
when link layer authentication is available can be found, for example, in the
SHAMAN Final Technical Report4. This has the advantage of decoupling au-
thentication from the access technology. The supposition here is that link layer
connectivity is provided by the Internet access network operator. Thus common
compound authentication protocols, e.g. the tunnelled authentication solutions
located at the network (IP) layer or above, mentioned in the next section and
currently being designed by the IETF, might be good candidates to solve this
problem.
3http://www.dslforum.org/
4http://www.ist-shaman.org/
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3.2.2 Tunnelled Authentication Mechanisms
A number of tunnelled authentication mechanisms have been proposed by the
IETF for use when connecting remote entities for Internet remote access, includ-
ing XAUTH [131], PIC [16], PANATLS [143], EAPTTLS [70] and PEAP [149].
Each of these protocols supports tunnelling of legacy one-way authentication
methods in order to provide a number of benefits, including access technol-
ogy independence, well understood key derivation, replay and dictionary attack
protection, and privacy support.
Nevertheless, it is important to consider a larger spectrum of solutions to
the problem of managing legacy authentication methods. This is supported by
the fact that tunnelled protocols such as PANATLS (see section 3.7.6), although
aiming to address problems such as access technology dependence, can be con-
sidered as part of a transition from legacy one-way authentication methods to
certificate-based authentication [158].
It is important to take into account the vulnerabilities arising from the use
of tunnelled authentication mechanisms in certain circumstances, as well as
possible solutions to these problems, as described in the next section.
3.2.3 Vulnerabilities in Tunnelled Protocols
It has been discovered that the use of tunnelled protocols in the first phase,
together with legacy client authentication protocols in the second phase, cre-
ates a vulnerability to an active Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack, which allows
the attacker to impersonate the remote entity (see [21, 158]). The attack be-
comes possible if the legacy client authentication protocol is used in multiple
environments (e.g. with and without tunnel-protection).
As stated by Asokan, Niemi and Nyberg [21], the MitM attack can occur
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when using tunnelled authentication protocols constructed as combinations of
two protocols: an inner protocol, and an outer protocol. The inner protocol,
which provides authentication of the client to the network, consists of the legacy
client authentication method. The outer protocol, which provides authentica-
tion of the network to the client, is used to protect the exchange of the inner
protocol messages. The outer protocol is solely responsible for the generation
of session key material.
Therefore, the session key material is based only on a unilateral authentica-
tion, in which the network server is authenticated to the client. The combination
of the facts that firstly, the client authentication protocol can be used in mul-
tiple environments, secondly, the session keys are derived solely on the basis
of the network authentication protocol, and thirdly, the client authentication
protocol is not aware of the protection protocol, opens up the opportunity for a
man-in-the-middle to impersonate the legitimate client. The active MitM attack
proceeds as follows:
1. The MitM waits for a legitimate device to enter an untunnelled legacy
remote authentication protocol and captures the initial message sent by
the legitimate client.
2. The MitM initiates a tunnelled authentication protocol with an authenti-
cation agent.
3. After the tunnel is set up between the MitM and the authentication agent,
the MitM starts forwarding the legitimate client’s authentication protocol
messages through the tunnel.
4. The MitM unwraps the legacy authentication protocol messages received
through the tunnel from the authentication agent and forwards them to
the legitimate client.
5. After the remote authentication has ended successfully, the MitM derives
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the session keys from the same keys it is using for the tunnel.
Asokan, Niemi and Nyberg [21] have shown that the MitM problem can be
addressed by either restricting the use of the legacy authentication protocol to a
specific environment only, or by implementing a cryptographic binding between
the protocols used in the first and second phases. The latter is deemed to be
the recommended solution, as it allows more flexible use of existing strong EAP
methods (section 3.4).
Tunnelled authentication protocols may also be vulnerable to a particular
type of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack, known as a ‘blind resource consumption
DoS attack’ [65]. Such an attack would typically be launched during the initial
handshake phase of the authentication process, by attackers masquerading as
remote clients. The attackers would then bombard the access network with
messages in order to swamp it, causing it to exhaust all available resources, and
preventing network access by legitimate clients.
One means of mitigating this type of DoS attack, or at least making it more
difficult to conduct effectively, requires the access network to generate a random
value, referred to as a cookie, as described in [65]. During the initial handshake
phase, the access network sends a request message carrying the cookie, and
then checks whether the client answer message contains the expected cookie
value. If the cookie is valid, the access network enters the authentication and
authorisation phase. Otherwise, it discards the received message.
3.3 Legacy One-Way Authentication Protocols
Currently a number of legacy one-way (user) authentication methods are in use,
including PAP [126] & CHAP [169], EAP-MD5 [27], One-Time-Password (OTP)
[28, 75], and Generic Token Card (GTC) [28]. They all provide unilateral (user
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to access network) authentication, and none of them derive keys that could be
used in constructing compound MACs and/or compound keys, or provide keying
material for authentication and/or encryption of a subsequent data stream.
These legacy authentication methods can be used in at least two of the following
three modes:
• plain mode;
• EAP encapsulated; or
• EAP encapsulated and tunnelled within a secure channel set up as a result
of the initial authentication protocol.
Some legacy authentication methods encapsulated as EAP types, such as
OTP, should not be used without a specific form of tunnelling. OTPs are
typically created for a specific application, which can be contacted only through
a unique form of protected tunnel. However, the situation is quite different for
more sophisticated authentication methods, which are used with and without
tunnels. This may open the system up to the vulnerability described in [21],
which allows a MitM (see section 3.2.3) to impersonate the remote entity.
In the following sections we summarise some of the existing one-way legacy
authentication protocols that do not involve the generation of keys.
3.3.1 PPP PAP & CHAP
The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) [168] provides a standard method of en-
capsulating network layer protocol information over point-to-point links. PPP
also defines an extensible link control protocol, which allows negotiation of an
authentication protocol for authenticating its remote entity (called the peer5),
5The end of the point-to-point link which is being authenticated by the authenticator.
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before allowing network layer protocols to communicate over the link with an
entity in the access network (called the authenticator6).
The Password Authentication Protocol (PAP) [126] provides a simple method
for the remote entity or peer to establish its identity to the authenticator in
the access network using a two-way handshake. This is done only upon initial
link establishment. After the link establishment phase is complete, an iden-
tifier/password pair is repeatedly sent by the peer to the authenticator until
authentication is acknowledged or the connection is terminated. The peer is in
control of the frequency and timing of the attempts. PAP is obviously not a
strong authentication method. Passwords are sent in clear over the circuit, and
there is no protection from playback or repeated trial and error attacks7.
The PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP) [169] is a
stronger legacy authentication method using PPP, which uses a random chal-
lenge, with a cryptographically hashed response, which depends on the challenge
and a secret key. CHAP is used to periodically verify the identity of the peer
using a three-way handshake (see Figure 3.3). This is done upon initial link
establishment, and may be repeated at any time after the link has been estab-
lished. After the link establishment phase is complete (0), the authenticator
sends a ‘challenge’ message to the peer (1). The peer responds with a value
calculated using a one-way hash function (see section 2.1.3.2). The authentica-
tor checks the response against its own calculation of the expected hash value
(2). If the values match, the authentication is acknowledged (3a); otherwise the
connection should be terminated (3b). At random intervals, the authenticator
sends a new challenge to the peer (4), and repeats steps 1 to 3.
6The end of the link that requires authentication to be performed.
7The PAP legacy authentication method is most appropriate for use where a plaintext
password must be available to simulate a login at a remote host. In such use, this method
provides a similar level of security to the usual user login at the remote host.
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0.  Link Establishment  phase (PPP)
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1.  Challenge 
2.  Response -
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3a.  Success packet
Y
Connection
terminated
Authent icator
(4. At random intervals, Repeat 1-3, with a new challenge)  
Authentication
acknowledged
(unique, unpredictable value)
(one  way hash value of
Figure 3.3: CHAP typical steps
Main Advantage of CHAP: CHAP provides protection against playback
attacks by the peer through the use of an incrementally changing identifier and
a variable challenge value. This method depends upon a ‘secret’ known only to
the authenticator and that peer. The secret is not sent over the link.
Main Disadvantages of CHAP: CHAP requires that the secret be available
to the authenticator in plaintext form. As a result, irreversibly encrypted pass-
word databases, as commonly used, e.g. in Unix, and which protect passwords
against snooping by systems administrators, cannot be used. Hence CHAP is
not ideally suited for large installations, since every possible secret is maintained
at both ends of the link. CHAP is also incapable of protecting against real time
active wiretapping attacks.
3.3.2 PPP EAP-MD5
RFC 2284 [27] defines the PPP Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP),
which is a general protocol for PPP authentication [168] which supports multi-
ple authentication mechanisms. EAP does not select a specific authentication
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mechanism at the Link Control Phase (LCP), but rather postpones this until
the Authentication Phase. This allows the authenticator to request more in-
formation before determining the specific authentication mechanism. This also
permits the use of a ‘backend’ server which actually implements the various
mechanisms, while the PPP authenticator merely passes through the authenti-
cation exchange.
The PPP EAP authentication exchange proceeds as follows:
• After the Link Establishment Phase is complete, the authenticator sends
one or more Requests to authenticate the peer. The Request has a type
field to indicate what is being requested. Examples of Request types in-
clude Identity, MD5-challenge, One-Time Passwords, Generic Token Card,
etc. All EAP implementations must support the MD5-Challenge mecha-
nism, which corresponds closely to the CHAP authentication protocol (see
section 3.3.1). Typically, the authenticator will send an initial Identity Re-
quest followed by one or more Requests for authentication information8.
• The peer sends a Response packet in reply to each Request. As with the
Request packet, the Response packet contains a type field which corre-
sponds to the type field of the Request.
• The authenticator ends the authentication phase with a Success or Failure
packet.
An authenticator authenticates the peer using a sequence of methods. A
common example of this is an Identity request followed by an EAP authenti-
cation method, such as the legacy MD5-Challenge, which is analogous to the
PPP CHAP protocol described in section 3.3.1, with MD5 (see section 2.1.3.2)
as the specified algorithm. The basic steps, listed in Figure 3.4, are as follows.
8However, an initial Identity Request is not required, and may be bypassed in cases where
the identity is presumed (leased lines, dedicated dial-ups, etc.).
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The link between the peer and the authenticator is established (0). The
initial method is started. The authenticator sends a packet to query the identity
of the peer (1). The peer obtains the user identity and answers the authenticator
(2). If the initial method completes unsuccessfully (3a), then the authenticator
sends a Failure packet. If it completes successfully (3b), then the authenticator
sends a Request packet for an authentication method. If the authentication
type is acceptable (4b), the peer then sends a Response packet containing a
type field matching the Request. If it is unacceptable (4a), then the peer sends
a Response packet containing a ‘Not Acknowledged’ (NAK) type field plus the
desired authentication method, and the authenticator may restart from step 3,
changing to the peer’s desired method.
The Notification Type is optionally used to convey a displayable message of
an imperative nature to the peer (5). The peer sends a Response packet in reply
to the Notification message (6). The sequence of authentication methods pro-
ceeds until either an authentication method fails (7a) or the final authentication
method completes successfully (7b).
0. L ink established ( PPP)
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1. R equest / I dent it y
2. R esponse/ I dent it y
Completes OK?
3b. R equest / MD5- Challenge
Y
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Figure 3.4: PPP EAP-MD5 typical steps
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Main Advantages of PPP EAP: The PPP EAP protocol can support
multiple authentication mechanisms without having to pre-negotiate a particu-
lar mechanism during the LCP Phase. When acting as an authenticator, certain
devices (e.g. a NAS) do not necessarily have to understand each request type
and may be able to simply act as a pass through agent for a ‘backend’ server on
a host. The device only needs to look for the success/failure code to terminate
the authentication phase.
Main Disadvantages of PPP EAP: PPP EAP requires the addition of a
new authentication type to the LCP, and thus PPP implementations will need
to be modified to use it. It also departs from the previous PPP authentication
model of negotiating a specific authentication mechanism during LCP.
3.3.3 One-Time Password (OTP)
The One-Time Password (OTP) authentication system [28, 75, 133] provides
authentication for system access (login), network access, and other applications
requiring authentication. It is secure against passive attacks based on replaying
captured reusable passwords. Such an attack can be performed by eavesdrop-
ping on network connections to obtain authentication information, such as the
login identifiers (IDs) and passwords of legitimate users. Once this information
is captured, it can be used at a later time to try to gain access to the system.
OTP systems are designed to counter this type of attack, called a ‘replay attack’.
The security of the OTP system is based on the non-invertibility of a secure
hash function (see section 2.1.3.2). Such a function must be tractable to compute
in the forward direction, but computationally infeasible to invert. The OTP
authentication system uses a secret pass-phrase to generate a sequence of one-
time (single use) passwords. With this system, the user’s secret pass-phrase
never needs to cross the network at any time, such as during authentication or
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during pass-phrase changes. Thus, it is not vulnerable to replay attacks.
There are two entities in the OTP operation. The generator, which may
be located at the remote entity requesting network access, must produce the
appropriate one-time password from the user’s secret pass-phrase and from in-
formation provided in the challenge from the server. The server, which may be
located at the access network, must send a challenge that includes the appropri-
ate generation parameters to the generator, must verify the one-time password
received back from the generator, must store the last valid one-time password
it received, and must store the corresponding one-time password sequence num-
ber. The server must also facilitate the changing of the user’s secret pass-phrase
in a secure manner.
In order to produce a one-time password, the generator passes the user’s
secret pass-phrase, along with a seed received from the server as part of the
challenge, through multiple iterations of a secure hash function to produce a one-
time password. After each successful authentication, the number of secure hash
function iterations is reduced by one. Thus, a unique sequence of passwords is
generated. The server verifies the one-time password received from the generator
by computing the secure hash function once and comparing the result with the
previously accepted one-time password9.
Main Advantage of OTP: The OTP method protects the authentication
system against passive eavesdropping and replay attacks. Added security is
provided by the property that no secret information need be stored on any
system, including the access network server being protected.
Main Disadvantages of OTP: The OTP system does not prevent a net-
work eavesdropper from gaining access to private information. It also does not
9The server system has a database containing, for each user, the one-time password from
the last successful authentication or the first OTP of a newly initialised sequence [75].
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provide protection against either ‘social engineering’ or active attacks, such as
Internet (TCP) session hijacking [75]. The use of IPsec (see section 3.6.5) is
recommended to protect against TCP [157] session hijacking.
3.3.4 Generic Token Card (GTC)
Generic Token Card (GTC) [27, 28] is an EAP authentication method which
was specifically defined for use with hardware authentication tokens that can
generate dynamic user credentials. The request message contains a displayable
message, which is shown in some way to the token holder. The token holder
then enters the displayed information into the authentication token, which pro-
vides a response of some kind. This token response is then entered into the peer
device, which uses it to construct a response message sent back to the authen-
ticator. The EAP GTC method is intended for use with authentication tokens
supporting challenge/response authentication, and must not be used to provide
support for cleartext passwords in the absence of a protected tunnel with server
authentication.
Main Advantage of GTC: The OTP and Generic Token Card methods
provide protection against dictionary attacks10. Since the purpose of the OTP
and Generic Token Card methods is to authenticate ‘something the user has’,
neither method rests solely on a password, and so neither method is vulnerable
to a dictionary attack, although passwords or PINs may be used to protect
access to an authentication token.
Main Disadvantages of GTC: Both the OTP and Generic Token Card EAP
methods provide one-way authentication, but do not support key generation
10A dictionary attack refers to the general technique of trying to guess a secret
by running through a list of likely possibilities, often a list of words from a dictio-
nary. It contrasts to a brute-force attack, in which all possibilities are tried (see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dictionary attack).
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[28]. As a result, the OTP and Generic Token Card methods, when used by
themselves, are only appropriate for use on networks where physical security can
be assumed. These methods should not be used on wireless networks, or over the
Internet, unless the EAP conversation is protected. This can be accomplished
using technologies such as TLS (see section 3.6.3) or IPsec (see section 3.6.5).
3.3.5 Addressing Legacy One-Way Authentication
There are a number of legacy one-way authentication methods, and we have
reviewed some of them immediately above. However, because of the rapid
proliferation of Internet remote access technologies, wireless devices and next
generation service offerings, more secure and, most importantly, more flexible
authentication mechanisms (i.e. mechanisms that are independent of underlying
access technologies) are necessary. Since existing legacy one-way authentication
solutions, e.g. CHAP carried by PPP authentication, possess a number of secu-
rity deficiencies and are dependent on the access technologies, without such a
new approach network providers will need either new transport mechanisms or
extensions to existing legacy authentication mechanisms whenever a new access
technology is introduced.
One approach to solving this problem would be to modify legacy authenti-
cation methods so as to enable key derivation, or to incorporate key material
derived during the initial tunnel authentication. Nonetheless, since the moti-
vation for continued use of legacy authentication technologies is to minimise
the deployment of new technology, there does not seem any compelling logic to
follow such an approach. This is because, in situations where deployment of a
modified legacy method would be feasible, it would also normally be feasible to
implement a wide range of alternatives. This could include the possible deploy-
ment of a new method supporting mutual authentication and key derivation,
e.g. the re-use of solutions implemented in mobile systems in the Internet envi-
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ronment [145], or the deployment of alternative technologies such as public key
based authentication.
In the remainder of this chapter we summarise further existing authentica-
tion protocols relevant to this thesis, including the current EAP framework (now
adapted for wired IEEE 802 networks, wireless LAN, and the Internet), mo-
bile telecommunications methods, tunnelled authentication schemes, and public
key based procedures. In Chapter 4 we describe both the problem space and
a number of scenarios where existing authentication mechanisms are not suffi-
cient. Finally, we argue that new, more secure and more flexible, authentication
protocols are required.
3.4 EAP Architecture
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is an authentication frame-
work which supports multiple encapsulated authentication schemes, called EAP
methods. An EAP method is thus an entity authentication algorithm carried by
the EAP protocol, which provides one-way or mutual authentication between
the communicating parties, and may also derive keying material. A 2007 In-
ternet Draft [18] provides a framework for the generation, transport and use
of keying material generated by EAP methods; it also specifies the EAP key
hierarchy. A complete specification of the EAP architecture is given in RFC
3748 [13].
EAP typically runs directly over data link layer protocols, such as the PPP
or IEEE 802, without requiring IP. EAP was designed for use in network access
authentication, where IP layer connectivity may not be available. EAP may
be used on dedicated links and switched circuits, and wired as well as wireless
links.
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In the following sections the current EAP architecture is summarised.
3.4.1 EAP Development
Whilst EAP was originally developed for use with PPP (section 3.3.2), it is
now in use with a variety of lower layer protocols. In line with RFC 3748
[13], EAP was adapted for use on IEEE 802 wired media [84], IEEE wireless
LANs [85, 171], and over the Internet [13]. It is important to observe that
some legacy EAP protocols (e.g. PPP EAP-MD5) are susceptible to dictionary
and brute-force attacks; do not provide confidentiality; do not support server
authentication as required to prevent spoofing by rogue servers (gateways), and
do not support the generation of keys in a way suitable for 802.11–2007 [85].
However, the current EAP framework allows the use of EAP methods which
address these weaknesses.
3.4.2 EAP Basic Features
One of the main features of the EAP architecture is its flexibility [13]. EAP
allows the protocol participants to select a specific authentication mechanism,
typically after the authenticator requests more information in order to determine
the authentication method to be used. Rather than requiring the authenticator
to be updated to support each new authentication method, EAP permits the
use of a backend authentication server, which implements some or all of the
possible authentication methods, with the authenticator acting as a forwarding
agent for some or all methods and peers.
EAP authentication is initiated by the server (authenticator), whereas many
authentication protocols are initiated by the client (peer). As a result, it may be
necessary for an authentication algorithm to add one or two additional messages
(at most one round trip) in order to run over EAP.
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EAP is a ‘lock step’ protocol, so that, other than the initial request, a new
request cannot be sent prior to receiving a valid response11. As a result, EAP
cannot efficiently transport bulk data.
3.4.3 EAP Exchange
The EAP authentication exchange proceeds as follows [13]:
• The authenticator sends a Request to authenticate the peer. The Request
has a Type field to indicate what is being requested. Examples of Request
Types include Identity, MD5-challenge, etc. Typically, the authenticator
will send an initial Identity Request.
• The peer sends a Response packet in reply to a valid Request. The Re-
sponse packet contains a Type field, which corresponds to the Type field
of the Request.
• The authenticator sends an additional Request packet, and the peer replies
with a Response. The sequence of Requests and Responses continues as
long as needed.
• The conversation continues until either the authenticator cannot authen-
ticate the peer (if unacceptable Responses have been received to one or
more Requests), in which case the authenticator implementation transmits
an EAP Failure, or the authenticator determines that successful authen-
tication has occurred, in which case the authenticator transmits an EAP
Success.
11The authenticator is responsible for retransmitting requests. After a suitable number of
retransmissions, the authenticator ends the EAP conversation.
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3.4.4 EAP Layers
EAP implementations consist of the following layers [13]:
• Lower layer. The lower layer is responsible for transmitting and receiving
EAP frames between the peer and authenticator. EAP has been run over
a variety of lower layers, including PPP [168], wired IEEE 802 LANs [84],
IEEE 802.11 wireless LANs [85], and TCP [157].
• EAP layer. The EAP layer receives and transmits EAP packets via
the lower layer, implements duplicate detection and retransmission, and
delivers and receives EAP messages to and from the EAP peer and au-
thenticator layers.
• EAP peer and authenticator layers. The EAP layer demultiplexes
incoming EAP packets to the EAP peer and authenticator layers. Typi-
cally, an EAP implementation on a given host will support either peer or
authenticator functionality, but it is possible for a host to act as both an
EAP peer and an authenticator.
• EAP method layers. EAP methods implement the authentication al-
gorithms and receive and transmit EAP messages via the EAP peer and
authenticator layers. Since fragmentation support is not provided by EAP
itself, this is the responsibility of EAP methods.
3.4.5 EAP Advantages and Disadvantages
The advantages and disadvantages of EAP can be summarised as follows:
Advantages of EAP: EAP can support multiple authentication mechanisms
without having to pre-negotiate a particular such mechanism. Network Access
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Server (NAS) devices (e.g., a switch or access point) do not have to under-
stand every authentication method, and may act as a forwarding agent for a
backend authentication server. Separation of the authenticator from the back-
end authentication server simplifies credential management and policy decision
making.
Disadvantages of EAP: When used with PPP as the lower layer protocol,
EAP requires the addition of a new authentication Type to the PPP LCP, and
thus PPP implementations need to be modified to carry EAP. EAP also strays
from the previous PPP authentication model in which a specific authentication
mechanism is negotiated during LCP. Similarly, switch or access point imple-
mentations need to support IEEE 802.1X [84] in order to use EAP. Where the
authenticator is separate from the backend authentication server, this compli-
cates the security analysis and key distribution.
3.5 Mobile Authentication Methods
In this section a number of existing mobile telecommunications methods relevant
to this thesis are reviewed, including GSM (section 3.5.1), GPRS (section 3.5.2),
3G/UMTS/AKA (section 3.5.3), 3G/GAA (section 3.5.4), and CDMA2000 (sec-
tion 3.5.5). This will enable us to assess the suitability of the security solutions
implemented in this domain for possible application in network (Internet) re-
mote access.
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3.5.1 Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM)
In this section an outline of the GSM12 system security features is given, with
a focus on the air interface protocol. An overview of the GSM system is pre-
sented, including a description of how the GSM security scheme operates (sec-
tion 3.5.1.1), its main objectives (section 3.5.1.2) and the services that it pro-
vides (section 3.5.1.3).
3.5.1.1 GSM System Overview
Figure 3.5 shows the GSM system components, which are described below. Fur-
ther details of the GSM system can be found, for example, in [179].
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Figure 3.5: GSM system overview
• Mobile Station (MS): this is made up of a Mobile Equipment (ME
or ‘mobile telephone’) with its GSM Subscriber Identity Module (SIM).
Through the SIM, each MS has a contractual relationship with a network,
12GSM was formerly an acronym for Groupe Speciale Mobile (founded in 1982). It is
now an acronym for Global System for Mobile communications (http://www.gsmworld.com).
The GSM protocols have been standardised by the European Telecommunications Standards
Institute (ETSI, http://www.etsi.org/).
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called the home network, but may be allowed to roam in other visited
networks when outside the home network coverage area.
• International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) and Authen-
tication Key (Ki): at the time the customer starts a subscription, the
home network assigns the customer a unique and permanent identifier, the
IMSI, together with a unique 128-bit secret key (Ki). Each customer’s Ki
is also stored in an Authentication Centre (AuC) in the home network.
The key Ki plays two roles in GSM: authentication, in which the MS
proves it possesses Ki, and encryption, which is performed with the use
of a cipher key derived from Ki.
• GSM Subscriber Identity Module (SIM): this is a smart card that
must be inserted into the ME for service access. The IMSI and the authen-
tication key Ki of the MS are ‘securely stored’ in the SIM. In practice, the
SIM is issued to the customer at the time the subscription is first taken
out, and the customer never has access to the key Ki.
• Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) or Visited Network (VN):
this is a network that is currently providing service to an MS, and the
MS is said to be ‘visiting’ this network. An MS is registered with the
PLMN which it is currently visiting. A PLMN contains, among others
components, a collection of Base Stations (BSs) and a Visited Location
Register (VLR).
• Base Station (BS): this is a Base Transceiver Station belonging to a
PLMN serving the MS. Base stations form a patchwork of radio cells over
a given geographic coverage area. Base Stations are connected to base
station controllers (BSCs).
• Base Station Controller (BSC): this is a node controlling a number of
BSs, coordinating handovers and performing BS co-ordination not related
to switching. The BSC to BS link is, in many cases, a point to point mi-
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crowave link. BSCs are also connected to mobile switching centres (MSCs)
via fixed or microware links. MSCs are connected to public networks (e.g.
PSTN, PDNS, ISDN and the Internet).
• Visited Location Register (VLR): this is used to record information
about all MSs ‘visiting’ a specific PLMN.
• Home PLMN (HPLMN) or Home Network (HN): each MS has a
home PLMN with which shares an IMSI and a secret keyKi. The HPLMN
and the visited PLMN have a bilateral agreement, under which the visited
PLMN trusts the HPLMN to pay for the services that the visited PLMN
provides to the MS. Each HPLMN maintains a Home Location Register
(HLR) and operates an AuC to support its MSs.
• Home Location Register (HLR): this is used to record the most recent
known location of all MSs belonging to a specific HPLMN.
• Authentication Centre (AuC): this is used by a HPLMN to generate
random challenges (RAND) and to store secret key information (Ki) re-
lating to each of its MSs. The AuC can be integrated with other network
functions, e.g. with the HLR.
• Air Interface: this is a synonym for the radio path between the BS and
the MS. The MS ‘visits’ a PLMN by communicating with the serving BS
across an air interface and receiving an entry in the VLR maintained by
that PLMN.
3.5.1.2 GSM Security Objectives
The main objectives of the security provisions built into the GSM system are
“to make the system as secure as the public switched telephone network” (i.e.
no more vulnerable to eavesdropping than fixed phones) [30], and to prevent
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phone cloning13. Use of an air interface as the transmission medium gives rise
to a number of potential threats because of the potential for eavesdropping. As
stated in [145], “it was soon apparent in the threat analysis that the weakest
part of the system was the radio path, as this can be easily intercepted”. In fact,
there was no attempt to provide security on the fixed network part of GSM. It
should be noted that the GSM security system was designed with the following
three constraints in mind [179]:
• To ensure that the level of confidentiality provided is not so high that it
could cause export problems for the GSM system;
• GSM was not required to be resistant to ‘active attacks’ in which the
attacker interferes with the operation of the system, perhaps masquerading
as a system entity; and
• The trust between operators necessary for the operation of the security
system should be minimised.
3.5.1.3 GSM Security Services
In this section the three GSM air interface security services relevant here are
reviewed, i.e. subscriber identity confidentiality, subscriber identity authentica-
tion and data confidentiality. Figure 3.6 illustrates the operation of these GSM
security services. Further details of GSM security can be found, for example, in
[135, 145, 179].
Subscriber identity confidentiality is achieved through the use of temporary
identities. Apart from at initial registration, a user is not identified employ-
ing his permanent identity, i.e. his International Mobile Subscriber Identity
(IMSI), but instead uses a temporary identity known as the Temporary Mobile
13Phone cloning occurs when someone with a scanner can eavesdrop on the communication
between the mobile phone and the BS, and then make calls on that mobile phone’s account
[166, p113].
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Figure 3.6: Authentication and confidentiality for GSM
Subscriber Identity (TMSI). The TMSI is only valid in a given location area,
and thus it is always used together with the respective Location Area Identi-
fier (LAI). The relationship between the TMSI and the IMSI is maintained
by the VLR. To avoid user traceability, which may lead to the compromise of
subscriber identity confidentiality, TMSIs are changed regularly by the visited
network (VN) in an ‘unlinkable’ way. This unlinkability is supported by the fact
that they are transmitted to the MS via an encrypted radio channel.
Subscriber identity authentication is used to authenticate the MS to the VN.
This service is based on use of the secret key Ki, shared between the user’s
SIM and the AuC of the subscriber’s HN. For each subscriber, and whenever
necessary, the subscriber’s HN selects one or more random challenge values
RAND . Each RAND is input to a home network-specific MAC algorithm A3,
along with the key Ki for that subscriber, and the output is known as XRES.
A set of pre-calculated (RAND, XRES ) pairs are then supplied to the VN.
Whenever the VN wishes to authenticate the MS, it sends it one of the RAND
values. The MS inputs the RAND along with Ki to algorithm A3, and sends
back the output, known as SRES. The VN then compares the received SRES
with the stored XRES, and if they agree the MS is deemed authentic.
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As stated in [82], a variety of “subscriber related data is transferred over
GSM/GPRS networks and needs to be protected”. This data includes:
• Signalling information elements related to the user, such as the Inter-
national Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI), the IMSI, and the calling
subscriber directory number;
• User information, such as short messages, transferred in a connectionless
packet mode over a signalling channel, and voice and non-voice communi-
cations on traffic channels over the air interface.
In order to provide data confidentiality between the MS and the VN, a 64-bit
encryption key Kc is also produced at the same time as XRES/SRES is gener-
ated14, again as a function of RAND and Ki, using a key generation algorithm
A8. The key Kc is passed from the AuC to the VN with the RAND and XRES
values, as part of what is known as an ‘authentication triplet’ (RAND, XRES,
Kc), and used as input to a stream cipher algorithm A5 to encrypt user and
signalling data sent between the MS and the VN.
3.5.2 General Packet Radio Service (GPRS)
The General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) has been standardised by ETSI. In
this section an overview of the security features of GPRS is provided. These
services are similar to those provided by GSM, as described in section 3.5.1.
We focus on the same three security features that we considered in section
3.5.1, i.e. subscriber identity confidentiality (section 3.5.2.1), subscriber identity
authentication (section 3.5.2.2), and data confidentiality (section 3.5.2.3).
14In the network, the values of Kc are calculated in the AuC/HLR simultaneously with
the values for XRES. In the mobile, the current Kc is stored in the mobile station until it is
updated as part of the next authentication procedure.
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3.5.2.1 Subscriber Identity Confidentiality
As stated in [82], “the purpose of this function is to avoid an intruder... [iden-
tifying] a subscriber on the radio path”. As mentioned in section 3.5.1.3, in
GSM this is achieved by protecting the subscriber’s IMSI using a temporary
identity called a TMSI. A new TMSI is allocated as part of every location
update. GPRS networks use a similar method based on a Temporary Logical
Link Identity (TLLI) and a Routing Area Identity (RAI). Like the TMSI, the
TLLI only has a meaning in a given Routing Area (RA), and so the TLLI is
accompanied by the RAI to avoid ambiguity. The Serving GPRS Support Node
(SGSN) maintains the relationship between TLLIs and IMSIs, in a similar way
to the VLR in GSM.
3.5.2.2 Subscriber Identity Authentication
According to [82], “the network can trigger this function for several reasons,
including a subscriber applying for a change of a subscriber related information
element in the VLR or HLR, a subscriber accessing a service (e.g. setting up a
mobile originated or terminated call), or a cipher key mismatch”.
The GPRS authentication procedure is handled in the same way as in GSM
(see section 3.5.1.3), the main difference being that the procedures are executed
in the SGSN, which requests the (XRES, RAND) pairs from the HLR/AuC.
3.5.2.3 Data Confidentiality
GPRS data confidentiality is provided using an encryption method and a key
establishment process directly analogous to those used by GSM. The main dif-
ference is that, in GPRS, encryption is applied at the logical link control layer
and reaches further into the core network. Also, different encryption algorithms
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are used.
3.5.3 Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS)
The Universal Mobile Telecommunication System (UMTS) has been developed
by the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)15. Third generation (3G)
is the term used to describe the new generation of mobile services, currently
being rolled out worldwide, which provide better quality voice and high-speed
Internet and multimedia services.
In this section an overview of the 3GPP security architecture (section 3.5.3.1)
and UMTS network access security services (section 3.5.3.2) is given.
3.5.3.1 Third Generation (3GPP) Security
3G radio access link security employs a system developed from the GSM secu-
rity scheme. 3GPP, that developed the 3G/UMTS standards, has adopted the
security features from GSM that have proved to be robust, and tries to max-
imise architectural compatibility with GSM in order to ease inter-working and
handover. 3G security [8] also tries to correct the problems identified in GSM
by addressing security weaknesses and by adding new features. The 3G security
scheme provides the following security features:
• mutual authentication and key agreement between MS and network;
• encryption of user traffic and signalling data over the air interface; and
• integrity protection of signalling data sent over the air interface.
The GSM security features retained and enhanced in 3GPP are, according
to Walker and Wright [179]:
15http://www.3gpp.org/
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• use of a smart card as a subscriber identity module (in the form of a
UMTS SIM or USIM);
• authentication of the MS to the network;
• encryption of user traffic and signalling data sent over the air interface;
and
• user identity confidentiality over the air interface.
The new security features required for 3GPP include mandatory integrity
protection for critical signalling commands (e.g. for the start encryption com-
mand), which provides enhanced protection against false BS attacks (see [179])
by allowing the MS to check the authenticity of certain signalling messages.
This feature also extends the influence of MS authentication when encryption is
not applied, by allowing the VN to check the authenticity of certain signalling
messages.
3.5.3.2 UMTS Network Access Security: Authentication and Key
Agreement (AKA)
UMTS network access security provides users with secure access to UMTS ser-
vices, protecting in particular the UMTS radio access network (UTRAN). In
this section, the four UMTS network access security features relevant here are
summarised, i.e. entity authentication, signalling integrity, user traffic confiden-
tiality, and user identity confidentiality. Further details of UMTS security can
be found, for example, in [8, 26, 179].
Entity Authentication UMTS mutual entity authentication involves the
Mobile Station (MS), the visited network (VN), and the home network (HN);
the VN verifies the subscriber’s identity by means of a challenge-response mech-
anism, while the MS checks that the VN has been authorised by the HN. A
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128-bit secret key K is shared by the Universal Subscriber Identity Module
(USIM) and the HN AuC. An authentication vector is produced by the AuC
from K and a sequence number, and sent on demand to the VN. The authen-
tication vector contains a random number RAND, a network authentication
token AUTN, an expected result XRES, a temporary integrity key IK, and a
temporary cipher key CK.
Whenever the VN wishes to authenticate the MS, it sends it the next un-
used (RAND, AUTN ) pair. The MS verifies AUTN, using K and the copy of
the sequence number that it maintains. If this process is successful, the USIM
sends RES, computed as a function of K and RAND using the UMTS message
authentication function f2 [8], back to the VN. The USIM also inputs K and
RAND to the UMTS key generating functions f3 and f4 [8] to obtain, respec-
tively, CK and IK. The VN then compares the received RES with the stored
XRES, and if they agree the MS is deemed authentic; CK and IK can then be
used for connection security.
Signalling Integrity The UMTS mutual authentication and key agreement
process provides enhanced protection against false BS attacks by allowing the
MS to authenticate the VN. 3G authentication provides authentication of MS to
VN and VN to MS, establishes a cipher key (CK ) and an integrity key (IK ), and
gives assurance to the MS that the keys have not been used before. Signalling
data integrity and origin authentication is provided by computing an integrity
check using the 128-bit key IK, shared by the MS and the VN.
A new sequence number (SQN ) is generated in the AuC and used as input
to compute AUTN, and this latter is attached to the authentication vector
(or ‘quintet’) to address the threat of ‘quintet’ re-use. The USIM verifies the
freshness of a received AUTN by checking that the sequence number SQN used
to compute AUTN exceeds the most recently received such number. A MAC
is also attached to show that the ‘quintet’ really came from the HN and to
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integrity protect the attached AUTN.
User Traffic Confidentiality User traffic confidentiality is provided by en-
crypting traffic using the 128-bit key CK. The user traffic confidentiality feature
extends to the Radio Network Controller (RNC).
Encryption of user traffic and signalling data sent over the air interface is
performed using a block cipher called KASUMI (see section 2.1.3.2), which had
an open design process, and takes a longer cipher key length (128 bits) than the
GSM encryption algorithm. As stated above, the encryption terminates at the
RNC, a 3G entity similar to the GSM BSC. The BS-RNC links, that may use
microwave and thus be prone to interception, are encrypted. KASUMI is also
used for the integrity protection of commands (critical signalling) between MS
and RNC [179]. The 3G specifications introduce protection of network signalling
information (including the authenticator vectors or ‘quintets’) transmitted be-
tween and within networks; if these networks were successfully attacked, then
obtaining cleartext ‘quintets’ would enable an attacker to masquerade as valid
MS. Further, to prevent false messages being introduced into the network, it is
vital that the origin of such commands is authenticated.
User Identity Confidentiality Finally, UMTS provides user identity confi-
dentiality through the use of temporary identities. Apart from at initial regis-
tration, a user is not identified employing his permanent identity, i.e. his IMSI,
but instead uses a temporary identity known as the TMSI16. To avoid user
traceability, which may lead to the compromise of user identity confidentiality,
temporary identities are changed regularly in an ‘unlinkable’ way. In addition,
it is required that any signalling or user data that might reveal the user identity
is encrypted when sent across the UTRAN.
16It is TMSI in the circuit switched domain, and P-TMSI in the packet switched domain.
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3.5.4 Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA)
The Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA) [10] has also been developed
under the auspices of 3GPP (see section 3.5.3.1). In this section, an overview
of GAA is provided (section 3.5.4.1), and the operation of the GAA scheme is
described (section 3.5.4.2), including the mechanisms it uses to issue authenti-
cation credentials, using either shared secret (section 3.5.4.3) or digitally signed
certificates (section 3.5.4.4). The potential advantages of GAA are then dis-
cussed (section 3.5.4.5). A complete specification of the GAA system is given
in a 2007 3GPP Technical Report [10].
3.5.4.1 GAA Overview
GAA is a generic architecture for peer authentication, which can, a priori, serve
for any application, enabling cellular operators to extend the 3G authentication
framework to support other (non-cellular) services. In other words, as stated
by Laitinen et al. [124], “GAA is a general framework that allows the cellular
authentication infrastructure used in authorising subscribers’ access to the cel-
lular network to be used in authorising access to new services”. These services
can be provided either by cellular network operators, or by third parties that
have a business agreement with them.
According to Laitinen et al. [124], in GAA the mobile device and the service
provider are automatically furnished with fresh credentials — an identifier and
a shared key — after which they can authenticate each other. Credential provi-
sion, which requires a cellular authentication infrastructure, is performed over
IP. Moreover, the mobile device possessing those credentials can be dynami-
cally supplied with a subscriber certificate, and thus become part of a Public
Key Infrastructure (see section 2.1.3.3).
Figure 3.7 shows the GAA system components, which are described below.
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Further details of the GAA system can be found, for example, in [5, 6, 7, 10, 124].
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Figure 3.7: GAA system overview
• User Equipment (UE): this is made up of a client device e.g. a mobile
telephone with its subscriber’s smart card (e.g. a USIM). Through the
smart card, each UE has a contractual relationship with a network, called
the home network, but may be allowed to roam in other visited networks
when outside the home network coverage area. The GAA credentials are
used between the UE and a network application server. As stated in
section 4.2.4 of [7], the UE is required to support the HTTP Digest AKA
protocol [138]. In addition, as discussed in section 4.3.3 of [6], the UE may
have the capability to generate public and private key pairs (see section
2.1.3.3), protect the use of the private key (e.g. with a PIN), and store
this key in non-volatile memory.
• Home Subscriber System (HSS): each UE has an associated HSS,
in which all the subscriber’s security settings are stored. The HSS and
the visited network have a bilateral agreement, under which the visited
network trusts the HSS to pay for the services that the visited network
provides to the UE. The general rule is that the UE always interacts
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with its home network, and the resulting GAA credentials can be used
with any network application server that has a relationship with the HSS.
Each HSS operates an AuC to support its UEs.
• Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA): this is an application
independent mechanism based on 3GPP AKA (see sections 3.5.3.1 and
3.5.3.2), that is used to provide a UE and a network application server
with a common shared secret. This shared secret can be then used to
authenticate communications between the UE and the application server.
The mobile subscriber authentication procedure in GBA makes use of the
HTTP Digest AKA protocol [138]. A complete description of the GBA
mechanism is given in a 2007 3GPP Technical Specification (TS) [7].
• Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Portal: this network element issues
digitally signed public key certificates for UEs and operator CAs (see
section 2.1.3.3). In both cases, certification requests and responses are
protected by shared key material that has been previously established
between the UE and a GAA functional element called the bootstrapping
server function.
• Support for Subscriber Certificates (SSC): this mechanism dynam-
ically issues digitally signed certificates to mobile subscribers. Once a
mobile subscriber has a key pair and has obtained a certificate for it, she
can use them to produce digital signatures, as well as to authenticate her-
self to a network application server. In order to obtain a digital certificate,
a UE sends a certificate request to a PKI portal of its HSS. This PKI por-
tal, which plays the role of the application server, authenticates the UE’s
request. A complete description of the SSC mechanism is given in a 2007
3GPP TS [6].
• Access to network application functions using HTTP over TLS
(HTTPS): the HTTPS protocol [159] may be used in a variety of services
to secure the application layer session between the UE and an application
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server. When this occurs, a mechanism which makes use of a ‘reverse
proxy’, called an authentication proxy (AP — described in section 6.5
of [10]) may be employed. A complete description of the authentication
schemes that can be used with HTTPS is given in a 2006 3GPP TS [5].
• Network Element (NE): a number of GAA functionalities are imple-
mented in NEs, which may belong either to the visited network or to the
HSS. As described in section 4.2 of [7], the set of GAA functionalities
that are hosted in a NE includes, for instance, the bootstrapping server
function (BSF), the network application function (NAF), the subscriber
locator function (SLF), the Diameter proxy (Zn-Proxy), and the PKI por-
tal. These GAA functionalities are discussed below.
3.5.4.2 Operation of the GAA Scheme
In this section, a summary of the operation of the GAA scheme is provided. The
GAA system [10] involves three main building blocks: GBA [7], SSC [6], and
HTTPS access [5], which were briefly described in the previous section. GAA
supports two types of authentication for mobile applications. One is based on a
secret shared between the communicating entities, while the other is based on
digitally signed public key certificates (see section 2.1.3.3). Figure 3.8 shows the
two types of authentication mechanisms supported by GAA, which are described
immediately below.
3.5.4.3 GAA Authentication Mechanism Via Shared Secret
As previously stated, GBA [7] provides a mechanism based on 3GPP AKA (see
sections 3.5.3.1 and 3.5.3.2) to install a shared secret between a UE and an appli-
cation server. Figure 3.9 [7] illustrates the operation of this GBA bootstrapping
network model, including the entities involved and the interfaces between them.
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Figure 3.8: GAA authentication mechanisms
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Figure 3.9: GBA bootstrapping network model
The GBA mechanism re-uses the 3GPP AKA scheme, introducing a new
NE that implements the bootstrapping server function (BSF). The BSF has
an interface (Zh) with the HSS, with which it performs the credential fetch-
ing protocol. This protocol is based on a Diameter application protocol (see
section 3.9.2) given in a 2007 3GPP TS [2] and is used to fetch the required
authentication information (i.e. authentication ‘quintets’ and GBA user security
settings) from the home AuC in the HSS. The UE runs 3GPP AKA with the
HSS via the BSF. The UE has an interface (Ub) with the BSF, across which the
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bootstrapping protocol is executed, which is based on HTTP Digest AKA [138].
This protocol is used to support mutual authentication and key establishment.
A shared session key is then established in the BSF and UE, derived from the
(CK, IK ) key pair established by this bootstrapping protocol.
Another NE, namely the network application server, implements the network
application function (NAF). The NAF fetches the session key from the BSF,
together with subscriber profile information (e.g. user security settings), via
an interface (Zn) using the key distribution protocol. This is also based on a
Diameter application protocol (see section 3.9.2). In the case where the UE has
contacted a NAF that is operated in a visited network, this visited NAF uses
a Diameter proxy (Zn-Proxy, described in section 4.2.2 of [7]) in its network to
communicate, via an interface (Zn ′), with the subscriber’s home BSF.
The NAF and the UE will then share a secret key that can be used for
application security, in particular for mutual authentication at the start of an
application layer session. The use of GAA credentials between the UE and the
NAF occurs via an interface (Ua) using the application protocol, which is secured
using the keying material previously agreed via the interface (Ub) between the
UE and the BSF. A variety of application protocols can be supported. For
example, as stated in [124], 3GPP has provided GAA use profiles [1, 5], including
for the HTTP Digest [68] and pre-shared key TLS [60] protocols.
Finally, the optional interface (Dz ) between BSF and SLF is used to retrieve
the address of the HSS, which maintains the user subscription.
3.5.4.4 GAA Authentication Mechanism Based On Certificates
As described in the previous section, the SSC dynamically issues digitally signed
public key certificates to mobile subscribers. Figure 3.10 [6] illustrates the op-
eration of SSC, including the entities involved and the interfaces between them.
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Figure 3.10: SSC certificate issuing model
To obtain a certificate, a UE sends a certificate request to a PKI portal
of its HSS, which must authenticate that request. As stated before, this PKI
portal plays the role of the application server, which implements the NAF. The
UE must support an interface (Ua) with the PKI portal, using the certification
enrolment protocol. This interface is protected using the shared keys previously
established during the bootstrapping procedure.
The certificate enrolment process, i.e. the issuing of a certificate to a sub-
scriber and the corresponding communication session between a UE and a PKI
portal, requires authentication of the communicating entities. There are two
options for this authentication process: use of a pre-shared secret or use of
asymmetric cryptography and certificates. The latter is only used when a new
certificate is requested from the PKI portal, and another valid certificate is al-
ready loaded in the UE. The former method requires a shared secret to be
established between the PKI portal and the UE. If this shared secret is not
pre-configured, the GBA mechanism [7] can be used to obtain it, through two
interfaces (Ub, Zn) established, respectively, between the BSF and UE, and the
BSF and the PKI portal. The BSF supports this by providing not only the
authentication process, but the PKI portal specific user security settings.
Issuing a certificate to a mobile subscriber, which is described in [6], means
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that the UE is loaded with a certificate corresponding to its (public, private)
key pair. Once the certificate is in place, it can be used to authenticate the UE.
The key pair and the corresponding digitally signed certificate can also be used
for integrity protection or (less likely) confidentiality, but these are out of the
scope of GAA.
3.5.4.5 Potential advantages of GAA
According to Laitinen et al. [124], the GAA framework brings a number of
potential advantages for end users. For instance, it is easy to add new services
to the GAA architecture, since the creation of usernames and passwords during
sign up is not necessary. Also, if the GAA customer makes use of multiple
services, there is no need to maintain multiple passwords. It is also easy for the
end user to switch mobile devices, as the access rights follow the smart card
(e.g. a USIM) from which the GAA credentials are bootstrapped.
As stated in [124], the ability to authenticate mobile subscribers using the
GAA architecture also creates a huge pool of potential customers for service
providers, which do not need to supply their users with credentials. In addition,
the GAA scheme provides a potentially strong authentication method, signifi-
cantly improving on username/password methods. The GAA architecture also
provides a potentially competitive advantage over other service providers, as it
can offer, for example, integrated billing.
Finally, 3GPP GAA offers new business models for cellular operators, with
which they can exploit existing assets, i.e. their subscriber base and roaming
agreements.
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3.5.5 Code Division Multiple Access 2000 (CDMA2000)
The Code Division Multiple Access 2000 (CDMA2000) wireless communications
system is being developed by the Third Generation Partnership Project Two
(3GPP2)17. CDMA2000, also known as IMT-CDMA Multi-Carrier or IS-2000,
is the main path for CDMA operators to move from second generation (2G) to
second-and-a-half (2.5G) and third generation (3G) cellular networks. 3GPP2
has created a set of standards that define the new air interface and specify radio
access and core network changes that enhance network capacity, improve speed
and bandwidth to mobile terminals, and will eventually allow end-to-end IP
services.
CDMA2000 uses an identification and authentication system based on a com-
bination of Mobile Identification Number (MIN ) and Electronic Serial Number
(ESN ). It is intended that this scheme, when combined with CDMA2000 spread
spectrum techniques, should make it very difficult for unauthorised users to in-
tercept and decipher air interface traffic.
In this section, overviews of the evolution (section 3.5.5.1), security require-
ments (section 3.5.5.2), and security services (section 3.5.5.3) of this 3G mobile
communication system are given.
3.5.5.1 CDMA2000 Evolution
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU18), working with industry
bodies from around the world, defines and approves technical requirements and
standards as well as the use of spectrum for 3G systems under the International
Mobile Telecommunication-2000 (IMT-2000) program. IMT-2000 is thus the
global standard for 3G wireless communications, defined by a set of interdepen-
dent ITU recommendations, e.g. ITU-R M.1457 [106].
17http://www.3gpp2.org/
18http://www.itu.int/
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The ITU requires that IMT-2000 (3G) networks deliver improved system
capacity and spectrum efficiency over the 2G systems, and support data services
at minimum transmission rates of 144 kbps in mobile (outdoor) and 2 Mbps
in fixed (indoor) environments. Based on these requirements, in 1999 ITU
approved five radio interfaces for IMT-2000 standards as a part of the ITU-
R M.1457 recommendation [106]. CDMA2000 is one of the five standardised
interfaces.
The CDMA2000 radio transmission technologies proposal meets the IMT-
2000 requirements, while maintaining backward compatibility to what the in-
dustry terms ‘cdmaOne’, which is a complete family of standards. CDMA2000
is thus a technology for the evolution of cdmaOne/IS-95 to 3G services, which
will provide enhanced services to CDMAOne subscribers, as well as forward and
backward compatibility capabilities in terminals [106, 172].
CDMA2000 radio transmission technologies are being deployed in several
phases. The first release, CDMA2000 1x, supports an average of 144 kbps packet
data in a mobile environment. The second release of 1x, called 1x-EV-DO, will
support data rates up to 2 Mbps on a dedicated data carrier. Finally, 1x-EV-DV
will support even higher peak rates, simultaneous voice and high-speed data, as
well as improved Quality of Service mechanisms.
Despite the existence of several releases, CDMA2000 1x is fully standardised
under the auspices of 3GPP2 [172], and therefore all CDMA2000 1x networks
which adhere to the standard are interoperable.
3.5.5.2 CDMA2000 Security Requirements
As stated in the 3GPP2 vision document [172], security is an essential require-
ment for CDMA2000, which needs to be addressed not only for the air interface,
but also for end-to-end service provisioning. The security features provided by
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CDMA2000 must be flexible in order to give a level of security appropriate to
the service/application being offered.
Consequently, the CDMA2000 specifications support a variety of wireless
services using both voice and data. The security requirements of the CDMA2000
system protect service providers against fraud, and protect the privacy of system
users. The following CDMA2000 security requirements are based on those given
in the 3GPP2 vision document [172].
Security in IP based networks. Since the number of Internet applications
implemented in mobile stations is expected to grow, and given that, in
these cases, signalling data and user data may be sent via the same com-
munications channel, IP security issues are critical. Therefore, threats to
the Internet infrastructure will also become threats to future mobile envi-
ronments, and thus security mechanisms similar to those provided in the
wired Internet will be necessary.
Scalable security architecture across all devices/spaces. The need to en-
sure trust and confidentiality is independent of whether a device or system
is connected to a wired network, a WLAN, wide-area cellular network, or
any sort of hybrid network, or is simply a stand-alone device.
Access security. Future user authentication may include local authentication
between a user and a terminal based on biometrics. These capabilities
may complement the traditional user authentication methods.
Seamless roaming across heterogeneous networks. Seamless roaming be-
tween heterogeneous networks (e.g. wireless to wired) has typically been
possible only if all the networks are controlled by the same entity. In
a future world of heterogeneous networks, where seamless roaming be-
tween different types of access networks is possible, the trust and privacy
equation becomes even more complex. This complexity requires the devel-
opment of a scalable security architecture that can enable secure seamless
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roaming in a true heterogeneous network.
Support for certificate-based security. Future applications (for example,
m-commerce and m-transactions) will require certificate-based security.
The MS must be able to support subscriber-based and server-based cer-
tificates.
Content rights protection. It is expected that a variety of multimedia con-
tent will be widely available to mobile devices, where the content copy-
right must be securely protected. Methods of protecting digital content
will need to be developed.
End-to-end security. End-to-end application layer security (authentication,
confidentiality and integrity) may be required independently of the un-
derlying network architecture. Therefore it is expected that the network
architecture and the underlying transport mechanisms will be transparent
to application layer security mechanisms deployed to support end-to-end
security.
Security for short range interfaces. Several short-range interface technolo-
gies, e.g. Bluetooth, are already available. In the near future, many appli-
cations may use these interfaces to provide connectivity between a mobile
station and various external devices (e.g. display screen, external speak-
ers, or pen interface). Therefore, security over those interfaces should
be designed to give similar security levels to those provided for cellular
technology.
Robustness against potential attacks. Network spamming has caused many
problems in the Internet. Because of radio bandwidth limitations and air-
time cost, this problem is magnified for a wireless network. DoS attacks
and packet spoofing are becoming common both on the Internet and in
mobile systems. The next generation 3GPP2 All-IP core network will
try to provide an effective solution to minimise the threat posed by such
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attacks.
3.5.5.3 CDMA2000 1x Security Services
As described by Wingert and Naidu [183], CDMA2000 1x network security
protocols rely on a 64-bit authentication key (A-Key) and the ESN of the
mobile station. A random binary string called RANDSSD, which is generated
in the HLR/AuC, also plays a role in the authentication procedures. The A-Key
is programmed into the MS and stored in the home network AuC.
In addition to authentication, the A-Key is used to generate sub-keys for
voice privacy and message encryption. CDMA2000 1x uses the standardised
Cellular Authentication and Voice Encryption (CAVE) algorithm to generate a
128-bit sub-key called the ‘Shared Secret Data’ (SSD). The A-Key, the ESN,
and the network-supplied RANDSSD are used as inputs to CAVE to generate
the SSD. The SSD has two parts: SSD A (64 bits), for authentication, and
SSD B (64 bits), used to generate keys to encrypt voice and signalling mes-
sages. The SSD can be shared with roaming service providers to allow local
authentication. A fresh SSD can be generated when an MS returns to the HN
or roams to a different system.
We next describe how CDMA 2000 1x implements three major mobile secu-
rity features: authentication, data protection, and anonymity.
Entity Authentication As stated byWingert and Naidu [183], in CDMA2000
1x networks the MS uses the SSD A and the broadcast random number (RAND19)
as inputs to the CAVE algorithm to generate an 18-bit authentication signature
(AUTH SIGNATURE ), a type of MAC, and sends it to the base station. This
signature is then used by the BS to verify that the subscriber is legitimate. Both
19The broadcast RAND, generated in the MSC, should not be confused with the RANDSSD
from the HLR.
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Global Challenge (where all MSs are challenged with the same random num-
ber) and Unique Challenge (where a specific RAND is used for each requesting
MS) procedures are available to the operators for authentication. The Global
Challenge method allows very rapid authentication. Also, both the MS and the
network track the Call History Count (a 6-bit counter). This provides a way to
detect cloning, as the operator is alerted if there is a mismatch.
The A-Key is re-programmable, but if it is changed both the MS and the
network AuC must be updated. A-Keys may be programmed by any of the
following: the factory; the dealer at the point of sale; subscribers via telephone;
or via the air interface, i.e. so called over the air service provisioning (OTASP).
OTASP transactions utilise a Diffie-Hellman key agreement algorithm (see sec-
tion 2.1.3.3). The A-Key in the MS can be changed via OTASP, yielding an
easy way to quickly cut off service to a cloned MS or initiate new services to
a legitimate subscriber. As stated in [183], security of the A-Key is the most
important component of the CDMA2000 security system.
Voice, Signalling, and Data Confidentiality As described in [183], the
MS uses the SSD B and the CAVE algorithm to generate a Private Long Code
Mask (derived from an intermediate value called the Voice Privacy Mask), a
Cellular Message Encryption Algorithm (CMEA) key (64 bits), and a Data
Key (32 bits). The Private Long Code Mask is utilised in both the MS and
the network to change the characteristics of a Long code. This modified Long
code is used for voice scrambling, which adds an extra level of confidentiality
over the CDMA2000 air interface. The Private Long Code Mask is not used
to encrypt information; it simply replaces the well-known value used in the
encoding of a CDMA2000 signal with a private value known only to the MS
and the network. It is extremely difficult to eavesdrop on conversations without
knowing the Private Long Code Mask.
Additionally, the MS and the network use the CMEA key with the Enhanced
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CMEA (ECMEA) algorithm to encrypt signalling messages sent over the air
interface and to decrypt the information received. A separate data key, and an
encryption algorithm called ORYX [183], are used by the MS and the network
to encrypt and decrypt data traffic on the CDMA2000 channels.
Anonymity CDMA2000 systems support the assignment of a TMSI to a MS,
which is used in communications to and from a particular MS over the air
interface. This feature is handled in the same way as in UMTS (see section
3.5.3.2), making it more difficult to correlate a mobile user’s transmission to a
user identity, i.e. avoiding user traceability, which may lead to the compromise
of user identity confidentiality.
CDMA2000 Further Releases Further releases of 3G CDMA2000 technolo-
gies add more security protocols, including the use of 128-bit privacy and au-
thentication keys. For CDMA2000 networks, as described byWingert and Naidu
[183], new algorithms such as SHA-1 (see section 2.1.3.2) are used for integrity
protection, and AES (see section 2.1.3.2) for message encryption. The AKA
protocol (see section 3.5.3.2) will be used for all releases following CDMA2000
release C. The AKA protocol will also be used in WCDMA-MAP networks,
along with the Kasumi algorithm (see section 2.1.3.2) for encryption and mes-
sage integrity.
3.6 Cryptographic Tunnelling and Key Genera-
tion
This section summarises a number of existing tunnelling and key generation
schemes relevant to this thesis, including ISAKMP (section 3.6.1), IKE (section
3.6.2), TLS (section 3.6.3), WTLS (section 3.6.4), IPsec (section 3.6.5), EAP
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Key Derivation for Multiple Applications (section 3.6.6), and EAP-PSK (section
3.6.7). These are reviewed to assess whether they are suitable for application in
network (Internet) remote access.
3.6.1 Internet Security Association and Key Management
Protocol (ISAKMP)
The Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)
[49, 131] defines procedures and packet formats to establish, negotiate, mod-
ify and delete Security Associations (SAs). SAs contain all the information
required for execution of various network security services, such as IP layer ser-
vices (including header authentication and payload encapsulation), transport or
application layer services, or self-protection of negotiation traffic.
ISAKMP defines payloads for exchanging key generation and authentication
data. These formats provide a consistent framework for transferring key and au-
thentication data, in a way that is independent of the key generation technique,
encryption algorithm and authentication mechanism.
ISAKMP is kept distinct from specific key exchange protocols in order to
cleanly separate the details of security association management from the details
of key exchange. There are many different key exchange protocols, each with
different security properties. However, a common framework is required for
agreeing to the format of SA attributes, and for negotiating, modifying, and
deleting SAs. As described in RFCs 2408 [131] and 4306 [49], ISAKMP serves
as this common framework.
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3.6.2 Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
IKE is the default authentication and key exchange protocol used for creating
IPsec security associations (see section 3.6.5). IKE operates in two phases: IKE
Phase I (described in section 3.6.2.1) establishes an ISAKMP security associa-
tion (section 3.6.1), which is then used to secure IPsec SA negotiation in IKE
Phase II (section 3.6.2.2). More details on IKE can be found in RFCs 2409 [76]
and 4109 [79]. Certain issues involving IKE, such as the resolution of certain
known security defects, are addressed by IKE version 2 (IKEv2 — described in
section 3.8.1), which has received a considerable amount of expert review.
3.6.2.1 IKE Phase I: Session Key derivation for the ISAKMP SA
In IKE Phase I, an ISAKMP security association (section 3.6.1) can be estab-
lished in two main ways. IKE additionally offers four authentication modes,
for each of which the session key derivation technique is different. The pseudo-
random functions employed for key derivation are negotiated in both IKE Phase
I and IKE Phase II.
3.6.2.2 IKE Phase II: Session Key derivation for the IPsec SA
In IKE Phase II, an IPsec security association (see section 3.6.5) is derived from
the keying material previously computed for the ISAKMP SA (IKE Phase I).
The precise nature of the keying material derived from IKE Phase II depends
on whether or not perfect forward secrecy is required (see section 2.1.3.3).
3.6.3 Transport Layer Security Protocol (TLS)
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol [44] provides security functions
for data sent over the Internet. It achieves this by securing data traffic sent over
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a reliable transport protocol, i.e. a transport protocol which includes a non-
cryptographic message integrity check to protect against accidental, as opposed
to deliberate, errors in transmission (e.g. TCP [157]). Within the protocol
hierarchy, TLS is located underneath the application layer and on top of the
transport layer. It provides entity authentication, data authentication, and data
confidentiality, allowing client/server applications to communicate in a way that
is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. The TLS
protocol provides both unilateral and mutual authentication, with session key
establishment based on the use of public key certificates.
TLS can be used in order to create an authenticated tunnel to secure the
communications of any application, not just between a web browser and server.
The IETF TLS working group20 is working on a second, enhanced version of
the current TLS 1.0 specification.
3.6.3.1 TLS and SSL
TLS is the IETF standardised version of the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol
published by Netscape [69]. Since the description of TLS differs only in minor
ways from the SSL specification, in this thesis we subsequently always refer to
TLS.
3.6.3.2 TLS Subprotocols
In accordance with RFC 2246 [44], the TLS protocol consists of two main sub-
protocols. The TLS Record subprotocol provides protection of the application
data exchanged between two entities. The security association, including the
session key required for the TLS Record subprotocol, is provided by the TLS
Handshake subprotocol, which provides authentication and session key estab-
20http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/tls-charter.html
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lishment.
TLS Record subprotocol At the lowest level, running over some reliable
transport protocol (e.g. TCP [157]), is the TLS Record subprotocol, which pro-
vides two connection security properties:
• The connection is private. The data is encrypted using a symmetric
encryption algorithm. The secret encryption keys are generated uniquely
for each connection, and are based on a secret negotiated by another the
TLS Handshake subprotocol.
• The connection is reliable. Message transport includes a message in-
tegrity check using a MAC.
TLS Handshake subprotocol The TLS Record subprotocol is used for en-
capsulation of various higher level protocols. One such encapsulated protocol,
the TLS Handshake subprotocol, allows the server and client to authenticate
each other and to negotiate an encryption algorithm and cryptographic keys
before the application protocol transmits or receives its first byte of data; i.e.,
the TLS Handshake subprotocol is responsible for negotiating a session. Many
connections can be instantiated using the same session through a resumption
feature in the TLS Handshake subprotocol.
The TLS Handshake subprotocol provides three basic security properties:
• The peer’s identity can be authenticated using asymmetric cryptography
(see section 2.1.3.3).
• The negotiation of a shared secret is secure, i.e. the negotiated secret is
unavailable to eavesdroppers, including active attackers.
• The negotiation is reliable, i.e. no attacker can modify the negotiation
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communication without being detected by the legitimate parties to the
communication.
3.6.3.3 TLS Advantage and Goals
One advantage of TLS is that it is application protocol independent. Higher
level protocols can execute on top of the TLS Protocol transparently.
The goals of the TLS Protocol are:
• Cryptographic security: TLS is used to establish a secure connection
between two parties.
• Interoperability: Independent programmers are able to develop appli-
cations using TLS that will then be able to successfully exchange crypto-
graphic parameters.
• Extensibility: TLS seeks to provide a framework into which new asym-
metric and symmetric encryption methods can be incorporated as neces-
sary.
• Relative efficiency: Cryptographic operations tend to be highly CPU
intensive, particularly public key operations. For this reason, the TLS
protocol has incorporated an optional session caching scheme to reduce
the number of connections that need to be established from scratch.
3.6.4 Wireless Transport Layer Security Protocol (WTLS)
The Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) is a protocol stack for wireless com-
munication networks, specified by the WAP Forum21, which has become part
of the Open Mobile Alliance (OMA). WAP is essentially a wireless equivalent
of the Internet protocol stack.
21www.wapforum.org
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Wireless Transport Layer Security (WTLS) [181] is the security layer for
WAP applications. A complete specification of the WTLS protocol is given in
[181]. Based on TLS, WTLS was developed to address certain limitations of
mobile devices — such as limited processing power and memory capacity, and
low bandwidth — and to provide adequate authentication, data integrity, and
privacy protection mechanisms.
Because mobile networks do not provide end-to-end security, TLS had to
be modified to address the special needs of wireless users. Designed to support
datagrams in a high latency, low bandwidth environment, WTLS provides an
optimised handshake through dynamic key refreshing, which allows encryption
keys to be regularly updated during a secure session.
3.6.5 IPsec
The IP security (IPsec) protocol [118] is designed to provide interoperable, high
quality security for IPv4 and IPv6 data flows. A brief description of the IPsec
security framework is now provided. A complete specification of the IPsec pro-
tocol is given in RFC 4301 [118].
3.6.5.1 IPsec Security Services
IPsec provides security services at the IP layer by enabling a system to select
the required security protocols, determine the algorithms to be used to provide
the services, and put in place any cryptographic keys required to provide the
requested services22.
The set of security services offered includes: access control, connectionless
integrity, data origin authentication, protection against replays, confidentiality,
22IPsec can be used to protect one or more ‘paths’ between a pair of hosts, between a pair
of security gateways, or between a security gateway and a host.
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and limited traffic flow confidentiality. These services are provided at the IP
layer, offering protection for IP and/or upper layer protocols.
3.6.5.2 ESP and AH
As stated in RFC 4301 [118], IPsec comprises two traffic security protocols: the
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [117] provides confidentiality and origin
authentication functions to a data packet, and the Authentication header (AH )
[116] provides origin authentication functions to a data packet. Both AH and
ESP are vehicles for access control, based on the distribution of cryptographic
keys and the management of traffic flows relative to these security protocols.
3.6.5.3 IPsec SA
The concept of a ‘Security Association’ (SA) is fundamental to IPsec. Both AH
and ESP make use of SAs, and a major function of IKE (see section 3.6.2) is
the establishment and maintenance of security associations. A SA is ‘a simplex
connection that affords security services to the traffic carried by it’ [118].
Security services are provided to the entities sharing an SA by the use of AH,
or ESP, but not both23. A security association is uniquely identified by a triple
consisting of a Security Parameter Index (SPI), an IP Destination Address, and
a security protocol (AH or ESP) identifier.
3.6.5.4 Tunnel and Transport Modes of Operation
Both the AH and the ESP protocols have two distinct modes of operation:
Tunnel mode completely encapsulates the original packet within another IP
23If both AH and ESP protection is applied to a traffic stream, then two (or more) SAs
need to be created. Moreover, to secure typical, bi-directional communication between two
hosts, or between two security gateways, two SAs (one in each direction) are required.
122
3. Authentication Protocols for Internet Remote Access
header, and Transport mode keeps the original header and does not add the
extra IP header.
Tunnel Mode (DHCP IPsec) In tunnel mode, the AH and ESP protocols
are applied to tunnelled IP packets. Tunnel mode creates a second IP header
in the packet, and uses both the local and remote security gateway addresses
as source and destination IP addresses. Also, tunnel mode allows an instance
of IP to run immediately above the IPsec layer. RFC 3456 [152] explores the
requirements for host configuration in IPsec tunnel mode, and describes how the
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP [46, 47]) may be used to support
this configuration.
Transport Mode In transport mode, the AH and ESP protocols provide
protection primarily for upper layer protocols. Transport mode does not add
a second IP header and does not permit an instance of the IP protocol to be
implemented above it in the protocol hierarchy. Instead, tunnel mode allows
other tunnelling applications (e.g. L2TP tunnel [174]) to be run over an IPsec
transport mode connection.
3.6.5.5 Tunnel Mode SA
As described in RFC 4301 [118], a tunnel mode SA is essentially an SA applied
to an IP tunnel. If either end of a security association is a security gateway, then
the SA needs to be in tunnel mode. For a tunnel mode SA, the protocol which
has an associated SA possesses an ‘outer’ IP header that specifies the IPsec
processing destination, plus an ‘inner’ IP header that specifies the ultimate
destination for the packet. The security protocol header appears after the outer
IP header, and before the inner IP header. If the AH protocol is employed in
tunnel mode, portions of the outer IP header are afforded protection, as well as
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all of the tunnelled IP packet. If the ESP protocol is employed, the protection
is afforded only to the tunnelled packet, not to the outer header.
3.6.6 EAP Key Derivation for Multiple Applications
Some EAP methods generate keying material shared by the EAP peers (see sec-
tion 3.4); these keys can be used, for instance, with IEEE 802.11 [85] encryption.
As described in [13], an EAP method typically produces a Master Session Key
(MSK), which is sent by the EAP server to the authenticator. The authentica-
tor then uses the MSK to derive Transient Session Keys (TSKs), which are used
to protect the actual communication path. In addition, an EAP method may
internally use some keys, known as Transient EAP Keys (TEKs), to protect
its communication path. A complete specification of the generation, hierarchy,
transport and use of EAP keying material is given in a 2007 Internet Draft [18].
The EAP protocol (see section 3.4) also defines an Extended Master Session
Key (EMSK), which may be used to derive keys for multiple applications, such
as protecting EAP messages, distributing credentials for re-authentication, or
handoff mechanisms involving multiple WLAN access points [71]. In this case,
it is desirable that such keys are cryptographically separate, i.e. knowledge of
one key does not give any information about other keys. Cryptographic sep-
aration between different applications requires that the derivation of TSKs is
coordinated.
In a 2003 Internet Draft [165], Salowey and Eronen proposed a mechanism
to derive cryptographically separate keys for multiple applications independent
of the EAP method in use. The Salowey-Eronen mechanism specifies a way of
coordinating these key derivations using a key derivation function, which takes
as input the EMSK described above, an application key label, and optional
application data, and returns a multiple application master session key (AMSK).
These AMSKs are then used to derive TSKs, which are used to actually protect
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the data, e.g. to encrypt it.
3.6.7 EAP-PSK
Bersani and Tscho¨fenig [25] specified the EAP-Pre-Shared Key (EAP-PSK) pro-
tocol, an EAP method for mutual authentication and session key derivation,
which uses a 16-byte pre-shared key (PSK) as its long term credential and relies
on a single cryptographic primitive, i.e. AES-128 (see section 2.1.3.2). EAP-
PSK was inspired by the EAP-Archie proposal [178], which is now abandoned.
A complete specification of the EAP-PSK protocol is given in RFC 4764 [25].
As described in the EAP-PSK draft, a pre-shared key means a secret key (see
section 2.1.3.2) which is derived by some prior mechanism and shared between
the parties before the protocol using it takes place. It is simply a bit sequence of
a given length, each bit of which has been chosen uniformly and independently
at random.
When mutual authentication is successful, EAP-PSK provides a protected
communications channel for the authenticated parties; it is designed for authen-
tication over insecure networks, such as IEEE 802.11 [85].
EAP-PSK assumes that the PSK is only shared between the EAP peer and
the EAP server. The PSK is used to derive two 16-byte subkeys, called the
Authentication Key (AK) and the Key-Derivation Key (KDK). The AK is used
to mutually authenticate the EAP peer and the EAP server, and the KDK is
used to derive session keys shared by the EAP peer and the EAP server (namely,
the TEK, MSK and EMSK).
EAP-PSK is made up of three protocols: a key setup protocol to derive
the AK and KDK from the PSK, an authenticated key exchange protocol to
mutually authenticate the communicating parties and derive session keys, and
a protected channel protocol for the mutually authenticated parties to use for
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data communications.
3.7 Compound Tunnelled Authentication Pro-
tocols
One of the main motivations behind introducing two-step (tunnelled) authen-
tication protocols as allowed by EAP was to support the use of legacy authen-
tication protocols and existing authentication key management infrastructures.
Since its deployment, a number of weaknesses in EAP have become apparent.
These include the lack of user identity confidentiality, integrity protection for
the EAP negotiation, and a standardised mechanism for key exchange [149].
One of the main purposes of recent work in certain IETF working groups
has been to fix these perceived weaknesses of EAP, while still retaining the pri-
mary benefit of EAP encapsulation: namely a standard interface between the
inner client authentication protocol and the outer authentication protocol allow-
ing support for multiple existing remote authentication protocols. This section
summarises a number of recently proposed compound tunnelled authentication
schemes relevant to this thesis, including XAUTH (section 3.7.1), PIC (section
3.7.2), PEAP (section 3.7.3), EAP-TTLS (section 3.7.4), PANA (section 3.7.5),
PANATLS (section 3.7.6), and SeNAA (section 3.7.7). We present them here
in order that we can subsequently consider their further application for network
(Internet) remote access.
3.7.1 Extended Authentication within ISAKMP/Oakley
(XAUTH)
The IKE protocol (see section 3.6.2) allows a device to set up a secure session by
means of a bidirectional authentication method using either pre-shared keys (see
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section 3.6.7) or digital certificates. However, IKE does not provide a method to
exploit legacy authentication methods. The Extended Authentication scheme
within ISAKMP/Oakley (XAUTH) [24] is a method for using existing unidi-
rectional authentication mechanisms such as RADIUS (section 3.9.1), SecurID
[111], and OTP (section 3.3.3) within IPsec’s ISAKMP (section 3.6.1) protocol.
A complete specification of the XAUTH technique is given in a 2001 Internet
Draft [24].
The purpose of XAUTH is not to replace or enhance the existing authenti-
cation mechanisms described in IKE, but rather to allow them to be extended
using legacy authentication mechanisms. As stated in [24], the XAUTH tech-
nique allows the IPsec ISAKMP/Oakley [76] protocol to support additional au-
thentication mechanisms such as two-factor authentication, challenge/response
and other remote access unidirectional authentication methods.
The XAUTH protocol is designed in such a way that extended authentication
may be accomplished using any mode of operation for IKE phase I (i.e. Main
Mode or Aggressive Mode) as well as any authentication method supported
by IKE. This protocol may also be easily extended to support new modes or
authentication methods.
3.7.2 Pre-IKE Credential (PIC) Provisioning Protocol
The Pre-IKE Credential (PIC) Provisioning Protocol [16] is a means of boot-
strapping IPsec authentication via an ‘Authentication Server’ (AS) and user
authentication mechanisms. A complete specification of the PIC protocol is
given in a 2002 Internet Draft [16]. As described in the PIC draft, the client
machine communicates with the AS using a key exchange protocol, where only
the server is authenticated. The session keys derived as a result of this pro-
cess are used to protect the user authentication protocol conducted between the
client and the ‘backend authentication server’. Once the user is authenticated,
127
3. Authentication Protocols for Internet Remote Access
the client machine obtains credentials from the AS that can be used later to
authenticate the client.
PIC embeds EAP messages (see section 3.4) in ISAKMP payloads (see sec-
tion 3.6.1) to support multiple forms of user authentication. If this user authen-
tication succeeds, the client machine can request and obtain credentials from
the AS24. The credentials are intended to be used by the client to perform
regular IKE authentication with an IPsec-enabled security gateway.
The PIC protocol is defined between the Client and the AS. The PIC draft
[16] describes the four main stages of the proposed PIC protocol as follows:
1. An optional round of messages provides partial protection of the AS
against DoS attacks, by verifying that the initiator of the exchange is
reachable at the purported source IP address.
2. The protocol establishes a one-way authenticated channel from the client
to the AS, in which only the server is authenticated.
3. User authentication is performed over this secured channel. User authen-
tication information is transported using EAP tunnelled within ISAKMP.
4. The AS sends the client a credential which can be used in subsequent IKE
exchanges. This credential can be thought of as a certificate, or as a private
key generated or stored by the AS and accompanied by a corresponding
certificate. It may also be a secret key, or other information for deriving
such a key.
In stage 4 the created ISAKMP tunnel is used for the secure provisioning of
credentials for successfully authenticated users.
24The term ‘credentials’ is used here to mean both digital certificates and shared secret
keys.
128
3. Authentication Protocols for Internet Remote Access
3.7.3 Protected EAP Protocol (PEAP)
Protected EAP (PEAP) [149] provides wrapping of the EAP protocol (see sec-
tion 3.4) within TLS (see section 3.6.3). It claims to provide user anonymity
and built-in support for key exchange. A complete specification of the PEAP
protocol is given in a 2004 Internet Draft [149]. The relationship among the
EAP peer (client), the front-end authenticator, known as the ‘network access
server’ (NAS) in PEAP, and an authentication agent, known as the ‘backend
authentication server’ in PEAP, is depicted in Figure 3.11.
Client
Backend
Server
(Authentication Agent)
EAP Method EAP Method
NAS
(Front end
Authentication)
Cipher suite
(for link layer)
Keys
Trust
Over PPP or
802.11 link
EAP conversation
Cipher suite
(for link layer)
 r ti
Figure 3.11: Relationship among EAP client, backend authentication
server, and NAS in PEAP
As shown in Figure 3.11, the EAP conversation ‘passes through’ the NAS
on its way between the client and the backend authentication server. While
the authentication conversation is between the EAP client and the backend
authentication server, the NAS and the backend authentication server need to
establish trust for the conversation to proceed. I.e. in the case where the NAS
and EAP server reside on separate machines, they both need to establish trust
in each other beforehand; this is required to prevent spoofing by rogue servers
(gateways).
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The client and the backend server first set up a TLS channel over EAP.
The client authentication protocol between the client and the backend server
is encrypted and integrity protected within this TLS channel. As a result, the
NAS does not have knowledge of the TLS master secret established between the
client and the backend authentication server, and cannot decrypt the PEAP
conversation.
The backend server derives master session keys from the TLS master secret
using a one-way function, and conveys them to the NAS; the NAS can then
use these session keys to protect subsequent link layer communications between
it and the client. The PEAP draft [149] does not discuss the format of the
attributes used to communicate the master session keys from the backend au-
thentication server to the NAS. AAA carrier protocols such as RADIUS (see
section 3.9.1) can be used for this purpose.
3.7.4 EAP Tunnelled TLS Authentication Protocol (EAP-
TTLS)
The EAP Tunnelled TLS Authentication Protocol (EAP-TTLS) [70] claims to
allow legacy password-based authentication protocols to be used with existing
authentication databases, while protecting the security of these legacy proto-
cols against eavesdropping, MitM (see section 3.2.3) and other cryptographic
attacks. A complete specification of the EAP-TTLS protocol is given in a 2004
Internet Draft [70].
EAP-TTLS also allows the client and the backend server to establish keying
material for use in the data connection between the client and the front-end
authenticator. The keying material is established implicitly between the client
and the backend server based on the TLS handshake (see section 3.6.3). EAP-
TTLS derives sessions keys by applying a pseudo-random function to the TLS
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master secrets and other input. The backend server distributes derived session
keys to the front-end authenticator using the AAA protocol (see section 3.9).
The client derives the same keys in parallel.
3.7.5 Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network
Access (PANA)
This section briefly introduces the draft PANA protocol [65], a link layer agnostic
transport for EAP to enable client-to-network access authentication. Chapter
6 describes the PANA protocol in more detail. A complete specification of the
PANA protocol is given in a 2005 Internet Draft [65].
PANA is designed for use between a PANA Client (PaC) and a PANA Au-
thentication Agent (PAA) situated in the access network, where the PAA may
optionally be a client of an AAA infrastructure (see section 3.9). A complete
specification of the interworking of PANA with IETF AAA protocols (e.g. the
Diameter EAP protocol — see section 3.9.3) is given in a 2005 Internet Draft
[125]. This specification contains, for instance, a table with a PANA-Diameter
message mapping (see section 5 of [125]).
PANA can carry any authentication mechanism that can be specified as an
EAP method (see section 3.4), and can be used on any link that supports IP.
The PANA protocol specification is designed to provide the client-to-network
access authentication component within an overall secure network access frame-
work, which would also need to include protocols and mechanisms for service
provisioning, access control as a result of initial authentication, and accounting.
The payload of a PANA message consists of a (possibly empty) sequence of
Attribute Value Pairs (AVPs), e.g. a Cookie AVP, used for making an initial
handshake robust against ‘blind resource consumption DoS attacks’ (see section
3.2.3), a MAC AVP, protecting the integrity of a PANA message, or an EAP-
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Payload AVP, which transports an EAP payload. PANA uses UDP [156] as its
transport layer protocol, and sequence numbers to provide ordered delivery of
EAP packets. A summary of the PANA header format is shown in Figure 3.12.
  Version
(1 octet = 8 bits)
Message Length
(2 octets)
   Flags
     (2 octets)
Message Type
(2 octets)
AVPs ...
  Reserved
(1 octet)
Sequence Number
Figure 3.12: PANA header format
Two important features of PANA, namely the security association (SA) and
the re-authentication procedure, are now described. Once the EAP method has
completed, a session key is shared by the PaC and the PAA. The session key
is provided to the PaC as part of the EAP key exchange process, and the PAA
can obtain the session key from the EAP server via the AAA infrastructure (if
used). PANA SA establishment based on the EAP session key is required where
no physical or link layer security is available.
The re-authentication procedure extends the current PANA session lifetime
by re-executing the EAP method. Re-authentication of an on-going PANA
session must maintain the existing sequence numbers. In an instance of the
re-authentication procedure, if there is an existing PANA SA, both PANA-
Auth-Request/Answer messages are protected with a MAC AVP.
The whole of this thesis is based on one particular draft of the PANA spec-
ification [65]. Working on one particular draft has been necessary because it is
a work in progress and changes relatively frequently.
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3.7.6 PANA over TLS (PANATLS)
The Protocol for carrying Authentication for Network Access over Transport
Layer Security (PANATLS) 2002 Internet Draft [143] specifies a method to carry
authentication information over a TLS protected channel (see section 3.6.3) be-
tween a PaC and a PAA, both of which are on the same subnet [184]. PANATLS
uses the TLS protocol to provide a secure means of exchanging authentication
information.
The purpose of the PANATLS method is not only to provide a mechanism for
carrying the authentication parameters, but also to address certain outstanding
issues, e.g. re-authentication, security threats, etc. In particular, the security
features provided by TLS are important for giving confidentiality and/or in-
tegrity protection for the entire authentication protocol exchange, including
confidentiality for the identity of the client as well as the authentication result
(e.g. EAP-Success/Failure). Such protection is not provided by other authenti-
cation protocols such as EAP (see section 3.4).
PANATLS is designed to carry any authentication protocol information,
including EAP messages. It is also possible to use a TLS certificate for authen-
ticating a PaC, without using any other authentication protocol. PANATLS
supports the combination of multiple types of authentication to authenticate a
PaC. For example, it is possible to use a TLS client certificate to authenticate
the IP address of the PaC, and then to use EAP to authenticate the user of the
PaC.
It is possible to launch MiTM attacks against PANATLS, typically with the
objective of falsifying the authentication process (see sections 3.2.3 and 6.2.1.2).
In order to prevent such attacks, it is necessary to create a binding between
the security association established between the PAA and the PaC (i.e. the
TLS session) and any state that is established based on the information carried
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inside or outside of TLS. Therefore MitM attacks against one (or both) of the
communicating entities can be prevented by PANATLS, because this protocol
supports the creation of cryptographic binding between the PaC device identifier
and the TLS session (see section 4.8.1 of [143]), and the EAP authentication
session and the TLS session (see section 4.8.2 of [143]).
3.7.7 Secure Network Access Authentication (SeNAA)
The Secure Network Access Authentication (SeNAA) 2002 Internet Draft [67]
describes how the reliable SeNAA protocol over UDP [156] can be used to
carry TLS protocol exchanges (see section 3.6.3) inside a TLS payload. SeNAA
messages are formatted in the same way as Diameter messages (see section
3.9.2), and they contain AVPs. In the SeNAA messages, almost all AVPs (with
a few exceptions, e.g. the Session-Id AVP) are carried in a TLS payload and
protected by the TLS Record subprotocol (see section 3.6.3.2). SeNAA provides
secure transport for EAP (see section 3.4) when executed between a PaC and a
PAA, by carrying the EAP protocol exchanges inside the TLS payload.
SeNAA mutual authentication is divided into two phases. In phase 1, which
carries a TLS handshake (see section 3.6.3.2), the network is authenticated.
Access network authentication is based on access network certificates. Phase 2
carries the EAP protocol which is used to authenticate the user. User authen-
tication is bound to the device identifier, which is used to control access to the
network.
SeNAA does not assume a secure channel between the PaC and the PAA.
To provide such a channel, the SeNAA protocol makes use of the TLS protocol
to negotiate a local security association between PaC and PAA, where TLS
provides authentication, privacy, integrity, and replay protection. It is used to
protect a number of SeNAA AVPs and EAP packets exchanged between PaC
and PAA. AVPs that need protection are fed to the TLS Record subprotocol (see
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section 3.6.3.2) and the resulting encrypted and compressed data is sent within
a TLS-Payload AVP. The EAP protocol is carried inside an EAP-Payload AVP
[59]. After a successful TLS handshake, the SeNAA protocol exchanges are
protected using a checksum stored in the Msg-Checksum AVP. The AVP is
protected using the TLS Record subprotocol.
As stated in [67], TLS is also used by SeNAA for re-authentication between
a PaC and a PAA. Local re-authentication, in which a PaC authenticates
to a PAA, occurs as part of phase 1, and is handled using the TLS session
resumption feature (see section 3.6.3.2). TLS supports mutual authentication
and can optionally be used instead of EAP for user authentication. In all cases
TLS is used for access network authentication.
SeNAA messages carry information such as the PaC device identifier, that
are integrity protected, as described in [184]. If the PAA supports a Diameter
and/or RADIUS AAA backend (section 3.9), signalling between PaC and PAA
can easily be extended to the backend.
3.8 Public Key Authentication for Network Ac-
cess
The cryptographic techniques used to provide security features for the network
access procedures can be either secret key (symmetric) or public key (asym-
metric) techniques. Whereas use of the former class of schemes requires the
involvement of the home network during the initial authentication process be-
tween a user and visited network, the latter allows for architectures that avoid
on-line involvement of the home network, since authentication may then be
based on certificates. Nevertheless, asymmetric techniques typically require a
PKI to support key distribution, and use of this PKI may require on-line certifi-
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cate status checking. While symmetric techniques are used almost exclusively
today, it seems likely that asymmetric techniques will gain greater importance in
future ubiquitous mobility access networks because of their greater flexibility.
For further information on public key based network access, see Schwiderski-
Grosche and Knospe [167].
This section summarises a number of public key authentication methods
for network access relevant to this thesis, including IKEv2 (section 3.8.1) and
public key based EAP methods (section 3.8.2). As previously, these methods
are described here so that we can subsequently assess their suitability for further
application.
3.8.1 Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2)
Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) [49] is a component of the IP Security
Protocol (see section 3.6.5) that is used for mutual authentication and to estab-
lish and maintain SAs. A complete specification of the IKEv2 protocol is given
in RFC 4306 [49]. For further information on IKEv2 and its design rationale,
see Perlman [154]. IKEv2 consists of two phases:
1. An authentication and key exchange protocol, which establishes an IKE-
SA,
2. Messages and payloads which allow negotiation of parameters (e.g. algo-
rithms, traffic selectors) in order to establish IPsec SAs (i.e. Child-SAs).
In the context of the IKE-SA, four cryptographic algorithms are negotiated:
an encryption algorithm, an integrity protection algorithm, a Diffie-Hellman
group (see section 2.1.3.3), and a pseudo-random function. The pseudo-random
function is applied in the construction of keying material for the cryptographic
algorithms used in both the IKE-SA and the CHILD-SAs (see section 2.13 of
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[49]). In addition, IKEv2 also includes certain payloads and messages which
allow configuration parameters to be exchanged for remote access scenarios.
IKEv2 is designed to address certain issues with IKEv1 (see section 3.6.2), as
described in Appendix A of [49]. Of particular importance here are the reduced
number of initial exchanges, support of legacy authentication, decreased latency
of the initial exchange, optional DoS protection capability, and the resolution of
certain known security defects. IKEv2 is a protocol that has received a consid-
erable amount of expert review, and whose design benefits from the experience
gained from IKEv1.
IKEv2 also provides authentication and key exchange capabilities which al-
low an entity to use symmetric as well as asymmetric cryptographic techniques,
in addition to legacy authentication25 support, within a single protocol. Such
flexibility seems likely to be important for heterogeneous network access sup-
porting ubiquitous mobility.
3.8.2 Public Key Based EAP Methods
As discussed previously, the EAP protocol supports the use of a number of
different authentication mechanisms, known as EAP methods. This section dis-
cusses two EAP methods that are based on public key techniques, namely the
EAP-TLS (section 3.8.2.1) and EAP-Double-TLS (section 3.8.2.2) authentica-
tion protocols.
25Legacy authentication, described in section 3.3, involves methods that are not strong
enough to be used in networks where attackers can easily eavesdrop and spoof on the link
(e.g. EAP-MD5 [27] over wireless links). They also may not be able to produce enough keying
material. Use of legacy methods can be made more robust by carrying them over a secure
channel (see also [49, 65]).
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3.8.2.1 EAP-TLS
The PPP EAP Transport Layer Security Authentication Protocol (EAP-TLS)
[17] allows use of the protected cipher suite negotiation, mutual authentica-
tion and key management capabilities of the TLS protocol (see section 3.6.3).
EAP-TLS requires that the peer and the EAP server be authenticated using
asymmetric cryptographic techniques, the key management for which is based
on X.509 [80] certificates. A complete specification of the EAP-TLS protocol is
given in RFC 2716 [17].
As stated in RFC 2716 [17], as a result of the EAP-TLS conversation, the
EAP endpoints mutually authenticate, negotiate a cipher suite, and derive a
session key. The EAP-TLS conversation typically begins with the authenticator
and the peer negotiating the use of EAP. Next, the authenticator sends an
EAP-Request/Identity packet to the peer (step 1), and the peer responds with
an EAP-Response/Identity packet to the authenticator, containing the peer’s
user ID (step 2). From this point forward, while nominally the EAP conversation
occurs between the authenticator and the peer, the authenticator may act as
a pass through device, with the EAP packets received from the peer being
encapsulated for transmission to a RADIUS/Diameter (see section 3.9) or other
backend security server (i.e. the EAP server).
Once it has received the peer’s identifier, the EAP server responds with an
EAP TLS/Start packet (step 4). The peer answers with a TLS client hello
handshake message (step 5), and the EAP server responds in turn with a TLS
server hello handshake message (step 6). At this point, the peer has authenti-
cated the EAP server (server authentication). The next message (step 7) con-
tains, among other things, a client key exchange message, which completes the
establishment of a shared master secret between the peer and the EAP server. If
the EAP server sent a certificate request message in the preceding EAP-Request
packet, then the peer must send, in addition, certificate and certificate verify
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handshake messages. The former contains a certificate for the peer’s public sig-
nature verification key, while the latter contains the peer’s signed authentication
response to the EAP server.
After receiving this packet, the EAP server verifies the peer’s certificate and
digital signature, if requested (client authentication). If the peer authenticates
successfully, the EAP server sends a response containing a finished handshake
message (step 8). If the EAP server is correctly authenticated, the peer must
send an EAP-Response packet of EAP-Type equal EAP-TLS, and no data (step
9). The EAP server must then respond with an EAP-Success message (step 10).
3.8.2.2 EAP-Double-TLS
EAP-Double-TLS [22] is an EAP protocol that extends EAP-TLS. A complete
specification of the EAP-Double-TLS protocol is given in a 2006 Internet Draft
[22]. In EAP-TLS, a full TLS (see section 3.6.3) handshake is used to mutually
authenticate a peer and server and to share a secret key. EAP-Double-TLS ex-
tends this authentication negotiation by using a secure connection established
by the TLS Pre-Shared Key (PSK — see section 3.6.7) handshake, to exchange
additional information between peer and server. The secure connection estab-
lished using the TLS PSK handshake is used to allow the server and the peer
to securely exchange their identifiers, and to update security attributes for later
sessions in order to ensure perfect forward secrecy (see section 2.1.3.3). A more
detailed description of the TLS PSK handshake may be found in section 3.3.1
of [22].
EAP-Double-TLS allows the peer and server to establish keying material for
use in subsequent data exchanges. The keying material is established implicitly
between the peer and server as a result of the TLS Pre-Shared Key handshake.
The TLS shared-key mechanism is designed for use as a ‘resumed session’ (i.e.
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a secure connection may be terminated and resumed26 later by the peer and
server) using a pre-installed secret key. RFC 4279 [60] details the use of secret
keys (see section 2.1.3.2) shared in advance among communicating parties in
the TLS protocol. The secure connection established by the resumed handshake
may then be used to allow the server to authenticate the peer using certificate
authentication infrastructures (see section 2.1.3.3), PSK (see section 3.6.7), or
smart cards.
Finally, EAP-Double-TLS allows anonymous exchanges and provides iden-
tity privacy protection against eavesdropping, MitM (see section 3.2.3) and other
cryptographic attacks.
3.9 AAA Backend Infrastructure
A number of requirements apply to an authentication, authorisation and ac-
counting (AAA) backend infrastructure. The AAA protocol evaluation criteria
for network access, summarised in RFC 2989 [15], include the following:
Scalability. The AAA protocol must be capable of supporting millions of users
and tens of thousands of simultaneous requests. Also the AAA architec-
ture and protocol must be capable of supporting tens of thousands of
devices, AAA servers, proxies and brokers.
Mutual Authentication. The AAA protocol must support mutual authenti-
cation between the AAA client and server.
Transmission Level Security. The AAA protocol requires authentication,
integrity protection and confidentiality at the transmission layer. This
26TLS allows the peer and the server to resume sessions. When a TLS session is resumed, it
must be resumed using the same cipher suite with which it was originally negotiated. The peer
and the server may thus decide to resume a previous session instead of negotiating security
parameters for a new session [44].
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security model is also referred to as hop-by-hop security, whereas end-to-
end security is established between two communicating peers.
Data Object Confidentiality. The AAA protocol requires confidentiality at
the object level, where an object consists of one or more attributes.
Data Object Integrity. The AAA protocol requires authentication and in-
tegrity protection at the object level. Object level authentication must
be persistent across one or more intermediate AAA entities (e.g. proxies,
brokers, etc.), so that any AAA entity in a proxy chain may verify the
integrity and authenticity of a data object.
Certificate Transport. The AAA protocol must be capable of transporting
public key certificates.
In this section two AAA backend infrastructure protocols are discussed,
namely RADIUS (section 3.9.1) and Diameter (section 3.9.2). The Diameter
EAP application (see section 3.9.3) is also described.
3.9.1 RADIUS
The Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) [161] protocol car-
ries authentication, authorisation, and configuration information between a net-
work access server and a remote authentication server. RADIUS runs over the
UDP protocol [156] . Historically, the RADIUS protocol has been used to pro-
vide AAA backend services for dial-up PPP [168] and terminal server access. A
complete specification of the RADIUS protocol is given in RFC 2865 [161]. A
number of RADIUS key features are listed below:
Client/Server Model. A network access server operates as a client of RA-
DIUS. A RADIUS server receives user connection requests, authenticates
the user, and then returns all the configuration information necessary for
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the client to deliver service to the user. A RADIUS server can act as a
proxy client to other RADIUS servers.
Network Security. Transactions between the client and RADIUS server are
authenticated through the use of shared secret. Any user passwords input
to the client device are sent to the RADIUS server in encrypted form.
Flexible Authentication Mechanisms. RADIUS servers can support a va-
riety of methods to authenticate a user. When provided with a user name
and password, a RADIUS server can support PPP PAP or CHAP, UNIX
login, and other authentication mechanisms.
Extensible Protocol. RADIUS transactions are comprised of variable length
attributes. New attribute values can be added without invalidating exist-
ing implementations of the protocol.
RADIUS protocol operation is described below, and summarised in Figure
3.13.
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Figure 3.13: RADIUS operation
The Access-Request contains such Attributes as the user’s name, the hash
of the user’s password, the ID of the client and the ID of the Port which the
user is accessing. The user entry in the RADIUS server database contains a
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list of requirements to be met if access for the user is to be permitted. If any
condition is not met, the RADIUS server sends an ‘Access-Reject’ response,
indicating that this user request is invalid. If all conditions are met and the
RADIUS server wishes to issue a challenge, to which the user must respond, the
RADIUS server sends an ‘Access-Challenge’ response, Finally, if all conditions
are met and the RADIUS server is completely satisfied, the list of configuration
values for the user are placed into an ‘Access-Accept’ response. These values
include the type of service (e.g. SLIP, PPP, or Login User) and all necessary
values to deliver the desired service.
As discussed in RFC 2865 [161], RADIUS is today a widely implemented and
used means of authenticating and authorising dial-up and tunnelled network
users. In addition, a number of significant extensions to RADIUS have been
published in RFC 2869 [160]. Nevertheless, as discussed in RFC 3588 [34], the
continued growth of the Internet and the introduction of new access technologies,
including wireless, DSL (see section 3.2.1), Mobile IP [153], and Ethernet27
based LANs, and the increasing complexity and density of routers and network
access servers, will put new demands on AAA protocols, making the RADIUS
protocol increasingly unsuitable for use in such networks.
The potential future problems with RADIUS have led to the development of
Diameter [34]. The basic RADIUS model is retained by the Diameter protocol.
However, Diameter, described immediately below, addresses the known flaws
in the RADIUS Protocol so that AAA services can be provided to new access
technologies.
3.9.2 Diameter
As mentioned in section 3.9.1, the Diameter protocol [34] was not designed from
the ground up. Instead, the basic RADIUS model was retained, and known flaws
27http://www.ieee802.org/3/
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in the RADIUS protocol were addressed. Diameter does not share a common
protocol data unit with RADIUS, but does borrow sufficiently from the protocol
to ease migration. The Diameter protocol was thus heavily inspired and builds
upon the tradition of the RADIUS protocol.
The basic concept behind Diameter is to provide a base protocol that can
be extended in order to provide AAA services for use with new access tech-
nologies (e.g. Roaming Protocols and Mobile-IP) in large scale systems with
provisions for congestion control [34]. Such flexibility seems likely to be im-
portant for heterogeneous network access supporting ubiquitous mobility. A
complete specification of the Diameter protocol is given in RFC 3588 [34].
Diameter runs over reliable transport mechanisms (TCP and SCTP, as de-
fined in [19]; see section 3.6.3), and provides the following facilities:
• delivery of AVPs;
• capabilities negotiation;
• error notification;
• extensibility, through addition of new commands and AVPs; and
• basic services necessary for applications, such as handling of user sessions
or accounting.
All data delivered by the protocol must be in the form of an AVP. Some
of these AVP values are used by the Diameter protocol itself (e.g. the User-
Name AVP), while others deliver data associated with particular applications
that employ Diameter. AVPs may be added arbitrarily to Diameter messages,
so long as the required AVPs are included. AVPs are used by the base Diameter
protocol to support the following features:
• Transport of user authentication information, to enable the Diameter
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server to authenticate the user.
• Transport of service specific authorisation information between Diameter
client and servers, allowing the peers to decide whether a user’s access
request should be granted.
• Exchanging resource usage information to be used for accounting purposes,
capacity planning, etc.
• Relaying, proxying and redirecting of Diameter messages through a server
hierarchy.
The Diameter base protocol provides the minimum requirements needed
for a AAA protocol, as listed in RFC 2989 [15]. The base protocol may be
used by itself for accounting purposes only, or it may be used with a Diameter
application, such as Mobile IPv4 [33], or network access [35]. It is also possible
for the base protocol to be extended for use in new applications, via the addition
of new commands or AVPs. Currently the focus of Diameter is network access
and accounting applications.
In the Diameter base protocol, any node can initiate a request. In that sense,
Diameter is a peer-to-peer protocol. A Diameter client is a device at the edge
of the network that performs access control, such as a network access server
or a foreign agent. A Diameter client generates Diameter messages to request
authentication, authorisation, and accounting services for the user. A Diameter
agent is a node that does not authenticate and/or authorise messages locally;
agents include proxies, redirects and relay agents. A Diameter server performs
authentication and/or authorisation of the user. A Diameter node may act as
an agent for certain requests while acting as a server for others.
As stated in RFC 3588 [34], the current Diameter specification is made up
of a base specification [34], a Transport Profile [19], and two applications: Mo-
bile IPv4 [33], and the Diameter Network Access Server (NAS) application [35].
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The Transport Profile document [19] discusses transport layer issues that arise
with AAA protocols, and gives recommendations on how to overcome them28.
The Diameter Mobile IPv4 document [33] specifies a Diameter application that
allows a Diameter server to authenticate, authorise and collect accounting in-
formation for Mobile IPv4 services rendered to a mobile node. The Mobile IPv4
(see section 4.2.4) protocol allows a mobile node to change its point of attach-
ment to the Internet while maintaining its fixed home address. Finally, the NAS
document [35] defines a Diameter application that allows a Diameter server to
be used in a PPP/SLIP dial-up and terminal server access environment; pro-
visions are made in this application for servers that need to perform protocol
conversion between Diameter and RADIUS.
3.9.3 Diameter EAP Application
As described in section 3.4, EAP [13] is an authentication framework which
supports multiple authentication mechanisms. EAP may be used on dedicated
links as well as switched circuits, and wired as well as wireless links.
The Diameter EAP application [59] carries EAP packets between a network
access server working as an EAP authenticator and a backend authentication
server. The Diameter EAP application is based on the Diameter NAS applica-
tion and is intended for similar environments. A complete specification of the
Diameter EAP application is given in RFC 4072 [59].
In the Diameter EAP application, authentication occurs between the EAP
client and its home Diameter server. This end-to-end authentication process
reduces the possibility for attacks on the authentication procedure (e.g. replay
and MitM attacks). End-to-end authentication also provides a possibility for
mutual authentication, which is not possible with PAP and CHAP (described
in section 3.3.1) in a roaming PPP environment.
28This document also defines the Diameter failover algorithm and state machine.
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Diameter EAP defines new Command-Codes and new AVPs, and can work
with RADIUS EAP support (see RFC 3579 [14]). The use of EAP in Diameter
involves the following steps (see Figure 3.14).
2.  Diameter- EAP- Request
(N ULL EAP-Payload AVP)
3.  Diameter- EAP- Answer
(Filled EAP-Payload AVP and Result-Code=
DIAM ETER_M ULTI_RO UN D_AUTH)
EAP Authent icator
(Access Device)
Diameter Client
EAP Authent icat ion
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Authent icat ing Peer
(Supplicant )
EAP Client
EAP end-to-end (mutual) authentication
1.  EAP init iat ion in a link layer
(PPP, IEEE 802.1x)
4.  EAP- Request / I dent it y
(EAP Payload forwarded)
5.  EAP- Response/ I dent it y
(client!s EAP Payload)
6.  Diameter- EAP- Request
(client!s EAP Payload encapsulated
in EAP-Payload AVP)
7.  Diameter- EAP- Answer
(O ptional EAP Payload encapsulated and 
Result-Code=SUCCESS or FAILURE)
8.  Service provided (or not )
! !
Figure 3.14: Using EAP in Diameter
1. The EAP conversation between the EAP Client (Authenticating Peer) and
the Access Device (EAP Authenticator) begins with the initiation of EAP
within a link layer, such as PPP [168] or 802.11 [85].
2. The Access Device (Diameter Client) will typically send to the Diame-
ter Home Server a Diameter-EAP-Request (DER) message with a NULL
EAP-Payload AVP, signifying an EAP-Start.
3. If the Diameter Home Server supports EAP, it must respond with a
Diameter-EAP-Answer (DEA) message. The initial DEA message con-
tains an EAP-Payload AVP (that encapsulates an EAP packet) and usu-
ally the Result-Code AVP is set to DIAMETER MULTI ROUND AUTH,
signifying that a subsequent request is expected. The initial DEA in
a multi-round exchange normally encapsulates an EAP-Request/Identity
payload, requesting the EAP Client to identify itself.
4. The Access Device forwards the EAP-Request/Identity payload to the
EAP Client.
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5. The EAP Client returns to the Access Device an EAP-Response/Identity
packet, containing the EAP Client’s identity (or user’s identity).
6. Upon receipt of the EAP Client’s EAP-Response, the Access Device will is-
sue a second DER message to the Diameter Home Server, with the client’s
EAP packet encapsulated within the EAP-Payload AVP.
7. The conversation continues until the Diameter Server sends a DEA with
a Result-Code AVP indicating SUCCESS or FAILURE, and an optional
EAP-Payload (of type EAP-Success or EAP-Failure). If a response is
received with the Result-Code AVP set to DIAMETER COMMAND UN-
SUPPORTED, it is an indication that the Diameter Home Server does not
support EAP.
8. The Result-Code AVP is used by the Access Device to determine whether
or not service is to be provided to the EAP Client.
3.10 Liberty Alliance Project
The Liberty Alliance Project represents a broad spectrum of organisations that
have united to establish open technical specifications to support a vast range of
network identity-based interactions. The network identity of a user is the global
set of attributes composed from an individual’s various accounts (see section 1.3
of [56]). A complete specification of the Liberty architecture is available at the
Liberty Alliance Project web site29.
The Liberty architecture specifies a single sign-on (SSO) solution, where an
initial authentication of the user to an Identity Provider (IdP) can be reused
for further authentication, via a network identity infrastructure, to a number of
Service Providers (SPs). SPs are organisations offering Web-based services to
29http://www.projectliberty.org/specs/
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users (e.g. Internet portals, retailers, transportation providers, financial insti-
tutions, entertainment companies, not-for-profit organisations, and government
agencies). IdPs are SPs offering identity services; they may offer a range of
business incentives to encourage other SPs to affiliate with them. As described
in [56], establishing such SP affiliations creates circles of trust, i.e. a collabora-
tion of businesses and IdPs having business relationships based on Liberty and
operational agreements. Each circle of trust may contain multiple SPs and (in
the simplest case) one IdP.
For example, in an enterprise circle of trust, the IdP is a company managing
employee network identities across the enterprise. Another example is a con-
sumer circle of trust, where a user’s bank has established business relationships
with a number of other SPs, allowing the user to use her bank-based network
identity with them30.
In this section, the key objectives (section 3.10.1), the main requirements
(section 3.10.2) and the operation (section 3.10.3) of the Liberty scheme are
described. After that, an overview of the Liberty SSO architecture is provided
(section 3.10.4), and the three major components of the Liberty basic structure
are then discussed, including the identity federation framework (section 3.10.5),
the identity web services framework (section 3.10.6), and the identity service
interface specifications (section 3.10.7). Finally, the security mechanisms incor-
porated in Liberty-enabled implementations are summarised (section 3.10.8).
3.10.1 Liberty Objectives
According to section 1.3.1 of [56], the key Liberty objectives are to:
• enable consumers to protect the security and privacy of their network
30Although these scenarios are enabled by SPs and IdPs deploying Liberty-enabled products
in their infrastructure, they do not require users to use anything other than one of today’s
common Web browsers.
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identity information;
• enable businesses to manage customer relationships without third party
involvement;
• provide an open SSO standard including decentralised authentication and
authorisation from multiple providers; and
• create a network identity infrastructure supporting all network access de-
vices.
3.10.2 Liberty Requirements
The following Liberty engineering requirements are based on those given in the
Liberty Architecture Overview specifications [56, 173].
Interoperability. Potential Liberty clients include a broad range of presently
deployed Web browsers, Web-enabled client access devices, and newly de-
signed Web-enabled browsers or clients with specific Liberty-enabled fea-
tures.
Openness. Liberty must provide the widest possible support for operating sys-
tems, programming languages, and network infrastructures, and must fa-
cilitate multi-vendor interoperability between Liberty clients and services.
Identity federation. SPs and IdPs must notify the user regarding identity
federation and defederation, in addition to notifying each other about
user identity defederation. Each IdP also notifies appropriate SPs of user
account terminations at the IdP. Each SP or IdP gives each of its users
a list of the user’s federated identifiers at the IdP or SP. An SP may also
request an anonymous, temporary identifier for a user.
Authentication. The IdP’s authenticated identifier must be given to the user
before she presents her credentials to the IdP. Protection of information
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exchanged between IdPs, SPs, and User Agents, and mutual authenti-
cation between IdPs and SPs, must be provided31. SPs must have the
capability to cause the IdP to re-authenticate the user. An IdP, at the
discretion of the SP, is allowed to authenticate the user via an IdP other
than itself.
Use of pseudonyms. Liberty-enabled implementations must be able to sup-
port the use of pseudonyms that are unique on a per-identity-federation
basis across all IdPs and SPs.
Anonymity. An SP may request that an IdP supplies a temporary pseudonym
that will preserve the anonymity of a user. This identifier may be used
to obtain information for or about the user, without requiring the user to
consent to a long term relationship with the SP.
Global logout. Liberty-enabled implementations must be able to notify all
affected SPs when a user logs out at the IdP.
Service discovery. The Liberty architecture must provide a mechanism for
SPs to query the discovery service for the relevant providers of services to
a particular user.
Service registration. The Liberty scheme must provide a mechanism for SPs
to register/deregister a list of services that it provides for a specific user
with the discovery service.
Support for gathering consent. The Liberty scheme must provide a mech-
anism for a relying SP to request that the invoking SP directs a user to
the relying SP in order to request the user for consent. It is also required
that the SP utilises a ‘Liberty Enhanced Client Profile (LECP) commu-
nications channel’ (see section 3.2.1 of [173]) to ask the user for consent
and to obtain the user’s response.
31A variety of authentication methods are supported by Liberty.
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Support for anonymous service. The Liberty architecture must provide a
mechanism for an SP to make anonymous attribute requests and receive
anonymous attribute responses (i.e. the ability to share attributes without
disclosing the identity of the user to the requestor or SP), in addition to
a mechanism to prevent correlation of pseudonyms in service tokens with
user identifiers.
Support for usage indications. The Liberty scheme must provide a mecha-
nism for an SP to associate the user’s intended usage with the requested
attributes, in an attribute request to a relying SP. A mechanism is also
required for an SP to associate the agreed upon intended usage indica-
tions with the attribute response, in addition to a mechanism for an SP
to return a list of acceptable usage indications.
3.10.3 Operation of the Liberty Scheme
As stated in [56], Liberty is composed of three architectural components, the
operation of which are described below and summarised in Figure 3.15.
User
IdPs SPs
web redirection
web services
metadata & schemas
Agent
Figure 3.15: Liberty operation
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3.10.3.1 Web Redirection
The web redirection component enables Liberty-enabled entities to provide iden-
tity management services to users. There are two options for web redirection,
namely HTTP-redirect and Form-POST (see section 4.1 of [56]). Both options
create a communication channel between IdPs and SPs via the User Agent. Note
that the term User Agent is used to mean software running on the consumer
host acting on the user’s behalf, e.g. http client software or a web browser.
3.10.3.2 Web Services
The web services component consists of a set of protocol profiles which enable
Liberty-enabled entities to directly communicate. In the Liberty context, a pro-
tocol profile means a combination of message content specification and message
transport mechanisms, which includes possible mappings of protocol messages
exchanged by IdPs and SPs to particular means of communications (e.g. HTTP
and SOAP, described immediately below). Protocol profiles are grouped into
categories according to the protocol message intent, as follows (see section 3 of
[37]):
• Single Sign-On and Federation;
• Name Registration;
• Federation Termination Notification;
• Single Logout;
• Identity Provider Introduction;
• Name Identifier Mapping;
• Name Identifier Encryption.
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A number of Liberty protocol interaction steps occur directly between sys-
tem entities (in addition to other steps occurring via web redirection), and are
based on Remote-Procedure-Call-like (RPC-like) protocol messages conveyed
via the SOAP protocol [29, 74]. SOAP is a widely implemented specification for
RPC-like interactions and message communications, which uses the Extensible
Markup Language32 (XML) and Hypertext Transfer (HTTP) [62] protocols (see
section 4.2 of [56]).
3.10.3.3 Metadata and Schemas
This Liberty architectural component consists of a set of metadata and for-
mats used by Liberty-enabled sites to communicate a variety of provider-specific
(and other) information. Metadata and schemas are generic terms referring to
a variety of subclasses of information and associated formats exchanged be-
tween SPs and IdPs. The Liberty subclasses of exchanged information are:
Account/Identity, Authentication Context, and Provider Metadata (see section
4.3 of [56]).
3.10.4 Liberty Architecture
As stated by Tourzan and Koga [173], the Liberty architecture consists of a
multi-level layered specification set, based on open standards including the Secu-
rity Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [128] and SOAP (see section 3.10.3.2).
The Liberty architecture has three major components:
• The Liberty Identity Federation Framework (ID-FF), which specifies core
protocols, schemata and profiles that allow implementers to create a stan-
dardised identity federation network.
• The Liberty Identity Web Services Framework (ID-WSF), which consists
32http://www.w3.org/XML/
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of a set of schemata, protocols and profiles used to provide identity ser-
vices, such as identity service discovery and invocation.
• The Liberty Identity Service Interface Specifications (ID-SIS), which utilise
the ID-WSF and ID-FF to provide services that depend on network iden-
tity, such as contacts, presence detection or wallet services.
We discuss these three Liberty architecture components in more detail in
the following sections.
3.10.5 Liberty Identity Federation Framework (ID-FF)
The main goal of the Liberty Identity Federation Framework (ID-FF) is to estab-
lish a basic structure to support a range of network identity based interactions,
and give business:
• a basis for new revenue opportunities, building upon existing relationships
with consumers and partners; and
• a framework that gives consumers choice, convenience and control when
using any Internet-connected device.
In this federated commerce scenario, a user’s online identity, personal profile,
personalised online configurations, buying habits, and shopping preferences are
administered by the user and securely shared with organisations of the user’s
choosing. A federated network identity model can then ensure that critical
private information is only used by appropriate parties.
The first step to realising a federated identity infrastructure is the establish-
ment of a standardised, multi-vendor, Web-based single sign-on with federated
identifiers, based on today’s commonly deployed technologies. A general specifi-
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cation of the Liberty ID-FF structure, which offers an approach for implement-
ing such a scheme, is given by Wason et al. [56].
As stated in section 2 of [56], Liberty ID-FF has two main facets: identity
federation and single sign-on, which are described immediately below.
3.10.5.1 Liberty Identity Federation
When a user first uses an IdP to login to an SP, she must be given the opportu-
nity to federate any existing SP local identity with the identity she has at the
IdP. Identity federation then involves linking distinct SP and IdP user accounts,
and associating an opaque user handle with the two local user identities. This
account linkage underlies and enables other facets of Liberty ID-FF.
Identity federation must only take place given prior agreement between IdPs
and SPs. It should also be predicated upon notifying the user, obtaining the
user’s consent, and recording both the notification and consent in an auditable
fashion.
After federation, the IdP and the SP share a pair of unlinkable pseudonyms
(opaque user handles) for the user, one for each direction. They do not need to
know one another’s local identity for the user.
3.10.5.2 Liberty Single Sign-On
Single sign-on allows a user to sign on once with an IdP in a federated group of
SPs (or, from a provider’s point of view, with a member of a circle of trust) and,
after that, use other websites from the group without signing on again. Single
sign-on is enabled once a user’s IdP and SP identities have been federated.
From a user’s perspective, single sign-on is realised when the user logs into an
IdP, and uses multiple affiliated SPs without having to sign on again, as shown
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in Figure 3.16. This process requires federation of the user’s local identifiers
between the applicable IdPs and SPs.
User
IdP SP
Agent
1. User 
logs in
    2. SP 
recognises 
    user
Figure 3.16: Liberty user logs in at IdP and is recognised by SP
3.10.5.3 Single Sign-On and Federation Protocol
The Liberty single sign-on and identity federation processes are supported by
the Single Sign-On and Federation Protocol, as specified by Cantor and Kemp
[36]. This protocol enables both identity federation (see section 4.4.1 of [56])
and single sign-on (see section 4.4.2 of [56]) in a single overall flow. A variety
of profiles implementing this overall protocol flow (see section 4.4.3 of [56]) are
defined by Cantor, Kemp and Champagne [37].
3.10.6 Liberty IdentityWeb Services Framework (ID-WSF)
The Liberty ID-FF framework previously described requires the use of federated
network identifiers. The Liberty ID-WSF builds upon this foundation and pro-
vides a framework for identity-based web services in a federated network identity
environment. A general specification of the Liberty ID-WSF framework is given
by Tourzan and Koga [173].
As stated by Tourzan and Koga [173], the Liberty ID-WSF defines a SOAP
based invocation framework (see section 3.10.3.2), which allows identity Web
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services to be discovered and invoked. Figure 3.17 [173] illustrates the Liberty
entities involved in a possible scenario for identity Web service invocation.
User
      Web
   Service
 Consumer
Sets permissions,
     Web
  Service
 Provider
 Trusted
Authority provides inputs
1. Creates service
       assertion
   2. Invokes service
with service assertion
Sets permissions,
provides inputs
Figure 3.17: Identity Web service invocation
As shown in the figure above, once a service has been discovered and suf-
ficient authorisation data has been received from a Trusted Authority, the in-
voking entity, called the Web Service Consumer, may invoke the service at the
hosting/relying entity, called the Web Service Provider.
In order to convey the fact that a Liberty entity has the right to access a
resource, the ID-WSF framework defines extensions so that service invocation
authorisation data may be generated by a Trusted Authority, and then issued to
the invoking entity. The Web Service Provider can make access control decisions
using this authorisation data, based on its business practices and the preferences
of the resource owner.
The Trusted Authority is, in most cases, an IdP/Discovery Service, which
defines mechanisms for describing and discovering identity web services. An
identity web service is a type of web service whose operations are indexed by
identities (see section 1.1 of [23]). An identity will typically have one or more
discovery services on the network, which allow other entities to discover its
identity services.
A discovery service is thus a type of identity service that allows requesters
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to discover resource offerings associated with a given identity (see section 5 of
[23]). A resource offering is the association of a resource and a service instance
that provides access to that resource (see section 4 of [23]). A service instance
is a running web service at a distinct protocol endpoint (see section 3 of [23]).
The Liberty ID-WSF framework also defines an Interaction Service protocol
[12]. This protocol provides schemas and profiles to enable an entity to interact
with the owner of a resource that is exposed by a Web Service Provider. An
example of a use of the Interaction Service would be to query the user for
permissions in a web services context.
Finally, the Liberty Alliance has defined a Personal Profile service [115]
for use with the Liberty ID-WSF framework. This service is designed to enable
account creation in a web services context. The Personal Profile service provides
a schema for requests for personal information, which allows a Web Service
Consumer to gather the information necessary to create an account or provide
personalised services.
3.10.7 Liberty Identity Service Interface Specifications (ID-
SIS)
The Liberty ID-SIS component provides a collection of identity Web service
specifications and corresponding implementation guidelines, which can be sum-
marised as follows:
Personal Profile (PP). The ID-SIS-PP service specification [115] describes
a Web service that provides a user’s basic profile information (such as
her name or contact details). A user might typically have two ID-SIS-
PP service instances, one for a work identity and another for a private
identity. The implementation guidelines that supplement the ID-SIS-PP
specification are given in [114].
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Employee Profile (EP). The ID-SIS-EP service specification [113] describes
a Web service that provides an employee’s basic profile information. The
implementation guidelines that supplement the ID-SIS-EP specification
are given in [112].
Contact Book (CB). The ID-SIS-CB service specification [55] describes a
Web service offering contact information. The implementation guidelines
that supplement the ID-SIS-CB specification, which offer the ability to
manage a contact directory, are given in [50].
Geolocation (GL). The ID-SIS-GL service specification [52] describes a Web
service offering geolocation information associated with a user, including
position, speed and direction33. The implementation guidelines that sup-
plement the ID-SIS-GL specification are given in [73].
Presence (PRES). The ID-SIS-PRES service specification [54] describes a
Web service offering presence information associated with a user. The im-
plementation guidelines that supplement the ID-SIS-PRES specification,
which focus on guidelines for Presence Service Providers and Presence
Service Clients, are given in [53].
3.10.8 Liberty Security Mechanisms
Table 3.1 [173] summarises the security mechanisms which, as described below,
are incorporated in Liberty implementations at two different layers: channel se-
curity and message security. It also summarises the security-oriented processing
requirements placed on Liberty implementations. A complete specification of
the Liberty security mechanisms is given by Ellison, Hirsch and Madsen [58].
Separate security mechanism SAML [128] profiles, defining in particular the use
33ID-SIS-GL may also provide geolocation information in a more human readable format
(e.g. street, city, region, and country).
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of Liberty security tokens34, are also given by Ellison, Hirsch and Madsen [57].
A complementary specification of the Liberty ID-WSF authentication service,
which permits a Liberty-enabled User Agent (LUA — see section 3.10.3.1) to
authenticate with an IdP and obtain a security token, is given by Hodges and
Aarts [78].
Table 3.1: Liberty security mechanisms
Security Mechanism Channel Security Message Security
Confidentiality. Required. Optional.
Per-message data integrity. Not applicable. Required.
Transaction integrity. Not applicable. Required.
Data origin authentication. Not applicable. Required.
Non-repudiation. Not applicable. Required.
3.10.8.1 Channel Security
Channel security covers how communications between IdPs, SPs, and User
Agents are to be protected. Liberty implementations must use either TLS or
SSL (see section 3.6.3) for channel security, or another communication secu-
rity protocol with similar security characteristics, e.g. IPsec (see section 3.6.5).
Critical issues for Liberty channel security include the following:
• SPs are required to authenticate IdPs using IdP server-side certificates.
IdPs have the option to require authentication of SPs using SP client-side
certificates.
• Each SP must specify a list of authorised IdPs, and each IdP is required
to be equipped with a list of authorised SPs. Thus any SP-IdP pair must
be mutually authorised before they engage in Liberty interactions. Such
authorisation occurs in addition to the authentication process.
34The possession of a security token entitles the Liberty user to invoke services of the IdP,
such as the Single-Sign-On service.
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• The authenticated identifier of an IdP must be presented to a user before
the user presents personal authentication data (or credentials) to that IdP.
3.10.8.2 Message Security
Message security covers security mechanisms applied to the Liberty protocol
messages (such as requests and assertions) passed between IdPs, SPs, and User
Agents. These messages are exchanged across the communication channels
whose security characteristics were discussed above. Critical issues for Liberty
message security include the following:
• Liberty protocol messages must be digitally signed and verified, providing
data integrity, data origin authentication, and a basis for non-repudiation
(see section 2.1.1.4).
• IdPs and SPs must use cryptographic key pairs that are distinct from the
key pairs used for TLS or SSL channel protection, and that are suitable
for long-term signatures.
• In transactions between SPs and IdPs, message requests must be protected
against replay, and received responses must be checked for correct corre-
spondence with issued requests. Time-based assurance of freshness may
also be employed in Liberty message exchanges. These security techniques
provide transaction integrity.
• To become members of a Liberty circle of trust, providers must estab-
lish bilateral agreements on selecting CAs, obtaining X.509 credentials
(see section 2.1.3.3), establishing and managing trusted public keys, and
managing the life cycles of corresponding credentials.
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The aim of this chapter is to describe the problem domain which forms the
main focus of this thesis. In addition we describe a variety of different scenarios
related to Internet remote access authentication; these scenarios serve to further
illustrate this problem domain.
Section 4.1 establishes the Internet remote access problem domain; this dis-
cussion covers a number of different issues, including remote dynamic service
provider selection, tunnelled authentication procedures for carrying EAP, EAP
encapsulated authentication methods, transport schemes for EAP, and current
ad hoc solutions for Internet remote access.
Section 4.2 identifies a variety of different authentication scenarios for Inter-
net remote access; the first two are categorised in terms of which layer in the
protocol stack security services are provided. Next we depict a scenario cover-
ing the case where no security services are provided at the lower layers of the
protocol hierarchy. We then describe further scenarios involving respectively
mobile IP, personal area networks, and limited free access.
165
4. Internet Authentication Problem Domain & Scenarios
4.1 Problem Domain
Internet remote access networks which are not physically secured against unau-
thorised use are typically set up so that roaming entities are obliged to go
through an authentication process. In some scenarios, an IP-based device is re-
quired to authenticate itself to the network prior to being authorised to use it.
As stated in RFC 4058 [184], this authentication procedure usually requires a
protocol that can support a variety of authentication methods, dynamic service
provider selection, and roaming clients.
The Internet remote access authentication process thus needs a protocol
between the remote entity and the network capable of transporting multiple
authentication methods, e.g. CHAP (see section 3.3.1) and TLS (see section
3.6.3). In the light of the abundance of access technologies, e.g. GSM (section
3.5.1), IEEE 802.11 [85], and Bluetooth1, it is important that the authentication
protocol is able to carry a range of different authentication methods regardless
of the underlying access technology.
In the absence of a link layer authentication mechanism that can satisfy
these needs, current architectures fill the gap by using a number of methods
which are far from ideal, both architecturally and from a security perspective.
Operators typically adopt one of the following three approaches: use of non-
standard ad hoc solutions at layers above the link layer, insertion of additional
protocol layers for authentication, or misuse of an existing protocol in ways that
were not intended by its designer.
Examples of such approaches include: inserting an additional layer between
the link layer and the network layer for client authentication (e.g. PPPoE [129]),
overloading another network layer protocol to achieve this goal (e.g. Mobile IPv4
[153], with a Registration-required flag), and even defining ad hoc application
1http://www.bluetooth.com/
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layer authentication mechanisms (e.g. http redirects with web-based login). As
stated in RFC 4058 [184], “in the absence of physical security (and sometimes in
addition to it) a higher layer (L2+) access authentication mechanism is needed”.
In these and other cases, a network layer authentication protocol may provide
a cleaner solution to the authentication problem.
This section establishes the problem domain for Internet remote access au-
thentication; this discussion covers a number of different issues, including remote
dynamic service provider selection (section 4.1.1), tunnelled authentication for
carrying EAP (section 4.1.2), EAP encapsulated authentication methods (sec-
tion 4.1.3), transport schemes for EAP (section 4.1.4), and current ad hoc so-
lutions for Internet remote access (section 4.1.5).
4.1.1 Remote Dynamic Service Provider Selection
As stated in RFC 4058 [184], an important aspect of an authentication protocol
for Internet remote access is the ability to provide dynamic service provider
selection to the remote entities. Regardless of their network access provider
(NAP), remote entities should be able to select an Internet access provider
(ISP) of their choice. Separation of the NAP from the ISP, and the creation of
a single NAP granting service for remote entities from multiple ISPs, are made
possible by this characteristic [144].
4.1.2 Tunnelled Authentication for Carrying EAP
Support for a variety of authentication methods, including those providing dy-
namic service provider selection and support for roaming clients, can be achieved
by using tunnelled authentication mechanisms (see sections 3.2.2 and 3.7) and
even new arrangements. This thesis focuses on scenarios in which tunnelled au-
thentication protocols that can carry EAP [13] are used. This is because EAP is
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very flexible and can encapsulate arbitrary authentication methods (see section
3.4).
4.1.3 EAP Encapsulated Authentication Methods
Although most of the tunnelled authentication mechanisms proposed in IETF
documents advocate the use of EAP, they do not discuss which authentication
methods would be most suitable to be carried by EAP in particular practical
applications. For example, if a remote entity wishes to access real time media
applications available via the Internet through an access network, delay is not
a good feature. So, in such situations, it would be important to reduce the
number of round trips needed for the authentication protocol carried by EAP.
Indeed, in such a case it may be important to consider if it is really necessary
to use a challenge-response protocol for authentication. As stated in [127], a
lightweight authentication method based on a one-time-pad, hash chains (see
sections 2.1.3.2 and 3.3.3) or some kind of cryptographic random number se-
quence may sometimes be more suitable in such circumstances.
By using EAP to encapsulate (or carry) authentication methods, it is thus
possible to create new authentication solutions at the application layer. This
can be achieved, for instance, through the EAP encapsulation of authentication
protocols arising from the mobile telecommunications sphere, or of public key
based authentication protocols.
4.1.4 Transport Schemes for EAP
The use of EAP requires the provision of a transport scheme between the remote
entity and the Internet access network (see section 3.4). Among the current
access technologies, only IEEE 802 defines how to carry EAP at the link layer
[84]. Other link layer technologies require the implementer to make a choice
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between using PPP [168] or PPPoE [129] as a link layer agnostic way of carrying
EAP, given that PPP-based authentication can provide some of the required
functionality.
However, just using PPP for authentication is not a good choice, since insert-
ing this additional layer between the link layer and network layer has undesirable
properties. According to RFC 4058 [184],“using PPP just for remote entity au-
thentication incurs additional messaging during the connection setup and extra
per-packet processing. It also forces the network topology to a point-to-point
model”.
Defining a network layer transport for EAP, such as the proposed tunnelled
authentication solutions (see sections 3.6 and 3.7), or other possible arrange-
ments, provides a cleaner answer to the problem. As stated in RFC 4058 [184],
such solutions provide support for a variety of authentication methods, dynamic
service provider selection and roaming clients. In addition, it is also possible
to define a link layer agnostic carrier for the EAP protocol, without having to
incur the additional costs and limitations of inserting another layer in the stack,
as in the case of PPP.
4.1.5 Ad Hoc Solutions for Internet Remote Access
For the time being, while a network layer authentication solution (see section
4.1.4) has not been approved as a standard, implementers are forced to design
their own ad hoc solutions to the Internet remote authentication problem. One
such solution is the application layer authentication method implemented using
http redirects and web-based login2. In this method, once the link is established,
user traffic is re-directed to a web server, which in turn generates a web-based
2This solution can, for example, be used for web mail access; however this is not exactly
an Internet remote access example, but instead an instance of access to an Internet service. A
better example would be the use of http redirects with web-based login to DSL networks (see
section 3.2.1) that use DHCP (see section 3.6.5.4) as a configuration method, as described in
section 4.2.3.
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login, forcing users to provide the authentication information. In addition to
being a non-standard solution, this method has well-known vulnerabilities, and
therefore must only be considered as a stop-gap solution.
Another approach to providing network access authentication is based on
overloading an existing network layer protocol. The Mobile IPv4 [153] protocol
has a built-in authentication mechanism which works in this fashion. Never-
theless, such a solution has very limited applicability as a link layer agnostic
method, since it relies on use of the Mobile IPv4 protocol.
4.2 Scenarios
The authentication scenarios for Internet remote access identified in this sec-
tion were adapted from the handling scenarios described in Appendix B of RFC
4058 [184]. The first two, described in sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, are categorised
in terms of which layer in the protocol stack the security services are provided.
Next, in section 4.2.3, we give a scenario covering the case where no security
services are provided at the lower layers. We then describe three further sce-
narios involving respectively mobile IP (section 4.2.4), personal area networks
(section 4.2.5), and limited free access (section 4.2.6).
4.2.1 Tunnelled Authentication with Physical Security
In Internet access networks where a certain level of security is provided at phys-
ical layer, authenticating the remote entity is still important, since the physical
layer does not provide information on the remote entity. Instead, if physical
layer security is provided, then per-packet authentication (or message authen-
tication, as described in section 2.1.2) and encryption do not necessarily need
to be provided at higher layers. To illustrate this, we cite DSL networks (as
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described in section 3.2.1) implemented on top of point-to-point phone lines.
In this type of network, tunnelled authentication can be used both for entity
authentication and as a hook to Internet remote access control.
There are a number of possible use scenarios for DSL networks with respect
to remote entity configuration and authentication. In DSL networks in which
PPP is used for both configuration and authentication, and even IP encapsula-
tion, the providers may not need to migrate to more sophisticated authentication
methods such as tunnelled solutions. This is because they can take advantage of
the built-in PPP authentication method, without incurring additional costs, and
without the limitations associated with inserting another layer in the protocol
stack.
By contrast, some DSL networks use configuration methods other than PPP,
e.g. DHCP (see section 3.6.5.4) or static IP configuration. Such networks use
either an ad hoc network access authentication method, such as http-redirect
with web-based login (see section 4.1.5), or no authentication method at all.
In this case a new Internet remote access authentication procedure is needed.
Thus a tunnelled authentication mechanism that can carry EAP, and/or even a
public key based solution or a solution arising from the mobile communication
sphere, can be used to meet this requirement.
4.2.2 Tunnelled Authentication with Link Security
In a number of situations, link layers might only be protected by security mech-
anisms outside the scope of an authentication protocol. In such cases, a higher
layer authentication protocol carrying EAP can be used to regulate Internet
access for remote entities. One example of such a scenario is provided by web-
based login (see section 4.1.5) in current Wi-Fi3 networks. Although in this
kind of WLAN it is possible to enable Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) secu-
3http://www.weca.net/
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rity to perform message authentication, WEP fails to meet its security design
goal (see, for example, Walker [177]). In particular, the WEP encryption pro-
cedure is a fundamentally unsound construction. For further details see, for
example, Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir [63], who present several weaknesses in
the mode of operation of the stream cipher RC4 (see section 2.1.3.2) used by
WEP4.
To provide entity authentication, the Wi-Fi Protected Access protocol imple-
ments 802.1X [84] and EAP (see section 3.4). Together, these schemes provide a
framework for more robust remote entity authentication. This framework uses
a central backend (AAA) authentication server, such as RADIUS (see section
3.9.1), to authenticate each remote entity wishing to gain network access.
A different approach can be found in the third generation standards for mo-
bile telecommunication systems, which include W-CDMA UMTS (section 3.5.3
describes this 3GPP5 standard) and the American CDMA2000 IS-2000 scheme
(section 3.5.5 describes this 3GPP26 standard). These mobile network standards
require remote entity authentication with the radio network (BS/MSC/VLR),
before providing connectivity to the mobile access network. Following com-
pletion of the ad hoc authentication process specific to the access technology,
link layer protection is provided. In particular, CDMA2000 networks offer two
types of access service, namely Simple IP and Mobile IP, which we next briefly
describe.
Simple IP: The Simple IP access service requires the remote entity to pro-
vide authentication credentials via PPP [168]. A RADIUS [161] based AAA
backend infrastructure is used to verify the credentials provided by the remote
entity, before network access is provided. Currently CDMA2000 networks in-
4IEEE 802.11–2007 [85] specifies the use of the Temporal Key Integrity Protocol to elimi-
nate the known WEP shortcomings.
5http://www.3gpp.org
6http://www.cdg.org/technology/3g.asp
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clude PPP as part of the protocol stack between the Mobile Node (MN), which
corresponds to the remote entity, and the Packet Data Serving Node (PDSN),
which corresponds to the Access Router.
Consequently, CDMA2000 networks rely on PPP functionality to authenti-
cate a remote user to the access network. However, it is possible that future
releases of the standard may not use PPP, but instead may adopt a simple fram-
ing scheme, such as High-level Data Link Control (HDLC [104]). In such a sce-
nario, network remote access authentication can be performed over CDMA2000
using a Simple IP service, e.g. using a tunnelled authentication mechanism car-
rying EAP, where EAP encapsulates an appropriate lightweight authentication
method.
Mobile IP: When the CDMA2000 MN chooses the Mobile IP [153] access
service, authentication is performed by the Foreign Agent (FA) in the PDSN,
which interacts with an AAA RADIUS [161] server (see Figure 4.1). The MN
credentials and the Network Access Identifier (NAI), i.e. the MN identifier,
are included in the Mobile IPv4 [153] Registration-Request message, issued by
the MN to the FA via the radio network. The FA then uses the NAI and
the MN credentials contained in the MN-AAA authentication extension in the
RADIUS Access-Request message. After a successful response message from the
RADIUS server (Access-Accept), the registration-request message is forwarded
to the Home Agent (HA)7.
This model merges an IP mobility scheme with network remote access au-
thentication. The problem with this authentication model is that it can only be
used in IPv4 networks in which every client implements mobile node function-
ality. A more flexible approach would be to separate network remote access and
Mobile IPv4. Such an approach, i.e. a tunnelled authentication mechanism car-
7The HA may be assigned by the visited access provider network or by the home IP
network.
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Figure 4.1: AAA infrastructure for Mobile IPv4 service in a
CDMA2000 network
rying EAP, would be used to authenticate the user for network remote access,
and the Mobile IPv4 messages would be sent after the authentication process
has completed.
Since EAP is used, such an approach would be more flexible, since it enables
different authentication schemes to be supported rather than relying on just
the HMAC-MD5 MAC scheme (see section 2.1.3.2), which is the default MAC
algorithm for the Mobile IPv4 (MN-AAA) authentication extension [153].
The IP mobility solution for IPv6 networks, described in [110], is slightly
different from that proposed for IPv4 networks [153]. When Mobile IPv6 is
deployed in CDMA2000 networks, the FA would no longer exist and, for this
reason, the IPv4 scheme would no longer work. In such a scenario, the MN would
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have to authenticate using another mechanism, and a tunnelled authentication
mechanism carrying EAP is a possible solution.
In short, in order to achieve a more flexible model, authentication for net-
work remote access, and authentication/authorisation for enabling IP Mobility,
should be separated. This can be accomplished by using a tunnelled authen-
tication mechanism carrying EAP for network remote access, with EAP en-
capsulating an appropriate authentication method, while allowing Mobile IP
implementations to adhere to RFCs 3344 [153] and 3775 [110].
4.2.3 Absence of Lower Layer Security
There are scenarios where neither physical nor link layer access security is avail-
able on the network. One possible reason for such a scenario is a lack of adequate
authentication capabilities in the link layer protocol in use. Link layer technolo-
gies generally provide a data encryption service, but inadequate authentication
method support. As we have discussed previously, it is desirable to be able to
support arbitrary authentication methods, without being limited to those that
are specific to the underlying technology. Another cause of missing lower layer
authentication is the difficulty of deployment.
Assuring physical security or enabling link layer security might not be prac-
tical in a number of scenarios. In the absence of such lower layer security and
entity authentication schemes, not only are providers unable to control the use
of their networks, but users will potentially also feel insecure while exchanging
sensitive information.
In order to support authentication functionality in such systems, many
providers today use a higher layer authentication scheme, e.g. http-redirect,
commonly known as web-based login (see section 4.1.5). While this method
partially solves the problem by allowing only authorised users to access the net-
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work, it does not support lower layer security mechanisms, including per-packet
(message) authentication and encryption. Moreover, it is a non-standard ad hoc
solution that provides only limited authentication method support.
In such scenarios, a standard network layer solution, such as a tunnelled
authentication mechanism carrying EAP, would be appropriate, since it would
provide link layer agnostic Internet remote access authentication. In fact, a
tunnelled authentication mechanism carrying EAP can support a variety of
authentication schemes, and is also capable of enabling lower layer security. This
solution may be appropriate if it can specify authentication methods that can
derive and distribute keys for the authentication, integrity and confidentiality
of data traffic, either at the link or the network layer.
For example, if the link layer does not support the desired authentication
method but supports encryption, a tunnelled authentication mechanism can
be used to bootstrap the latter. On the other hand, if the link layer neither
supports the desired authentication method nor encryption, a tunnelled au-
thentication mechanism carrying EAP can be used to bootstrap higher layer
security protocols, such as IKE (see section 3.6.2) and IPsec (see section 3.6.5).
Thus use of a tunnelled authentication mechanism carrying EAP can result
in a secured network environment, even in cases where the underlying layers do
not have built-in security features. Also, assuming EAP will support a variety
of authentication schemes, providers will have the advantage of using a single
framework across multiple environments. Such flexibility seems likely to be
important for heterogeneous network access supporting ubiquitous mobility.
4.2.4 Mobile IP
As described in section 4.2.2, Mobile IPv4 defines its own authentication ex-
tensions to authenticate and authorise mobile nodes at both foreign agents and
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home agents. One of the possible modes of Mobile IPv4 involves the mobile node
using a co-located care-of address, and therefore does not rely on any mobility
management functionality of the foreign agent on the remote access network.
In this case, a mobile node can send its registration-request message directly
to the home agent. Even in the co-located care-of address case, the protocol can
require mobile nodes to register with a foreign agent by setting the Registration-
Required bit in the agent advertisements. The problem here is that this forces
mobile nodes to send their registration-request messages via a foreign agent,
even though they would not interact with that agent.
This type of Mobile IP registration is used for performing network remote
access authentication. As discussed previously, another problem with this re-
mote authentication model is that it can only be used in IPv4 networks where
every client implements mobile node functionality. Even for IPv4 clients, a
more flexible approach would be to replace this protocol-specific authentication
method by a common authentication protocol, such as a tunnelled authentica-
tion mechanism carrying EAP.
A solution of this latter type can be used with any client, regardless of Mobile
IPv4 support; it can support various authentication methods, and can also be
used with IPv6 clients. Mobile IPv6 [110] does not define a foreign agent in the
access networks, or provide any protocol support for access authentication.
4.2.5 Personal Area Networks
As defined by Ohba et al. [144], “a personal area network (PAN) is the inter-
connection of devices within the range of an individual person”. For example,
connecting a cellular phone, a PDA, and a laptop via short range wireless links
would form a PAN.
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Devices in a PAN can directly communicate with each other; moreover, they
can potentially access the Internet if any one of them is specifically designated
as a mobile router and provides gateway functionality. Just like a remote access
network, a PAN will typically also require authentication and authorisation prior
to granting access to its clients. A mobile router can terminate the link layer
from a PAN node, and act as the first-hop router for it.
Additionally, a mobile router can also perform access control as an authen-
tication agent. PAN nodes might be using a variety of different link layer tech-
nologies to connect to a mobile router. Therefore, to simplify the task of the
router, it is desirable to use authentication methods that are independent of
the underlying link, e.g. those relying on a link layer agnostic authentication
protocol, such as a tunnelled mechanism carrying EAP.
Another characteristic of a PAN is its small scale. In most cases, a PAN
will consist of only a handful of nodes; thus the authentication process does not
necessarily require a managed backend AAA infrastructure for credential veri-
fication. Locally stored information can be used in a tunnelled authentication
deployment carrying EAP, without relying on a AAA backend.
The 3GPP architecture allows separation of a mobile termination (MT) de-
vice, such as a cellular phone, and a piece of termination equipment (TE), such
as a laptop [182]. A TE can be connected to the Internet via a MT by es-
tablishing a PPP connection. One or more TEs can be connected to a MT to
form a PAN. The current architecture does not allow direct communication
between the TEs (if more than one are connected to the MT) without having
to go through the cellular interface of the MT.
This architecture will benefit from using shared links (e.g. using Ethernet)
between the TE and the MT. Shared links would allow TEs to communicate di-
rectly with one another, without having to send data through the power-limited
MT, or over the expensive air interface. A tunnelled authentication mechanism
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carrying EAP can be used for authenticating PAN nodes when shared links are
used between TEs and the MT.
4.2.6 Limited Free Access
As stated by Ohba et al. [144], certain networks might allow clients to access
a limited part of the network topology without any explicit authentication and
authorisation. For example, in an airport network, information such as flight
arrival and departure gate numbers, and information about airport shops and
restaurants, are offered as free services by the airlines or airport authorities for
their passengers. In order to access such information, users can simply plug
their devices into the network, without performing any authentication.
The network will typically only offer link layer connectivity and limited net-
work layer access to users. Access to further services or sites, using such local
networks, requires authentication and authorisation. If users want such services,
the access network can detect that attempt and initiate a user authentication
procedure. This also allows the network to initiate authentication whenever ap-
propriate. Once a user has successfully performed the authentication procedure,
it will be allowed to go beyond the free access zone.
A tunnelled authentication mechanism carrying EAP can be an enabler to
such limited free access scenarios, and can also offer a flexible access control
framework for public hot-spot networks.
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The aim of this chapter is to provide a sound basis for the assessment of
candidate entity authentication protocols against Internet remote access require-
ments. We define two main requirement sets, namely security requirements and
implementation requirements.
Firstly, to establish the security requirements, we analyse and compare po-
tential risks associated with entity authentication protocols, examining a num-
ber of aspects of entity authentication security for Internet remote access (sec-
tion 5.1). Secondly, to obtain the implementation requirements, we analyse and
compare features such as complexity, flexibility and performance (section 5.2).
The result of this critical analysis is then used to derive the security and
implementation services and properties required of new entity authentication
schemes for Internet access. These requirements are used to define and limit
the scope of this thesis (section 5.3).
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5.1 Security Requirements
The provision of a secure network access service requires the implementation of
access control based on the mutual authentication and authorisation of clients
and access networks. Initial and subsequent client-to-network authentication
methods provide parameters that are needed to police the traffic flow through
the enforcement points1. This thesis focuses on authentication protocols that
carry such parameters between the client and the access network.
In this section, we analyse and compare potential risks associated with the
entity authentication protocols considered in this thesis, examining a number of
aspects of security for Internet remote access, including: client authentication
(section 5.1.1), key establishment (section 5.1.2), use of EAP methods (section
5.1.3), mutual entity authentication (section 5.1.4), key freshness (section 5.1.5),
re-authentication (section 5.1.6), authorisation, access control and accounting
(section 5.1.7), AAA Backend infrastructure (section 5.1.8), absence of a secure
channel (section 5.1.9), Denial-of-Service attacks (section 5.1.10), and client
identity confidentiality (section 5.1.11). Some of the security requirements de-
scribed here were adapted from RFC 4058 [184].
5.1.1 Client Authentication
New Internet remote access authentication schemes, such as those proposed in
this thesis, must enable authentication of the client, i.e. the remote device, to the
access network. This involves the client providing the credentials (see section
2.2.1) necessary to prove its identity. A client identifier can be authenticated
by verifying the credentials supplied by one of the users of the device, or by the
device itself.
1An enforcement point is a node on the access network where per-packet enforcement
policies (i.e. filters) are applied on the inbound and outbound traffic of client devices.
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Once network access is granted to the device, methods that may be used by
the device to control which users can access the network are outside the scope
of this thesis. After a successful client authentication procedure for remote net-
work access, the methods that might be used to provide message authentication
(section 2.1.1.2), integrity (section 2.1.1.3), and replay protection (sections 2.2.4
and 2.2.5) for data traffic, are also outside the scope of this thesis. That is, we
focus here purely on the authentication and key establishment processes, and
not on subsequent use made of the authenticated channel and/or keys that may
have been established.
5.1.2 Key Establishment
As discussed in section 2.2.4, a key establishment facility enables network remote
access authentication schemes to be linked to an integrity service, in order to
provide ongoing data origin authentication and integrity. To achieve this, the
entity authentication protocol needs to be integrated with a key establishment
mechanism, such that a by-product of successful authentication is a session key,
appropriate for use with an integrity mechanism used to protect subsequently
exchanged data.
The following example shows the importance of providing this feature in In-
ternet remote access authentication schemes. Certain types of service theft are
possible when the device identifier of the remote client is not protected during
or after an authentication protocol exchange; see, for example, [151]. Inter-
net remote access methods should thus have the capability to exchange device
identifiers securely between the authentication client and the access network, in
cases where the network is vulnerable to MitM attacks (see section 3.2.3). One
way of solving this problem (see, for example, [18]) requires cryptographic key
generation to take place at both the remote client and in the access network.
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5.1.3 Use of EAP Methods
Since the EAP protocol (see section 3.4) is very flexible and can encapsulate
arbitrary authentication methods (section 4.1.3), it is clearly a protocol that
satisfies many of the requirements for a variety of authentication scenarios.
Therefore we subsequently assume that Internet remote access authentication
schemes will make use of a tunnelled authentication mechanism carrying EAP
(see section 4.1.2).
In networks which are not physically secured against unauthorised use (see
section 4.2.3), link-layer or network-layer encryption mechanisms, such as IPsec
(see section 3.6.5), can be used to provide such security. However, these mech-
anisms require the presence of keying material at the authentication client (see
section 2.1.3.3).
Many EAP methods are capable of generating initial keying material, but
this material cannot be directly used with IPsec. This is because it lacks the
properties of an IPsec SA (see section 3.6.5.3), which includes secure cipher suite
negotiation, mutual proof of possession of keying material (see section 2.2.5),
and freshness of transient session keys (see section 2.2.5). However, these initial
EAP keys can be used with an IPsec key management protocol, such as IKE
(see section 3.6.2), to generate the required security associations. A separate
‘secure association protocol’, such as ISAKMP (see section 3.6.1), is required to
generate an IPsec SA using the EAP keys.
5.1.4 Mutual Entity Authentication
The authentication client and the network may be able to perform mutual au-
thentication in some Internet remote access schemes. Indeed, just providing the
capability for the network to authenticate the client may not always be suffi-
cient. Nevertheless, a mutual authentication capability is not always required.
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For example, clients might not need to authenticate the access network when
physical security is available to enable the client to implicitly authenticate the
network (e.g. dial-up networks).
Moreover, as described in section 2.2.5, although mutual authentication is
very commonly seen as the necessary precursor to the establishment of a secure
connection in any environment, there do exist examples of cases where mutual
authentication is not necessary, and, indeed, may impose unnecessary overheads
on session establishment. Hence, and following [136], we claim that (mutual)
entity authentication is not always an essential precursor for the establishment
of secure communications. In some cases, the most important issue is to en-
sure that the properties of (implicit) key authentication and key freshness are
provided for any established session keys. These session keys can be used to
protect the integrity of security-sensitive data exchanged during the session,
thereby preventing MitM attacks.
5.1.5 Key Freshness
As stated in section 2.2.5, a further property, useful in many applications, is key
freshness. The absence of key freshness would enable an interceptor to force the
verifier to keep re-using an ‘old’ session key, which might have been compro-
mised. It would therefore seem reasonable to make key freshness a requirement
for any key establishment processes within an authentication protocol designed
for use in the Internet remote access environment.
5.1.6 Re-Authentication
As described in section 2.2.4, authentication protocols provide assurance re-
garding the identity of an entity only at a given instant in time. Thus the
authenticity of the entity can be ascertained just for the instance of the au-
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thentication exchange. If continuity of such an assurance is required, use of
additional techniques is necessary. For example, authentication can be repeated
periodically.
New entity authentication schemes, such as those defined in this thesis,
should thus be capable of supporting both periodic and on-demand re-authentication.
Moreover, both the remote client and the access network should be able to ini-
tiate the initial authentication and the re-authentication processes.
5.1.7 Authorisation, Access Control, and Accounting
After a device has been authenticated by Internet remote access methods, it
will be authorised for network access. That is, the core requirement of Internet
remote access schemes is to verify if the client device has the authorisation to
send and receive IP packets. It may also be possible to provide finer granularity
authorisation, such as authorisation for use of individual network services (e.g.
use of http or ssh services).
While a backend authorisation infrastructure, e.g. RADIUS (see section
3.9.1) or Diameter (see section 3.9.2), might provide the necessary authorisation
information to the access network, explicit support for authorisation function-
ality is outside the scope of this thesis. Therefore, in assessing possible new
authentication schemes for Internet remote access, we do not consider the pos-
sible need for the access network to provide service authorisation information
to the authenticated client device.
Client remote access authentication should be followed by access control,
to make sure only authenticated and authorised clients can send and receive
IP packets via the access network. Access control would typically involve im-
plementing access control lists on the enforcement points. Although Internet
remote access schemes identify clients that are authorised to access the net-
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work, providing access control functionality in the network is outside the scope
of this thesis.
Finally, issues associated with the transfer and management of accounting
data are also outside the scope of this thesis.
5.1.8 AAA Backend
Internet remote access protocols, such as those proposed in this thesis, must
not make any assumptions regarding the backend authentication mechanisms.
An access network may interact with backend AAA infrastructures, such as
RADIUS (see section 3.9.1) or Diameter (see section 3.9.2), but it is not a
requirement. If the access network does not rely on a specific AAA protocol,
e.g. RADIUS or Diameter, it can use a proprietary backend system, or rely on
locally stored information.
The interaction between the access network and the backend authentication
entities is outside the main scope of this thesis.
5.1.9 Secure Channel
Authentication schemes for Internet remote access must not assume the presence
of a secure channel between the remote client and the access network. They
need to be able to provide a secure authentication service in networks which
are not protected against packet eavesdropping and spoofing. They should
provide protection against replay attacks on both the client device and the
access network.
Addressing this requirement partially relies on the mandatory use of EAP
methods (see section 5.1.3). Use of EAP methods that provide mutual authen-
tication and key derivation/distribution is essential to satisfy this requirement.
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EAP does not rely on the presence of a secure channel, and supports a variety
of authentication methods that can be used in such environments.
In addition, entity authentication protocols for Internet remote access should
not contain vulnerabilities that can be exploited when they are used over inse-
cure channels. Following RFC 4058 [184], they may provide a secure channel
by deploying a two-phase authentication process. The first phase can be used
for the creation of a secure channel, and the second phase for client and access
network authentication.
5.1.10 Denial-of-Service Attacks
Authentication schemes proposed for Internet remote access need to be robust
against Denial-of-Service attacks, in particular against ‘blind resource consump-
tion DoS attacks’ (see section 3.2.3). Such attacks could swamp the access net-
work, causing it to expend all available resources, and prevent network access
by legitimate clients.
5.1.11 Client Identity Confidentiality
Some remote clients might prefer to hide their identity from visited access net-
works for privacy reasons. Providing identity confidentiality for remote clients is
a potentially valuable feature, that it would be desirable for new authentication
schemes proposed for Internet remote access to provide (at least as an option).
5.2 Implementation Requirements
In this section, we analyse and compare implementation features of entity au-
thentication protocols applicable to this thesis, including: client identifiers (sec-
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tion 5.2.1), IP address assignment (section 5.2.2), EAP lower layer requirements
(section 5.2.3), flexibility (section 5.2.4), performance (section 5.2.5), complex-
ity (section 5.2.6), and IP version independence (section 5.2.7). Some of the
implementation requirements described in this section were adapted from RFC
4058 [184].
5.2.1 Client Identifiers
Any authentication scheme proposed for use in an Internet remote access en-
vironment should support a variety of client identifier types (e.g. username,
Network Access Identifier, etc.), as well as a variety of remote device identifier
types (e.g. IP address, link-layer address, port number of a switch, etc.).
An access network needs to be able to create a binding between the client
identifier and the associated device identifier upon successful entity authentica-
tion. This can be achieved as a result of the authentication method communicat-
ing the client identifier and the device identifier to the access network during the
protocol exchange. In order to prevent unauthorised access, the device identifier
can be cryptographically protected; this case is described in RFC 4016 [151]. In
this case, the keying material required by the cryptographic methods needs to
be indexed by the device identifier.
The binding between the client identifier and the associated device identifier
is typically used for access control and accounting in the access network (see
section 5.1.7).
5.2.2 IP Address Assignment
Assigning an IP address to the client of an authentication scheme for Internet
remote access is outside the scope of this thesis. We simply note here that the
189
5. Internet Remote Access Requirements
authentication client needs to configure an IP address before running the entity
authentication method.
5.2.3 EAP Lower Layer Requirements
EAP imposes many requirements on the underlying transport protocol that
must be satisfied if EAP is to operate correctly. RFC3748 [13] describes the
generic transport requirements to be satisfied by Internet remote access schemes
making use of EAP.
5.2.4 Flexibility
Entity authentication schemes for Internet remote access need to support client
devices with multiple interfaces, and access networks with multiple routers on
multi-access links. In other words, they should not assume that the client device
has only one network interface, that the access network has only one first hop
router, or that the remote client device is using a point-to-point link.
5.2.5 Performance
An Internet remote access method must efficiently handle the authentication
process in order to gain network access with minimum latency. For example, it
might minimise protocol signalling by creating local security associations.
5.2.6 Complexity
Following the example shown in section 4.1.3, if a remote entity wishes to access
real time media applications available on the Internet through an access network,
delay is an undesirable feature. Hence, in such situations, it would be highly
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desirable if the number of round trips needed by the authentication protocol
could be minimised.
By using EAP to carry lightweight authentication methods, it is possible
to create authentication solutions with low complexity at the application layer.
This can be achieved, for instance, through the EAP encapsulation of lightweight
authentication protocols arising from the mobile telecommunications sphere.
5.2.7 IP Version Independence
It is desirable that authentication schemes for Internet remote access can work
with both IPv4 and IPv6.
5.3 Services and Properties of New Authentica-
tion Protocols
In this section, the result of the critical analyses made in sections 5.1 and 5.2 is
used to deduce the security (section 5.3.1) and implementation (section 5.3.2)
services and properties required of new entity authentication protocols for In-
ternet remote access.
5.3.1 Security Services and Properties
The security services and properties required of new authentication schemes for
Internet access are as follows:
• entity authentication service for remote network access, verifying the client
supplied credentials;
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• key establishment services with the key freshness property;
• use of a tunnelled authentication mechanism carrying EAP;
• mutual entity authentication services between the remote client and the
access network;
• use of periodic and on-demand re-authentication techniques;
• possible interaction between the access network and backend AAA infras-
tructures (without the need to rely on a specific AAA protocol);
• absence of vulnerabilities that can be exploited over insecure channels
(protecting against replay attacks, eavesdropping and spoofing on both
the client device and the access network);
• robustness against DoS attacks, especially against ‘blind resource con-
sumption DoS attacks’ (see section 3.2.3); and
• identity confidentiality service for remote clients.
5.3.2 Implementation Services and Properties
The implementation services and properties required of new authentication
schemes for Internet access are as follows:
• support for a variety of identifier types for both authentication clients and
remote devices, including the ability to create a cryptographic binding
between the client identifier and the associated device identifier (upon
successful entity authentication protocol exchange);
• satisfaction of the EAP generic transport requirements;
• flexibility, by offering support to client devices with multiple interfaces,
and access networks with multiple routers on multi-access links;
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• performance, by efficiently handling the authentication process, in order
to gain network access with minimum latency;
• low complexity, with the goal of reducing the delay by using EAP encap-
sulation of lightweight authentication protocols; and
• IP version independence.
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The aim of this chapter is to justify the selection of the Protocol for carry-
ing Authentication for Network Access (PANA) as the target environment for
transporting the new Internet entity authentication schemes subsequently pro-
posed in this thesis. This Chapter describes the PANA protocol in more detail
(section 6.1), before explaining the reasons for choosing it as the transportation
environment (section 6.2).
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6.1 PANA Framework
IP based remote hosts that connect to the Internet via an access network will
typically need to provide their credentials and be authenticated before being
authorised to access the network. There is currently no generic network layer
protocol to be used to authenticate a user device requesting network access.
The IETF PANA protocol [65] is intended to address this issue.
As stated in section 3.7.5, PANA carries any authentication mechanism that
can be specified as an EAP method (see section 3.4), and can be used on any
link that supports IP. The PANA protocol specification provides the client-to-
network access authentication component of an overall secure network access
framework.
The aim of this section is to give a detailed description of the PANA frame-
work. Firstly we identify the goals of PANA and give an overview of the IETF
draft PANA protocol (section 6.1.1); we also list the terms used frequently in
PANA documents (section 6.1.2). Secondly, a brief description of the payload
of a PANA message, consisting of a series of Attribute Value Pairs (AVPs), is
provided (section 6.1.3). After that, we identify five distinct phases of a PANA
session, and describe them (section 6.1.4). We then summarise the PANA se-
curity association establishment process (section 6.1.5).
6.1.1 PANA Goals and Overview
The draft PANA protocol [65] provides a link layer agnostic and IP compatible
transport for EAP (see section 3.4), that allows a remote host to be authenti-
cated for network access. That is, PANA is a link layer agnostic transport for
EAP that enables client-to-network access authentication between a user device
(PANA Client or PaC) and a device at the network access point (PANA Au-
thentication Agent or PAA), where the network access device may optionally
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be a client of an AAA infrastructure (see sections 3.7.5 and 3.9). A summary
of the PANA protocol is given in Figure 6.1.
Local
PAA
Device
Credent ials
PANA SA
PPP,  802. 1x Opt ional
AAA I nf rast ructure
(RADI US,  Diameter)
PaC
Net work
AAA Client AAA server
AS
Figure 6.1: PANA protocol overview
The scope of the PANA draft [65] is thus the design of a link-layer agnostic
transport for network access authentication methods, where the EAP protocol
provides such authentication methods. In other words, PANA will carry EAP,
which can carry a variety of authentication methods. By virtue of enabling
transport of EAP above IP, any authentication method that can be carried
as an EAP method is made available to PANA, and hence to any link-layer
technology. As described in RFC 3748 [13], there is a clear division of labour
between PANA (an EAP lower layer), EAP, and EAP methods.
PANA is an UDP-based [156] protocol. It has its own retransmission mech-
anism to reliably deliver messages. As stated in [65], ‘the PANA protocol mes-
saging consists of a series of requests and responses, some of which may be
initiated by either end. Each message can carry zero or more AVPs as payload.
The main payload of PANA is EAP which performs authentication’. PANA
helps the PaC and the PAA to establish an EAP session.
A variety of access network scenarios can arise. For example, security ser-
vices may or may not be provided at lower layers in the protocol hierarchy, and
a variety of different client IP configuration and authentication methods might
be deployed. The IETF draft ‘PANA Framework’ [109] defines a general frame-
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work describing how these various deployment choices are handled by PANA
and the access network architectures.
Appendix A of RFC 4058 [184] contains the problem statement that led
to the development of PANA, whilst appendix B identifies a variety of envi-
ronments and scenarios for PANA. Potential security threats for network-layer
access authentication protocol are detailed in RFC 4016 [151]. The require-
ments for the PANA protocol are defined in RFC 4058 [184]. Some of these
requirements are imposed by the chosen payload, i.e. EAP (see section 3.4).
6.1.2 PANA Terminology
Terminology frequently used when discussing the PANA protocol is as follows
[65]:
PANA Client (PaC). The client side of the PANA protocol that resides in
the access device (e.g. laptop, PDA, etc.). It is responsible for providing
the credentials in order to prove its identity for the purposes of network
access authorisation. The PaC and the EAP peer (see section 3.4) are
assumed to be located in the same access device.
Device Identifier (DI). The identifier used by the network to control and
police the network access of a remote device. Depending on the access
technology, this identifier may contain an address that is carried in pro-
tocol headers (e.g. an IP or a link-layer address), or a local identifier that
is made available by the local protocol stack of a connected device (e.g. a
PPP interface id).
PANA Authentication Agent (PAA). The PANA protocol entity in the
access network responsible for verifying the credentials provided by a PaC,
and also for authorising network access to the client device, as identified
by a DI. The PAA and the EAP authenticator (and optionally the EAP
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server) are assumed to be located in the same node. The authentication
and authorisation procedure can, according to the EAP model (see section
3.4), also be oﬄoaded to the backend AAA infrastructure (see section 3.9).
PANA Session. A PANA session begins with a handshake between the PaC
and the PAA, and terminates as a result of an authentication or liveness
test failure, a message delivery failure after the number of retransmissions
reaches a maximum value, session lifetime (see below) expiration, or an
explicit termination message. A fixed session identifier (see below) is main-
tained throughout a session. A session cannot be shared across multiple
network interfaces. Only one DI can be bound to a PANA session.
Session Lifetime. A time period associated with a PANA session, which limits
its lifetime. For an established PANA session, the session lifetime is bound
to the lifetime of the current authorisation given to the PaC. The session
lifetime can be updated by a new round of EAP authentication, as long
as this occurs before the session expires.
Session Identifier. The session identifier (Session-Id) is used to uniquely iden-
tify a PANA session between a PAA and a PaC. It includes an identifier
for the PAA, and therefore it cannot be shared across multiple PAAs. It
is included in a PANA message to bind the message to a specific PANA
session. This bidirectional identifier is allocated by the PAA following the
handshake, and is freed for re-use when the session terminates.
PANA Security Association (PANA SA). A PANA security association
between a PaC and a PAA is made up of stored cryptographic keying ma-
terial and associated context. The security association is used to protect
bidirectional PANA signalling traffic between the PaC and the PAA.
Network Access Server (NAS). A network device that provides access to
the network.
Authentication Server (AS). An entity that authenticates the PaC. It may
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be co-located with the PAA, or it may be part of the AAA backend in-
frastructure (see section 3.9).
Enforcement Point (EP). A node on the access network at which per-packet
enforcement policies (i.e. filters) are applied to the traffic of access devices.
The PAA provides the unique DI to each client, together (optionally) with
cryptographic keys to be used to support client-based filtering by the EP.
The EP and the PAA may be co-located.
Network Access Provider (NAP). A service provider that provides physi-
cal and link-layer connectivity to an access network that it manages.
AAA-Key. A key derived by the EAP peer and EAP server and transported
to the EAP authenticator. A complete specification of the framework for
EAP key derivation, including the generation and use of EAP keys by
EAP methods and AAA protocols, is given in the 2007 Internet Draft
‘EAP Key Management Framework’ [18].
6.1.3 PANA Payload (AVPs)
The payload of any PANA message consists of a number (possibly zero) of AVPs
[65]. Possible PANA AVP types are as follows. A summary of the PANA header
format is given in section 3.7.5.
Cookie AVP: contains a random value generated by the PAA and used for
making PAA discovery robust against ‘blind resource consumption DoS
attacks’ (see section 3.2.3). For further details, see section 6.1.4.1.
Protection-Capability AVP: contains the type of per-packet protection pro-
vided, based on a link-layer or a network-layer cryptographic mechanism
enabled after the PANA authentication process.
Device-Id AVP: contains a device identifier for the PaC or the EP.
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EAP AVP: contains an EAP payload.
MAC AVP: contains a Message Authentication Code (see section 2.1.3.2) that
protects the integrity of a PANA message.
Termination-Cause AVP: contains the reason for session termination.
Result-Code AVP: contains information about the protocol execution re-
sults.
Session-Id AVP: contains the PANA session identifier value.
Session-Lifetime AVP: contains the duration of authorised access.
Failed-AVP: contains an offending AVP that caused a failure.
Provider-Identifier AVP: contains the identifier of a NAP or an Internet
Service Provider (ISP).
Provider-Name AVP: contains the name of a NAP or an ISP.
NAP-Information AVP, ISP-Information AVP: contains the identifier of
a NAP and an ISP, respectively.
Key-Id AVP: contains an AAA-Key identifier (see section 6.1.2).
PPAC AVP: Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP. Used to indicate the
available/chosen IP address configuration methods that can be used by
the PaC after successful PANA authentication.
Nonce AVP: contains a randomly chosen value (see sections 8.9 and 11.5 of
[65]) that is used in PANA cryptographic key computations, e.g. as a
PANA SA attribute; this AVP ‘must be included in the first PANA-
Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages in the authentication
and authorisation phase [described in section 6.1.4.2] when stateless PAA
discovery is used’ (see section 4.3 of [65]).
Notification AVP: contains a displayable message.
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6.1.4 PANA Phases
PANA messages are sent between the PaC and PAA as part of a PANA ses-
sion. A PANA session, illustrated in Figure 6.2, consists of five distinct phases
[65]: the discovery and handshake phase (section 6.1.4.1), the authentication
and authorisation phase (section 6.1.4.2), the access phase (section 6.1.4.3), the
re-authentication phase (section 6.1.4.4), and the termination phase (section
6.1.4.5).
PaC PAA
PANA-Start-Request
PANA-Bind-Request {EAP-Success}
PANA-Auth-Answer
PANA-Bind-Answer
Client Authenticating Party
PANA-PAA-Discover
PANA-Start-Answer
Discovery and
handshake 
phase
PANA-Auth-Request {EAP-Request}
PANA-Auth-Request {EAP-Response}
PANA-Auth-Answer
Authentication and
authorisation
phase
PANA-Ping-Answer
PANA-Ping-Request
PANA-Termination-Request
PANA-Termination-Answer
Access
phase (IP data
traffic allowed)
Termination
phase
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
(k)
(l)
(m)
Figure 6.2: Illustration of PANA messages in a session
6.1.4.1 Discovery and Handshake Phase
The discovery and handshake phase initiates a new PANA session. The PaC
discovers the PAA(s) by either explicitly soliciting advertisements, or receiving
unsolicited advertisements. The PaC’s answer, sent in response to an adver-
tisement, starts a new session. A complete specification of the discovery and
handshake phase is given in section 4.3 of the PANA Internet Draft [65].
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When a PaC attaches to a network, it may or may not know the IP address
of the PAA. If it knows the PAA address, then it sends the PAA a PANA-
PAA-Discover message, as shown in Figure 6.2 (a), and initiates the PANA
exchange. If the PaC does not know the IP address of the PAA, it relies on
dynamic discovery methods, such as ‘multicast-based discovery’ [65] to deter-
mine it. This involves the PaC sending a PANA-PAA-Discover message (a) to
a scoped multicast address and UDP port. The multicast scope is configured
such that the discovery messages only reach the designated PAA. Details of this
scope configuration are given in RFC 2365 [134].
In both situations, the PAA responds with a PANA-Start-Request message
(b). There may be more than one PAA in the access network, and thus the PaC
may receive multiple PANA-Start-Requests. By default, the PaC chooses the
PAA that sends the first PANA-Start-Request. The PaC then responds with a
PANA-Start-Answer message (c), indicating it wishes to enter the authentica-
tion and authorisation phase.
A PANA-Start-Request message (b) may carry a Cookie AVP (see section
6.1.3), which contains a cookie, i.e. a random value generated by the PAA. This
cookie is used to protect the PAA against ‘blind resource consumption DoS
attacks’ (see section 3.2.3), launched by attackers bombarding the PAA with
PANA-PAA-Discover messages (a).
If the PANA-Start-Request (b) contains a Cookie AVP, then the PANA-
Start-Answer (c) must contain the cookie value copied from the request. When
the PAA receives the PANA-Start-Answer (c), it checks whether the cookie it
contains has the expected value (if no cookie is present then the received message
is discarded). If the cookie is valid, the protocol enters the authentication and
authorisation phase. Otherwise, it discards the received message.
A Protection-Capability AVP and a PPAC AVP (see section 6.1.3) may also
be included in the PANA-Start-Request (b), in order to indicate the network
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capabilities.
6.1.4.2 Authentication and Authorisation Phase
The discovery and handshake phase is followed by the authentication and au-
thorisation phase, which involves the transfer of EAP payloads between the
PAA and PaC. The EAP payloads carry an EAP method (see section 3.4). A
complete specification of the authentication and authorisation phase is given in
section 4.4 of the PANA Internet Draft [65]. At the end of this phase, the PAA
conveys the result of the authentication and authorisation process to the PaC.
This phase may involve execution of two EAP sessions, one for the NAP and
one for the ISP.
As shown in Figure 6.2, EAP-Request (d) and Response (f) messages are
carried in PANA-Auth-Requests. PANA-Auth-Answer messages, i.e. (e) and
(g), are typically used to acknowledge receipt of the requests. As an optimisa-
tion, a PANA-Auth-Answer may also carry the EAP-Response message.
PANA optionally allows execution of two separate authentication methods,
one with the NAP and one with the ISP, within the same PANA session. When
performed separately, the result of the first EAP authentication process is sig-
nalled via an exchange of PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request and PANA-FirstAuth-
End-Answer messages, which distinguishes the execution of the first authen-
tication method from the second. For further details on the NAP and ISP
authentication processes, see section 4.8 of the PANA Internet Draft [65].
The result of the PANA protocol is sent to the PaC in a PANA-Bind-Request
message (h). This message carries the final EAP authentication result (whether
it is the second EAP result of separate NAP and ISP authentication exchanges,
or the single EAP result) and the result of the PANA authentication procedure.
The PANA-Bind-Request (h) is acknowledged with a PANA-Bind-Answer mes-
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sage (i).
When an EAP method (see section 3.4) capable of deriving keys is used, and
the keys are successfully derived in this phase, the PANA messages that carry
the EAP-Success message and any subsequent message will also contain a MAC
AVP (see section 6.1.3).
The PANA-Bind message exchange is also used to bind the device identifiers
of the PaC and EP to the PANA SA (see section 6.1.5). The PANA-Bind-
Request message may contain a Protection-Capability AVP (see section 6.1.3)
to indicate that link-layer or network-layer encryption will be enabled after the
authentication process1.
6.1.4.3 Access Phase
After a successful authentication process, the client device gains access to the
network, and can thus send and receive IP data traffic through the EP. A
complete specification of the access phase is given in section 4.5 of the PANA
Internet Draft [65]. At any time during the access phase, as shown in Figure
6.2, the PaC and PAA may optionally ping each other to test the liveness of
the PANA session, using PANA-Ping-Request (j) and PANA-Ping-Answer (k)
messages, which carry a Session-Id AVP (see section 6.1.3). Both the PaC and
the PAA are allowed to send a PANA-Ping-Request (j) to the communicating
peer, and expect the peer to return a PANA-Ping-Answer (k).
When an appropriate PANA SA is available (see section 6.1.5), the PANA-
Ping messages will be protected with a MAC AVP (see section 6.1.3).
1If the PaC does not support the protection capability indicated in this AVP, it sends a
PANA-Error-Request message back to the PAA and terminates the PANA session.
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6.1.4.4 Re-authentication Phase
If successful, the authentication and authorisation phase determines the PANA
session lifetime. However, as described in section 6.1.2, this session lifetime
can be updated by conducting a new round of EAP authentication (see section
3.4) before the session expires. During the access phase, the PANA session can
thus enter the re-authentication phase, in order to extend the current session
lifetime by re-executing the EAP method. Once the re-authentication phase
has successfully completed, the session re-enters the access phase; otherwise,
the session is deleted. A complete specification of the re-authentication phase
is given in section 4.6 of the PANA Internet Draft [65].
The (optional) re-authentication phase may be triggered by both the PaC
and the PAA. The re-authentication procedure is summarised in Figure 6.3.
In this figure, the name of each message is shown, followed by the sequence
number in round brackets; square brackets are used to indicate the contents of
the message.
PaC PAA
PANA-Bind-Request (p+2) [Session-Id, Result-Code, EAP {Success},
PANA-Auth-Answer (p) [Session-Id, MAC]
PANA-Bind-Answer (p+2) [Session-Id, Device-Id, Key-Id, PPAC, MAC]
Client Authenticating Party
PANA-Reauth-Request (q) [Session-Id, MAC]
PANA-Auth-Request (p) [Session-Id, EAP {Request}, MAC]
Re-authentication
phase
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
PANA-Reauth-Answer (q) [Session-Id, MAC]
PANA-Auth-Request (q+1) [Session-Id, EAP {Response}, MAC]
PANA-Auth-Answer (q+1) [Session-Id, MAC]
PANA-Auth-Request (p+1) [Session-Id, EAP {Request}, MAC]
PANA-Auth-Answer (p+1) [Session-Id, EAP {Response}, MAC]
Device-Id, Key-Id, Lifetime, Protection-Cap., PPAC, MAC]
Figure 6.3: Re-authentication phase initiated by the PaC
When the PaC initiates the re-authentication phase, it sends a PANA-
Reauth-Request message (a). This message contains a Session-Id AVP (see
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section 6.1.3), which identifies the PANA session to the PAA. If the PAA has
an established PANA session with a matching session identifier, it responds
with a PANA-Reauth-Answer (b), followed by a PANA-Auth-Request (c) to re-
execute the EAP method carried by PANA (c to j); otherwise, it responds with
a PANA-Error-Request message.
When the PAA initiates the re-authentication phase, it sends a PANA-Auth-
Request (c), containing the session identifier, to the PaC. The PaC then enters
the re-authentication phase by re-executing the EAP method carried by PANA
(c to j). The PAA must initiate the re-authentication phase before the current
session lifetime expires.
As shown in Figure 6.3, if there is an established PANA SA (see section
6.1.5), all PANA-Reauth, PANA-Auth and PANA-Bind messages sent in the
re-authentication phase will be protected with a MAC AVP (see section 6.1.3).
Any subsequent EAP routine will be performed with the same ISP and NAP as
were selected during the discovery and handshake phase. Re-authentication of
an on-going PANA session must maintain the existing sequence numbers in the
PANA header (see section 3.7.5). Also, the value of the ‘S-flag’ in the header
of PANA messages (see section 3.7.5) needs to be inherited from the previous
authentication/authorisation (or re-authentication) phase.
6.1.4.5 Termination Phase
The PaC or PAA may choose to discontinue the access service at any time.
The termination phase, a routine for explicitly terminating a PANA session,
can thus be initiated either by the PaC (i.e. disconnect indication) or the PAA
(i.e. session revocation). A complete specification of the termination phase is
given in section 4.7 of the PANA Internet Draft [65]. The PANA-Termination-
Request (l) and PANA-Termination-Answer (m) messages, shown in Figure 6.2,
can be used for both disconnect indication and session revocation procedures.
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The reason for termination is indicated in the Termination-Cause AVP (see
section 6.1.3). If there is an established PANA SA (see section 6.1.5), all mes-
sages exchanged during this phase will be protected with a MAC AVP (see
section 6.1.3). When the sender of the PANA-Termination-Request (l) receives
a valid acknowledgment, all states maintained for the PANA session must be
deleted immediately.
If the PaC or the PAA disconnects without engaging in termination messag-
ing, it is expected that either the expiry of the session lifetime or failed liveness
tests will clean up the session at the peer.
6.1.5 PANA Security Association
The PANA authentication protocol can be linked to an ongoing integrity ser-
vice. In this case, in line with section 2.2.4, PANA can be integrated with a
key establishment mechanism, such that a by-product of successful EAP en-
tity authentication is a shared secret, i.e. a fresh (see section 2.2.5) and unique
session key, appropriate for use with an integrity mechanism used to protect
subsequently exchanged data. This assumes that the chosen EAP method al-
lows session key derivation (see section 2.1.3.3). The session key is available
for the PaC as part of the authentication and key exchange procedure (see sec-
tion 2.1.2) of the selected EAP method. The PAA can obtain the session key
from the EAP server via an AAA infrastructure (see sections 3.7.5 and 3.9), if
one is being used. The Diameter Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) draft
[32] describes how a session key can be securely carried (i.e. CMS protected or
wrapped) between AAA servers.
Cryptographic protection of messages between the PaC and PAA is thus
possible as soon as the EAP protocol (see section 3.4), in conjunction with the
EAP encapsulated method (see section 4.1.3), exports a shared session key. This
session key is used to create a PANA security association [65], which provides
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per-message integrity protection and authentication services (see section 2.1.1).
A complete specification of the PANA SA is given in section 5.3 of the PANA In-
ternet Draft [65]. The establishment of a PANA SA is required in environments
where no physical or link layer security is available (see section 4.2.3).
A PANA SA is created as an attribute of a PANA session, when EAP suc-
ceeds with the creation of an AAA-Key2. When two EAP sessions are per-
formed in sequence, as in the case where separate NAP and ISP authentication
processes (see section 6.1.4.2) are performed, it is possible that two AAA-Keys
are derived. If this happens, then the PANA SA will be generated using both
AAA-Keys.
When a new AAA-Key is generated in the re-authentication phase (see sec-
tion 6.1.4.4), any key derived from the old AAA-Key needs to be updated using
the new AAA-Key. In order to distinguish the new AAA-Key from previous
keys, a Key-Id AVP (see section 6.1.3), which contains an AAA-Key identifier,
is carried either in the PANA-Bind messages, as shown in Figure 6.3 (i) and
(j), or in the PANA-FirstAuth-End messages (see section 6.1.4.2) at the end of
the EAP method which was used to generate the AAA-Key.
PANA messages carrying a Key-Id AVP need to be protected with a MAC
AVP (see section 6.1.3). The MAC AVP value field is computed using a new
PANA MAC KEY value derived either from the new AAA-Key or from the
new pair of AAA-Keys, in the case of separate NAP and ISP authentication
processes (see section 6.1.4.2). More information on the computation of the
MAC AVP value field can be found in section 5.4 of the PANA draft [65].
The PANA session lifetime is bounded by the authorisation lifetime granted
by the authentication server (as for the AAA-Keys lifetime). The lifetime of the
PANA SA is the same as the lifetime of the PANA session. The created PANA
2A PANA SA is not created when the PANAmechanism fails, or if no AAA-Key is produced
by an EAP method.
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SA is deleted when the corresponding PANA session is deleted.
6.2 Reasons for Choosing PANA
The aim of this section is to justify the selection of the PANA protocol as the
target environment for transporting the new Internet authentication schemes
proposed later in this thesis.
Firstly, we describe a variety of trust relationships and threat scenarios which
affect the PANA method, by analysing and comparing potential risks associated
with protocols used to carry authentication for network access (section 6.2.1).
Secondly, the PANA security requirements arising from these threats will be
established; we also identify the PANA implementation features (section 6.2.2).
The result of this critical analysis is then used to derive the services and
properties required of the PANA protocol. These are assessed against the ser-
vices and properties required of new entity authentication methods for Internet
access, as listed in section 5.3. This assessment is used to validate the choice
of PANA as the target transportation environment of the new authentication
schemes proposed here (section 6.2.3).
6.2.1 PANA Threat Analysis
As stated in RFC 4016 [151], the PANA protocol will be used in network access
environments where ‘there is no a priori trust relationship or security association
between the PaC and the PAA or EP’. In these environments, the link between
the PaC and the PAA may be a shared medium. In addition, the PaCs may not
trust each other, and any PaC (or any other entity with access to the shared
medium) might pretend to be a PAA, spoof IP addresses, or launch a variety of
other attacks. In the context of the above network access environments, there
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are a variety of scenarios which affect the PANA threat model.
In this section, we examine two important aspects of the PANA threat model
for network access environments, namely trust relationships (section 6.2.1.1) and
threat scenarios (section 6.2.1.2).
6.2.1.1 PANA Trust Relationships
The pairs of entities that must share a trust relationship before use of the PANA
protocol are as follows [151]:
PAA and AS. When the PaC uses a domain other than its home domain for
network access, then the PAA in the visited network needs to communicate
with the home AS to verify the PaC credentials. Possible threats arising
in the communication path between the PAA and AS are detailed in RFC
3579 [14]. To counter these threats, this traffic channel must be protected
using a security association established between the PAA and AS.
PAA and EP. The PAA and EP must belong to the same domain. Where
necessary, a security association can be established to protect the link
between them.
PaC and AS. The PaC and AS must belong to the same domain and hence
share a trust relationship. When the PaC uses a domain other than its
home domain for network access, it provides its credentials to the PAA
in the visited network. The information provided will therefore pass via
the PaC-PAA and PAA-AS paths. For further information on the threats
arising to data sent via the PAA-AS path, see RFC 3579 [14]. Section
6.2.1.2 describes the threats arising in the PaC-PAA path.
As described in RFC 4016 [151], it is possible that some of the PANA entities
(e.g. the PAA, AS, and EP) are co-located. In those cases, it can be assumed
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that there are no significant threats to their communications.
Pairs of entities that do not need to share a trust relationship prior to use
of the PANA protocol are as follows [151]:
PaC and PAA. The PaC and PAA typically belong to different domains.
They establish a security association during the authentication process.
PaC and EP. The authentication process may result in the establishment of a
secret key shared by the PaC and PAA, which can also be used to secure
the link between the PaC and EP.
AS and EP. The EP is not known outside of the access network, and therefore
the AS and the EP do not need to share a security association.
6.2.1.2 PANA Threat Scenarios
There are a variety of scenarios which need to be considered when developing the
threat model for the PANA protocol. As cited in RFC 4016 [151], the threats
to PANA can be grouped according to the stages through which the client goes
in order to gain network access. In the following paragraphs, the threats related
to the following stages are described:
• PAA discovery;
• the authentication procedure itself, which includes: false success or failure
indications, MitM attacks, replay attacks, device identifier attacks, and
device identifier confidentiality;
• the PaC leaving the network;
• service theft;
• PAA-EP communication; and
• other miscellaneous attacks.
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PAA Discovery As described in section 6.1.4.1, the PAA is discovered by
sending solicitations or receiving advertisements from the PaC. In this initial
stage of the PANA protocol, the PaC has no assurance that the other end of
the link is the PAA (see section 6.2.1.1), and an attacker can pretend to be
a PAA by sending a spoofed advertisement. This threat is present mainly in
environments where the PaC-PAA link is shared.
The advertisement may be used to include other information than the discov-
ery of the PAA itself. This can, for instance, lead to a ‘bidding down attack’ (see
section 6.1 of [151]), where an attacker sends a spoofed advertisement with ca-
pabilities indicating authentication methods less secure than those that the real
PAA supports, thereby fooling the PaC into negotiating a method less secure
than would otherwise be available. Of course, such an attack will only succeed
if the fake PAA can break the weaker authentication method and the weaker
method is accepted by the PaC. Moreover, the possibility of such an attack is
essentially inevitable in any system allowing negotiation of the authentication
method to be used.
False Success or Failure Indications As stated in section 3.7.5, PANA
carries any authentication scheme that can be specified as an EAPmethod. EAP
methods incorporate a message used to indicate success or failure (see section
3.4). By sending a false failure message, an attacker can prevent the client from
accessing the network. By sending a false success message, an attacker can
prematurely end the authentication exchange, denying service for the PaC.
This attack is possible if the success or failure indication is not protected
by a security association between the PaC and the PAA. All PANA messages
exchanged prior to completion of the key establishment process may be unpro-
tected.
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Man-in-the-Middle Attacks An attacker can claim to be the PAA to the
real PaC, and also claim to be the PaC to the genuine PAA. As stated in section
3.2.3, this is called a Man-in-the-Middle attack, whereby the PaC is fooled into
believing that it is communicating with the real PAA, which is also misled into
believing that it is communicating with the genuine PaC (see also section 6.2.2
of [151]).
As stated in section 3.2.3, the use of tunnelled protocols in the first step,
together with the use of legacy client authentication protocols in the second
step, creates a vulnerability to an active MitM attack, which allows the attacker
to impersonate the remote entity (see [21]). The attack becomes possible if
the legacy client authentication protocol is used in multiple environments (e.g.
with and without tunnel-protection). An instance of an active MitM attack, in
which compound authentication methods are used, is described in [21]. In these
attacks, the server first authenticates to the client. As the client has not yet
proven its identity, the server acts as the MitM, tunnelling the identity of the
genuine client to gain access to the network.
Asokan, Niemi and Nyberg [21] have shown that the problem can be fixed
by either restricting the use of the legacy authentication protocol to a specific
environment, or by implementing a cryptographic binding between the first step
and the second step protocols. As detailed in RFC 4016 [151], this implies that
PANA will be vulnerable to such attacks if compound methods are used without
cryptographically binding them.
Replay Attacks As described by Parthasarathy [151], an attacker can replay
the PANA messages that denote authentication failure or success at a later time,
to create false failure or success indications. The attacker can also potentially
replay other PANA protocol messages to deny service to the PaC.
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Device Identifier Attacks When the PaC is authenticated, the PAA sends
access control information to the EP, which is to be used for controlling the
network (see section 2.1.1.5). As noted by Parthasarathy [151], this information
‘typically contains the device identifier of the PaC, which is either obtained
from the IP headers and MAC headers of the packets exchanged during the
authentication process or carried explicitly in the PANA protocol field’. The
attacker can thus gain unauthorised network access by taking the following steps
[151].
• An attacker pretends to be a PAA and sends advertisements. The PaC is
fooled and starts exchanging packets with the attacker.
• The attacker modifies the IP source address in the packet, adjusts the
UDP [156] /TCP [157] checksum, and forwards the packet to the genuine
PAA. It makes the same changes to the return packets.
• When the genuine PaC is authenticated, the attacker gains access to the
network, as the packets sent to the PAA contain the IP and MAC addresses
of the attacker.
Device Identifier Confidentiality Some clients might wish to hide their
identities from visited access networks for privacy reasons. Although providing
identity protection for clients is outside the scope of PANA, identity protection
can be achieved by letting PANA carrying authentication methods that already
have this capability.
PaC Leaving the Network When the PaC leaves the network, it can inform
the PAA, so that the resources used by the client can be properly accounted for.
As stated in [151], the PAA may also choose to revoke the PaC network access
at any time it considers necessary. In this scenario, there are three possible
threats.
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• An attacker can pretend to be a PAA and revoke access to the PaC,
causing a DoS attack on the PaC.
• An attacker can pretend to be a genuine PaC and transmit a disconnect
message, again causing a DoS attack on the PaC.
• The PaC can leave the network without notifying the PAA or EP (e.g. if
the network cable is unplugged). In this case, an attacker can pretend to
be the PaC and can start using the network in place of the PaC.
Service Theft An attacker can gain unauthorised network access by stealing
service from a legitimate client. Once the genuine PaC is authenticated, an
EP will typically have filters in place to prevent unauthorised network access.
These filters will be based on something carried in every packet, for example,
the IP and MAC addresses. In this latter case, any received packets will be
dropped unless they contain specific IP addresses matching the MAC addresses.
The following are possible threats in this scenario:
• An attacker can spoof both the IP and MAC addresses of an authorised
client to gain unauthorised access.
• The PaC can leave the network without notifying the PAA or EP (e.g. if
the system crashes). In this case, an attacker can pretend to be the PaC
and start using the network.
PAA-EP Communication When the PaC is authenticated, the PAA sends
access control information to the EP which is to be used for controlling network
access (see section 2.1.1.5). This information contains at least the device identi-
fier of the PaC. If stronger protection is needed, the PAA will also communicate
a shared secret known only to the PaC and PAA, to be used to set up a security
association between the PaC and the EP. The following are possible threats:
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• An attacker can eavesdrop on the information exchanged between the
PAA and EP. The attacker can further use this information to spoof the
genuine PaC and also to set up a security association for gaining network
access.
• An attacker can pretend to be a PAA and send false information to an
EP to gain network access.
These threats can be addressed by protecting the communications path be-
tween the PAA and the EP.
Miscellaneous Attacks As stated by Parthasarathy [151], the PaCs do not
necessarily trust one another; any PaC can pretend to be a PAA, spoof IP
addresses, and launch a range of other attacks. There are a variety of DoS
attacks which affect the PAA and the backend AS. For instance, to launch a
‘blind resource consumption DoS attack’ (see section 3.2.3), an attacker can
bombard the PAA with many PaC authentication requests. If the PAA and
the AS are not co-located, the PAA may allocate local resources to store client
state records, before it receives the AS response. If a sufficiently large number
of requests are received, then this can exhaust the PAA memory resources.
Also, depending on the method, an attacker can force the PAA or the AS to
make computationally intensive computations, which can exhaust the available
processing resources.
Another kind of attack, known as an ‘IP address depletion attack’ (see sec-
tion 6.6 of [151]), is based on the fact that the PaC acquires an IP address before
the PANA authentication process begins [184]. When this occurs, it opens up
the possibility of DoS attacks in which attackers can exhaust the IP address
space by acquiring multiple IP addresses, or deny IP address allocations to
other entities by falsely responding to every duplicate address detection query.
The IP address depletion attack can be prevented by deploying a secure
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address resolution scheme that does not depend on client authentication, such
as the SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) mechanism given in RFC 3971 [51].
6.2.2 PANA Security and Implementation Requirements
In this section, we establish the PANA security requirements (section 6.2.2.1);
we also analyse and compare the PANA implementation features, in order to
obtain implementation requirements for PANA (section 6.2.2.2).
6.2.2.1 PANA Security Requirements
The PANA security requirements, arising from the threat analysis in section
6.2.1, can be summarised as follows [151].
• The PANA protocol must not assume that the PAA discovery process is
protected (see ‘PAA Discovery’ in section 6.2.1.2).
• The PANA method must mutually authenticate the PaC and the PAA,
and must be able to establish keys between them to protect message ex-
changes (see ‘Success or Failure False Indications’ in section 6.2.1.2).
• When compound authentication methods are carried by the PANA pro-
tocol, they must be cryptographically bound (see ‘Man-in-the-Middle At-
tacks’ in section 6.2.1.2).
• The PANA method must protect itself against replay attacks (see ‘Replay
Attack’ in section 6.2.1.2).
• The PANA device identifier must be protected against spoofing in the
PaC and PAA message exchanges (see ‘Device Identifier Attack’ in section
6.2.1.2).
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• The PANA protocol must protect disconnect and revocation messages,
and must not depend on the PaC sending a disconnect message (see ‘PaC
Leaving the Network’ in section 6.2.1.2).
• The PANA method must securely bind the authenticated session to the
client device identifier to prevent service theft; it must also establish a
shared secret between the PaC and the PAA, which can be used to set
up a security association between the PaC and the EP in order to protect
against service theft (see ‘Service Theft’ in section 6.2.1.2).
• The communication between the PAA and EP must be protected against
eavesdropping and spoofing attacks (see ‘PAA-EP Communication’ in sec-
tion 6.2.1.2).
6.2.2.2 PANA Implementation Requirements
We now analyse and compare the following PANA implementation features,
which were adapted from the PANA requirements described in section 4 of
RFC 4058 [184].
Multiple identifiers. PANA must support a variety of identifier types for au-
thentication clients and remote devices, including the ability to create
a cryptographic binding between the client identifier and the associated
device identifier (upon successful PANA protocol exchange).
IP Address Assignment. The PaC must configure an IP address before en-
tering the PANA authentication process (the PANA protocol will not make
any assumptions about the mechanisms used for the PaC address config-
uration).
EAP Lower Layer Requirements. The EAP protocol [13] imposes many re-
quirements on the underlying transport protocol that need to be satisfied
by the PANA carrier for correct operation.
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Flexibility. The PANA protocol will support PaCs with multiple network in-
terfaces, and access networks with multiple routers (instead of only one
first hop router,) on multi-access links (instead of point-to-point links).
Disconnect Indication. The PANA method cannot assume that the link is
connection-oriented. This link may thus have a mechanism to provide
disconnect indication, which is useful in helping the PAA to clean up
resources when a client moves away from the network (e.g. to inform the
enforcement points that the client is no longer connected).
Location of PAA. The PAA and the PaC will be exactly one IP hop away
from each other. Bridging and tunnelling techniques can place two nodes
exactly one IP hop away from each other, even if they are connected to
separate physical links.
Performance. The PANA protocol design needs to efficiently handle the au-
thentication process in order to gain network access with minimum la-
tency; e.g. the protocol signalling may be minimised by creating local
security associations.
Complexity. By using the EAP protocol to carry lightweight authentication
methods, it is possible to make use of the PANA protocol to create new
ongoing authentication solutions with low complexity at the application
layer.
IP Version Independence. The PANA protocol will work with both the IPv4
and the IPv6 protocols.
6.2.3 PANA Services and Properties Assessment
In this section, the results of the critical analyses made in sections 6.2.1 and
6.2.2 are used to assess the security and implementation services and properties
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possessed by the PANA protocol against the services and properties required of
new authentication methods for Internet access (as defined in section 5.3).
Table 6.1: PANA security services and properties assessment
Security Requirements of New Au-
thentication Methods
Security Services and Properties of the
PANA Protocol
Entity authentication service for remote
network access.
Service provided by PANA (section 6.1.1).
Key establishment services with key
freshness property.
Services possible in PANA (depending on
the chosen EAP method; see section 6.1.5).
Use of a tunnelled authentication mech-
anism carrying EAP.
Property provided by PANA (section 6.1.1).
Mutual authentication services between
the remote client and the access network.
Services provided by PANA (section
6.2.2.1).
Use of periodic and on-demand re-
authentication techniques.
Service provided by PANA (section 6.1.4.4).
Possible interaction between the network
and AAA infrastructures.
Property provided by PANA (section 6.1.5).
Absence of vulnerabilities that can be
exploited over insecure channels.
Property possible in PANA (section 6.2.1.2).
Robustness against DoS attacks. Property provided by PANA (section
6.1.4.1).
Identity confidentiality service for re-
mote clients.
Service possible in PANA (depending on the
chosen EAP method; see section 6.2.1.2).
As shown in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, PANA has the potential to meet all the
identified requirements for a transportation environment for new entity authen-
tication schemes. This justifies the choice of PANA as the target environment
for carrying the authentication techniques discussed in the remainder of this
thesis.
Table 6.2: PANA implementation service and properties assessment
Implementation Requirements of
New Authentication Methods
Implementation Services and Properties
of the PANA Protocol
Support for multiple client and device
identifiers.
Service provided by PANA (section 6.2.2.2).
Satisfaction of the EAP transport re-
quirements.
Property provided by PANA (section 6.2.2.2).
Flexibility. Property provided by PANA (section 6.2.2.2).
Performance. Property provided by PANA (section 6.2.2.2).
Low complexity. Property provided by PANA (section 6.2.2.2).
IP version independence. Property provided by PANA (section 6.2.2.2).
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As described in section 1.2, this thesis proposes a series of new solutions
for Internet remote access authentication, derived by adapting and reinforcing
security techniques arising from a variety of different sources. The aim of this
chapter is to present the first new authentication scheme, combining the GSM
authentication mechanism (see section 3.5.1) with PANA (see section 3.7.5 and
Chapter 6), which we call PANA/GSM.
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7.1 Introduction
As described in section 4.1, Internet remote access networks which are not phys-
ically secured against unauthorised use are typically set up so that roaming en-
tities are obliged to go through an authentication process (see section 2.2). In
some ubiquitous mobility scenarios (see section 4.2), IP based remote hosts that
connect to the Internet via an access network will typically need to provide their
credentials (see section 2.2.2) and be authenticated before being authorised to
access the network. For such a process we need an easy-to-use, strong, and
scalable entity authentication infrastructure. According to Laitinen et al. [124],
one of the most critical steps in setting up such an infrastructure is the provi-
sioning of initial credentials to the user, which means, for example, registering
username/password pairs, or distributing smart cards.
Entity authentication based on smart cards is more secure than reusing
the same password at multiple sites, and more user-friendly than using a large
collection of diverse passwords — each of which should be hard to guess (and
hence hard to recall). As a result, passwords are typically either kept in an
encrypted file protected by a single password, or (most usually) are written on
a piece of paper kept somewhere near the PC monitor.
Credential provisioning is costly and takes time, which may be inconvenient
for users. This motivates the idea of reusing already deployed user credentials
for new Internet remote access services. In particular, cellular network oper-
ators already have an authentication infrastructure based on subscriber smart
cards, for example in the form of GSM SIMs (see section 3.5.1.1). Therefore
it seems potentially desirable to reuse this existing infrastructure for heteroge-
neous Internet remote access authentication.
As previously discussed, the IETF PANA protocol (see Chapter 6) is in-
tended to be a flexible and scalable generic network layer protocol to be used to
224
7. PANA/GSM
authenticate a user device requesting Internet remote access. In addition, the
GSM authentication infrastructure (see section 3.5.1) is by far the most widely
deployed cellular network authentication system, with more than one billion
users. Building on these two observations, we now present a new authentication
scheme, combining GSM authentication mechanism with PANA, which we call
PANA/GSM. This innovative proposal, previously described in [146], adapts
the security techniques used in the GSM mobile telecommunication system to
the PANA network remote access authentication framework, which interacts,
via EAP (see section 3.4), with an AAA backend infrastructure (as described
in sections 3.7.5 and 3.9) in a complete solution designed to support ubiquitous
client mobility for Internet access.
The purpose (section 7.2) and the components used in the assembly (section
7.3) of the novel PANA/GSM scheme are first given. Second, the EAP-SIM
mechanism (section 7.4), an EAP method (see section 3.4) published in RFC
4186 [77] and used as a component in the new PANA/GSM technique, is ex-
plained. The framework of the proposed new PANA/GSM protocol is then given
(section 7.5). Next two important features of PANA/GSM, namely the secu-
rity association and the re-authentication procedure (section 7.6), are described.
Finally, the conclusions of the chapter are given (section 7.7).
The main novel contribution of this chapter lies in sections 7.3, 7.5, and 7.6.
Whilst the EAP-SIM mechanism described in section 7.4 has been previously
described (notably by Haverinen and Salowey [77]), the details of how it would
operate when executed over PANA have not. This chapter does not contain a
detailed security analysis of the new proposal — this issue is covered in Chapter
11.
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7.2 PANA/GSM Objective
Currently there is no standard protocol for performing network access authen-
tication above the link layer. Instead, a number of ad hoc and often inadequate
solutions (as described in section 4.1.5) are being used to overcome the problem
(itself described in section 4.1), in a variety of distinct scenarios (outlined in
section 4.2).
The objective of the PANA/GSM protocol is thus to provide a network
layer (see section 4.1.4), IP compatible, lightweight, attack-resistant (e.g. with
respect to MitM and DoS attacks — see section 3.2.3), and relatively flexible
authentication method, that allows a remote client to be authenticated in a het-
erogeneous Internet access environment supporting ubiquitous mobility. This
authentication method must meet a number of detailed security and implemen-
tation requirements, as specified in Chapter 5.
7.3 PANA/GSM Protocol Hierarchy
In this section, an overview of the components used in the construction of the
new PANA/GSM authentication scheme is given. The first component, as pre-
viously discussed, is the GSM SIM authentication mechanism. Section 3.5.1
gives an outline of the GSM system security features, with a focus on the air
interface protocol, including the GSM SIM authentication procedure.
The second component used in the PANA/GSM protocol assembly is EAP
(see section 3.4). The EAP protocol supports a variety of authentication schemes,
giving network access providers the advantage of using a single framework across
multiple environments. Such flexibility seems likely to be important for hetero-
geneous network access supporting ubiquitous mobility. Since EAP is very flex-
ible and can encapsulate arbitrary authentication schemes (see section 4.1.3),
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called EAP methods, it is clearly a protocol that satisfies many of the require-
ments for a variety of authentication scenarios (see sections 4.2 and 5.1.3).
Nevertheless, EAP itself does not specify any authentication method. It
is only a transport mechanism, allowing concrete authentication methods for
EAP, such as methods from the mobile telecommunications area, to be defined
separately. In fact, the EAP-SIM protocol, an EAP method specified in RFC
4186 [77], describes a way of encapsulating the security parameters used by the
GSM system within EAP. EAP-SIM also proposes enhancements to the GSM
security procedures, in order to provide mutual authentication and session key
agreement using the GSM SIM.
Although EAP-SIM re-uses a security solution implemented in a widely de-
ployed mobile system (i.e. GSM) in a flexible authentication framework (i.e
EAP), using EAP-SIM on its own for authentication is not a good choice. This
is because it does not provide a complete authentication solution for ubiquitous
client mobility for Internet access.
The effective use of EAP-SIM in this latter environment requires the pro-
vision of a transport scheme for authentication data between a remote entity
seeking access to a network and another entity located in the access network
(see section 4.1.4). More specifically, a transport scheme independent of the ac-
cess network type is needed, to transfer user authentication information to the
access network and, optionally, to the AAA backend infrastructure (see section
3.9). Defining a network layer transport for EAP-SIM, such as the proposed
tunnelled authentication solutions (see section 3.7), provides a cleaner answer
to the problem.
In Chapter 6, we justified the selection of PANA, a UDP-based protocol
(see section 6.1.1), as the tunnelled network layer transportation environment.
We describe in this chapter how to use PANA to support the use of EAP-
SIM for Internet remote access authentication in ubiquitous mobility scenarios.
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PANA is also able to interact with an AAA infrastructure supporting EAP, i.e.
Diameter EAP (see sections 3.7.5 and 3.9.3). Consequently, PANA is our choice
for the third component in the construction of our proposed technique, which
thus combines GSM authentication with EAP-SIM and PANA interacting with
Diameter EAP, into a scheme which we call PANA/GSM. A summary of the
PANA/GSM protocol hierarchy is shown in Figure 7.1.
EAP
PANA/TLS or WTLS
TCP or UDP
IP
Mobile area /Public Key 
PANA
UDP
IP
GSM SIM authentication
Figure 7.1: PANA/GSM protocol hierarchy
7.4 An EAP Mechanism for Carrying GSM
In this section, EAP-SIM, an EAP method which is used as a component of
the PANA/GSM technique, is explained. RFC 4186 [77] describes this authen-
tication and session key distribution mechanism, that uses the GSM SIM (see
section 3.5.1). It involves a client acting on behalf of a user, an authenticating
party, and an EAP server (see section 3.4). The EAP server, which typically
belongs to the user’s home Internet AAA network (see section 3.9), must be able
to obtain ‘authentication triplets’ (RAND, XRES, Kc) from the subscriber’s HN
AuC (see section 3.5.1.3) in the GSM mobile network.
The EAP-SIM packet format and the use of attributes are specified in section
8 of [77]. Either the IMSI or the TMSI can be employed as part of the user
identifier. Section 4.2 of [77] describes user identity management. EAP-SIM
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includes optional identity privacy support (see section 4.2.1.2 of [77]), and an
optional fast re-authentication procedure (see section 5 of [77]).
In EAP-SIM, a set of n RAND challenges are used to generate 64-bit confi-
dentiality keys Kc (n = 2 or 3), which are combined to generate a ‘more secure’
key than can be obtained from individual GSM triplets. We label these n confi-
dentiality keys Kc,j (1 ≤ j ≤ n). As described in section 3.5.1.3, each key Kc,j
is produced as a function of a challenge RANDj and the customer’s unique
128-bit secret key Ki, using a key generation algorithm known as A8. In the
GSM mobile network, the values of Kc,j are calculated in the subscriber’s HN
AuC, before being sent to the EAP server within authentication triplets. In
the EAP client, each Kc,j is generated and stored in the GSM SIM until it is
updated as part of the next authentication procedure, where:
Kc,j = A8(Ki, RANDj). (7.1)
The EAP client also inputs each of the n challenges RANDj along with Ki
to a MAC algorithm known as A3 that is implemented in the GSM SIM, and
obtains the resulting n outputs, known as SRESj , as follows:
SRESj = A3(Ki, RANDj). (7.2)
In EAP-SIM authentication, a secret Master Key MK is derived by applying
the hash function SHA-1 (see section 2.1.3.2) to the concatenation of the cus-
tomer’s identifier (Identity — written as I in the equation below), the n GSM
keys Kc,j , a nonce, i.e. a randomly chosen value1 (NONCE MT — written
as N below) freshly generated by the EAP client, and other relevant context
information X, i.e. the concatenation of the list of the supported EAP-SIM
versions (Version List) and the identifier of the EAP-SIM version in use (Se-
1Nonces are inputs to cryptographic functions; they contain pseudo random data used to
guarantee liveliness during an exchange, and protect against replay attacks.
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lected Version). That is, the 160-bit key MK is derived as follows, where here,
as throughout, | denotes concatenation of data items, and h denotes the SHA-1
hash function:
MK = h(I|Kc,1| . . . |Kc,n|N |X). (7.3)
As stated in RFC 4186 [77], the MK value is then fed into a pseudo-random
number generator algorithm, the details of which are specified in Change Notice
1 of FIPS 186-2 [141]. Figure 7.2 shows the main steps in a simplified version of
this algorithm. In this algorithm, the parameter b is set to 160, and m is set to
the number of 320-bit output values required. The values XKEY and XVAL are
b bits long (i.e. 160 bits), and MK is used to set the initial value of the seed-key,
XKEY. The function G is constructed using SHA-12 (see section 2.1.3.2).
Algorithm : pseudo-random-generator(MK, b,m)
comment:Choose a new, secret value for the seed-key.
XKEY ←MK
t← 67452301 EFCDAB89 98BADCFE 10325476 C3D2E1F0
comment: t is the initial value for H0|H1|H2|H3|H4 in G.
for j ← 0 to m− 1
do

for i← 0 to 1
do
XV AL← XKEY mod 2
b
wi ← G(t,XV AL)
XKEY = (1 +XKEY + wi) mod 2b
xj ← w0|w1
return (xj)
Figure 7.2: Pseudo-random number generator algorithm (FIPS 186-2)
In line with section 3.6.6, this pseudo-random number algorithm produces
separate Transient EAP Keys or TEKs for protecting EAP packets, a Master
Session Key (MSK) for encryption of the traffic exchanged between the client
and the network, and an Extended Master Session Key (EMSK) used to derive
2The function G is very similar to SHA-1, but the message padding is different.
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keys for multiple applications. EAP-SIM also requires the generation of two
TEKs for its own purposes, i.e. the authentication key (Ka) to be used with
the Message Authentication Code attribute (AT MAC), and the encryption key
(Ke) to be used with the data encryption attribute.
In the EAP-SIM full authentication procedure, the 320-bit random numbers
(x0, x1, . . . , xm−1) output from the generator are concatenated and partitioned
into suitable-sized bit strings, which are used as keys in the following order: Ke
(128 bits), Ka (128 bits), MSK (64 bytes), and EMSK (64 bytes)3.
In EAP-SIM fast re-authentication, the same pseudo-random number algo-
rithm can be used to generate a new MSK and a new EMSK. In this case, the
seed value (XKEY′) is calculated as given below, where I denotes the next fast
re-authentication user identifier, c denotes the next counter value4, N denotes a
freshly generated 16-byte nonce (known as NONCE S), and MK is the master
key derived during the preceding full authentication:
XKEY ′ = h(I|c|N |MK). (7.4)
The pseudo-random number generator described in Figure 7.2 is then run
with the new seed value XKEY′, and the resulting 320-bit random numbers
(x0, x1, . . . , xm−1) are concatenated and partitioned into two 64-byte strings,
which are used as the new 64-byte MSK and the new 64-byte EMSK.
Finally, in order to provide mutual authentication, EAP-SIM enhances GSM
authentication by accompanying the RAND challenges and other EAP-SIM mes-
sages with a MAC, generated using the HMAC-SHA-1 function (see section
2.1.3.2). The MAC is calculated over the whole EAP-SIM packet concatenated
3As stated in section 1.2 of [18], the MSK and the EMSK are individually at least 64 octets
in length, where each octet or byte, as called in RFC 4186 [77], contains 8 bits.
4Both the peer and the EAP server maintain a copy of this counter, which is used to
protect against replay attacks. The EAP server sends its counter value to the peer in the fast
re-authentication request. The peer must verify that its counter value is less than or equal to
the value sent by the EAP server.
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with optional message-specific data, with the exception that the value field of
the MAC attribute (AT MAC) is set to zero when calculating the MAC value.
7.5 PANA/GSM Framework
In this section, the authentication framework for the new PANA/GSM scheme is
described. The entities (section 7.5.1) involved in the PANA/GSM method are
first given. After that, the PANA/GSM authentication scheme (section 7.5.2)
is explained.
7.5.1 PANA/GSM Entities
The PANA/GSM method proposed here involves three entities, namely the
PANA Client (also referred to here as the PaC, client, user, customer or sub-
scriber), the PANA Authentication Agent (PAA or authenticating party) and
the EAP server. The PaC is associated with a network device and a set of
GSM credentials stored in a SIM; these credentials are used to authenticate the
PaC identity for the purposes of network access. A possible implementation
of the PaC would be an Internet access device (e.g. a laptop) with a PC card
inserted in the PCMCIA5 socket, where the PC card is itself equipped with a
GSM-enabled SIM card.
The PAA verifies the GSM credentials provided by the PaC and grants
network access. In the context of this chapter, the user’s EAP server is assumed
to be implemented on the AAA server (see section 3.9) and has an interface to
the GSM network; that is, it operates as a gateway between the Internet AAA
network and the GSM authentication infrastructure. The PAA is thus an AAA
client that communicates with the user’s EAP server through an AAA protocol
5Personal Computer Memory Card International Association (www.pcmcia.org/).
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supporting EAP (i.e. Diameter EAP, described in section 3.9.3) and key wrap
(e.g. Diameter CMS [32]), i.e. the use of a key-encrypting key to encrypt a
content-encryption key. PANA/GSM also involves a further entity, namely the
EP (see section 6.1.2), which applies per-packet enforcement policies (i.e. filters)
to the traffic of the PaC’s devices.
7.5.2 PANA/GSM Authentication Scheme
The aim of this section is to give a detailed description of the PANA/GSM
scheme. Firstly we identify the distinct phases of a PANA/GSM session, and
briefly describe them (section 7.5.2.1). Secondly, a complete description of the
PANA/GSM message exchange is provided (section 7.5.2.2). We then sum-
marise the calculation of the PANA/GSM-based MAC used during that ex-
change (section 7.5.2.3).
Figure 7.3 shows the PANA/GSM authentication procedure, which is further
described below. In this figure, the name of each message is shown, followed
by the contents of the message in round brackets; square brackets are used to
denote optional fields.
7.5.2.1 PANA/GSM Phases
The PANA/GSM authentication procedure has three main phases: (1) Discov-
ery and Handshake, (2) Authentication and Authorisation, and (3) Access. In
the Discovery phase, an IP address for the PAA is identified, and a PANA/GSM
session is established between the PaC and the PAA, following the PANA model
(see section 6.1.4.1). After this phase is complete, a session identifier (Session-
Id — see section 6.1.2) is allocated by the PAA and included in all further
messages; this identifier is freed when the PANA/GSM session terminates.
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Figure 7.3: PANA/GSM full authentication procedure
In the Authentication phase, the main focus of this section and further ex-
plained below, EAP-SIM messages encapsulated in PANA/GSM messages are
exchanged between the PaC and the PAA. In this phase, EAP Request and
Response payloads are typically carried in PANA-Auth-Requests, and PANA-
Auth-Answers are simply used to acknowledge receipt of the requests. However,
taking advantage of an optimisation discussed in section 6.1.4.2 and adopted by
PANA/GSM, in the context of this chapter a PANA-Auth-Answer will include
an EAP-SIM Response payload.
As previously discussed, the PAA communicates with the EAP server through
the AAA Diameter EAP protocol (see section 3.9.3). Hence, EAP-SIM pack-
ets encapsulated in Diameter-EAP messages are exchanged between the PAA,
which is thus the Diameter client, and the EAP server, which is implemented
on the Diameter server, following the process for using EAP in Diameter given
in Figure 3.14. The PANA-Diameter message mapping, given in section 3.7.5,
is also adopted here to allow the transport of EAP-SIM payloads between the
PANA framework and the AAA Diameter infrastructure (see section 3.9.2). At
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the end of the Authentication phase, a PANA SA is established, including the
provision of a shared secret EAP-SIM session key MSK (see section 7.4); we call
this the PANA/GSM SA.
During the Access phase, a separate protocol is used between the PAA and
the EP to manage PaC network access control. After this phase, the established
PANA/GSM session and the PANA/GSM SA are deleted, following the PANA
draft standard (see section 6.1.4.5).
7.5.2.2 PANA/GSM Message Exchange
During the Authentication phase, the first PANA-Auth-Request message (a)
issued by the PAA carries a PANA-based Nonce, i.e. a randomly chosen value
(see section 6.1.3), used in further PANA/GSM cryptographic key computa-
tions, and an EAP-Request/Identity payload, requesting the PaC to identify
itself. The PaC responds (b) with a PANA-Auth-Answer, which also carries
a PANA-based Nonce value, and an EAP-Response/Identity payload including
the user’s identifier (Identity).
The PAA then issues a Diameter-EAP-Request to the EAP server via an
AAA interaction (see section 3.9.3), including the EAP-Response/Identity mes-
sage in an EAP-Payload AVP, and the user’s identifier value in a Diameter
User-Name AVP (see section 3.9.2). The EAP server responds with a Diameter-
EAP-Answer in a multi-round exchange, which includes a NULL EAP-Payload
AVP and a Result-Code AVP set to DIAMETER MULTI ROUND AUTH, sig-
nifying that a subsequent request is expected.
An EAP-Request/SIM/START packet, containing a list of the EAP-SIM
versions supported by the PAA (Version List), is now sent to the PaC in
a PANA-Auth-Request (c). The PaC responds (d) with a message carrying
the EAP-Response/SIM/Start payload, which includes NONCE MT, a random
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number chosen by the PaC, and the EAP-SIM version selected by the PaC
(Selected Version).
After receiving the EAP-Response/SIM/Start payload from the PAA via
an AAA interaction, i.e. encapsulated in a Diameter-EAP-Request, the EAP
server obtains the set of n GSM triplets generated by the AuC within the home
GSM network of the PaC (e). As specified in section 7.4, the EAP server can
now derive the keying material, using as input into the hash function SHA-1 (see
section 2.1.3.2) a combination of the values: the user’s Identity (I), NONCE MT
(N), Version List, and Selected Version (X), together with the set of n GSM
keys Kc,j obtained from the GSM triplets. The output will be the secret key
MK (see equation 7.3). From MK, the EAP server is able to derive the keying
material, including the MSK, which is used by PANA/GSM as the AAA-Key
(see section 6.1.2), and Ka, which is used to calculate the MAC.
The EAP server then sends back to the PAA a Diameter-EAP-Answer in a
multi-round exchange. This exchange includes an EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge
payload, which contains the set of n challenges RANDj obtained from the
GSM triplets, and a MAC to protect the challenges. The MAC of this EAP-
SIM payload is calculated by applying HMAC-SHA-1 (see section 2.1.3.2) to
the concatenation of the EAP Packet (P ) and NONCE MT (N), as shown in
equation (7.5), where here, as throughout, fK(X) denotes an HMAC-SHA-1
MAC computed using the key K and data X:
MAC = fKa(P |N). (7.5)
The next PANA/GSM message (f) issued by the PAA encapsulates the re-
ceived EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge payload detailed above. On receipt of this
message, the PaC runs the GSM authentication algorithm inside a SIM to de-
rive the keying material, as described in section 7.4. Each key Kc,j is generated
in the GSM SIM, as a function of the challenge RANDj and the customer’s
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unique secret key Ki, using key generation algorithm A8 (see equation 7.1). At
the same time, n values SRESj are generated, also as a function of RANDj and
Ki, using MAC algorithm A3 (see equation 7.2). After that, the PaC derives
the secret key MK (see equation 7.3) and the resulting EAP-SIM session keys,
including MSK and Ka.
Next, the PaC calculates a copy of the MAC, as shown in equation 7.5,
and verifies that the calculated MAC equals the received MAC (g). Since the
RANDj challenges given to a PaC are accompanied by the AT MAC, and since
the PaC’s NONCE MT value contributes to AT MAC, the PaC is able to verify
that the EAP-SIM message is fresh (i.e. not a replay; see section 2.2.5) and that
the sender possesses valid GSM triplets for the user.
If all the checks succeed, the PaC responds (h) with a PANA-Auth-Answer
encapsulating the EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge payload, itself containing the
AT MAC attribute. This is calculated by applying HMAC-SHA-1, as given in
equation (7.6), where P is the EAP Packet, and the set of concatenated SRESj
values are the PaC’s responses to the n received challenges RANDj :
MAC = fKa(P |SRES1| . . . |SRESn). (7.6)
After receiving the EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge payload from the PAA
via an AAA Diameter-EAP-Request, the EAP server verifies that the MAC
value is correct. This involves using the EAP-SIM payload concatenated with
the n stored values of XRESj , together with the key Ka as inputs to HMAC-
SHA-1. That is, checking involves recomputing the MAC according to equation
(7.6), but using XRESj in place of SRESj . The n stored values XRESj are
obtained from the same GSM triplets and in the same order as the n previously
sent RANDj challenges.
The EAP server then sends back (i) an AAA Diameter-EAP-Answer, which
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includes a Result-Code AVP set to DIAMETER SUCCESS. This message also
includes an EAP-Payload AVP with a code field set to Success, which indicates
that the authentication was successful. This EAP-Success packet carries derived
AAA keying material, including an AAA-Key.
The PAA then encapsulates the PANA result code, the EAP-Success packet,
and the PANA/GSM session lifetime (see section 6.1.2) in a PANA-Bind-
Request message sent to the PaC (j), and receives back an acknowledgement
through a PANA-Bind-Answer (k). On receipt of this message, the PAA issues
a Diameter Accounting-Request (Start) to the EAP server, which indicates the
start of the session, following the PANA-Diameter message mapping given in
section 3.7.5.
PANA-Bind messages are protected by a PANA/GSM-based MAC AVP,
calculated as described in the next section, and carry a Key-Id AVP (see section
6.1.3); this latter AVP contains an AAA-Key identifier that is assigned by the
PAA and is unique within the PANA/GSM session.
Finally, PANA-Bind messages may also optionally contain a Protection-
Capability AVP (see section 6.1.3), which is sent from the PAA to indicate
that link-layer or network-layer encryption should be initiated after completion
of PANA/GSM. PANA-Bind messages are also used for binding the device iden-
tifiers of the PaC and the PAA to the PANA/GSM SA established at the end of
the authentication phase; this is achieved using a Device-Id AVP. PANA-Bind
messages with a Result-Code AVP indicating successful authentication also in-
clude PPAC AVPs (see section 6.1.3), which help the PAA/PaC to negotiate
the available/chosen IP address configuration method.
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7.5.2.3 PANA/GSM-based MAC
The PANA/GSM-based MAC (MPG) is calculated using HMAC-SHA-1, as
given in equation (7.7), where PG denotes the PANA/GSM packet, and Kp
denotes the PANA MAC Key (see section 6.1.5):
MPG = fKp(PG). (7.7)
The EAP-SIM shared secret MSK, which is used to establish a PANA/GSM
SA, is adopted as the AAA-Key, which is then used to generate a distinct
PANA MAC Key Kp. However, two AAA-Keys may be produced as a result
of separate NAP and ISP authentication processes (see section 6.1.4.2). In this
case, the AAA-Key used in the Kp generation procedure, which we call Kaaa,
is derived as in equation (7.8), where Knap denotes the AAA-key produced by
the NAP, and Kisp denotes the AAA-key produced by the ISP:
Kaaa = Knap|Kisp. (7.8)
In this case, the PANA MAC Key Kp is derived from a combination of
PANA-based Nonces and the AAA-Key Kaaa. That is, Kp is calculated by
applying HMAC-SHA-1, as given in equation (7.9), using the key Kaaa to the
concatenation of two PANA-based Nonces, which we call Npac and Npaa, sent
respectively by the PaC (b) and the PAA (a), and the PANA/GSM Session-Id
AVP value (Sid):
Kp = fKaaa(Npac|Npaa|Sid). (7.9)
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7.6 PANA/GSM SA and Re-Authentication
Two important features of PANA/GSM, namely the security association and
the re-authentication procedure, are now described.
Once the EAP-SIM method has completed, a session key, i.e. the EAP-SIM
MSK, which is used as the AAA-Key (as discussed in the previous section), is
shared by the PaC and the PAA. This session key is provided to the PaC as part
of the EAP key exchange process, and the PAA obtains the session key from the
EAP server via the AAA infrastructure. PANA/GSM SA establishment based
on the EAP session key is required where no physical or link layer security is
available (see section 4.2.3).
The purpose of a re-authentication exchange is to allow for efficient re-keying,
using the existing PANA/GSM security association, in situations where (de-
pending on the security policy in force) full authentication is not required.
Two types of re-authentication (or fast re-authentication) are supported by
PANA/GSM. The first type enters the chosen EAP method, i.e. the EAP-SIM
fast re-authentication process (see section 5 of [77]), during the authentication
and authorisation phase, and in this case the initial discovery and handshake
phase is omitted. The generation of a new session key, using an EAP-SIM fast
re-authentication process, is described in section 7.4. The second type of re-
authentication uses protected PANA/GSM messages exchanged directly during
the access phase, without entering the authentication and authorisation phase,
i.e. the PANA re-authentication phase (see section 6.1.4.4).
7.7 Conclusions
Authentication and key agreement are fundamental components of a secure pro-
cedure for heterogeneous network access supporting ubiquitous mobility. The
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main challenges addressed here include the investigation and development of
unified, secure and convenient authentication mechanisms that can be used in
access networks of a wide range of types.
In this chapter, we have proposed the PANA/GSM protocol, providing an IP-
compatible, lightweight, flexible and scalable method for authenticating a user
to an access network. The protocol is based on PANA, a network-layer access
authentication protocol carrier, which communicates, via Diameter EAP, with
an AAA infrastructure interacting with an AuC in the GSM mobile network.
PANA/GSM uses the EAP-SIM protocol, which encapsulates GSM parameters
in EAP and provides enhancements such as stronger authentication and key
agreement as well as mutual authentication.
The use of ‘triplets’ in PANA/GSM minimises the necessary trust relation-
ship between operators, thereby increasing the likelihood of successful use. From
the user perspective, the protocol works with a ‘standard’ GSM SIM card and
requires only an appropriate Internet access device and a SIM card reader, which
may or may not be integrated with the access device. The gains in performance
arising from the two types of fast re-authentication, and the gains in security
from the PANA/GSM SA, potentially make the PANA/GSM proposal attrac-
tive to GSM operators willing to offer their users heterogeneous Internet access
in ubiquitous mobility networks.
This new Internet authentication scheme, designed to meet the requirements
established in Chapter 5, is proposed here as a candidate for secure access
procedure for heterogeneous network access supporting ubiquitous mobility (see
section 1.1). In Chapter 11, the new scheme is submitted to a formal threat
modelling process; it is also compared with the three further novel Internet
entity authentication techniques proposed in Chapters 8, 9, and 10.
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As explained in Chapter 7, this thesis proposes a series of new solutions
for Internet remote access authentication, derived by adapting and reinforc-
ing security techniques arising from a variety of different sources. The aim
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of this chapter is to present the second new authentication scheme, namely a
means of combining the UMTS authentication and key agreement mechanism
(see section 3.5.3.2) with PANA (see section 3.7.5 and Chapter 6), which we
call PANA/UMTS.
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8.1 Introduction
As described in section 7.1, in some ubiquitous mobility scenarios, IP based
remote hosts that connect to the Internet via an access network will typically
need to provide their credentials and be authenticated before being authorised
to access the network. For such a process we need an easy-to-use, strong, and
scalable entity authentication infrastructure. According to Laitinen et al. [124],
one of the most critical steps in setting up such an infrastructure is the provi-
sioning of initial credentials to the user, which means, for example, registering
username/password pairs, or distributing smart cards. As stated before, authen-
tication based on smart cards is more secure than reusing the same password
at multiple sites, and more user-friendly than using a large collection of diverse
passwords.
As outlined in section 7.1, credential provisioning is costly and takes time,
which may be inconvenient to users. This motivates the idea of reusing already
deployed user credentials for new Internet remote access services. In particular,
cellular network operators already have an authentication infrastructure based
on subscriber’s smart cards, for example in the form of UMTS USIMs (see
section 3.5.3.1). Therefore it seems potentially desirable to reuse this existing
infrastructure for heterogeneous Internet remote access authentication.
As previously discussed, the IETF PANA protocol (see Chapter 6) is in-
tended to be a flexible and scalable generic network layer protocol to be used
to authenticate a user device requesting Internet remote access. In addition,
the 3GPP UMTS AKA infrastructure (see section 3.5.3.2), currently being
rolled out worldwide, is an internationally accepted standard for the new gen-
eration of mobile services, which provide both better quality voice and high-
speed Internet and multimedia services (see section 3.5.3.2). Building on these
two observations, we now present a new authentication scheme, combining the
UMTS authentication and key agreement mechanism with PANA, which we call
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PANA/UMTS. This innovative proposal, previously described in [148], adapts
the security techniques used in the UMTS mobile telecommunication system
to the PANA network remote access authentication structure, in a solution de-
signed to support ubiquitous client mobility for Internet access.
The purpose (section 8.2) and the components used in the assembly (section
8.3) of the novel PANA/UMTS scheme are first given. Second, the EAP-AKA
mechanism (section 8.4), an EAP method (see section 3.4) published in RFC
4187 [20] and used as a component of the new PANA/UMTS technique, is
explained. The framework of the proposed new PANA/UMTS protocol is then
given (section 8.5). Next, two important features of PANA/UMTS, namely
the security association and the re-authentication procedure (section 8.6), are
described. This is followed by a description of how the GAA architecture (see
section 3.5.4) can be used to support an internal interface for PANA/UMTS
(section 8.7). Finally, the conclusions of the chapter are given (section 8.8).
The main novel contribution of this chapter lies in sections 8.3, 8.5, 8.6,
and 8.7. Whilst the EAP-AKA mechanism described in section 8.4 has been
previously described (notably by Arkko and Haverinen [20]), the details of how
it would operate when executed over PANA have not. This chapter does not
contain a detailed security analysis of the new proposal — this issue is covered
in Chapter 11.
8.2 PANA/UMTS Objective
Currently there is no standard protocol for performing network access authen-
tication above the link layer. Instead, a number of ad hoc and often inadequate
solutions (as described in section 4.1.5) are being used to overcome the problem
(itself described in section 4.1), in a variety of distinct scenarios (outlined in
section 4.2).
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The objective of the PANA/UMTS protocol is thus to provide a network
layer, IP compatible, lightweight, attack-resistant (e.g. with respect to MitM and
DoS attacks — see section 3.2.3), and relatively flexible authentication method,
that allows a remote client to be authenticated in a heterogeneous Internet
access environment supporting ubiquitous mobility. This authentication method
must meet a number of detailed security and implementation requirements, as
specified in Chapter 5.
8.3 PANA/UMTS Protocol Hierarchy
In this section, an overview of the components used in the construction of the
new PANA/UMTS authentication scheme is given. The first component, as
previously discussed, is the UMTS USIM authentication and key agreement
mechanism. Section 3.5.3 gives an outline of the UMTS system security features,
with a focus on the air interface protocol, including the authentication and key
agreement (AKA) scheme.
The second component used in the PANA/UMTS protocol assembly is EAP
(see section 3.4). The EAP protocol, as previously discussed, supports a vari-
ety of authentication schemes, giving providers the advantage of using a single
framework across multiple environments. Such flexibility seems likely to be im-
portant for heterogeneous network access supporting ubiquitous mobility. Since
EAP is very flexible and can encapsulate arbitrary EAP methods, it is clearly a
protocol that satisfies many of the requirements for a variety of authentication
scenarios (see sections 4.2 and 5.1.3).
However, as previously described, EAP itself does not specify any authenti-
cation method. It is only a transport mechanism, allowing concrete authenti-
cation methods for EAP, such as methods from the mobile telecommunications
area, to be defined separately. In fact, the EAP-AKA protocol, an EAP method
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specified in RFC 4187 [20], describes a way of encapsulating the security param-
eters used by the UMTS AKA system within EAP, in order to provide mutual
authentication and session key agreement using the UMTS USIM.
Although EAP-AKA re-uses a security solution implemented in a new gener-
ation of mobile system (i.e. UMTS AKA) in a flexible authentication framework
(i.e EAP), using EAP-AKA on its own for authentication is not a good choice.
This is because it does not provide a complete authentication solution for ubiq-
uitous client mobility for Internet access.
The effective use of EAP-AKA in this latter environment requires the pro-
vision of a transport scheme for authentication data between a remote entity
seeking access to a network and another entity located in the access network
(see section 4.1.4). More specifically, a transport scheme independent of the
access network type is needed, to transfer user authentication information to
the access network and, optionally, to the AAA infrastructure (see section 3.9).
Defining a network layer transport for EAP-AKA, such as the proposed tun-
nelled authentication solutions (see section 3.7), provides a cleaner answer to
the problem.
In Chapter 6, we justified the selection of PANA, a UDP-based protocol (see
section 6.1.1), as the tunnelled network layer transportation environment. We
describe here how to use PANA to support the use of EAP-AKA for Internet
remote access authentication. As stated previously, PANA is also able to inter-
act with Diameter EAP (see sections 3.7.5 and 3.9.3). Consequently, PANA is
our choice for the third component in the construction of our proposed tech-
nique, which thus combines UMTS authentication with EAP-AKA and PANA
interacting with Diameter EAP, into a scheme which we call PANA/UMTS. A
summary of the PANA/UMTS protocol hierarchy is shown in Figure 8.1.
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Figure 8.1: PANA/UMTS protocol hierarchy
8.4 An EAP Mechanism for Carrying UMTS
In this section, EAP-AKA, an EAP method which is used as a component
of the PANA/UMTS technique, is explained. RFC 4187 [20] describes this
authentication and session key distribution mechanism, that is based upon the
UMTS AKA technique (see section 3.5.3). AKA is based on challenge-response
mechanisms and symmetric cryptography (see section 2.1.3.2), and typically
runs in a UMTS USIM. AKA can also be used in a CDMA2000 (Removable)
User Identity Module ((R)UIM) [20], which is similar to a smart card, for all
releases of CDMA2000 following release C (see section 3.5.5.3).
EAP-AKA involves a client acting on behalf of a user, an authenticating
party, and an EAP server (see section 3.4). The EAP server, which typically
belongs to the user’s home Internet AAA network (see section 3.9), must be
able to obtain authentication vectors from the subscriber’s HN AuC (see section
3.5.3.2). The EAP-AKA packet format and the use of attributes are specified
in section 8 of [20]. Either permanent identities, usually based on the IMSI,
or temporary identities (pseudonyms), which are equivalent to the GSM TMSI,
can be employed as part of the user identifier. Section 4.1 of [20] describes user
identity management.
EAP-AKA typically uses two round trips to mutually authenticate the client
and the network, and provide them with temporary shared secret keys. The pro-
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tocol includes an exchange of EAP-Request/Response messages of types Iden-
tity and AKA. The message type AKA also has a subtype field1 that admits
the values: Challenge, Authentication-Reject, Synchronization-Failure, Identity,
Notification, Re-authentication, and Client-Error.
In the EAP-AKA full authentication procedure, an identity request/response
message pair is first exchanged. After obtaining the client identity, the EAP
server is able to obtain an authentication vector from the subscriber’s HN AuC
in the UMTS mobile network. As stated in section 3.5.3.2, an authentication
vector or ‘quintet’ (RAND, AUTN, XRES, IK, CK) is produced from a 128-bit
secret key K, shared by the USIM and the HN AuC, and a sequence number.
From the vector, the EAP server derives the EAP-AKA keying material, as
further explained below.
Next, the EAP server sends an EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge message. This
message contains a random challenge (RAND) and a network authentication
token (AUTN ), both obtained from the authentication vector, and a MAC at-
tribute (AT MAC). The message may also optionally contain encrypted data
(AT ENCR DATA) for identity confidentiality and fast re-authentication sup-
port (see section 4.1 of [20]).
The client runs the AKA algorithm, usually inside a USIM (see section
3.5.3), and verifies AUTN and the MAC. If this is successful, the client has
assurance that it is talking to a valid EAP server. It then derives RES and
certain temporary keys as a function of K and RAND (see section 3.5.3.2), and
sends back the EAP-Response/AKA-Challenge, protected by another AT MAC.
The EAP server then checks the AT MAC by comparing the received RES with
the stored XRES from the authentication vector; the shared temporary keys
can now be used.
As specified in section 7 of RFC 4187 [20], the EAP-AKA keying material
1The subtype-specific data is composed of parameters encapsulated in attributes.
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is generated from a Master Key (MK ), which is derived by applying the hash
function SHA-1 (see section 2.1.3.2) to the concatenation of the customer’s
identifier (Identity — written as I below), the UMTS integrity key IK, and the
UMTS confidentiality key CK . That is, the 160-bit key MK is derived as given
in equation (8.1), where here, as throughout, | denotes concatenation of data
items, and h denotes the SHA-1 hash function:
MK = h(I|IK|CK). (8.1)
According to RFC 4187 [20], the MK value is input to the pseudo-random
number generator described in Figure 7.2, i.e. the same scheme as used in
EAP/SIM (see section 7.4). The MK value is thus employed as the initial
secret seed-key XKEY, and the derived material is used to generate the tempo-
rary keys. These temporary keys include the MSK, used for encryption of the
traffic between the client and the network, the encryption key (Ke) to be used
with AT ENCR DATA, the authentication key (Ka) to be used with AT MAC,
and the EMSK, itself used to derive keys for multiple applications (see section
3.6.6).
In the EAP-AKA full authentication procedure, the 320-bit random numbers
(x0, x1, . . . , xm−1) output from the generator are concatenated and partitioned
into suitable-sized bit strings, which are used as keys in the following order: Ke
(128 bits), Ka (128 bits), MSK (64 bytes), and EMSK (64 bytes)2.
Finally, EAP-AKA includes optional identity privacy support (see section
4.1.1.2 of [20]), and an optional fast re-authentication procedure (see section
5 of [20]). In EAP-AKA fast re-authentication, the pseudo-random algorithm
described in Figure 7.2 can be used to generate a new MSK and a new EMSK.
In this case, the seed value XKEY′ is calculated as given in equation 7.4, where I
2As stated in section 1.2 of [18], the MSK and the EMSK are individually at least 64
octets in length, where each octet or byte, as it is called in RFC 4187 [20], contains 8 bits. In
particular, EAP-AKA defines each MSK and EMSK to be 64 bytes in length.
250
8. PANA/UMTS
denotes the next fast re-authentication user identifier, c denotes the next counter
value, N denotes a freshly generated 16-byte nonce (known as NONCE S), and
MK is the master key derived during the preceding full authentication. The
pseudo-random number generator is then run with the new seed value XKEY′,
and the resulting 320-bit random numbers (x0, x1, . . . , xm−1) are concatenated
and partitioned into two 64-byte strings, which are used as the new 64-byte
MSK and the new 64-byte EMSK.
8.5 PANA/UMTS Framework
In this section, the authentication framework for the new PANA/UMTS scheme
is described. The entities involved in the PANA/UMTS method are first given
(section 8.5.1). After that, the PANA/UMTS authentication scheme is ex-
plained (section 8.5.2).
8.5.1 PANA/UMTS Entities
The PANA/UMTS method proposed here involves three entities, namely the
PaC (also referred to here as the client, user, customer or subscriber), the
PAA (or authenticating party) and the EAP server. The PaC is associated
with a network device and a set of UMTS credentials stored in a USIM; these
credentials are used to prove the PaC identity for the purposes of network access.
A possible implementation of the PaC would be an Internet access device (e.g.
a laptop) with a PC card inserted in the PCMCIA socket (see section 7.5),
where the PC card is itself equipped with a UMTS-enabled USIM card. There
are other possible implementations, e.g. involving the use of a UMTS Mobile
Equipment (ME, e.g. mobile phone) equipped with a USIM card and linked to
a laptop (e.g. via cable, Bluetooth, infrared or WLAN)3.
3An alternative described in [119] is to use USIM Toolkit commands, which enables the
USIM to request the ME to open an infrared or Bluetooth channel with the user laptop.
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The PAA authenticates the UMTS credentials provided by the PaC and
grants network access. In the context of this chapter, the user’s EAP server
is assumed to be implemented on the AAA server (see section 3.9) and has an
interface to the UMTS network; that is, it operates as a gateway between the
Internet AAA network and the UMTS AKA infrastructure. The PAA is thus
an AAA client that communicates with the user’s EAP server through an AAA
protocol supporting EAP (i.e. Diameter EAP, described in section 3.9.3) and
key wrap (see section 7.5). PANA/UMTS also involves a further entity, namely
the EP (see section 6.1.2), which applies per-packet enforcement policies (i.e.
filters) to the traffic of the PaC’s devices.
8.5.2 PANA/UMTS Authentication Scheme
The aim of this section is to give a detailed description of the PANA/UMTS
scheme. Firstly we identify the distinct phases of a PANA/UMTS session,
and briefly describe them (section 8.5.2.1). Secondly, a complete description
of the PANA/UMTS message exchange is provided (section 8.5.2.2). We then
summarise the calculation of the PANA/UMTS-based MAC used during that
exchange (section 8.5.2.3).
Figure 8.2 shows the PANA/UMTS authentication procedure, which is fur-
ther described below. In this figure, the name of each message is shown, followed
by the contents of the message in round brackets. Square brackets are used to
denote optional fields.
8.5.2.1 PANA/UMTS Phases
The PANA/UMTS authentication procedure has three main phases: (1) Dis-
covery and Handshake, (2) Authentication and Authorisation, and (3) Ac-
cess. In the Discovery phase, an IP address for the PAA is identified, and
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Figure 8.2: PANA/UMTS full authentication procedure
a PANA/UMTS session is established between the PaC and the PAA, following
the PANA model (see section 6.1.4.1). After this phase is complete, a session
identifier (Session-Id — see section 6.1.2) is allocated by the PAA and included
in all further messages; this identifier is freed when the PANA/UMTS session
terminates.
In the Authentication phase, the main focus of this section and further ex-
plained below, EAP-AKA messages encapsulated in PANA/UMTS messages are
exchanged between the PaC and the PAA. In this phase, EAP-AKA Request
payloads are carried in PANA-Auth-Requests. Moreover, taking advantage of
an optimisation discussed in section 6.1.4.2 and adopted by PANA/UMTS, in
the context of this chapter a PANA-Auth-Answer will include an EAP-AKA
Response payload.
As previously discussed, the PAA communicates with the EAP server using
the AAA Diameter EAP protocol (see section 3.9.3). Hence, EAP-AKA pack-
ets encapsulated in Diameter-EAP messages are exchanged between the PAA,
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which is thus the Diameter client, and the EAP server, which is implemented
on the Diameter server, following the process for using EAP in Diameter given
in Figure 3.14. The PANA-Diameter message mapping, given in section 3.7.5,
is also adopted here to allow the transport of EAP-AKA payloads between the
PANA framework and the AAA Diameter infrastructure (see section 3.9.2). At
the end of the Authentication phase, a PANA SA is established, including the
provision of a shared secret EAP-AKA session key MSK (see section 8.4); we
call this the PANA/UMTS SA.
During the Access phase, a separate protocol is used between the PAA and
the EP to manage PaC network access control. After this phase, the estab-
lished PANA/UMTS session and the PANA/UMTS SA are deleted, following
the PANA draft standard (see section 6.1.4.5).
8.5.2.2 PANA/UMTS Message Exchange
During the Authentication phase, the first PANA-Auth-Request message (a)
issued by the PAA carries a PANA-based Nonce, i.e. a randomly chosen value
(see section 6.1.3), used in further PANA/UMTS cryptographic key computa-
tions, and an EAP-Request/Identity payload, requesting the PaC to identify
itself. The PaC responds (b) with a PANA-Auth-Answer, which also carries
a PANA-based Nonce value, and an EAP-Response/Identity payload including
the user identifier Identity.
The PAA then issues a Diameter-EAP-Request to the EAP server via an
AAA interaction (see section 3.9.3), including the EAP-Response/Identity packet
in an EAP-Payload AVP, and the user’s identifier value in a Diameter User-
Name AVP (see section 3.9.2). After receiving this message, the EAP server is
able to obtain the user’s authentication vector (RAND, AUTN, XRES, IK, CK)
from the PaC’s home UMTS network (c). Parts of this vector are subsequently
used to derive certain temporary keys.
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As specified in section 8.4, the EAP server can now derive the EAP-AKA
keying material. This is achieved by inputting the concatenation of: the cus-
tomer’s Identity (I), the UMTS integrity key IK, and the UMTS confidentiality
key CK to the hash function SHA-1. The output is the secret key MK (as given
in equation 8.1). Using MK, the EAP server is able to derive the EAP-AKA
keying material, including the MSK, which is used by PANA/UMTS as the
AAA-Key (see section 6.1.2), and Ka, which is used to calculate the MAC.
The EAP server then sends back to the PAA a Diameter-EAP-Answer in
a multi-round exchange, with a Result-Code AVP set to DIAMETER MULTI
ROUND AUTH, signifying that a subsequent request is expected. This ex-
change also includes an EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge payload, which contains
the RAND and AUTN values obtained from the authentication vector, a MAC
to protect the whole EAP packet, and an optional AT ENCR DATA field (see
section 8.4). The MAC of this EAP-AKA payload is calculated by applying
HMAC-SHA-1 (see section 2.1.3.2) to the EAP packet (P ), as shown in equa-
tion (8.2), where here, as throughout, fY (X) denotes an HMAC-SHA-1 MAC
computed using the key Y and data X:
MAC = fKa(P ). (8.2)
The next PANA/UMTS message (d) issued by the PAA encapsulates the
received EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge payload detailed above. On receipt of
this message, the PaC runs the UMTS AKA algorithm inside a USIM to derive
the keying material and calculate AUTN, using the secret key K and the copy
of the sequence number that it maintains, as described in section 8.4. The
PaC also computes, again using the USIM, the UMTS keys CK and IK, which
are obtained by applying the key generating functions f3 and f4 (see section
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3.5.3.2) to K and RAND, as given in equations (8.3) and (8.4):
CK = f3K(RAND); (8.3)
IK = f4K(RAND). (8.4)
The PaC then derives the secret key MK (following equation 8.1) and the
resulting EAP-AKA session keys, including MSK and Ka. The authentication
key Ka is then used to calculate the MAC on the received EAP-Request/AKA-
Challenge packet (see equation 8.2).
After computing a copy of AUTN and MAC, the PaC checks that they are
the same as the received values4. If the check succeeds, the PaC assumes that
the received message is fresh (i.e. not a replay; see section 2.2.5) and that the
sender possesses a valid authentication vector for the user (the EAP server is
forbidden to reuse old authentication vectors). The PaC then derives RES and
the temporary keying material (e) for further use. The RES value is computed
in the USIM by applying the message authentication function f2 (see section
3.5.3.2) to K and RAND, as shown in equation (8.5):
RES = f2K(RAND). (8.5)
If all the checks succeed, the PaC responds (f) with a PANA-Auth-Answer
encapsulating the EAP-Response/AKA-Challenge payload, itself containing RES
and MAC. This MAC is computed as given in equation 8.2, i.e. using HMAC-
SHA-1 (see section 2.1.3.2) on the EAP packet (P ) with key Ka.
After receiving the EAP-Response/AKA-Challenge payload from the PAA
via an AAA Diameter-EAP-Request, the EAP server verifies that the MAC
4If the AUTN does not match, the PaC then sends back to the PAA an explicit error
packet (EAP-Response/AKA-Authentication-Reject) inside a PANA-Auth-Answer message.
If the MAC does not match, the PaC silently ignores the previous message and does not send
any authentication results to the PAA.
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is correct, and compares the received RES with the stored XRES from the
authentication vector; if they agree, the PaC is deemed authentic.
The EAP server then sends back (g) an AAA Diameter-EAP-Answer, which
includes a Result-Code AVP set to DIAMETER SUCCESS. This message also
includes an EAP-Payload AVP with a code field set to Success, which indicates
that the authentication was successful. This EAP-Success packet carries derived
AAA keying material, including an AAA-Key.
The PAA then encapsulates the PANA result code, the EAP-Success packet,
and the PANA/UMTS session lifetime (see section 6.1.2) in a PANA-Bind-
Request message sent to the PaC (h), and receives back an acknowledgement
through a PANA-Bind-Answer (i). On receipt of this message, the PAA issues
a Diameter Accounting-Request (Start) to the EAP server, which indicates the
start of the session, following the PANA-Diameter message mapping given in
section 3.7.5.
PANA-Bind messages are protected by a PANA/UMTS-based MAC AVP,
the calculation of which is described in the following section, and carry a Key-Id
AVP (see section 6.1.3); this latter AVP contains an AAA-Key identifier that is
assigned by the PAA and is unique within the PANA/UMTS session.
Finally, PANA-Bind messages may also optionally contain a Protection-
Capability AVP (see section 6.1.3), which is sent from the PAA to indicate
that link-layer or network-layer encryption should be initiated after completion
of PANA/UMTS. PANA-Bind messages are also used for binding the device
identifiers of the PaC and the PAA to the PANA/UMTS SA established at
the end of the authentication phase; this is achieved using a Device-Id AVP.
PANA-Bind messages with a Result-Code AVP indicating successful authenti-
cation also include PPAC AVPs (see section 6.1.3), which help the PAA/PaC
to negotiate the available/chosen IP address configuration method.
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8.5.2.3 PANA/UMTS-based MAC
The PANA/UMTS-based MAC (MPU ) is calculated using HMAC-SHA-1, as
given in equation (8.6), where PU denotes the PANA/UMTS packet, and Kp
denotes the PANA MAC Key (see section 6.1.5):
MPU = fKp(PU ). (8.6)
The EAP-AKA shared secretMSK, which is used to establish a PANA/UMTS
SA, is adopted as the AAA-Key, which is then used to generate the key Kp.
However, as previously discussed, two AAA-Keys may be produced as a result
of separate NAP and ISP authentication processes (see section 6.1.4.2). In this
case, the two keys are concatenated to yieldKaaa, which is then used to compute
Kp, as given in equation 7.8.
More specifically, and following equation (7.9), the PANA MAC Key Kp is
calculated by applying HMAC-SHA-1, using the key Kaaa to the concatenation
of the PANA-based Nonces Npac and Npaa, sent respectively by the PaC (b)
and the PAA (a), with the PANA/UMTS Session-Id AVP value (Sid).
8.6 PANA/UMTS SA and Re-Authentication
Two important features of PANA/UMTS, namely the security association and
the re-authentication procedure, are now described.
Once the EAP-AKA method has completed, a session key, i.e. the EAP-AKA
MSK, which is used as the AAA-Key (as discussed in the previous section), is
shared by the PaC and the PAA. This session key is provided to the PaC as part
of the EAP key exchange process, and the PAA can obtain the session key from
the EAP server via the AAA infrastructure. PANA/UMTS SA establishment
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based on the EAP session key is required where no physical or link layer security
is available (see section 4.2.3).
The purpose of a re-authentication exchange is to allow for efficient re-keying,
using the existing PANA/UMTS security association, in situations where (de-
pending on the security policy in force) full authentication is not required.
Two types of re-authentication (or fast re-authentication) are supported by
PANA/UMTS. The first type enters the chosen EAP method, i.e. the EAP-
AKA fast re-authentication procedure (see section 5 of [20]), during the authen-
tication and authorisation phase, and thus the initial discovery and handshake
phase is omitted. The second type uses protected PANA/UMTS messages ex-
changed directly during the access phase, without entering the authentication
and authorisation phase, i.e. the PANA re-authentication phase (see section
6.1.4.4).
8.7 PANA/UMTS with GAA Infrastructure
There is a problem that has not been addressed in this chapter. Section 8.5.1
states that, when using PANA/UMTS, the EAP server is assumed to be im-
plemented on the AAA server (see section 3.9) and has an interface to the
UMTS network (see section 3.5.3). It thus operates as a gateway between the
Internet AAA network and the UMTS AKA infrastructure. However, the EAP
server/UMTS network interface has not been defined. In this section, a possible
solution, which incorporates part of the GAA infrastructure (see section 3.5.4)
into the PANA/UMTS scheme, is proposed to address this problem.
Figure 8.3 shows a scheme in which the PANA/UMTS authentication pro-
tocol incorporates the GAA framework. The scheme is described immediately
below.
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Figure 8.3: PANA/UMTS incorporating the GAA framework
8.7.1 PANA/UMTS with GAA Entities
As previously stated, the PaC is associated with a network device, which con-
tains a set of UMTS credentials stored in a USIM. In the solution proposed
below, this network device also hosts the set of GAA functionalities required
from a UE. The PAA then authenticates the UMTS credentials provided by
the PaC, via the PANA/UMTS protocol, and grants network access. The net-
work access device which hosts the PAA is implemented on a client of an AAA
Diameter infrastructure; it also hosts the set of functionalities required from a
NAF.
This AAA Diameter client communicates, via the Diameter EAP applica-
tion (see section 3.9.3), with the user’s EAP server implemented on the AAA
Diameter server. The network element which implements the EAP server also
hosts the set of functionalities required from a BSF. As stated before, the EAP
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server, which is implemented in the AAA server, has an interface (Zh) to the
UMTS network, in particular to the home AuC in the HSS. This interface is
described immediately below.
8.7.2 An Internet AAA and UMTS AKA Interface
As described in section 3.5.4.3, the BSF (i.e. the EAP server) has a bootstrap-
ping interface (Zh) with the HSS (i.e. the UMTS network), with which it per-
forms the credential fetching protocol. This protocol is based on a Diameter
application protocol (see section 3.9.2) and is used to fetch the required au-
thentication information, i.e. authentication vectors and GBA User Security
Settings (GUSS5), from the home AuC in the HSS. Section 4 of [3] gives a com-
plete description of the application logic of the interface (Zh) between BSF and
HSS, while section 4.4.5 of [7] establishes the requirements for this interface. A
summary of the protocol hierarchy of the interface (Zh) is shown in Figure 8.4
[3]. The Diameter Base protocol is described in section 3.9.2, and the Diameter
application protocol is given in a 2007 3GPP TS [2].
IP
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Base Protocol
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Figure 8.4: Protocol hierarchy of the Zh interface
According to a 2007 3GPP TS [3], the overall GAA bootstrapping procedure
5A GUSS includes an application, i.e. a service offered by the mobile network operator
(or a third party) to the mobile subscriber, and a subscriber parameter set that contains
two parts: an authentication part, which contains the list of needed user identifiers, and an
authorisation part, which contains the user permission flags (see section 3.1 of [7]).
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can be summarised in the following three steps:
1. A UE starts the bootstrapping procedure via the interface Ub with the
BSF, with which it executes the bootstrapping protocol, by passing the
user identifier (see section 16 of [4]). As stated in section 8.4, either
permanent identities, usually based on the IMSI, or temporary identities
(pseudonyms), which are equivalent to the TMSI, can be employed as part
of the user identifier.
2. The BSF starts the credential fetching protocol using the bootstrapping
(Zh) interface with the user’s HSS, to request an authentication vector
and GUSS corresponding to the user identifier provided. The HSS then
supplies the BSF with the requested authentication vector and GUSS (if
any)6.
3. The BSF continues the bootstrapping protocol via the interface Ub with
the UE (see section 4 of [1]).
In the solution proposed in this section, which incorporates part of the GAA
framework into PANA/UMTS, steps 1 and 3 listed above, involving the interface
Ub, can be omitted. This is because the PaC (i.e. the UE), as previously shown
in item (b) of Figure 8.2, sends to the PAA (i.e. the NAF) a PANA-Auth-
Answer encapsulating an EAP-Response/Identity payload, which includes the
user identifier. By sending a Diameter-EAP-Request, the PAA then forwards
this user identifier to the EAP server (i.e. the BSF) in a Diameter User-Name
AVP (see sections 3.9.2 and 8.5.2.2).
Finally, by using the GAA bootstrapping (Zh) interface (step 2 above), the
EAP server can now operate as a gateway between the Internet AAA network
and the UMTS AKA infrastructure, performing the retrieval of authentication
6If more than one HSS is deployed within the UMTS network, the BSF may have to contact
the SLF using the Dz interface, prior to sending the request to the HSS (see section 3.5.4.3)
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vectors and the GUSS from the HSS. This provides a complete solution, ad-
dressing the problem raised above. In fact, the solution described here could be
applied directly to EAP-AKA, since GAA Zh can be used to allow an EAP-AKA
server to obtain authentication vectors from the HSS7.
8.8 Conclusions
As previously discussed, authentication and key agreement are fundamental
components of a secure procedure for heterogeneous network access support-
ing ubiquitous mobility. The main challenges addressed here include the in-
vestigation and development of unified, secure and convenient authentication
mechanisms that can be used in access networks of a wide range of types.
In this chapter, we have proposed the new PANA/UMTS protocol, in order
to provide an IP-compatible, lightweight, flexible and scalable method for au-
thenticating a user to an access network. The protocol is based on PANA, a
network-layer access authentication protocol carrier, which communicates, via
EAP, with an AAA infrastructure interacting with an AuC in the UMTS mo-
bile network. PANA/UMTS uses EAP-AKA, which allows use of the AKA
infrastructure in network scenarios in which mobile devices are equipped with
a USIM.
Use of UMTS authentication vectors minimises the necessary trust relation-
ship between operators, thereby increasing the likelihood of successful use. From
the user perspective, the protocol works with a ‘standard’ UMTS USIM (or even
a ‘standard’ CDMA2000 (R)UIM) card and requires only an appropriate Inter-
net access device and a USIM (or (R)UIM) card reader, which may or may not
be integrated with the access device. The gains in performance arising from the
7Although the EAP-AKA server is able to obtain authentication vectors from the home
AuC in the HSS, the communication between the EAP server and the HSS is outside the
scope of the EAP-AKA specification (see section 8.4).
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two types of fast re-authentication, the gains in security from the PANA/UMTS
SA, and the gains in flexibility and scalability by incorporating part of the GAA
architecture, potentially make the PANA/UMTS proposal attractive to UMTS
operators willing to offer their users heterogeneous Internet access in ubiquitous
mobility networks.
This new Internet authentication scheme, designed to meet the requirements
established in Chapter 5, is proposed here as a candidate for secure access
procedure for heterogeneous network access supporting ubiquitous mobility (see
section 1.1). In Chapter 11, the new scheme is submitted to a formal threat
modelling process; it is also compared with the three further novel Internet
entity authentication techniques proposed in Chapters 7, 9, and 10.
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9.8 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
As explained in Chapter 7, this thesis proposes a series of new solutions
for Internet remote access authentication, derived by adapting and reinforcing
security techniques arising from a variety of different sources. The aim of this
chapter is to present the third new authentication scheme, namely a means of
combining the Liberty Alliance architecture (see section 3.10) and the 3GPP
GAA security mechanisms (described in section 3.5.4), with PANA (see section
3.7.5 and Chapter 6), which we call PANA/Liberty.
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9.1 Introduction
As described in section 7.1, in some ubiquitous mobility scenarios, IP based
remote hosts that connect to the Internet via an access network will typically
need to provide their credentials and be authenticated before being authorised
to access the network, demanding an easy-to-use, strong, and scalable entity au-
thentication infrastructure. The Liberty Alliance architecture (see section 3.10)
offers an open Single Sign-On (SSO) standard, including decentralised authen-
tication and authorisation from multiple providers. The 3GPP GAA framework
(see section 3.5.4) offers the cellular authentication mechanisms to other mo-
bile applications, providing to communicating entities either a shared secret
based on 3GPP AKA (see section 3.5.3.2) or digitally signed public key certifi-
cates (see section 2.1.3.3). Although the Liberty protocols have been defined
independently of GAA, according to Laitinen et al. [124] the two schemes can
complement each other. Therefore, it seems potentially desirable to combine
Liberty and GAA to help to build an authentication infrastructure for Internet
remote access.
In Chapter 8 we presented the new PANA/UMTS scheme, which combines
UMTS AKA (see section 3.5.3.2), an internationally accepted standard for the
new generation of mobile services, with PANA (see Chapter 6), which is intended
to be a flexible and scalable generic network layer protocol for authenticating a
user device requesting Internet remote access. In particular, a possible variant
of PANA/UMTS, proposed in section 8.7, brings to this scheme the potential
advantages of incorporating part of the GAA framework (see section 3.5.4.5).
GAA offers a standardised, generic way to reuse the cellular network authentica-
tion infrastructure deployed in subscriber smart cards for other mobile services.
In addition, the Liberty architecture aims to provide an open SSO standard, and
create a network identity infrastructure supporting all network access devices
(see section 3.10.1).
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Building on the above observations, we now present a new authentication
scheme, combining the Liberty Alliance Project framework and 3GPP GAA
security mechanisms with PANA, which we call PANA/Liberty. This innovative
proposal first incorporates the security techniques used in the UMTS mobile
telecommunication system and part of the GAA infrastructure into the PANA
authentication structure; this scheme is then complemented by the Liberty SSO
service, which can be used to extend this initial authentication to all Liberty-
enabled Service Providers (SPs), in a solution designed to support ubiquitous
client mobility for Internet access.
The purpose (section 9.2) and the components used in the assembly (sec-
tion 9.3) of the novel PANA/Liberty scheme are first given. Second, a de-
scription of how two of the PANA/Liberty components, namely the Liberty
Alliance framework (see section 3.10) and the GAA architecture (see section
3.5.4) can be used in combination (section 9.4), is provided. The framework
of the proposed new PANA/Liberty protocol is then given (section 9.5). Next,
two important features of PANA/Liberty, namely the security association and
the re-authentication procedure (section 9.6), are described. This is followed
by a description of other possible ways in which PANA can be integrated into
Liberty (without the GAA framework), including a discussion of alternative
schemes that may be used as the PANA inner authentication protocol instead
of 3GPP AKA (section 9.7). Finally, the conclusions of the chapter are given
(section 9.8).
The main novel contribution of this chapter lies in sections 9.3, 9.5, 9.6, and
9.7. Whilst the use of a combination of the Liberty Alliance architecture and the
3GPP GAA security mechanisms described in section 9.4 has been previously
described (notably in the 3GPP TR 33.980 Specification [11]), the details of how
they would operate when executed with PANA have not. This chapter does not
contain a detailed security analysis of the new proposal — this issue is covered
in Chapter 11.
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9.2 PANA/Liberty Objective
Currently there is no standard protocol for performing network access authen-
tication above the link layer. Instead, a number of ad hoc and often inadequate
solutions (as described in section 4.1.5) are being used to overcome the problem
(itself described in section 4.1), in a variety of distinct scenarios (outlined in
section 4.2).
The objective of the PANA/Liberty protocol is thus to provide a network
layer, IP compatible, lightweight, attack-resistant (e.g. with respect to MitM and
DoS attacks — see section 3.2.3), and relatively flexible authentication method,
that allows a remote client to be authenticated in a heterogeneous Internet
access environment supporting ubiquitous mobility. This authentication method
must meet a number of detailed security and implementation requirements, as
specified in Chapter 5.
9.3 PANA/Liberty Protocol Hierarchy
In this section, an overview of the components used in the construction of the
new PANA/Liberty authentication scheme is given. The first component, as
previously discussed, is the UMTS USIM authentication and key agreement
mechanism. Section 3.5.3 gives an outline of the UMTS system security features,
including the authentication and key agreement (AKA) scheme.
The second component used in the PANA/Liberty protocol assembly is EAP
(see section 3.4). As previously described, EAP is very flexible, gives providers
the advantage of using a single framework across multiple environments, and
can encapsulate arbitrary EAP methods. In particular, the EAP-AKA protocol,
an EAP method specified in RFC 4187 [20], describes a way of encapsulating
the security parameters used by the UMTS AKA system within EAP, in order
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to provide mutual authentication and session key agreement using the UMTS
USIM. However, the effective use of EAP-AKA for ubiquitous client mobility
in an Internet access environment requires the provision of a transport scheme
independent of the access network type.
The third component used in the construction of our proposed technique
is PANA. In Chapter 6, we justified the selection of PANA, a UDP-based
protocol (see section 6.1.1), as the tunnelled network layer transportation envi-
ronment. In fact, the PANA/UMTS scheme, which we proposed in Chapter 8,
uses PANA to support the use of EAP-AKA for Internet remote access authen-
tication, combining UMTS authentication with EAP-AKA and PANA interact-
ing with Diameter EAP (see sections 3.7.5 and 3.9.3). Therefore, part of the
PANA/Liberty solution incorporates the components used in the PANA/UMTS
protocol assembly.
In section 8.7, we described how to incorporate part of the GAA infrastruc-
ture (see section 3.5.4) into the PANA/UMTS scheme. Since GAA offers an
easy-to-use, generic, and scalable way to reuse the cellular network authentica-
tion infrastructure deployed in subscriber smart cards to other mobile applica-
tion users (such as PANA/UMTS customers), it is clearly an architecture that
satisfies many of the requirements for a variety of authentication scenarios (see
sections 4.2 and 5.1.3). As a result, GAA is our choice for the fourth component
in the construction of the new PANA/Liberty authentication scheme.
We describe here how to use the Liberty SSO standard, which provides a
network identity infrastructure supporting all network access devices, to extend
the PANA/UMTS user authentication to all Liberty-enabled SPs. As stated
previously, and also explained immediately below, Liberty is able to interact
with 3GPP GAA. Consequently, Liberty is our choice for the fifth component
in the construction of our proposed technique, which thus combines the Liberty
and 3GPP GAA security mechanisms with PANA interacting with Diameter
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EAP, into a scheme which we call PANA/Liberty.
A summary of the PANA/Liberty protocol hierarchy is shown in Figure 9.1.
The Diameter Base protocol is described in section 3.9.2, and the Diameter
application protocol is given in section 3.5.4.3. The 3GPP GAA Zh interface is
explained in sections 3.5.4.3 and 8.7.2. The SSL/TLS protocols are described
in section 3.6.3. Finally, the HTTP, XML, SOAP, and SAML standards from
the Liberty protocol hierarchy are outlined in sections 3.10.3 and 3.10.4.
IP
EAP
PANA
UDP
UMTS AKA
Diameter
Application
Diameter Base
Protocol
SCTP
3GPP GAA Zh
TCP
Liberty
SAML
SSL/TLS
HTTP
XML
SOAP
Figure 9.1: PANA/Liberty protocol hierarchy
9.4 Liberty with GAA Infrastructure
In this section, a description of how two of the PANA/Liberty components,
namely the Liberty Alliance framework (see section 3.10) and the 3GPP GAA
architecture (see section 3.5.4) can be used in combination, is provided. The
3GPP TR 33.980 Specification [11] describes the possible interworking methods
which can be used between Liberty ID-FF (see section 3.10.5), Liberty ID-WSF
(described in 3.10.6), and GAA GBA (given in section 3.5.4).
Firstly, we describe how the Liberty and GAA authentication schemes can
complement each other (section 9.4.1). Secondly, a description of the archi-
271
9. PANA/Liberty
tecture for a collocated NAF/IdP service is provided (section 9.4.2). Next, we
summarise the federation and session concepts of Liberty with GAA (sections
9.4.3 and 9.4.4). We then illustrate three possible SSO scenarios involving Lib-
erty with GAA (section 9.4.5).
9.4.1 Liberty with GAA Authentication
Both the Liberty and GAA systems separate the authentication procedure from
the process of accessing services. The Liberty scheme reuses a single initial
authentication of the user for successive authentication to other SPs. However,
as noted by Laitinen et al. [124], the Liberty documents do not specify how the
initial user authentication is done, or how to provision user credentials.
As the GAA security mechanisms provide the means to authenticate the user
by reusing already deployed user credentials (for example, in the form of UMTS
USIMs — see section 3.5.3.1), the Liberty and GAA authentication schemes can
thus complement each other. GAA can be used first to authenticate the user,
and the Liberty SSO service can then be used to extend this authentication to
all Liberty-enabled SPs.
In this case, as described immediately below, the Liberty Identity Provider
(IdP) would function as a network application server (see section 4.2.1.1 of [11])
which, as discussed in section 3.5.4.3, implements the GAA network application
function (NAF).
9.4.2 Architecture for collocated NAF/IdP
According to the 3GPP TR 33.980 Specification [11], when an IdP is collocated
with a NAF, the NAF/IdP host authenticates the User Equipment (UE) using
the GAA credentials. There is only one reference point carrying both Liberty
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and GAA related information, i.e. the reference point between a NAF/IdP host
and a UE. The architecture for a collocated NAF/IdP service, further described
below, is shown in Figure 9.2.
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Figure 9.2: Liberty ID-FF and GAA with a collocated NAF and IdP
As discussed in section 3.5.4.3, the BSF has an interface (Zh) with the HSS,
with which it performs the credential fetching protocol, used to fetch the re-
quired authentication information (i.e. authentication ‘quintets’ and GBA User
Security Settings — GUSS, described in section 8.7.2) from the home AuC in
the HSS. The UE runs 3GPP AKA (see section 3.5.3.2) with the HSS via the
BSF. The UE has an interface (Ub) with the BSF, across which the bootstrap-
ping protocol is executed. A shared session key derived from the (CK, IK ) key
pair is then established in the BSF and UE, using this bootstrapping protocol.
The NAF/IdP fetches the session key from the BSF, together with subscriber
profile information (e.g. GUSS), via an interface (Zn) using the key distribution
protocol. The NAF/IdP and the UE will then share a secret key that can be
used for application security, in particular to mutually authenticate the UE and
the NAF/IdP. The use of GAA credentials between the UE and the NAF/IdP
occurs via an interface (Ua) using the application protocol, which is secured
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using the keying material previously agreed via the interface (Ub) between the
UE and the BSF (see section 3.5.4.3).
The protocols used to initiate the single sign-on and identity federation pro-
cesses in the UE are defined in Liberty ID-FF (see section 3.10.5). The UE
may implement a Liberty-enabled User Agent (LUA — see section 3.10.8). All
Liberty ID-FF and ID-WSF specific tasks (see sections 3.10.5 and 3.10.6) are
executed by the IdP implementation in the NAF; this procedure is transparent
to the set of GAA functionalities implemented in a UE.
9.4.3 Federation in Liberty with GAA
As discussed in section 3.10.5, Liberty adopts the concept of federating user
identities, which involves linking distinct SP and IdP user accounts, and asso-
ciating an opaque user handle with the two user identities. This relationship
between two entities requires a mapping. In order to map the GAA credentials
and the Liberty information, the NAF/IdP maintains a user table. Following
section 4.3.1 of [11], in the case of non-anonymous user access, the NAF/IdP
has two options for the identifier used to label this table:
• the IP Multimedia Private Identity (defined in section 13.3 of [4]); or
• the User Identifier (UID), which may be an IP Multimedia Public Identity
(defined in section 13.4 of [4]).
The table also stores the bootstrapping transaction identifier (B-TID1), the
key lifetime data, the key generation time, and the opaque user handles. This
table may also contain the NAF keying material, the GUSS, and further SP
related data. The table logically separates temporary GBA related data (e.g.
B-TID, key lifetime) from the Liberty IdP related and persistent data (e.g. SP
1A B-TID is used to bind the subscriber identity to the keying material in reference points
Ua, Ub and Zn (see section 3.1 of [7]).
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related data, the opaque user handle, and the GUSS). The temporary GBA
data is deleted on the expiry of the key or the Liberty session. The IdP related
data and the user identifier are permanent (see section 4.3.1 of [11]).
For anonymous user access, the B-TID is used as a temporary user identifier
for the table. The federation lasts as long as the Liberty session, and the
maximal length of the federation is the key lifetime. In this anonymous user case,
the whole table is temporary. NAF/IdP can manage defederation by deleting
the opaque user handles and SP related information from the table.
9.4.4 Liberty with GAA Session
The duration of a Liberty-GAA session depends on the key lifetime of the NAF
keying material. The maximum Liberty session lifetime must be at most the
remaining lifetime of the key. When the Liberty session expires, the temporary
GBA related data is deleted from the user table. If a session is explicitly termi-
nated (e.g. via Single Logout, described in section 3.10.3.2), then the temporary
GBA related data is deleted in the NAF/IdP. For the next login, the UE would
be required to execute the bootstrapping procedure again (discussed in section
3.5.4.3), since it no longer shares a key with the NAF/IdP.
If a new bootstrapping procedure has been executed since the last contact
between UE and NAF/IdP, the new temporary GBA related data is inserted
into the user table. If the freshness of the received keying material (see section
2.2.5) is not satisfactory, then the NAF/IdP sends a bootstrapping renegotiation
request to the UE (as outlined in section 4.5.3 of [7]) and uses the new keying
material for the Liberty session.
When a UE acting on behalf of a user initiates a Liberty-GAA session with
the NAF/IdP, it contacts the NAF/IdP via the Ua reference point, and amutual
authentication process (described in section 5.4 of [5]) is started. Depending
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on the entries in the table of the NAF/IdP, three possible approaches can be
followed:
1. If the B-TID exists in the table and has not expired, the NAF/IdP has all
the required data, and can thus start communication with the UE without
communicating via the Zn reference point2.
2. If the B-TID is not present in the table, and the GUSS received over Zn
contains a user identity which already exists in the table, then the entry
in the table is updated with the B-TID and related information.
3. If the B-TID is not present in the table, and the GUSS received over Zn
contains a user identity which is not present in the table or no user identity
is sent, then the IdP creates a new entry in the table.
9.4.5 Liberty with GAA Scenarios
In the 3GPP TR 33.980 Specification [11], three possible message flows for SSO
scenarios are outlined:
Liberty-GAA ID-FF with AuthnResponse transfer. In this scenario, de-
scribed in section 4.3.3 of [11], the UE is not Liberty-enabled. The protocol
elements are taken from within the Liberty ID-FF component (see section
3.10.5), and are complemented by the GAA specific details from the secure
access methods to NAF using HTTPS (see section 3.5.4.1).
Liberty-GAA ID-FF with artifact transfer. This scenario is similar to the
previous one, with the extension that the SP is able to contact the IdP
directly. The IdP supports an additional interface to the SP, to allow the
SP to retrieve the authentication assertion (see section 4.3.4 of [11]).
2If the IdP decides that the remaining lifetime of the B-TID is too short, it may indicate
to the UE that a bootstrapping renegotiation is required. In this situation, the procedure will
be similar to case 2.
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Liberty-GAA ID-WSF authentication service. In this scenario, the UE
implements a LUA, which is a Liberty-enabled client that has (or knows
how to obtain) knowledge about the IdP that the user wishes to use with
the SP (see section 4.4.3.3 of [56]). The protocol elements are taken from
within the Liberty ID-WSF component (see section 3.10.6), in particular
from the Liberty ID-WSF authentication service, which permits a LUA to
initially authenticate with an IdP and obtain a ‘security token’ (see section
3.10.8), and the interaction of the UE with the IdP involves two consec-
utive protocol runs. The active LUA client first contacts the NAF/IdP,
before accessing the service provided by the SP (see section 4.3.5 of [11]).
The SSO interactions of the UE with the IdP and the SP are specified in
a single sign-on protocol profile (see section 3.10.3.2), called the Liberty-
Enabled Client and Proxy Profile (detailed in section 3.2.4 of [37]).
9.5 PANA/Liberty Framework
In this section, the authentication framework for the new PANA/Liberty scheme
is described. The entities involved in the PANA/Liberty method are first given
(section 9.5.1). The PANA/Liberty authentication scheme is then explained
(section 9.5.2).
9.5.1 PANA/Liberty Entities
The PANA/Liberty method proposed here involves five entities, namely the PaC
(also referred to here as the client, user, customer or subscriber), the PAA (or
authenticating party), the Liberty-enabled SP, the EAP server, and the home
AuC in the HSS. These PANA/Liberty entities are shown in Figure 9.3.
The PaC is associated with a network device and a set of GAA credentials
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Figure 9.3: Entities involved in the PANA/Liberty scheme
stored in a USIM; these credentials are used to establish the PaC identity for the
purposes of network access. In the solution proposed below, this network device
hosts the set of GAA functionalities required from a UE; it also implements a
LUA.
The PAA authenticates the GAA credentials provided by the PaC, using the
PANA/UMTS protocol incorporating the GAA framework (see section 8.7), and
grants network access. As stated before, the Liberty SSO service can be used
to extend this authentication to all Liberty-enabled SPs. The network access
device which hosts the PAA is implemented on a client of an AAA Diameter
infrastructure (see section 3.9); it also hosts the set of functionalities required
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from a GAA NAF and a Liberty IdP.
The PAA has an interface (Zn) with the user’s EAP server (implemented
on the AAA Diameter server), across which the Diameter EAP application (see
section 3.9.3) is executed. The network element which implements the EAP
server also hosts the set of functionalities required from a GAA BSF. As stated
in section 3.5.4.3, the EAP server has an interface (Zh) to the UMTS network,
in particular to the home AuC in the HSS, operating as a gateway between the
Internet AAA network and the UMTS AKA infrastructure.
PANA/Liberty also involves a further entity, namely the EP (see section
6.1.2), which applies per-packet enforcement policies (i.e. filters) to the traffic
of the PaC’s devices.
9.5.2 PANA/Liberty Authentication Scheme
The aim of this section is to give a detailed description of the PANA/Liberty
scheme. Figure 9.4 shows the PANA/Liberty authentication procedure, which
has five main phases: (1) Discovery and Handshake, (2) Authentication and
Authorisation, (3) Network Access, (4) Internet Single Sign-On, and (5) Service
Access. These phases are explained immediately below.
9.5.2.1 Discovery and Handshake Phase
In the Discovery phase, the user first contacts the NAF/IdP of her choosing,
before accessing the service provided by the Internet SP by entering the corre-
sponding Uniform Resource Locator (URL) into her web browser (see section
3.10.3). The UE/LUA acting on behalf of the user (i.e. the PaC) then initiates
a Liberty-GAA session (see section 9.4.4) with the NAF/IdP (i.e. the PAA)
via the Ua reference point. In addition, a PANA/Liberty session is established
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Figure 9.4: PANA/Liberty authentication procedure
between the PaC and the PAA, following the PANA model (see section 6.1.4.1).
After this phase is complete, a session identifier (Session-Id — see section
6.1.2) is allocated by the PAA and included in all further messages; this identifier
is freed when the PANA/Liberty session terminates.
9.5.2.2 Authentication and Authorisation Phase
In the PANA/Liberty Authentication phase, EAP-AKA messages encapsulated
in PANA messages are exchanged between the PaC and the PAA, through the
Ua interface, following the PANA/UMTS authentication phase incorporating
the GAA framework (detailed in sections 8.5.2.2 and 8.7). The Liberty-GAA
collocated NAF/IdP service (described in section 9.4.2), which maintains a user
table for mapping the Liberty information and the GAA credentials (see section
9.4.3), complements this authentication procedure.
Depending on the entries in the NAF/IdP user table, a number of possible
approaches can be followed (as given in section 9.4.4). If the B-TID exists in the
table and has not expired, then the NAF/IdP has all the necessary data, and
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can thus start communication with the UE/LUA without communicating via
the Zn reference point. Otherwise, the NAF/IdP fetches the session key from
the BSF (i.e. the EAP server), together with a GUSS corresponding to the user
identifier, using the Diameter EAP protocol (see section 3.9.3).
In this case, as explained in section 8.7.2, the BSF starts the credential
fetching protocol, using the Zh interface with the user’s HSS, to request an
authentication vector and GUSS. Once the HSS has supplied the BSF with
the requested authentication vector and GUSS from the PaC’s home UMTS
network, the PAA and the PaC will thus share a secret key, which is used to
mutually authenticate UE/LUA and NAF/IdP.
Moreover, when the UE/LUA authenticates with the NAF/IdP, it retrieves
from it a Liberty ‘security token’ (see sections 3.10.8 and 9.4.5), carried as a
‘child’ payload of a SOAP header. This ‘security token’ entitles the user to
invoke the Single-Sign-On service of the IdP. At the end of the Authentication
phase, a PANA SA is established, including the provision of a shared secret
EAP-AKA session key MSK (see section 8.4); we call this the PANA/Liberty
SA.
Once the PAA has authenticated the GAA credentials provided by the PaC
and authorises network access, the chosen NAF/IdP web page is displayed to
the user. This web page typically offers links to multiple Internet SPs in the
circle of trust maintained by NAF/IdP.
9.5.2.3 Network Access Phase
During the Network Access phase, a separate protocol is used between the PAA
and the EP to manage PaC network access control. At any time while the
network access phase is ‘live’, the Internet Single Sign-On (and, after that, the
Service Access) phase can be started by the user. I.e., at some later time,
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the user can use her UE/LUA to visit one of the multiple affiliated (Liberty-
enabled) SPs in the circle of trust maintained by NAF/IdP, in order to access
specific Internet services. She can do this by choosing a SP link available in the
NAF/IdP web page or simply by entering a URL.
At the end of this phase, the established PANA/Liberty session and the
PANA/Liberty SA are deleted, following the PANA draft standard (given in
section 6.1.4.5).
9.5.2.4 Internet Single Sign-On Phase
In the Internet Single Sign-On phase, the interaction of the UE/LUA with the
NAF/IdP involves two consecutive protocol runs, following the Liberty-GAA
ID-WSF scenario given in section 9.4.5. The user first logs in to the NAF/IdP,
which subsequently helps the user to be automatically authenticated (without
having to sign on again) to the visited SP, by offering guarantees of the user
network identity. The UE/LUA then invokes the single sign-on service of the
NAF/IdP using the ‘security token’ (denoted here by <sec:Token>) previously
provided.
In this phase, we assume that the UE/LUA has already been authenticated
by the NAF/IdP. Thus, a valid PANA/Liberty session exists for the user at
the identity provider. The UE/LUA receives the authentication assertion (i.e.
the authentication and authorisation information) from the NAF/IdP to be
used at the visited SP. This transfer of authentication assertion requires direct
interaction between NAF/IdP and SP. As shown in Figure 9.3, the Liberty
protocol used for this interaction is SOAP based (see section 3.10.3.2), with
SAML assertions3 (see section 3.10.4) carrying the assertion information. This
interaction is outside the scope of the description here.
3The content of each SAML assertion is (partly) given by the results of the GBA operation
(see section 3.5.4.3), including information such as protocol parameters (e.g. execution time)
and user-specific parameters (e.g. taken from GUSS).
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After this step, the UE/LUA presents the authentication assertion to the SP
to obtain user recognition and to be given web service access. Figure 9.5 sum-
marises the PANA/Liberty SSO phase, which is further described below. In this
figure, the PANA/Liberty SSO message flow is shown, including the Liberty-
specified HTTP headers in the messages sent and received by the UE/LUA,
signifying to IdPs and SPs that it is ‘Liberty-enabled’4 (see section 9.4.5).
PaC PAA
HTTP Request; Liberty-Enabled Header ( )
UE/LUA NAF/IdP
(4)
 SP
(a)
(b)
(c)
            Process 
    lib:AuthnRequest  
         sec:Token
(d)
200 OK <lib:AuthnRequestEnvelope>; Liberty-
Enabled Header ( )
SOAP POST: <lib:AuthnRequest>; <sec:Token>; Liberty-Enabled Header ( )
(e)
200 OK SOAP: <lib:AuthnResponseEnvelope>; Liberty-Enabled Header ( )
(f)
POST <lib:AssertionConsumerServiceURL>; LARES =
<lib:AuthnResponse>; Liberty-Enabled Header ( )
(h)
HTTP Response ; Liberty-Enabled Header ( )
Process saml:Assertion(g)
Figure 9.5: PANA/Liberty SSO message flow
During the PANA/Liberty SSO phase, the first HTTP Request message
(a) is issued by the UE/LUA to access resource offerings (see section 3.10.6)
available at the chosen SP. The visited SP responds (b) with an HTTP 200 OK
answer, which carries an authentication request <lib:AuthnRequestEnvelope>5
payload including an <lib:AuthnRequest> element and a list of the identity
4I.e., signifying to IdPs and SPs that the UE/LUA can support capabilities beyond those
supported by common non-Liberty-enabled user agents.
5The contents of the payloads: <lib:AuthnRequestEnvelope>, <lib:AuthnRequest>,
<lib:AuthnResponseEnvelope>, <lib:AssertionConsumerServiceURL>, and
<lib:AuthnResponse> are defined in the Liberty SSO and Federation Protocol specifi-
cation (see section 3.10.5.3).
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providers that it recognises.
On receipt of this message, the UE/LUA chooses the appropriate NAF/IdP
to use (i.e. the one the user has already been authenticated by) and then issues
(c) an HTTP POSTmessage that encapsulates the received<lib:AuthnRequest>
element in the body and the <sec:Token> element in the <wsse:Security>
header of a SOAP request packet. At this point, the identity provider’s SSO ser-
vice URL processes6 the <lib:AuthnRequest> and <sec:Token> elements (d),
confirms that the UE/LUA has already been authenticated by the NAF/IdP,
and obtains consent from the user for federating (or not) the existing SP local
identity with the identity she has at the NAF/IdP (see the section immediately
below).
The NAF/IdP then sends back to the UE/LUA an HTTP 200 OK mes-
sage (e). This message includes a SOAP response packet, encapsulating a
<lib:AssertionConsumerServiceURL> and a <lib:AuthnResponse> element in
a <lib:AuthnResponseEnvelope> payload. The next HTTP POST message
(f) issued by the UE/LUA carries this latter <lib:AuthnResponse> value in
a POST form field called ‘LARES’; this message also includes the received
<lib:AssertionConsumerServiceURL> value. This value contains the SP’s as-
sertion consumer service URL, consisting of the target of the POST form. This
target must specify HTTPS (see section 3.5.4.1) as the URL scheme.
At this point, the SP processes the SAML assertion7 (<saml:Assertion>)
value (g) received in the <lib:AuthnResponse> element, to check its validity
and how to respond to the UE/LUA’s original request. The signature on the
<saml:Assertion> value must be verified in order to gain assurance regarding
the identity of the user. Finally, the SP sends back to the UE/LUA an HTTP
response (h) that either allows or denies access to the web service resources that
6This is executed according to the rules defined in the Liberty SSO and identity federation
protocol (see sections 3.10.5.3 and 3.10.8).
7The SP processing of this assertion must adhere to the rules defined in the SAML speci-
fication (see section 3.10.4).
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were originally requested.
9.5.2.5 Identity Federation Process
As stated in section 3.10.5.1, when a user first uses an IdP to login to an SP,
he/she must be given the opportunity to federate any existing SP local identity
with the identity she has at the IdP. Identity federation involves linking distinct
SP and IdP user accounts, associating an opaque user handle with the two local
user identities; this requires permission to be granted by the user.
After identity federation, the SP and the NAF/IdP share a pair of unlinkable
pseudonyms (opaque user handles) for the user, one for each direction. The
Liberty single sign-on and identity federation processes are supported by the
Single Sign-On and Federation protocol (described in section 3.10.5.3).
9.5.2.6 Service Access Phase
During the Service Access phase, a separate (HTTP-based) protocol is used
between the UE/LUA and the SP to manage user web service access control.
Once this phase is complete, the user is able to access web services provided by
the SP.
At the end of this phase, the established Liberty session is deleted, following
the Liberty Single Logout standard (given in section 3.10.3.2), which provides
synchronised session logout functionality across all sessions that were authenti-
cated by a particular IdP.
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9.6 PANA/Liberty SA and Re-Authentication
Two important features of PANA/Liberty, namely the security association and
the re-authentication procedure, are now described.
Once the EAP-AKA method has completed, a session key, i.e. the EAP-AKA
MSK, which is used as the AAA-Key (as discussed in section 8.5.2.2), is shared
by the PaC and the PAA. This session key is provided to the PaC as part of
the EAP key exchange process, and the PAA can obtain the session key from
the EAP server via the AAA infrastructure. PANA/Liberty SA establishment
based on the EAP session key is required where no physical or link layer security
is available (see section 4.2.3).
The purpose of a re-authentication exchange is to allow for efficient re-keying,
using the existing PANA/Liberty security association, in situations where (de-
pending on the security policy in force) full authentication is not required.
Two types of re-authentication (or fast re-authentication) are supported by
PANA/Liberty. The first type enters the chosen EAP method, i.e. the EAP-
AKA fast re-authentication procedure (see section 5 of [20]), during the authen-
tication and authorisation phase, and thus the initial discovery and handshake
phase is omitted. The second type uses protected PANA/Liberty messages ex-
changed directly during the access phase, without entering the authentication
and authorisation phase, i.e. the PANA re-authentication phase (see section
6.1.4.4).
9.7 Alternatives for PANA/Liberty Integration
Section 9.5 discussed just one way in which PANA could be integrated into
Liberty. However, there are other possibilities. For instance, whilst we propose
that in PANA/Liberty the PaC implements a LUA (as mentioned in section
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9.5.1) following the Liberty-GAA ID-WSF SSO scenario (as described in section
9.5.2.4), there are other possible scenarios with distinct SSO message flows.
For example, if the PaC is not Liberty-enabled, then the Liberty-GAA ID-FF
with AuthnResponse transfer and the Liberty-GAA ID-FF with artifact transfer
scenarios (as outlined in section 9.4.5) could be used. Moreover, it is possible
to integrate PANA into Liberty without using the GAA framework.
In this section, we give a description of other possible ways in which PANA
can be integrated into Liberty without making use of the GAA framework (as
explained in section 9.7.1). In particular, a discussion of alternative schemes
that may be used as the PANA inner authentication protocol instead of 3GPP
AKA (as given in section 9.7.2) is provided.
9.7.1 PANA/Liberty without GAA Framework
As stated before, the PANA/Liberty scheme combines the Liberty Alliance ar-
chitecture (see section 3.10) and the 3GPP GAA security mechanisms (described
in section 3.5.4), with PANA (see Chapter 6). Because we include GAA in this
scheme, we are limited to the two types of cellular authentication mechanisms
supported by GAA, i.e. either a shared secret based on 3GPP AKA or digitally
signed public key certificates (see section 3.5.4.2). However, it is possible to
integrate PANA into Liberty without depending on the GAA architecture. Al-
though this new scenario does not exploit the advantages of combining Liberty
and GAA, it opens up the possibility of integrating PANA into Liberty using
an alternative to 3GPP AKA as the PANA inner authentication protocol.
In order to combine the Liberty SSO advantages with PANA in this way,
it is necessary to choose an inner authentication protocol to replace the 3GPP
AKA, and incorporate it within an EAP method, which will be thus carried by
PANA. Alternative schemes for this scenario are described immediately below.
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9.7.2 Possibilities for PANA Inner Authentication
In this section, a number of alternative schemes that may be used as the PANA
inner authentication protocol are discussed. As stated in section 3.7.5, PANA
can carry any authentication mechanism that can be specified as an EAP
method. In other words, the inner authentication protocols used by PANA
must be initially encapsulated within EAP messages (given in section 3.4).
One alternative scheme that may be used here as the PANA inner protocol
is an EAP method encapsulating the 3GPP2 CDMA2000 1x identification and
authentication message exchanges (described in section 3.5.5); we might call
this method EAP-CDMA. A potential advantage of using EAP-CDMA for this
purpose is based on the fact that (as discussed in section 3.5.5.3) further releases
of 3G CDMA2000 technologies add more security protocols, including the use
of 128-bit privacy and authentication keys8.
A second alternative scheme for this purpose consists of the EAP-PSK pro-
tocol, proposed by Bersani and Tscho¨fenig (see section 3.6.7) for authentication
over insecure networks (e.g. IEEE 802.11 [85]). EAP-PSK is an EAP method
for mutual authentication and session key derivation, which uses a 16-byte pre-
shared key (PSK) as its long term credential. The PSK, which is used to derive
two 16-byte subkeys called the authentication key and the key-derivation key,
is assumed to be known only to the EAP peer and the EAP server. There-
fore, EAP-PSK is a good candidate for use as the PANA inner authentication
mechanism.
Another possibility involves using asymmetric methods, employing pub-
lic/private key pairs, certificates, and PKIs (see section 2.1.3.3). In this case,
a good candidate for use as a PANA inner authentication mechanism is the
EAP-IKEv2 protocol, described by Tscho¨fenig, Kroeselberg, Ohba and Bersani
8Another potential advantage derives from the flexibility of EAP-CDMA, since (as dis-
cussed in section 8.4) the AKA protocol can also be used in a CDMA2000 (R)UIM for all
releases of CDMA2000 following release C.
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[175]. EAP-IKEv2 specifies a way of encapsulating the first phase of the IKEv2
protocol (see section 3.8.1), which supports both symmetric and asymmetric
authentication, within EAP. The next chapter discusses this in more detail.
9.8 Conclusions
As previously discussed, authentication and key agreement are fundamental
components of a secure procedure for heterogeneous network access support-
ing ubiquitous mobility. The main challenges addressed here include the in-
vestigation and development of unified, secure and convenient authentication
mechanisms that can be used in access networks of a wide range of types.
In this chapter, we have proposed the new PANA/Liberty protocol, in or-
der to provide an IP-compatible, lightweight, flexible and scalable method for
authenticating a user to an access network, reusing the cellular network au-
thentication infrastructure deployed in subscriber smart cards, and offering an
open SSO standard service. The protocol is based on the PANA/UMTS scheme
presented in Chapter 8, and incorporates the security techniques used in the
UMTS mobile telecommunication system and the GAA infrastructure into the
PANA authentication structure.
This scheme is complemented by the Liberty SSO service, which can be used
to extend a PANA/UMTS initial authentication to all Liberty-enabled SPs, and
create a network identity infrastructure supporting all network access devices.
A description of other possible ways in which PANA can be integrated into
Liberty (without the GAA framework) was provided, including a discussion of
schemes that may be used as the PANA inner authentication protocol instead
of 3GPP AKA.
The gains in performance arising from the two types of fast re-authentication,
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the gains in security from the PANA/Liberty SA, and the gains in interoperabil-
ity, flexibility and scalability by incorporating the Liberty Alliance framework
and mechanisms of the GAA architecture, potentially make the PANA/Liberty
proposal attractive to Liberty operators willing to offer their users heterogeneous
Internet access in ubiquitous mobility networks.
This new Internet authentication scheme, designed to meet the established
requirements (see Chapter 5), has been proposed here as a candidate for se-
cure access procedure for heterogeneous network access supporting ubiquitous
mobility (see section 1.1). In Chapter 11, the new scheme is submitted to a for-
mal threat modelling process; it is also compared with the three further novel
Internet entity authentication techniques proposed in Chapters 7, 8, and 10.
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As explained in Chapter 7, this thesis proposes a series of new solutions
for Internet remote access authentication, derived by adapting and reinforcing
security techniques arising from a variety of different sources. The aim of this
chapter is to present the fourth new authentication scheme, namely a means of
combining the IKEv2 authentication mechanism (see section 3.8.1) with PANA
(see section 3.7.5 and Chapter 6), which we call PANA/IKEv2.
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10.1 Introduction
As described in section 7.1, in some ubiquitous mobility scenarios, IP based
remote hosts that connect to the Internet via an access network will typically
need to provide their credentials and be authenticated before being authorised
to access the network. For such a process we need a flexible, strong, and scal-
able entity authentication infrastructure. In particular, the cryptography used
in setting up such an infrastructure can be based on either secret key (or sym-
metric — see section 2.1.3.2) or public key (or asymmetric — see section 2.1.3.3)
techniques. Whereas the former requires the involvement of the home network
during the initial authentication process between a user and a visited network,
the latter allows for architectures that avoid on-line involvement of the home
network, since authentication may then be based on public key certificates (see
section 2.1.3.3).
Nevertheless, asymmetric techniques typically require a Public Key Infras-
tructure to support key distribution, and use of this PKI may require on-line
certificate status checking. While symmetric techniques are used almost exclu-
sively in today’s mobile networks, it seems likely that asymmetric techniques will
gain greater importance in future ubiquitous mobility access networks because
of their greater flexibility.
As previously discussed, the IETF PANA protocol (see Chapter 6) is in-
tended to be a flexible and scalable generic network layer protocol, to be used
to authenticate a user device requesting Internet remote access. In addition,
the EAP-IKEv2 protocol, an EAP method currently specified as an IETF In-
ternet draft [175]1, describes a way of encapsulating the first phase of the IKEv2
protocol (see section 3.8.1), which supports both symmetric and asymmetric au-
1The whole of this chapter is based on one particular draft of the EAP-IKEv2 specification
[175]. Working on one particular draft has been necessary because it is a work in progress and
changes relatively frequently. The latest version of this draft [176] was published as this thesis
was being completed, and it would therefore be desirable to make any necessary changes in
the schemes described in this chapter to reflect the changes to the EAP-IKEv2 text.
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thentication, within EAP. Building on these two observations, we now present
a new authentication scheme, combining the IKEv2 authentication and key ex-
change mechanism with EAP-IKEv2 and PANA, which we call PANA/IKEv2.
This innovative proposal, previously described in [147], adapts the symmetric
and asymmetric techniques used in the IKEv2 authentication mechanism to
the PANA network remote access structure, in a solution designed to support
ubiquitous client mobility for Internet access.
The main advantage of PANA/IKEv2 is that it does not define a new crypto-
graphic protocol, but re-uses the well-analysed IKEv2 authentication exchanges
within the EAP and PANA frameworks. As a result, it provides strong crypto-
graphic properties as well as a high degree of flexibility. Of particular interest
is the fact that PANA/IKEv2 provides an efficient ‘shared secret key’ based
authentication method (see section 2.1.3.2). It also provides mutual authenti-
cation between the PaC and the PAA. This may be based either on symmetric
methods using ‘pre-shared keys’ (see section 3.6.7), or on asymmetric methods,
based on public/private key pairs, certificates, and PKIs (see section 2.1.3.3).
The purpose (section 10.2) and the components used in the assembly (sec-
tion 10.3) of the novel PANA/IKEv2 scheme are first given. Second, the
EAP-IKEv2 mechanism (section 10.4), an EAP method (see section 3.4) pub-
lished in the 2006 Internet draft [175] and used as a component of the new
PANA/IKEv2 technique, is explained. The framework of the proposed new
PANA/IKEv2 protocol is then given (section 10.5). Next, two important fea-
tures of PANA/IKEv2, namely the security association and the re-authentication
procedure (section 10.6), are described. Finally, the conclusions of the chapter
are given (section 10.7).
The main novel contribution of this chapter lies in sections 10.3, 10.5, and
10.6. Whilst the EAP-IKEv2 mechanism described in section 10.4 has been
previously described (notably by Tscho¨fenig, Kroeselberg, Ohba and Bersani
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[175]), the details of how it would operate when executed over PANA have not.
This chapter does not contain a detailed security analysis of the new proposal
— this issue is covered in Chapter 11.
10.2 PANA/IKEv2 Objective
Currently there is no standard protocol for performing network access authen-
tication above the link layer. Instead, a number of ad hoc and often inadequate
solutions (as described in section 4.1.5) are being used to overcome the problem
(itself described in section 4.1), in a variety of distinct scenarios (outlined in
section 4.2).
The objective of the PANA/IKEv2 protocol is thus to provide a network
layer, IP compatible, lightweight, attack-resistant (e.g. with respect to MitM and
DoS attacks — see section 3.2.3), and relatively flexible authentication method,
that allows a remote client to be authenticated in a heterogeneous Internet
access environment supporting ubiquitous mobility. This authentication method
must meet a number of detailed security and implementation requirements, as
specified in Chapter 5.
10.3 PANA/IKEv2 Protocol Hierarchy
In this section, an overview of the components used in the construction of the
new PANA/IKEv2 authentication scheme is given. The first component, as
previously discussed, is the IKEv2 mechanism. IKEv2 provides authentication
and key exchange capabilities, and supports both symmetric and asymmetric
cryptographic techniques. Section 3.8.1 gives an outline of the IKEv2 security
features.
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The second component used in the PANA/IKEv2 protocol assembly is EAP
(see section 3.4). The EAP protocol, as previously discussed, supports a vari-
ety of authentication schemes, giving providers the advantage of using a single
framework across multiple environments. Such flexibility seems likely to be im-
portant for heterogeneous network access supporting ubiquitous mobility. Since
EAP is very flexible and can encapsulate arbitrary EAP methods, it is clearly a
protocol that satisfies many of the requirements for a variety of authentication
scenarios (see sections 4.2 and 5.1.3).
However, as previously described, EAP itself does not specify any authenti-
cation method. It is only a transport mechanism, allowing concrete authenti-
cation methods for EAP, such as public key based authentication schemes, to
be defined separately. In fact, the EAP-IKEv2 protocol, an EAP method cur-
rently specified as an IETF Internet draft [175], specifies a way of encapsulating
the security parameters used by the first phase of the IKEv2 mechanism within
EAP, in order to provide mutual authentication and session key agreement.
Although EAP-IKEv2 re-uses a public key based protocol (i.e. IKEv2) in a
flexible authentication framework (i.e EAP), using just EAP-IKEv2 for authen-
tication is not a good choice. This is because it does not provide a complete
authentication solution for ubiquitous client mobility for Internet access.
The effective use of EAP-IKEv2 in this latter environment requires the pro-
vision of a transport scheme for authentication data between a remote entity
seeking access to a network and another entity located in the access network
(see section 4.1.4). More specifically, a transport scheme independent of the
access network type is needed, to transfer user authentication information to
the access network and, optionally, to the AAA infrastructure (see section 3.9).
Defining a network layer transport for EAP-IKEv2, such as the proposed tun-
nelled authentication solutions (see section 3.7), provides a cleaner answer to
the problem.
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In Chapter 6, we justified the selection of PANA, a UDP-based protocol (see
section 6.1.1), as the tunnelled network layer transportation environment. We
describe in this chapter how to use PANA to support the use of EAP-IKEv2 for
Internet remote access authentication. As stated previously, PANA is also able
to interact with Diameter EAP (see sections 3.7.5 and 3.9.3). Consequently,
PANA is our choice for the third component in the construction of our pro-
posed technique, which thus combines IKEv2 authentication with EAP-IKEv2
and PANA, into a scheme which we call PANA/IKEv2. A summary of the
PANA/IKEv2 protocol hierarchy is shown in Figure 10.1.
EAP
PANA/TLS or WTLS
TCP or UDP
IP
Mobile area /Public Key 
PANA
UDP
IP
IKEv2 Phase 1
Figure 10.1: PANA/IKEv2 protocol hierarchy
10.4 An EAP Mechanism for Carrying IKEv2
The EAP-IKEv2 protocol [175] is an EAP mechanism (see section 3.4) for au-
thentication and session key distribution that uses the IKEv2 protocol (see
section 3.8.1). It offers the security benefits of IKEv2, which was defined for
Internet key exchange, in all scenarios using EAP-based authentication, with-
out establishing IPsec SAs (see section 3.6.5). IKEv2 provides authentication
and key exchange capabilities, and supports both symmetric and asymmetric
authentication within a single protocol. Such flexibility is likely to be important
for an EAP method.
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Figure 10.2 shows the EAP-IKEv2 message flow. In this figure, the name
of each message is shown, followed by the contents of the message in round
brackets. Square brackets are used to denote optional fields.
   I  R
                  EAP-Request/Identity
                   EAP-Response/Identity (Id)
Client Authenticating Party
(a)
(b)
(d)
   EAP-Request/EAP-IKEv2 (HDR(A,0), SAi1, KEi, Ni)
(c)
(e)
(f)
EAP-Response/EAP-IKEv2 (HDR(A,B), SAr1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ])
(g)
EAP-Request/EAP-IKEv2 (HDR(A,B), SK{IDi, [CERT,] [CERTREQ,]      
EAP-Response/EAP-IKEv2 (HDR(A,B), SK{IDr, [CERT,] AUTH})
EAP-Success
[IDr,] AUTH})      
(1)
Figure 10.2: EAP-IKEv2 message flow
The EAP-IKEv2 message flow occurs between the Initiator (I) and the Re-
sponder (R). R is also referred to here as the Client (acting on behalf of a
user), whereas I is referred to as the Authenticating Party. I may be co-located
with the EAP server, which is the network element that terminates the EAP
protocol (see section 3.4). However, the EAP server is typically implemented on
a separate AAA server in the user’s home Internet AAA network, with whom
I communicates using an AAA protocol (see section 3.9).
The core EAP-IKEv2 exchange (1) consists of four messages (two round
trips) only, where the first message pair (c, d) negotiates cryptographic algo-
rithms, exchanges nonces, and performs a Diffie-Hellman exchange (see section
2.1.3.3). The second message pair (e, f) authenticates the previous messages,
and exchanges the identities of I and R, as well as public key certificates.
In EAP-IKEv2 full authentication, an identity request/response message
pair (a, b) is first exchanged. Next, I sends (c) an EAP-Request/EAP-IKEv2
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message that contains an IKEv2 header (HDR2), a payload with the crypto-
graphic suites supported by I for the IKE-SA (SAi1), a Diffie-Hellman value
(KEi), and a nonce (Ni). R then responds with a message (d) that contains
its choice of a cryptographic suite from among I’s offers (SAr1), its value to
complete the Diffie-Hellman key exchange (KEr), and its nonce (Nr).
At this point, each party can generate the SKEYSEED value, from which
the keying material for the IKE-SA is derived. The SKEYSEED value (Ks) is
calculated by applying a negotiated IKEv2 pseudo random function (see section
3.8.1) to the concatenation ofNi andNr, using the Diffie-Hellman shared secret3
(gir), as given in equation (10.1), where here, as throughout, pfK(X) denotes
a pseudo random function pf computed using the secret K and data X (see
section 2.14 of [49]):
Ks = pfgir (Ni|Nr). (10.1)
The keying material derived from Ks includes a temporary key called Kd.
This is taken from the output of the pseudo random function pf∗, as shown
in equation (10.2), where here, as throughout, pf∗K(X) denotes the pseudo
random function pf applied iteratively, as specified in section 2.13 of [49], using
Ks and the concatenation of Ni, Nr, and the SPIs chosen by I and R, written
as Si and Sr below, as input (see section 2.14 of [49]):
Kd| . . . = pf∗Ks(Ni|Nr|Si|Sr). (10.2)
The temporary key Kd is then used to create further EAP-IKEv2 keying
2HDR contains Security Parameter Indexes (SPIs), version numbers, and flags of vari-
ous sorts. SPIs are values chosen by I and R to identify a unique IKE-SA (see section
3.8.1). HDR(A,0) means that I assigned the SPI ‘A’ and R has not yet chosen its SPI, while
HDR(A,B) means that I chose the SPI ‘A’ and R chose the SPI ‘B’.
3g denotes a Diffie-Hellman generator value agreed between the parties, which is used in
conjunction with a prime P . The pair of exponents (i, r) denote random values chosen,
respectively, by I and R. The Diffie-Hellman values (KEi,KEr) exchanged via the message
pair (c, d) are calculated as follows: KEi = g
i mod P and KEr = gr mod P . The value
(KEi)
r is then calculated by R, and (KEr)i is computed by I; both calculations yield the
same value, i.e. gir mod P .
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material, called KEYMAT. Since the required length of KEYMAT is greater
than the length of the output of the pseudo random function pf , this function
is also used iteratively here (see section 9 of [175]). That is, Km, which denotes
KEYMAT, is derived by iteratively applying pf , to the concatenation of Ni and
Nr, together with Kd, as shown in equation (10.3) (see section 2.17 of [49]):
Km = pf∗Kd(Ni|Nr). (10.3)
The keying material KEYMAT is then exported as part of the EAP keying
framework (see section 3.4) to derive further keys, including MSK, used to
encrypt the traffic between the client and the network, and EMSK, used to
derive keys for multiple applications (see section 3.6.6).
All but the IKEv2 headers of the messages that follow are encrypted and
integrity protected, and this is indicated in Figure 10.2 using the notation
SK{. . . }. The recipients must verify that all signatures and MACs (see section
2.1.3.2) are computed correctly, and that the identities IDi and IDr correspond
to the keys used to generate the Authentication (AUTH ) payload (see section
1.2 of [49]).
I sends back (e) a message to assert its identity (IDi), to prove knowledge
of the secret corresponding to IDi, and to integrity protect the contents of
the first message using the AUTH payload (see section 2.15 of [49]). It may
also send its certificate (CERT ) and a list of its ‘trust anchors’, i.e. the names
of the CAs (see section 2.1.3.3) whose public keys it trusts (CERTREQ); the
optional IDr payload enables I to specify which of R’s identities it wants to
talk to (e.g. when R is hosting multiple users at the same IP address). R then
asserts its identity (IDr), optionally sends one or more certificates (CERT ),
and authenticates its identity with AUTH (f). The message flow finishes with
an EAP-Success message (g).
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Man-in-the-Middle attacks that apply to certain tunnelled authentication
protocols (see section 3.2.3) are not applicable to EAP-IKEv2, as the extended
authentication feature of IKEv2 is not supported by EAP-IKEv2 (see section
13.2 of [175]). Hence, the cryptographic binding requirement, described in sec-
tion 3.2.3, is not applicable.
10.5 PANA/IKEv2 Framework
In this section, the authentication framework for the new PANA/IKEv2 scheme
is described. The entities involved in the PANA/IKEv2 method are first given
(section 10.5.1). After that, the PANA/IKEv2 authentication scheme is ex-
plained (section 10.5.2).
10.5.1 PANA/IKEv2 Entities
The PANA/IKEv2 mechanism proposed here involves three functional entities,
namely the PaC (also referred to here as the client, user, customer or sub-
scriber), the PAA (or authenticating party) and the EAP server. The PaC is
associated with a network device and a set of credentials; these credentials are
used to prove the PaC identity for the purposes of network access.
The PAA authenticates the IKEv2 credentials provided by the PaC and
grants network access. In the context of this chapter, the user’s EAP server
is assumed to be implemented on the AAA server (see section 3.9). The PAA
is thus an AAA client that communicates with the user’s EAP server through
an AAA protocol supporting EAP (i.e. Diameter EAP, described in section
3.9.3) and key wrap (see section 7.5). PANA/IKEv2 also involves a further
entity, namely the EP (see section 6.1.2), which applies per-packet enforcement
policies (i.e. filters) to the traffic of the PaC’s devices.
300
10. PANA/IKEv2
10.5.2 PANA/IKEv2 Authentication Scheme
The aim of this section is to give a detailed description of the PANA/IKEv2
scheme. Firstly we identify the distinct phases of a PANA/IKEv2 session, and
briefly describe them (section 10.5.2.1). Secondly, a complete description of
the PANA/IKEv2 message exchange is provided (section 10.5.2.2). We then
summarise the calculation of the PANA/IKEv2-based MAC used during that
exchange (section 10.5.2.3).
Figure 10.3 shows the PANA/IKEv2 authentication procedure, which is fur-
ther described below. In this figure, the name of each message is shown, followed
by the contents of the message in round brackets. Square brackets are used to
denote optional fields.
PaC PAA
EAP
PANA-Auth-Request (Session-Id, Nonce, EAP-Request/Identity)
PANA-Bind-Request (Session-Id, Result-Code, EAP-Success, 
AAA interaction
PANA-Auth-Answer (Session-Id, Nonce, EAP-Response/Identity
PANA-Auth-Request (Session-Id, EAP-Request/EAP-IKEv2 (HDR(A,0),
PANA-Auth-Answer (Session-Id, EAP-Response/EAP-IKEv2 (HDR(A,B), 
PANA-Auth-Request (Session-Id, EAP-Request/EAP-IKEv2 (HDR(A,B), 
PANA-Auth-Answer (Session-Id, EAP-Response/EAP-IKEv2 (HDR(A,B),
PANA-Bind-Answer (Session-Id, Device-Id, Key-Id, PPAC, MAC)
server
Client Authenticating Party
AAA server
PAA Discovery & Handshake
(1)
Access
(3)
(2)
 EP
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
Device-Id, Key-Id, Lifetime, [Protection-Cap.], PPAC, MAC)
AAA
Frame-      work 
 SAi1, KEi, Ni)
SAr1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ])
each party can generate
the SKEYSEED value
and derive KEYMAT
(e)
 SK{IDi, [CERT,] [CERTREQ,] [IDr,] AUTH}) 
SK{IDr, [CERT,] AUTH})
 (Identity))
Figure 10.3: PANA/IKEv2s full authentication procedure
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10.5.2.1 PANA/IKEv2 Phases
The PANA/IKEv2 authentication procedure has three main phases: (1) Dis-
covery and Handshake, (2) Authentication and Authorisation, and (3) Ac-
cess. In the Discovery phase, an IP address for the PAA is identified, and
a PANA/IKEv2 session is established between the PaC and the PAA, following
the PANA model (see section 6.1.4.1). After this phase is complete, a session
identifier (Session-Id — see section 6.1.2) is allocated by the PAA and included
in all further messages; this identifier is freed when the PANA/IKEv2 session
terminates.
In the Authentication phase, the main focus of this section and further
explained below, EAP-IKEv2 messages encapsulated in PANA/IKEv2 mes-
sages are exchanged between the PaC and the PAA. In this phase, EAP-
IKEv2 Request payloads are carried in PANA-Auth-Requests. Moreover, tak-
ing advantage of an optimisation discussed in section 6.1.4.2 and adopted by
PANA/IKEv2, in the context of this chapter a PANA-Auth-Answer will include
an EAP-IKEv2 Response payload.
As previously discussed, the PAA communicates with the EAP server using
the AAA Diameter EAP protocol (see section 3.9.3). Hence, EAP-IKEv2 pack-
ets encapsulated in Diameter-EAP messages are exchanged between the PAA,
which is thus the Diameter client, and the EAP server, which is implemented
on the Diameter server, following the process for using EAP in Diameter given
in Figure 3.14. The PANA-Diameter message mapping, given in section 3.7.5,
is also adopted here to allow the transport of EAP-IKEv2 payloads between the
PANA framework and the AAA Diameter infrastructure (see section 3.9.2). At
the end of the Authentication phase, a PANA SA is established, including the
provision of a shared secret EAP-IKEv2 session key MSK (see section 10.4); we
call this the PANA/IKEv2 SA.
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During the Access phase, a separate protocol is used between the PAA and
the EP to manage PaC network access control. After this phase, the estab-
lished PANA/IKEv2 session and the PANA/IKEv2 SA are deleted, following
the PANA draft standard (see section 6.1.4.5).
10.5.2.2 PANA/IKEv2 Message Exchange
During the Authentication phase, the first PANA-Auth-Request message (a)
issued by the PAA encapsulates a PANA-based Nonce, i.e. a randomly cho-
sen value (see section 6.1.3), used in further PANA/IKEv2 cryptographic key
computations, and an EAP-Request/Identity payload, requesting the PaC to
identify itself. The PaC responds (b) with a PANA-Auth-Answer, which also
carries a PANA-based Nonce value, and an EAP-Response/Identity payload
including the user’s identifier Identity.
The PAA then issues a Diameter-EAP-Request to the EAP server via an
AAA interaction (see section 3.9.3), including the EAP-Response/Identity packet
in an EAP-Payload AVP, and the user’s identifier value in a Diameter User-
Name AVP (see section 3.9.2). The EAP server responds with a Diameter-EAP-
Answer in a multi-round exchange, with a Result-Code AVP set to DIAME-
TER MULTI ROUND AUTH, signifying that a subsequent request is expected.
This exchange also includes an EAP-Request/EAP-IKEv2 packet, which con-
tains HDR, SAi1, KEi, and also Ni, the random number chosen by the EAP
server, encapsulated in an EAP-Payload AVP. This EAP payload is now sent
to the PaC in a PANA-Auth-Request (c).
The next PANA-Auth-Answer message (d) issued by the PaC includes the
EAP-Response/EAP-IKEv2 packet, containing SAr1,KEr, the random number
Nr chosen by the PaC, and CERTREQ, an optional list of the PaC trust anchors.
The PAA then sends a Diameter-EAP-Request to the EAP server, encapsulating
this latter EAP response packet in an EAP-Payload AVP.
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At this point, as specified in section 10.4, each party can derive the keying
material (e) for the IKE-SA, starting with the SKEYSEED value (see equation
10.1). From SKEYSEED, the EAP server then derives a variety of IKEv2 secret
keys, including the temporary key Kd (see equation 10.2), from which further
EAP-IKEv2 keying material, called KEYMAT, is created (see equation 10.3).
The KEYMAT is then exported as part of the EAP keying framework to derive
further keys, including MSK, which is used by PANA/IKEv2 as the AAA-Key
(see section 6.1.2). All but the HDR fields of the EAP payloads that follow are
encrypted and integrity protected.
The EAP server then sends back to the PAA a Diameter-EAP-Answer in
a multi-round exchange. This exchange includes an EAP-Request/EAP-IKEv2
packet with its identity IDi, an AUTH value, and the following optional pay-
loads: CERT 4, CERTREQ, and IDr, which enables the EAP server to specify
which of PaC’s identities it wants to talk to. As previously, in Figure 10.3 the
notation SK{. . . } indicates that the content between brackets is encrypted and
integrity protected.
The next PANA/IKEv2 message (f) issued by the PAA encapsulates the
received EAP-Request/EAP-IKEv2 payload detailed above. On receipt of this
message, the PaC then sends a PANA-Auth-Answer message carrying an EAP-
Response/EAP-IKEv2 packet to assert its identity (IDr); this message also
includes AUTH and optionally CERT (g). After receiving this latter EAP re-
sponse packet from the PAA via an AAA Diameter-EAP-Request, and if all
the checks succeed, the EAP server then sends back an AAA Diameter-EAP-
Answer, which includes a Result-Code AVP set to DIAMETER SUCCESS.
This message also includes an EAP-Payload AVP with a code field set to Suc-
cess, which indicates that the authentication was successful. This EAP-Success
packet carries derived AAA keying material, including an AAA-Key.
4If any CERT payloads are included, the first certificate provided will contain the public
key required to verify the AUTH field. If symmetric cryptographic techniques are being used,
the CERT and CERTREQ payloads are not required (see [49]).
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The PAA encapsulates the PANA result code, the EAP-Success packet, and
the PANA/IKEv2 session lifetime (see section 6.1.2) in a PANA-Bind-Request
message sent to the PaC (h), and receives back an acknowledgement through a
PANA-Bind-Answer (i). On receipt of this message, the PAA issues a Diameter
Accounting-Request (Start) to the EAP server, which indicates the start of the
session, following the PANA-Diameter message mapping given in section 3.7.5.
PANA-Bind messages are protected by a PANA/IKEv2-based MAC AVP,
calculated as described in the next section, and carry a Key-Id AVP (see section
6.1.3); this latter AVP contains an AAA-Key identifier that is assigned by the
PAA and is unique within the PANA/IKEv2 session.
Finally, PANA-Bind messages may also optionally contain a Protection-
Capability AVP (see section 6.1.3), which is sent from the PAA to indicate
that link-layer or network-layer encryption should be initiated after completion
of PANA/IKEv2. PANA-Bind messages are also used for binding the device
identifiers of the PaC and the PAA to the PANA/IKEv2 SA established at
the end of the authentication phase; this is achieved using a Device-Id AVP.
PANA-Bind messages with a Result-Code AVP indicating successful authenti-
cation also include PPAC AVPs (see section 6.1.3), which help the PAA/PaC
to negotiate the available/chosen IP address configuration method.
10.5.2.3 PANA/IKEv2-based MAC
The PANA/IKEv2-based MAC (MPI ) is calculated using HMAC-SHA-1, as
shown in equation (10.4), where PI denotes the PANA/IKEv2 packet, and Kp
denotes the PANA MAC Key (see section 6.1.5):
MPI = fKp(PI). (10.4)
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The EAP-IKEv2 shared secret MSK, which is normally used to establish a
PANA/IKEv2 SA, is adopted as the AAA-Key, which is then used as input to
generate a distinct key Kp. However, as previously discussed, two AAA-Keys
may be produced as a result of separate NAP and ISP authentication processes
(see section 6.1.4.2). In this case, Kaaa, which denotes the AAA-Key used in
the Kp generation procedure, results from the concatenation of the two keys, as
given in equation 7.8.
The PANA MAC KeyKp is calculated by applying HMAC-SHA-1, using the
key Kaaa to the concatenation of the PANA-based Nonces Npac and Npaa, sent
respectively by the PaC (b) and the PAA (a), and the PANA/IKEv2 Session-Id
AVP value (Sid), as given in equation 7.9.
10.6 PANA/IKEv2 SA and Re-Authentication
Two important features of PANA/IKEv2, namely the security association and
the re-authentication procedure, are now described.
As detailed in the previous section, the PANA/IKEv2 method generates the
keying material KEYMAT. This keying material is used within the IKE-SA
for protection of EAP-IKEv2 payloads (e.g. in the AUTH exchanges — see
section 10.4). It is also used to derive additional session keys (i.e. the MSK
and the EMSK ) that are exported as part of the EAP keying framework (see
section 3.6.6). Once the PANA/IKEv2 scheme has completed, these session
keys are shared by the PaC and the PAA. The session keys are provided to
the PaC as part of the EAP key exchange process, and the PAA can obtain the
session keys from the EAP server via the AAA infrastructure. PANA/IKEv2
SA establishment based on these EAP session keys is required where no physical
or link layer security is available (see section 4.2.3).
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The purpose of a re-authentication exchange is to allow for efficient re-keying,
using the existing PANA/IKEv2 security association, in situations where (de-
pending on the security policy in force) full authentication is not required. Two
types of re-authentication (or fast reconnection) are supported by PANA/IKEv2.
The first type enters the chosen EAP method, i.e. the EAP-IKEv2 fast recon-
nection process (see section 11 of [175]), during the authentication and autho-
risation phase, and in this case the initial discovery and handshake phase is
omitted. The second type uses protected PANA messages exchanged directly
during the access phase, without entering the authentication and authorisation
phase, i.e. the PANA re-authentication phase (see section 6.1.4.4).
10.7 Conclusions
As previously discussed, authentication and key agreement are fundamental
components of a secure procedure for heterogeneous network access support-
ing ubiquitous mobility. The main challenges addressed here include the in-
vestigation and development of unified, secure and convenient authentication
mechanisms that can be used in access networks of a wide range of types.
In this chapter, we have proposed the new PANA/IKEv2 protocol, in order
to provide an IP-compatible, flexible and scalable method for authenticating a
user to an access network using either symmetric or asymmetric techniques. The
protocol is based on PANA, a network-layer access authentication protocol car-
rier, which communicates, via EAP, with an AAA infrastructure. PANA/IKEv2
uses EAP-IKEv2, which allows use of the IKEv2 infrastructure defined for In-
ternet key exchange in any scenario using EAP-based authentication.
The gains in performance arising from the two types of fast reconnection, the
increase in flexibility provided by the public key based authentication option,
and the gains in security given by the PANA/IKEv2 SA, potentially make the
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PANA/IKEv2 proposal attractive to all operators willing to offer their users
heterogeneous Internet access in ubiquitous mobility networks.
This new Internet authentication scheme, designed to meet the requirements
established in Chapter 5, is proposed here as a candidate for secure access
procedure for heterogeneous network access supporting ubiquitous mobility (see
section 1.1). In Chapter 11, the new scheme is submitted to a formal threat
modelling process; it is also compared with the three further novel Internet
entity authentication techniques proposed in Chapters 7, 8, and 9.
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In this chapter we give a formal threat model, and use this model to con-
duct a comparative analysis of the four new Internet authentication techniques
proposed in this thesis. The primary goal of this chapter is to discover which
of them is the most secure, lightweight, flexible and scalable method for allow-
ing a client to be authenticated in a heterogeneous Internet access environment
supporting ubiquitous mobility.
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11.1 Introduction
As explained in section 1.2, this thesis proposes, evaluates and compares new
entity authentication protocols for Internet remote access. In this chapter we
give a formal threat model, and use this model to conduct a comparative analysis
of the four authentication techniques proposed in Chapters 7, 8, 9, and 10. These
new techniques are designed to meet the security and implementation services
and properties established in Chapter 5. These security requirements are used
in conjunction with the Internet authentication problem domain established in
Chapter 4 to define and limit the scope of this thesis.
Firstly, the four new authentication schemes are submitted to a formal threat
modelling process (sections 11.2 to 11.6). Secondly, we make a comparative anal-
ysis of the protocols, to determine which of these techniques is the most secure,
lightweight, flexible and scalable authentication method that allows a client to
be authenticated in a heterogeneous Internet access environment (section 11.7).
Finally, the conclusions of the chapter are given (section 11.8).
11.2 Threat Modelling
As stated in section 1.2, the security analysis of the proposed authentication
protocols is performed using the threat modelling process described in Chapter
4 of Howard and LeBlanc [81, p69-124]. According to Howard and LeBlanc, ‘a
threat to a system is a potential event that will have an unwelcome consequence
if it becomes an attack. A vulnerability is a weakness in a system, such as a
coding bug or a design flaw. An attack occurs when an attacker has a motive,
or reason to attack, and takes advantage of a vulnerability to threaten an asset ’
[81, p87]. An asset is also referred to as a threat target. A threat model is thus a
security-based analysis that can be used to determine the highest level security
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risks posed to an application, and how attacks can manifest themselves [81,
p69].
The goal of using this security-based analysis here is to determine which
threats to the new authentication techniques require mitigation and how to
mitigate them, reducing via a formal process of threat modelling the overall
risk to the protocols to an acceptable level. As discussed in [81], it is cheaper to
find a security flaw in a protocol during the design stage and remedy the solution
before coding starts. Figure 11.1 shows the threat modelling process taken from
Howard and LeBlanc [81, p72], the steps in which are further described in the
following sections.
 Decompose
    protocol 
  Determine
     threats
 Rank
threats
Mitigation 
Figure 11.1: Process of threat modelling
11.3 Formally Decomposing the Protocols
As stated by Howard and LeBlanc [81, p74], the use of formal decomposition
methods, such as data flow diagrams (DFDs), is a critical component prior
to performing the threat analysis process for a protocol design. The leading
principle for DFDs is that an application or a system can be decomposed into
subsystems, and subsystems can be decomposed into still lower-level subsystems.
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Figure 11.2 shows the key data flow diagram symbols used in this chapter.
A Process
Transforms or manipulates data.
Multiple Processes
Transforms or manipulates data.
A Data Store
A location that stores temporary
or permanent data.
Boundary
A machine, physical, address
space or trust boundary.
Interactor
Input to the system.
Data Flow
Depicts data flow from data
stores, processes or interactors.
Auth data
Figure 11.2: Basic data flow diagram symbols
The first phase of decomposition makes use of a high-level context data flow
diagram, also referred to as level-0 (zero) DFD, which determines the scope
of the authentication techniques being analysed, and helps us to understand
the boundaries between trusted and untrusted components (see section 11.3.1).
Once this phase is complete, we focus on greater protocol detail lower levels
using level-1 and level-2 diagrams (see section 11.3.2). We discuss these decom-
position phases in more detail in the following sections.
11.3.1 Context Data Flow Diagrams
The new authentication techniques proposed in Chapters 7, 8, 9, and 10 follow
the general entity authentication model1 discussed in section 2.3, and have their
scope limited by the problem domain established in section 4.1. They all use
1This model states that, to meet the goals of an authentication protocol, the entities
generate and exchange standardised messages.
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the PANA protocol as a common target transport environment, as justified in
Chapter 6. However, they make use of four different PANA inner authentication
protocols, for each of which, with the exception of the solutions proposed in
Chapters 8 and 9, the security mechanism is distinct.
This section defines the scope of the proposed authentication techniques
being analysed and the boundaries between trusted and untrusted components
by means of context diagrams. As stated by Howard and LeBlanc [81, p75], ‘a
context diagram has only one process and usually no data store’. A high-level
context data flow diagram is presented in Figures 11.3, 11.4, 11.5, and 11.6 for
each of the four entity authentication proposals.
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Figure 11.3: PANA/GSM context diagram
11.3.2 Level-1 and Level-2 Diagrams
Each of the context diagrams presented in Figures 11.3, 11.4, 11.5, and 11.6 com-
prises one or more processes, and needs to be decomposed accordingly. Figures
11.7, 11.8, 11.9, and 11.10 show the corresponding level-1 data flow diagrams,
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Figure 11.4: PANA/UMTS context diagram
which include depictions of general processes and data stores from the context
of use of each of the four entity authentication proposals.
At this phase of the DFD decomposition method, it is important to define
and limit the main focus of the formal threat model. Indeed, the reason for
using DFDs in this security analysis is not to determine how everything works
(e.g. as occurs in a typical application design), but rather to go sufficiently deep
to achieve an understanding of the composition of the proposed authentication
protocols in order to determine the threats that apply.
In Chapter 5, we established that this thesis focuses mainly on authentica-
tion and key establishment processes that carry parameters2 between the client
and the access network, and not on any subsequent uses of the authenticated
channel and/or keys that may have been established (see section 5.1.1). In par-
ticular, it is important to note that the entity authentication schemes proposed
in Chapters 8 and 9 make use of an identical underlying security mechanism3.
2As stated in section 5.1, these parameters are needed to police the traffic flow through
enforcement points.
3As described in section 9.3, part of the PANA/Liberty authentication solution incorpo-
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Figure 11.5: PANA/Liberty context diagram
In addition, the AAA interaction between the access network and the back-
end authentication entities is outside the main scope of this thesis (see section
5.1.8). Also, in the proposed authentication techniques a separate protocol is
used between the PAA and the EP to manage PaC network access control (as
explained in sections 7.5.2.1, 8.5.2.1, 9.5.2.3, and 10.5.2.1).
Building on the above observations, and after analysing the level-1 DFDs of
the four proposed protocols, we have deduced that the main focus of this formal
threat model needs to be directed towards the data flows exchanged between
the remote client (i.e. the 2.0 PaC interactor) and the visited access network
(i.e. the 1.0 PAA interactor) boundaries, through the PANA/xxx4 underlying
authentication process, as shown in Figures 11.7, 11.8, 11.9, and 11.10.
rates the security components used in the PANA/UMTS protocol assembly.
4Where ‘xxx’ denotes GSM, UMTS, Liberty or IKEv2.
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Figure 11.6: PANA/IKEv2 context diagram
The analysis of the level-1 DFDs has enabled us to decide on the focus
of our analysis, as stated above. This is because the selected data flows in-
corporate the PaC-PAA exchanges of the PANA protocol which, as stated in
Chapter 6, is the common target transport environment for the new authen-
tication schemes. Moreover, this decision allows us to concentrate our threat
analysis on the underlying client-to-network access authentication component
of each of the proposed overall secure network access frameworks (see section
6.1). Hence, this choice enables us to avoid wasting time on threats that are
outside the scope and beyond the control of the new proposals.
Having produced the level-1 DFDs, the next step should be to produce
more detailed level-2 (or child) DFDs for each of the underlying PaC-PAA
authentication exchanges. However, the detailed data flows for the PANA/GSM
authentication process have already been shown in Figure 7.3; similarly, the
flows for PANA/UMTS and PANA Liberty are given in Figure 8.2, and the
flows for PANA/IKEv2 in Figure 10.3. As a result, we do not give the diagrams
again here, but base our analysis on the diagrams given in previous chapters.
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Figure 11.7: PANA/GSM level-1 diagram
11.4 Determining the Threats to the Protocols
According to Howard and LeBlanc [81, p83], after the decomposition process
performed in the previous section, the next step is to take the identified as-
sets and treat them as the threat targets in the threat model, investigating the
components of the protocols and how data flows between them.
In this section, we perform two important parts of the threat analysis process
for authentication protocols, namely analysing the threat categories (section
11.4.1) and the threat trees (section 11.4.2).
11.4.1 Threat Categories and STRIDE
Determining the threats to the proposed authentication techniques involves di-
viding the threats into well-defined threat categories. In this case, as suggested
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Figure 11.8: PANA/UMTS level-1 diagram
in [81, p83], we use the concept of STRIDE , an acronym derived from the six
threat categories described below:
Spoofing Identity Spoofing threats allow an attacker to pose as another user
or allow a rogue server to pose as a valid server. One example of user identity
spoofing would involve illegally accessing and then using another user’s authenti-
cation credentials (see section 2.2.2). Examples of server spoofing include ‘DNS
spoofing’ and ‘DNS cache poisoning’ [81, p84]. Entity authentication services
(as given in section 2.1.1.2) can be used to prevent the realisation of threats in
this category.
Tampering with Data Data tampering involves malicious modification of
data, e.g. unauthorised changes made in a database, or alteration of data as it
flows between two machines over the Internet. Data integrity services (detailed
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Figure 11.9: PANA/Liberty level-1 diagram
in section 2.1.1.3) can be used to mitigate such threats.
Repudiation Repudiation threats arise from users who deny performing an
action which they have in fact carried out. An example of repudiation is a user
performing an illegal operation in a system and, after that, denying her action.
A non-repudiation service (see section 2.1.1.4) can provide a system with the
ability to counter repudiation threats.
Information Disclosure Information disclosure threats involve the exposure
of information to individuals who are not supposed to have access to it. Ex-
amples of such a threat include a user reading a file to which he/she has not
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been granted access, and an eavesdropper reading data sent between two ma-
chines. Confidentiality services (explained in section 2.1.1.1) can protect against
information being disclosed to entities not authorised to have that information.
Denial-of-Service DoS attacks deny service to valid users, e.g. by making a
web server temporarily unavailable or unusable5. Availability services (described
in section 2.1.1.6) can protect against certain types of DoS threats by improving
system availability and reliability, helping to ensure that computer system assets
are available to authorised parties when needed.
Elevation of Privilege In this type of threat, an unprivileged user gains
privileged access to resources (e.g. a computing resource, communications re-
5Real-life examples include various Distributed-Denial-of-Service attacks (DDoS) that can
be launched using publicly available attack tools, such as ‘trinoo’ and ‘stacheldraht’ (German
for ‘barbed wire’) [81, p85].
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source, or information resource). The effects of such an attack could include
realisation of most if not all of the other types of threat. Elevation of privilege
threats include those situations in which an attacker has effectively penetrated
all system defences and become part of the trusted system itself. Access control
services (see section 2.1.1.5) can protect against unauthorised access, helping to
ensure that access to protected resources is controlled.
It is worth observing that threats in the six categories are often closely inter-
related, and that realisation of a threat in one category can enable the realisation
of a threat in a different category. For instance, information disclosure threats
can lead to spoofing identity threats, if the user’s credentials are not protected
[81, p86].
Having examined the concept of STRIDE, we next attempt to determine the
threats to the new authentication techniques by applying the STRIDE classifi-
cation to threat trees.
11.4.2 Threat Trees
We first briefly describe the basic concepts underlying threat trees (section
11.4.2.1). We then examine threat trees for the proposed authentication tech-
niques (sections 11.4.2.2 to 11.4.2.4).
11.4.2.1 Introduction to Threat Trees
As stated in [81, p87], once a potential threat to a protocol component has been
recognised, we can determine how that threat could manifest itself by using
threat trees. The core idea behind this analysis is that the proposed authentica-
tion techniques are composed of threat targets identified in the decomposition
process, and these targets could have vulnerabilities that compromise the sys-
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tems when successfully attacked.
A threat tree describes a decision-making process used by an attacker in
order to find a way to compromise a protocol component. The root node in the
threat tree (represented graphically by the ‘top box’ in the threat tree diagram)
corresponds to the ultimate threat and the STRIDE threat category to which it
belongs. This root node is then linked to nodes representing possible means of
realising the threat, where these subsidiary nodes are again represented as boxes
in the threat tree diagram. We use dotted lines to link the boxes to indicate
the least likely attack points, and solid lines for the most likely. Also, we place
circles below the least likely nodes in the tree, indicating how the threat has
been mitigated6.
11.4.2.2 PANA/GSM Threat Trees
We first consider the security threats to the PANA/GSM protocol (described in
detail in Chapter 7), in order to create the corresponding threat trees.
PAA Spoofing and Triplet Exposure PANA/GSM provides mutual au-
thentication via the EAP-SIM mechanisms. The PaC believes that the PAA
is authentic because the network is able to calculate a correct AT MAC value
from the RAND challenges in the challenge request. The PAA believes that the
PaC is genuine because the MAC computed from the SRES response values is
correct. Moreover, PANA/GSM provides the means to validate a received EAP
packet through its PANA message validity check scheme.
In order to be able to calculate a correct AT MAC, as required to successfully
impersonate a valid PAA to the PaC, it suffices to know the RAND and Kc
values from n GSM triplets for the subscriber. Given physical access to the
6As discussed in [81, p91], these mitigation circles should be added later, after the threat
modelling process.
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subscriber’s SIM card, it is easy to obtain any number of GSM triplets. Triplets
can also be obtained by mounting an attack on the PaC platform via a virus or
other malicious software. The PaC thus needs to be protected against triplet
querying attacks by malicious software. Indeed, as discussed in section 7.5.2.2,
‘the PaC is able to verify that the EAP-SIM message is fresh (i.e. not a replay;
see section 2.2.5) and that the sender possesses valid GSM triplets for the user’.
In addition, if the same SIM credentials are also used for GSM traffic, the
triplets could be revealed in the GSM network. Care should therefore be taken
not to compromise the Kc keys used in PANA/GSM to attackers when they are
transmitted between entities, or handled outside a protected environment.
A threat tree summarising how a spoof network access device could im-
personate a valid PAA to the PaC by illegally accessing and then using GSM
triplets is given in Figure 11.11.
Impersonate a PAA via
GSM triplet exposure
(S)
Threat # 1
Calculate a correct
AT_MAC value
1.2
Obtain a number of
GSM triplets
1.1
and
Calculate triplets
using the SIM card
1.1.1
Need
physical
access to
SIM card
Install malicious software on
the PaC querying for triplets
1.1.2
Current triplets are
revealed in GSM traffic
1.1.3
Need
physical
access to
the PaC
Figure 11.11: Threat tree for PAA spoofing via GSM triplet exposure
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User Identity Disclosure As stated in section 6.2.1.2, some clients might
wish to hide their identities from visited access networks for privacy reasons.
PANA/GSM includes user identity confidentiality support, a GSM security ser-
vice (see section 3.5.1.3) which protects the privacy of the user identifier against
passive attacks (e.g. eavesdropping). However, the mechanism cannot be used
on the first connection with a given PAA, since in this case the permanent user
identifier needs to be sent in clear (as discussed in section 3.5.1.3). In this case,
an active attacker that impersonates the access network may learn the sub-
scriber’s permanent identifier. However, the PaC can refuse to send the clear-
text permanent user identifier to the PAA if it believes that the visited access
network should be able to recognise its temporary identifier (or pseudonym).
If user identity confidentiality is required and the PaC and PAA cannot guar-
antee that the pseudonym will be maintained reliably, then an external security
mechanism may be used to provide additional protection. Nevertheless, this
kind of tunnelling mechanism can itself introduce new security vulnerabilities,
as described in section 3.2.3.
A threat tree summarising how a malicious user could learn a permanent
GSM user identifier by using passive or active attacks is given in Figure 11.12.
Learn a permanent
GSM user identity
      (I)
Threat # 2
Request the PaC
to identify itself
2.3
Impersonate the PAA
in a first connection
2.2
and
Eavesdrop on PANA/
GSM auth traffic
2.1
Use of
pseudonym
Figure 11.12: Threat tree for a permanent GSM user identifier disclo-
sure
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Session Key Disclosure PANA/GSM key derivation combines several GSM
triplets in order to derive stronger keying material and AT MAC values (as de-
tailed in section 7.5.2.2). The actual strength of the resulting keys depends,
among other things, on the operator-specific authentication algorithms, the
strength of the key Ki, and the quality of the RAND challenges. At no point
does PANA/GSM require the keys Kc or the derived SRES values to be com-
municated.
A passive eavesdropper can learn n different RAND values and the corre-
sponding AT MAC, and may be able to link this information to the user identity.
An active attacker that impersonates a GSM subscriber could easily obtain n
different RAND values and the corresponding AT MAC values from the EAP
server for any user identity. However, as long as the cryptographic functions
used are sufficiently robust, this should not enable the attacker to deduce the
correct SRES and Kc values.
A threat tree summarising how an attacker could attempt to disclose the
correct PANA/GSM session keys is given in Figure 11.13.
Disclose PANA/GSM
session keys
(I)
Threat # 3
Deduce the correct
(K
c
, SRES) values
3.3
Obtain n (RAND, AT_MAC)
values for a given user
3.2
and
Eavesdrop on PANA/
GSM auth traffic
3.1
cryptographic
functions are
sufficiently
robust
(K
c
, SRES) are
not
communicated
Figure 11.13: Threat tree for a PANA/GSM session key disclosure
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Man-in-the-Middle Attacks As stated in section 6.2.1.2, an attacker can
claim to be the PAA to the real PaC, and also claim to be the PaC to the
genuine PAA. This is called a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack, whereby the
PaC is fooled into believing that it is communicating with the real PAA, which
is also misled into believing that it is communicating with the genuine PaC.
Care has to be taken to avoid MitM attacks arising when tunnelling is used
with PANA/GSM, e.g. when using PEAP (described in section 3.7.3), or when
EAP-SIM (detailed in section 7.4) is part of a sequence of EAP methods. Such
vulnerabilities can arise even when the individual authentication protocols used
are in themselves secure. An example of such a MitM problem is described by
Asokan, Niemi and Nyberg [21] (as discussed in sections 3.2.3 and 6.2.1.2).
When such attacks are successfully carried out, the attacker acts as an inter-
mediary between a PaC victim and a legitimate PAA. This allows the attacker to
authenticate successfully to the PAA, as well as to obtain access to the network.
As a solution to the problem, Asokan, Niemi and Nyberg suggest cryptographi-
cally binding the session keys of the two phases, i.e. binding together the tunnel
session key and the MSK derived from the EAP-SIM method. Even when tun-
nelling or an EAP sequence of methods are not used with PANA/GSM, user
data need to be integrity protected on physically insecure networks to avoid
MitM attacks and session hijacking.
A threat tree summarising how an attacker could attempt to launch a MitM
attack against the PANA/GSM authentication scheme is given in Figure 11.14.
Service Theft and Dictionary Attacks As discussed in section 6.2.1.2,
an attacker can gain unauthorised network access by stealing service from a
legitimate client. Once the genuine PaC has been authenticated, an EP will
typically have filters in place to prevent unauthorised network access. These
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Launch MitM attack against
the PANA/GSM scheme
(S)
Threat # 4
and
Tunnelling or sequence
of EAP methods is used
4.1
Use of
cryptographic
binding
Claim to be the PAA
to the real PaC
4.2
Claim to be the PaC
to the real PAA
4.3
and
Figure 11.14: Threat tree for MitM attacks against PANA/GSM
filters will be based on something carried in every packet, for example, the IP
and MAC addresses. In this latter case, any received packets will be dropped
unless they contain specific IP addresses matching the MAC addresses.
PANA/GSM does not specify a mechanism for preventing service theft (de-
scribed in section 6.2.1.2). Therefore an attacker can gain unauthorised access
to the network by spoofing both the IP and MAC addresses of a legitimate
PaC, and thereby steal service from another user. In a non-shared medium,
service theft can be prevented by simple IP address and MAC address filters.
In shared links, filters are not sufficient to prevent service theft as they can
easily be spoofed (as described by Parthasarathy [151]). An Internet draft [150]
describes how an IPsec SA (see section 3.6.5) can be established to secure the
link between the PaC and the EP, which can be used to prevent service theft
in the access network.
A threat tree summarising how an attacker could gain unauthorised access
to the network by stealing service from another PANA/GSM user is given in
Figure 11.15.
Because PANA/GSM is not a password-based protocol, it is not vulnerable
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Steal service from another
PANA/GSM user
(E)
Threat # 5
Gain unauthorised
network access
5.3
and
Spoof the IP address
of a legitimate PaC
5.1
Use of IP
address filter or
(in shared links)
IPsec SA
Spoof the MAC address
of a legitimate PaC
5.2
and
Use of MAC
address filter or
(in shared links)
IPsec SA
Figure 11.15: Threat tree for service theft attacks against PANA/GSM
to dictionary attacks (see section 3.3.4), assuming that the pre-shared secret is
not derived from a weak password, name, or other low entropy source.
Credential Reuse and Brute-Force Attacks PANA/GSM cannot prevent
attacks taking place within the GSM networks. If the SIM credentials used for
PANA/GSM are also used in GSM, then it is possible to mount attacks via
the GSM air interface. A passive attacker can eavesdrop on GSM traffic and
obtain (RAND, SRES) pairs. The attacker can then use a brute-force attack7
to obtain each of the 64-bit keys Kc used to encrypt the GSM data. If the
attacker can obtain n 64-bit confidentiality keys Kc (n = 2 or 3), he/she can
then impersonate a valid network to a PANA/GSM client.
An active attacker can mount a ‘false GSM base station (BS) attack’, re-
playing previously seen RAND challenges to obtain SRES values (see [145] for
further details). The attacker can then use a brute-force attack to obtain the
keys Kc. If the attack is successful, then the attacker can impersonate a valid
network or decrypt previously seen traffic. However, it should be noted that
these attacks are not possible if the SIM credentials used in PANA/GSM are
7An attack in which all possibilities to guess a secret are tried.
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not also used in the GSM network. It should also be noted that performing a
brute-force search for a 64-bit key is a non-trivial task that could not be exe-
cuted in real time; moreover, it is unlikely to be worth the effort of performing
such a search just to steal network access.
A threat tree summarising how an attacker could attack PANA/GSM when
using SIM credentials also used in the GSM network is given in Figure 11.168.
Reuse SIM credentials
shared in GSM air interface
(I) – (S)
Threat # 6
Impersonate valid
network to a PaC
6.3
Obtain n (RAND,SRES)
   pairs used in GSM
6.1
Eavesdrop on
GSM traffic
6.1.1
Mount false
GSM BS attack
6.1.2
Obtain n
corresponding K
c
6.2
and and
Replay n previously
seen RAND challenges
6.1.2.2
and
Obtain n
SRES values
6.1.2.3
Install false GSM
base station
6.1.2.1
and
Non-trivial
task
Launch brute
force attack
6.2.1
Figure 11.16: Threat tree for SIM credential reuse and brute-force
attacks
Tampering with Signalling Traffic PANA/GSM signalling data could be
modified as it flows between the PaC and the PAA. The protection of signalling
message exchanges through the PANA/GSM SA prevents an opponent from act-
ing as a MitM adversary, from session hijacking, from injecting packets, from
replaying messages, and from modifying the content of the exchanged packets.
Also, as with all PANA methods, in PANA/GSM an integrity object is defined,
supporting data-origin authentication, replay protection using sequence num-
8As discussed in [81, p86], note that ‘some threat types can interrelate’. It is common for
information disclosure threats (I) to lead to spoofing threats (S). This effect can be seen by
comparing subthreat 6.3 of this figure with the root node of the threat tree shown in Figure
11.11, which are almost identical.
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bers and nonces, and integrity protection using a MAC function (see sections
6.1.4 and 7.5.2.1).
Moreover, certain EAP-SIM attributes are used to provide integrity, replay
protection, and confidentiality for EAP-SIM payloads, except for the initial
EAP/SIM/Start round trip (see section 7.4). However, in this latter case the
protocol values are protected by a later PANA/GSM exchange.
A threat tree summarising how an attacker could attempt to tamper with
the PANA/GSM signalling traffic is given in Figure 11.17.
Tamper with PANA/
GSM signalling traffic
(T)
Threat # 7
Modify the content of
the exchanged packets
7.3
Has access to the
signalling data flow
7.2
and
Signalling traffic is
unprotected
7.1
and
Use of
PANA/GSM
SA, MAC and
EAP-SIM
attributes
Use of
PANA/GSM
SA, MAC and
EAP-SIM
attributes
Figure 11.17: Threat tree for PANA/GSM signalling traffic tampering
Bidding Down Attack As described in section 6.1.4.1, the PAA is discovered
by sending solicitations or receiving advertisements from the PaC. In this initial
stage of the PANA/GSM protocol, the PaC has no assurance that the other end
of the link is the PAA (see section 6.2.1.1), and an attacker can pretend to be
a PAA by sending a spoofed advertisement. This threat primarily applies in
environments where the PaC-PAA link is shared.
The advertisement may be used to include information other than the dis-
covery of the PAA itself. This can, for instance, lead to a bidding down attack
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(see section 6.2.1.2), where an attacker sends a spoofed advertisement with ca-
pabilities indicating authentication methods less secure than those that the real
PAA supports, thereby fooling the PaC into negotiating a method less secure
than would otherwise be available. Of course, such an attack will only succeed
if the fake PAA can break the weaker authentication method and the weaker
method is accepted by the PaC.
Moreover, the possibility of such an attack is essentially inevitable in any
system allowing negotiation of the authentication method to be used. Hence,
EAP method downgrading attacks might be possible, because PANA/GSM does
not protect the EAP method negotiation, especially if the user employs the
EAP-SIM identifier with other EAP methods. However, the specification of the
EAP architecture (see section 3.4) describes how to avoid attacks that negotiate
the least secure EAP method from among a set. If a peer needs to make use
of different EAP authentication methods, then distinct identifiers should be
employed, each of which identifies exactly one authentication method.
In any case, some protection against such an attack can be offered by re-
peating the list of supported EAP methods protected with the PANA/GSM SA.
PANA/GSM does not support cipher suite negotiation, but includes an EAP-
SIM version negotiation procedure9 (see section 7.4). Of course, full protection
against such an attack is provided if legitimate parties only accept the use of
robust cryptographic techniques.
A threat tree summarising how an attacker could launch a bidding down
attack against the PANA/GSM authentication scheme is given in Figure 11.18.
9The shared secret used to establish a PANA/GSM SA is derived from the secret key
MK. As shown in equation 7.3, MK is the output of the hash function SHA-1, which uses as
input, among other values, the concatenation of the list of the supported EAP-SIM versions
(Version List) and the identifier of the EAP-SIM version in use (Selected Version).
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Launch bidding down attack
against PANA/GSM
(S)
Threat # 8
Negotiate wth PaC a
less secure auth method
8.3
The Pac-PAA
link is shared
8.1
Pretend to be a PAA
in discovery phase
8.2
and and
Repeat list of
supported auth
methods after
PANA/GSM SA
Send spoofed ad with
capabilities listing
weaker auth methods
8.3.2
Fool the PaC to accept
a weaker auth method
which can be broken
8.3.3
PaC needs to make
use of different auth
methods
8.3.1
and and
Use a distinct
identifier for each
auth method
needed
Figure 11.18: Threat tree for bidding down attacks against
PANA/GSM
Blind Resource Consumption DoS Attack There are a variety of DoS
attacks which can be launched against the PANA/GSM authentication process.
For instance, to launch a ‘blind resource consumption DoS attack’ (described in
section 3.2.3), an attacker can bombard the PAA with a large number of PaC
authentication requests. If the PAA and the EAP server are not co-located,
then the PAA may allocate local resources to store client state records before
it receives the EAP server response. If a sufficiently large number of requests
are received, then this could exhaust the PAA memory resources. Also, an
attacker can force the PAA to make computationally intensive computations,
which might exhaust the available processing resources.
PANA/GSM sequence numbers and cookies (as described in sections 3.2.3
and 6.1.4.1) provide protection against blind resource consumption DoS attacks.
But PANA/GSM does not protect the EAP-SIM method exchange itself. Since,
in particular, the PAA is not allowed to discard packets, and packets have to be
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stored or forwarded to an AAA infrastructure, a risk of DoS attacks remains.
Also PANA/GSM adopts the EAP-SIM mechanism, that is not a tunnelling
method. Hence an adversary can both eavesdrop on the EAP-SIM payloads
and inject arbitrary messages, which might confuse both the PaC and the PAA.
A threat tree summarising how an attacker could launch a blind resource con-
sumption DoS attack against the PANA/GSM authentication scheme is given
in Figure 11.19.
Deny service via blind resource
consumption DoS attack
(D)
Threat # 9
Prevent network access
by legitimate PaCs
9.3
Pretend to be a PaC
during the initial
handshake phase
9.1
Bombard the PAA with
messages to swamp it and
cause  resource exhaustion
9.2
and and
Use PANA/
GSM sequence
numbers and
cookies
Figure 11.19: Threat tree for blind resource consumption DoS attacks
against PANA/GSM
DoS Attack using Termination Messages The PaC or PAA may choose
to discontinue the access service at any time10. Hence, as discussed in section
6.2.1.2, an attacker can pretend to be a PAA in a PANA/GSM exchange and
revoke access to the PaC, causing a DoS attack on the PaC. An attacker can
also pretend to be a genuine PaC and transmit a disconnect message, again
causing a DoS attack on the PaC.
This kind of termination message causes state removal, a stop to the account-
ing procedure, and removes the installed packet filters. Thus such messages
10As explained in section 6.1.4.5, a routine for explicitly terminating a PANA session can be
initiated either by the PaC (i.e. disconnect indication) or the PAA (i.e. session revocation).
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need to be protected to prevent an adversary from deleting state information
and thereby causing DoS attacks. If there is an established PANA/GSM SA
(see section 7.6), all messages exchanged during the termination phase will be
protected with a PANA/GSM-based MAC AVP, which neutralises this threat.
A threat tree summarising how an attacker could launch a DoS attack using
PANA/GSM termination messages is given in Figure 11.20.
Deny service via PANA/GSM
termination messages
(D)
Threat # 10
Cause a DoS attack
on the PaC by
deleting state info
10.3
Pretend to be a
PaC or a PAA
10.1
Send a disconect message
to the PAA or revoke
access to the PaC
10.2
and and
Use PANA/
GSM-based
MAC to protect
messages
Figure 11.20: Threat tree for DoS attacks using PANA/GSM termina-
tion messages
DoS Attack using False Success or Failure Indications In physically
insecure networks, an attacker might attempt to mount DoS attacks by send-
ing false PANA/GSM success or failure indications. As discussed in section
6.2.1.2, by sending a false failure message, an attacker can prevent the client
from accessing the network. By sending a false success message, an attacker
can prematurely end the authentication exchange, denying service for the PaC.
This attack is possible if the success or failure indication is not protected by
a security association between the PaC and the PAA. All PANA/GSM mes-
sages exchanged prior to completion of the key establishment process may be
unprotected.
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Nevertheless, the attacker cannot force the PaC or the PAA to believe suc-
cessful authentication has occurred when mutual authentication has failed or
has not yet happened. In addition, any message whose sequence number is dif-
ferent to the expected value (e.g. a duplicate answer), and any message that fails
to pass the MAC verification step, is immediately discarded by the receiver.
A threat tree summarising how an attacker could launch a DoS attack using
false PANA/GSM success or failure indications is given in Figure 11.21.
Deny service via false
success or failure indications
(D)
Threat # 11
Prevent network access by
legitimate PaCs or prematurely
end the auth exchange
11.3
Pretend to be a
PAA
11.1
Send false PANA/
GSM failure or
success message
11.2
and and
Use PANA/
GSM SA,
sequence
numbers and
MAC
Figure 11.21: Threat tree for DoS attacks using false PANA/GSM
success or failure indications
IP Address Depletion Attack Another kind of attack, known as an ‘IP
address depletion attack’ (see section 6.2.1.2), arises from the fact that the PaC
acquires an IP address before the PANA/GSM authentication process begins.
When this occurs, it opens up the possibility of DoS attacks in which attackers
can exhaust the IP address space by acquiring multiple IP addresses, or deny
IP address allocations to other entities by falsely responding to every duplicate
address detection query.
An IP address depletion attack can be prevented by deploying a secure ad-
dress resolution scheme that does not depend on the client authentication pro-
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cess, such as the SEND mechanism (see section 6.2.1.2).
A threat tree summarising how an attacker could launch an IP address de-
pletion attack against the PANA/GSM authentication scheme is given in Figure
11.22.
Deny service via IP address
depletion attack
(D)
Threat # 12
Prevent network access
by legitimate PaCs
12.3
Pretend to be a
PaC before auth
process begins
12.1
Exhaust IP address
space or deny
IP address allocations
12.2
and and
Use secure
address
resolution (like
SEND)
Acquire multiple IP
addresses or falsely
respond to duplicate
address detection queries
12.2.1
Figure 11.22: Threat tree for IP address depletion attacks against
PANA/GSM
11.4.2.3 PANA/UMTS and PANA/Liberty Threat Trees
As previously stated, the entity authentication schemes proposed in Chapters
8 and 9 make use of an identical underlying security mechanism (see section
11.3.2). Consequently, after the decomposition process performed in section
11.3, analogous threat targets are identified in both authentication techniques.
This leads to the recognition of similar potential threats, which thus allows use
of the same threat trees for both protocols.
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We now consider the security threats to the PANA/UMTS and PANA/Liberty
protocols (described in detail in Chapters 8 and 9), in order to create the cor-
responding threat trees.
User Identity Disclosure Both PANA/UMTS and PANA/Liberty include
user identity confidentiality support, a UMTS security feature (see section 3.5.3.2)
which protects the privacy of the user identifier against passive attacks. How-
ever, the mechanism cannot be used on the first connection with a given PAA,
since in this case the permanent user identifier needs to be sent in clear (as dis-
cussed in section 3.5.3.2). Thus, an active attacker that impersonates the access
network may learn the subscriber’s permanent identifier. However, the PaC can
refuse to send the cleartext permanent user identifier to the PAA if it believes
that the visited access network should be able to recognise its pseudonym.
If user identity confidentiality is required, and the PaC and PAA cannot
guarantee that the pseudonym will be maintained reliably, then an external se-
curity mechanism may be used to provide additional protection. Nevertheless,
this kind of tunnelling mechanism can itself introduce new security vulnerabili-
ties, as described in section 3.2.3.
A threat tree summarising how a malicious user could learn a permanent
UMTS user identifier by using passive or active attacks is given in Figure 11.23.
MitM Attacks Care has to be taken to avoid MitM attacks arising when
tunnelling is used with PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty, e.g. when using PEAP
(described in section 3.7.3), or when EAP-AKA (detailed in section 8.4) is part
of a sequence of EAP methods11. An example of such a MitM problem is
discussed by Asokan, Niemi and Nyberg [21]. As a solution to the problem,
11As discussed in section 11.4.2.2, when such attacks are successfully carried out, the at-
tacker acts as an intermediary between a PaC victim and a legitimate PAA. This allows the
attacker to authenticate successfully to the PAA, as well as to obtain access to the network.
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Learn a permanent
UMTS user identity
     (I)
Threat # 1
Request the PaC
to identify itself
1.3
Impersonate the PAA
in a first connection
1.2
and
Eavesdrop on PANA/UMTS
or PANA/Liberty auth traffic
1.1
Use of
pseudonym
Figure 11.23: Threat tree for a permanent UMTS user identifier dis-
closure
Asokan, Niemi and Nyberg suggest cryptographically binding the session keys
of the two phases, i.e. binding together the tunnel session key and the MSK
derived from the EAP-AKA method. Even when tunnelling or an EAP sequence
of methods are not used with PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty, user data need
to be integrity protected on physically insecure networks to avoid MitM attacks
and session hijacking.
A threat tree summarising how an attacker could attempt to launch a MitM
attack against the PANA/UMTS or the PANA/Liberty authentication schemes
is given in Figure 11.24.
Service Theft Attacks Both PANA/UMTS and PANA/Liberty do not pre-
vent an attacker from gaining unauthorised access to the network by stealing
service from another user (described in section 6.2.1.2). However, a summary of
how to prevent service theft in the access network was given in section 11.4.2.2.
Hence, the solutions adopted by PANA/GSM for shared and non-shared links
can also be adopted by PANA/UMTS and PANA/Liberty.
A threat tree summarising how an attacker could gain unauthorised access to
339
11. Threat Modelling & Evaluation
Launch MitM attack against
PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty
(S)
Threat # 2
and
Tunnelling or sequence
of EAP methods is used
2.1
Use of
cryptographic
binding
Claim to be the PAA
to the real PaC
2.2
Claim to be the PaC
to the real PAA
2.3
and
Figure 11.24: Threat tree for MitM attacks against PANA/UMTS or
PANA/Liberty
the network by stealing service from another PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty
user is given in Figure 11.25.
Steal service from another PANA/
UMTS or PANA/Liberty user
(E)
Threat # 3
Gain unauthorised
network access
3.3
and
Spoof the IP address
of a legitimate PaC
3.1
Use of IP
address filter or
(in shared links)
IPsec SA
Spoof the MAC address
of a legitimate PaC
3.2
and
Use of MAC
address filter or
(in shared links)
IPsec SA
Figure 11.25: Threat tree for service theft attacks against
PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty
Tampering with Signalling Traffic PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty sig-
nalling data could be modified as it flows between the PaC and the PAA.
The protection of signalling traffic through PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty
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SAs prevents an opponent from acting as a MitM adversary, from session hi-
jacking, from injecting packets, from replaying messages, and from modifying
the content of the exchanged packets. Also, as with all PANA methods, in
both PANA/UMTS and PANA/Liberty an integrity object is defined, support-
ing data-origin authentication, replay protection using sequence numbers and
nonces, and integrity protection using a MAC function (see sections 6.1.4 and
8.5.2.1).
Moreover, certain EAP-AKA attributes are used to provide integrity, con-
fidentiality, and replay protection for EAP-AKA payloads exchanged in both
the PANA/UMTS and PANA/Liberty schemes. In this case, integrity protec-
tion is based on a MAC (i.e. AT MAC — see section 8.4). The messages may
also optionally contain encrypted data (AT ENCR DATA) for identity confi-
dentiality and fast re-authentication support (as discussed in section 8.4). On
full authentication, replay protection for the EAP-AKA payload is provided by
the underlying UMTS AKA scheme, which makes use of a random challenge
(RAND) and a network authentication token (AUTN), both obtained from the
authentication vector12.
A threat tree summarising how an attacker could attempt to tamper with
the PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty signalling traffic is given in Figure 11.26.
Bidding Down Attack EAP method bidding down attacks13 might be possi-
ble, because PANA/UMTS and PANA/Liberty do not protect the EAP method
negotiation14, especially if the user employs the EAP-AKA identifier with other
EAP methods. However, a summary of how to avoid attacks that negotiate
the least secure EAP method from among a set was given in the previous sec-
12The authentication vector (RAND, AUTN, XRES, IK, CK) is produced from a 128-bit
secret key K, shared by the USIM and the HN AuC, and a sequence number (see section 8.4).
13As discussed in the previous section, in a bidding down attack an attacker fools the PaC
into negotiating an authentication method less secure than would otherwise be available.
14PANA/UMTS and PANA/Liberty actually do not support EAP-AKA protocol version
negotiation or ciphersuite negotiation.
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Tamper with PANA/UMTS or
PANA/Liberty signalling traffic
(T)
Threat # 4
Modify the content of
the exchanged packets
4.3
Has access to the
signalling data flow
4.2
and
Signalling traffic is
unprotected
4.1
and
Use of
PANA/UMTS or
PANA/Liberty SA,
MAC and EAP-
AKA attributes
Use of
PANA/UMTS or
PANA/Liberty SA,
MAC and EAP-
AKA attributes
Figure 11.26: Threat tree for PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty sig-
nalling traffic tampering
tion. Hence, the solutions adopted by PANA/GSM can also be adopted by
PANA/UMTS and PANA/Liberty.
A threat tree summarising how an attacker could launch a bidding down
attack against the PANA/UMTS or the PANA/Liberty authentication schemes
is given in Figure 11.27.
Blind Resource Consumption DoS Attack In order to launch a ‘blind
resource consumption DoS attack’ (see section 3.2.3) against PANA/UMTS or
PANA/Liberty, an attacker could make use of the same steps adopted against
PANA/GSM (detailed in the previous section). Like PANA/GSM, PANA/UMTS
and PANA/Liberty do not protect the EAP-AKA method exchange itself, and
the EAP-AKA mechanism is not a tunnelling method. Hence an adversary
can both eavesdrop on the EAP-AKA payloads and inject arbitrary messages
which might confuse both the PaC and the PAA. A summary of how to pro-
vide protection against blind resource consumption DoS attacks by means of
sequence numbers and cookies was given in the previous section. Hence, the
solutions adopted by PANA/GSM can also be adopted by PANA/UMTS and
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Launch bidding down attack against
PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty
(S)
Threat # 5
Negotiate wth PaC a
less secure auth method
5.3
The Pac-PAA
link is shared
5.1
Pretend to be a PAA
in discovery phase
5.2
and and
Repeat list of
supported auth
methods after SA
establishment
Send spoofed ad with
capabilities listing
weaker auth methods
5.3.2
Fool the PaC to accept
a weaker auth method
which can be broken
5.3.3
PaC needs to make
use of different auth
methods
5.3.1
and and
Use a distinct
identifier for each
auth method
needed
Figure 11.27: Threat tree for bidding down attacks against
PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty
PANA/Liberty.
A threat tree summarising how an attacker could launch a blind resource
consumption DoS attack against the PANA/UMTS or the PANA/Liberty au-
thentication schemes is given in Figure 11.28.
DoS Attack using Termination Messages As discussed in section 6.2.1.2,
an attacker can pretend to be a PAA in a PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty
exchange and revoke access to the PaC, causing a DoS attack on the PaC.
An attacker can also pretend to be a genuine PaC and transmit a disconnect
message, again causing a DoS attack on the PaC.
This kind of termination message causes state removal, a stop to the account-
ing procedure, and removes the installed packet filters. Thus such messages
need to be protected to prevent an adversary from deleting state information
and thereby causing DoS attacks. If there is an established security association,
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Deny service via blind resource
consumption DoS attack
(D)
Threat # 6
Prevent network access
by legitimate PaCs
6.3
Pretend to be a PaC
during the initial
handshake phase
6.1
Bombard the PAA with
messages to swamp it and
cause  resource exhaustion
6.2
and and
Use PANA/UMTS
or PANA/Liberty
sequence numbers
and cookies
Figure 11.28: Threat tree for blind resource consumption DoS attacks
against PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty
all messages exchanged during the termination phase will be protected with
a PANA/UMTS-based or PANA/Liberty-based MAC AVP, which neutralises
this threat.
A threat tree summarising how an attacker could launch a DoS attack using
PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty termination messages is given in Figure 11.29.
Deny service via PANA/UMTS or
PANA/Liberty termination messages
(D)
Threat # 7
Cause a DoS attack
on the PaC by
deleting state info
7.3
Pretend to be a
PaC or a PAA
7.1
Send a disconect message
to the PAA or  revoke
access to the PaC
7.2
and and
Use PANA/
UMTS or PANA/
Liberty-based
MAC to protect
messages
Figure 11.29: Threat tree for DoS attacks using PANA/UMTS or
PANA/Liberty termination messages
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DoS Attack using False Success or Failure Indications In physically
insecure networks, an attacker might attempt to mount DoS attacks by sending
false PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty success/failure indications. As discussed
in the previous section, this attack is possible if the success or failure indication
is not protected by a security association between the PaC and the PAA. All
PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty messages exchanged prior to completion of the
key establishment process may be unprotected.
Nevertheless, the attacker cannot force the PaC or the PAA to believe suc-
cessful authentication has occurred when mutual authentication has failed or
has not yet happened. In addition, any message whose sequence number is dif-
ferent to the expected value (e.g. a duplicate answer), and any message that fails
to pass the MAC verification step, is immediately discarded by the receiver.
A threat tree summarising how an attacker could launch a DoS attack using
false PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty success/failure indications is given in
Figure 11.30.
Deny service via false
success or failure indications
(D)
Threat # 8
Prevent network access by
legitimate PaCs or prematurely
end the auth exchange
8.3
Pretend to be a
PAA
8.1
Send false failure or
success message
8.2
and and
Use PANA/
UMTS or PANA/
Liberty SA,
sequence
numbers and
MAC
Figure 11.30: Threat tree for DoS attacks via false PANA/UMTS or
PANA/Liberty success/failure indications
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IP Address Depletion Attack An ‘IP address depletion attack’ (see section
6.2.1.2) arises from the fact that the PaC acquires an IP address before the
PANA/UMTS or the PANA/Liberty authentication processes begin. As stated
previously, this opens up the possibility of DoS attacks in which attackers can
exhaust the IP address space by acquiring multiple IP addresses, or deny IP
address allocations to other entities by falsely responding to every duplicate
address detection query. An IP address depletion attack can be prevented by
deploying a secure address resolution scheme that does not depend on the client
authentication process, such as the SEND mechanism (see section 6.2.1.2).
A threat tree summarising how an attacker could launch an IP address deple-
tion attack against the PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty authentication schemes
is given in Figure 11.31.
Deny service via IP address
depletion attack
(D)
Threat # 9
Prevent network access
by legitimate PaCs
9.3
Pretend to be a
PaC before auth
process begins
9.1
Exhaust IP address
space or deny
IP address allocations
9.2
and and
Use secure
address
resolution (like
SEND)
Acquire multiple IP
addresses or falsely
respond to duplicate
address detection queries
9.2.1
Figure 11.31: Threat tree for IP address depletion attacks against
PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty
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Brute-Force and Dictionary Attacks The effective key length in both
PANA/UMTS and PANA/Liberty is 128 bits (see section 8.4), and there are
no known computationally feasible brute-force attacks. Because PANA/UMTS
and PANA/Liberty are not password-based protocols, they are not vulnerable
to dictionary attacks (see section 3.3.4), assuming that the pre-shared secrets
are not derived from a weak password, name, or other low entropy source.
A threat tree summarising how a malicious user could attempt to learn
PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty keying material by using brute-force attacks
is given in Figure 11.32.
Learn PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty
keys via brute-force attacks
(I)
Threat # 10
Try all possibilities to
guess a key
10.2
and
Gain any data useful to
recompute the keying material
10.1
Eavesdrop on PANA/UMTS
or PANA/Liberty traffic
10.1.1
Dump endpoints
computer memory
10.1.2
Guess the output of the
pseudo-random function
10.1.3
Use a good
source of
randomness and
never use a prf
with output  <
128 bits
Use of
PANA/UMTS or
PANA/Liberty SA,
MAC and EAP-
AKA attributes
No known
computationally
feasible brute-
force attacks
against
128 bits
Figure 11.32: Threat tree for brute-force attacks against the
PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty keying material
11.4.2.4 PANA/IKEv2 Threat Trees
We now consider the security threats to the PANA/IKEv2 protocol (described
in detail in Chapter 10), in order to create the corresponding threat trees.
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MitM Attacks As discussed in section 11.4.2.2, when MitM attacks are suc-
cessfully carried out, the attacker acts as an intermediary between a PaC victim
and a legitimate PAA. Care has to be taken to avoid MitM attacks arising when
tunnelling is used with PANA/IKEv2, e.g. when using PEAP (described in sec-
tion 3.7.3), or when EAP-IKEv2 (detailed in section 10.4) is part of a sequence
of EAP methods15. An example of such a MitM problem is discussed by Asokan,
Niemi and Nyberg16 [21]. As a solution to the problem, Asokan, Niemi and Ny-
berg suggest cryptographically binding the session keys of the two phases, i.e.
binding together the tunnel session key T (a typical example of T is the TLS
master key derived in the TLS handshake of PEAP) and the KEYMAT derived
from the EAP-IKEv2 method, to generate an ultimate session key K.
There are two ways to achieve the necessary binding between KEYMAT and
K. In the first method, the binding is established directly by taking KEYMAT
in addition to T as input to the computation of the session key K. This provides
implicit key authentication of the PaC (see section 2.2.5). The second method
is to make use of a cryptographic check value to verify that the PaC who is in
possession of T is also in possession of KEYMAT. This second type of binding
provides explicit key authentication of the PaC (as described in section 2.2.5).
A threat tree summarising how an attacker could attempt to launch a MitM
attack against the PANA/IKEv2 authentication scheme is given in Figure 11.33.
User Identity Disclosure As stated in section 6.2.1.2, some clients might
wish to hide their identities from visited access networks for privacy reasons. In
PANA/IKEv2, a large number of identities are involved due to multiple uses of
identifiers for routing (i.e. authentication end point indication). The identifier
15Even when tunnelling or an EAP sequence of methods are not used with PANA/IKEv2,
user data need to be integrity protected on physically insecure networks to avoid MitM attacks
and session hijacking.
16The MitM attack described is taken into account in the design of IKEv2 (see section
3.8.1).
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Launch MitM attack against
the PANA/IKEv2 scheme
(S)
Threat # 1
and
Tunnelling or sequence
of EAP methods is used
1.1
Use of
cryptographic
binding
Claim to be the PAA
to the real PaC
1.2
Claim to be the PaC
to the real PAA
1.3
and
Figure 11.33: Threat tree for MitM attacks against PANA/IKEv2
types, their requirements for confidentiality and integrity protection, and their
potential disclosure threats are as follows.
As shown in Figure 10.3, the identifier Identity, used in the first round trip of
the PANA/IKEv2 authentication phase (b), indicates where the EAP messages
terminate; it is not used to identify the PaC, and thus it does not allow the
adversary to learn the identity of the PaC. The identifiers IDi and IDr are used
respectively to identify the PAA (f) and PaC (g); IDi can be a fully-qualified
domain name (FQDN), and IDr can be associated with a user identifier (e.g. an
email address). Both identifiers are of importance for the PANA/IKEv2 Access
phase (3), and are thus encrypted and integrity protected by PANA/IKEv2.
In summary, PANA/IKEv2 includes identity confidentiality and integrity
protection support, which protects the privacy of the PaC and PAA identi-
ties against disclosure threats involving passive (e.g. eavesdropping) and active
attackers (e.g. impersonation of the access network).
A threat tree summarising how a malicious user could attempt to learn a
PANA/IKEv2 user identifier by using passive or active attacks is given in Figure
11.34.
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Learn a PANA/IKEv2
user identity
     (I)
Threat # 2
Request the PaC
to identify itself
2.3
Impersonate the PAA
in a first connection
2.2
and
Eavesdrop on PANA/
IKEv2 auth traffic
2.1
ID
i 
and ID
r
 are
encrypted and
integrity protected
by PANA/IKEv2
Identifier used
in first round trip
does not identify
the PaC
Figure 11.34: Threat tree for a PANA/IKEv2 user identifier disclosure
Service Theft and Dictionary Attacks PANA/IKEv2 does not prevent
an attacker from gaining unauthorised access to the network by stealing service
from another user (described in section 6.2.1.2). However, a summary of how
to prevent service theft in the access network was given in section 11.4.2.2. The
solutions adopted by PANA/GSM for shared and non-shared links can also be
adopted by PANA/IKEv2.
A threat tree summarising how an attacker could gain unauthorised access
to the network by stealing service from another PANA/IKEv2 user is given in
Figure 11.35.
Because PANA/IKEv2 is not a password-based protocol, it is not vulnerable
to dictionary attacks (see section 3.3.4), assuming that the pre-shared secret or
the key used for digital signature are not derived from a weak password, name,
or other low entropy source.
Perfect Forward Secrecy, Brute-Force Attacks and Generation of Ran-
dom Numbers PANA/IKEv2 generates IKEv2 keying material using an
ephemeral Diffie-Hellman exchange, in order to achieve the property of ‘per-
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Steal service from another
PANA/IKEv2 user
(E)
Threat # 3
Gain unauthorised
network access
3.3
and
Spoof the IP address
of a legitimate PaC
3.1
Use of IP
address filter or
(in shared links)
IPsec SA
Spoof the MAC address
of a legitimate PaC
3.2
and
Use of MAC
address filter or
(in shared links)
IPsec SA
Figure 11.35: Threat tree for service theft attacks against
PANA/IKEv2
fect forward secrecy’ (see section 2.1.3.3). Support of this property requires
that, when a connection is closed, each endpoint securely deletes not only the
keys used by the connection but any data that could be used to recompute those
keys.
The Diffie-Hellman exchange must be based on one of the groups defined in
RFC 4306 [49] (see section 3.8.1), where all but the first of the groups (which
is only present for historical reasons) offers security against any known com-
putationally feasible brute-force attack. It is assumed that all Diffie-Hellman
exponents are erased from computer memory after use.
In the context of the PANA/IKEv2 SA (see section 10.6), four cryptographic
algorithms are negotiated: an encryption algorithm, an integrity protection
algorithm, a Diffie-Hellman group, and a pseudo-random function (prf). The
prf is used for the construction of keying material for all of the cryptographic
algorithms used. The strength of all IKEv2 keys against brute-force attacks is
limited by the size of the output of the negotiated prf. For this reason, a prf
whose output is shorter than 128 bits (e.g. a CBC-MAC derived using a 64-bit
block cipher) must never be used with the PANA/IKEv2 protocol. Finally, a
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PANA/IKEv2 implementation also needs to use a good source of randomness
to generate the random numbers (nonces) required in the protocol17.
A threat tree summarising how a malicious user could attempt to learn
PANA/IKEv2 keying material by using brute-force attacks is given in Figure
11.36.
Learn PANA/IKEv2 keys
using brute-force attacks
(I)
Threat # 4
Try all possibilities to
guess a PANA/IKEv2 key
4.2
Gain any data useful to
recompute the keying material
4.1
and
Eavesdrop on unprotected
PANA/IKEv2 traffic
4.1.1
Dump endpoints
computer memory
4.1.2
Guess the output of the
negotiated prf function
4.1.3
Use of
ephemeral
Diffie-Hellman
exchange with
perfect forward
secrecy
Use of
ephemeral
Diffie-Hellman
exchange with
perfect forward
secrecy
Use a good
source of
randomness and
never use a prf
with output  <
128 bits
Figure 11.36: Threat tree for brute-force attacks against the
PANA/IKEv2 keying material
Tampering with Signalling Traffic PANA/IKEv2 signalling data could be
modified as it flows between the PaC and the PAA. The protection of signalling
traffic through an PANA/IKEv2 SA prevents an opponent from acting as a
MitM adversary, from session hijacking, from injecting packets, from replaying
messages, and from modifying the content of the exchanged packets. Also, as
with all PANA methods, in PANA/IKEv2 an integrity object is defined, sup-
porting data-origin authentication, replay protection using sequence numbers
17See RFC 1750 [48] and ISO/IEC 18031 [105] for details on generating random numbers
for security applications.
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and nonces, and integrity protection using a MAC function (see sections 6.1.4
and 8.5.2.1).
Moreover, as discussed in section 10.4, in PANA/IKEv2 all but the IKEv2
headers of the messages that follow the Diffie-Hellman exchange are encrypted
and integrity protected. The recipients must verify that all signatures and
MACs are computed correctly, and that the identities IDi and IDr correspond
to the keys used to generate the Authentication (AUTH ) payload. The use
of nonces guarantees liveliness during an exchange, and also protects against
replay attacks.
A threat tree summarising how an attacker could attempt to tamper with
the PANA/IKEv2 signalling traffic is given in Figure 11.37.
Tamper with PANA/
IKEv2 signalling traffic
(T)
Threat # 5
Modify the content of
the exchanged packets
5.3
Has access to the
signalling data flow
5.2
and
Signalling traffic is
unprotected
5.1
and
Use of
PANA/IKEv2 SA,
MAC and AUTH
payload
Use of
PANA/IKEv2 SA,
MAC and AUTH
payload
Figure 11.37: Threat tree for PANA/IKEv2 signalling traffic tampering
Bidding Down Attack EAP method bidding down attacks18 might be pos-
sible, because PANA/IKEv2 does not protect the EAP method negotiation19.
18As discussed in section 11.4.2.2, in a bidding down attack an attacker fools the PaC into
negotiating an authentication method less secure than would otherwise be available.
19PANA/IKEv2 does not support EAP-IKEv2 protocol version negotiation, but supports
cipher suite negotiation through IKEv2. In the context of the IKEv2 SA, four cryptographic
algorithms are negotiated (see section 3.8.1).
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However, a summary of how to avoid attacks that negotiate the least secure
EAP method from among a set was given in section 11.4.2.2. The solutions
adopted by PANA/GSM can also be adopted by PANA/IKEv2.
A threat tree summarising how an attacker could launch a bidding down
attack against the PANA/IKEv2 authentication scheme is given in Figure 11.38.
Launch bidding down attack
against PANA/IKEv2
(S)
Threat # 6
Negotiate wth PaC a
less secure auth method
6.3
The Pac-PAA
link is shared
6.1
Pretend to be a PAA
in discovery phase
6.2
and and
Repeat list of
supported auth
methods after
PANA/IKEv2
SA
Send spoofed ad with
capabilities listing
weaker auth methods
6.3.2
Fool the PaC to accept
a weaker auth method
which can be broken
6.3.3
PaC needs to make
use of different auth
methods
6.3.1
and and
Use a distinct
identifier for each
auth method
needed
Figure 11.38: Threat tree for bidding down attacks against
PANA/IKEv2
Blind Resource Consumption DoS Attack In order to launch a ‘blind
resource consumption DoS attack’ (see section 3.2.3) against PANA/IKEv2,
an attacker could make use of the same steps adopted against PANA/GSM
(detailed in section 11.4.2.2). Like PANA/GSM, PANA/IKEv2 does not protect
the EAP-IKEv2 method exchange itself, and the EAP-IKEv2 mechanism is not
a tunnelling method. Hence an adversary can both eavesdrop on the EAP-
IKEv2 payloads and inject arbitrary messages which might confuse both the
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PaC and the PAA. A summary of how to provide protection against blind
resource consumption DoS attacks through the use of sequence numbers and
cookies was given in section 11.4.2.2. The solutions adopted by PANA/GSM
can also be adopted by PANA/IKEv2.
A threat tree summarising how an attacker could launch a blind resource
consumption DoS attack against the PANA/IKEv2 authentication scheme is
given in Figure 11.39.
Deny service via blind resource
consumption DoS attack
(D)
Threat # 7
Prevent network access
by legitimate PaCs
7.3
Pretend to be a PaC
during the initial
handshake phase
7.1
Bombard the PAA with
messages to swamp it and
cause  resource exhaustion
7.2
and and
Use
PANA/IKEv2
sequence
numbers and
cookies
Figure 11.39: Threat tree for blind resource consumption DoS attacks
against PANA/IKEv2
DoS Attack using Termination Messages As discussed in section 6.2.1.2,
an attacker can pretend to be a PAA in a PANA/IKEv2 exchange and revoke
access to the PaC, causing a DoS attack on the PaC. An attacker can also
pretend to be a genuine PaC and transmit a disconnect message, again causing
a DoS attack on the PaC.
This kind of termination message causes state removal, a stop to the account-
ing procedure, and removes the installed packet filters. Thus such messages
need to be protected to prevent an adversary from deleting state information
and thereby causing DoS attacks. If there is an established security association,
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all messages exchanged during the termination phase will be protected with a
PANA/IKEv2-based MAC AVP, which mitigates this threat.
A threat tree summarising how an attacker could launch a DoS attack using
PANA/IKEv2 termination messages is given in Figure 11.40.
Deny service via PANA/IKEv2
termination messages
(D)
Threat # 8
Cause a DoS attack
on the PaC by
deleting state info
8.3
Pretend to be a
PaC or a PAA
8.1
Send a disconect message
to the PAA or  revoke
access to the PaC
8.2
and and
Use PANA/
IKEv2-based
MAC to protect
messages
Figure 11.40: Threat tree for DoS attacks using PANA/IKEv2 termi-
nation messages
DoS Attack using False Success or Failure Indications In physically
insecure networks, an attacker might attempt to mount DoS attacks by sending
false PANA/IKEv2 success/failure indications. As discussed in section 11.4.2.2,
this attack is possible if the success or failure indication is not protected by a
security association between the PaC and the PAA. All PANA/IKEv2 mes-
sages exchanged prior to completion of the key establishment process may be
unprotected.
Nevertheless, the attacker cannot force the PaC or the PAA to believe suc-
cessful authentication has occurred when mutual authentication has failed or
has not yet happened. In addition, any message whose sequence number is dif-
ferent to the expected value (e.g. a duplicate answer), and any message that fails
to pass the MAC verification step, is immediately discarded by the receiver.
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A threat tree summarising how an attacker could launch a DoS attack using
false PANA/IKEv2 success/failure indications is given in Figure 11.41.
Deny service via false
success or failure indications
(D)
Threat # 9
Prevent network access by
legitimate PaCs or prematurely
end the auth exchange
9.3
Pretend to be a
PAA
9.1
Send false PANA/
IKEv2 failure or
success message
9.2
and and
Use PANA/
IKEv2 SA,
sequence
numbers and
MAC
Figure 11.41: Threat tree for DoS attacks via false PANA/IKEv2 suc-
cess/failure indications
IP Address Depletion Attack An ‘IP address depletion attack’ (see section
6.2.1.2) arises from the fact that the PaC acquires an IP address before the
PANA/IKEv2 authentication processes begin. As previously described, this
opens up the possibility of DoS attacks in which attackers can exhaust the IP
address space by acquiring multiple IP addresses, or deny IP address allocations
to other entities by falsely responding to every duplicate address detection query.
An IP address depletion attack can be prevented by deploying a secure address
resolution scheme that does not depend on the client authentication process,
such as the SEND mechanism (see section 6.2.1.2).
A threat tree summarising how an attacker could launch an IP address deple-
tion attack against the PANA/IKEv2 authentication scheme is given in Figure
11.42.
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Deny service via IP address
depletion attack
(D)
Threat # 10
Prevent network access
by legitimate PaCs
10.3
Pretend to be a
PaC before auth
process begins
10.1
Exhaust IP address
space or deny
IP address allocations
10.2
and and
Use secure
address
resolution (like
SEND)
Acquire multiple IP
addresses or falsely
respond to duplicate
address detection queries
10.2.1
Figure 11.42: Threat tree for IP address depletion attacks against
PANA/IKEv2
11.5 Ranking the Threats by Decreasing Risk
According to Howard and LeBlanc [81, p93], after creating the threat trees in
the previous section, the next step is to use a threat ranking method, such as
DREAD, to determine the security risk for each of the captured threats.
In this section, a description of the basic concepts underlying DREAD is
first provided (section 11.5.1). We then use this threat ranking mechanism
to calculate the overall security risk for each of the proposed authentication
techniques (section 11.5.2).
11.5.1 DREAD Ranking Method
Ranking the threats involves calculating the risk that the threat causes to the
proposed authentication techniques. As suggested in [81, p93], we use the con-
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cept of DREAD , an acronym derived from the five terms (or metrics, rated on
a scale of 1 to 10) described below:
Damage Potential This metric involves rating the extent of the actual dam-
age which is possible with a particular threat. Typically, the worst score (with
metric value 10) is for a threat that allows the attacker to circumvent all security
restrictions, and then do virtually any damage he/she wishes.
Reproducibility This term is used to measure how easy it is to realise a
threat, i.e. to use it to generate an exploit. Some security flaws (especially
those existing in features installed by default) enable attacks that work every
time, and thus have high reproducibility (10), whilst others result in attacks
whose results are unpredictable and might work only sporadically.
Exploitability This metric assesses how much effort and expertise is required
to mount an attack (e.g. if a novice programmer with a home computer can
mount the attack, then it scores a 10)20; it also considers what degree of au-
thentication and authorisation is required to attack the system. For instance, if
an anonymous remote user can attack the system, then the exploitability metric
is set to 10, whilst a local user exploit requiring strong credentials has a lower
exploitability.
Affected Users This metric quantifies roughly what percentage of users would
be impacted if the threat were exploited by an attack: 91–100 percent (equating
to a metric of 10) down to 0–10 percent (with a metric of 1). Distinguishing be-
tween server and client attacks is important here, since if a server is the threat
target then a larger number of clients will be affected. Thus, all else being
20However, an attack that can only be launched by a national government needing to invest
millions of dollars probably scores 1.
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equal, attacks affecting servers are assigned a higher metric value than attacks
on clients.
Discoverability The analysis below assumes that a threat will always be
discoverable — this is because the attacks are against protocol specifications,
which are likely to be in the public domain, as opposed to source code, which
may not be generally available. Hence, we label each threat with the highest
rating (10) for this metric, relying on the other metrics to guide our threat
ranking.
We determine a DREAD overall rating for each of the captured threats by
averaging the five metric values listed above (i.e. adding the values and dividing
the sum by five). Once we have calculated the risk rating of each threat, we
then sort all the threats to each of the proposed authentication techniques in
descending order (i.e. threats with a higher risk first and lower-risk threats last).
11.5.2 Using DREAD to Calculate Security Risk
We now use the DREAD threat ranking procedure, discussed in the previous
section, to determine the security risk (sections 11.5.2.1 to 11.5.2.3) and sort the
threats (section 11.5.2.4) applying to each of the entity authentication proposals.
11.5.2.1 PANA/GSM Security Risk
Each of the PANA/GSM threat trees presented in Figures 11.11 to 11.22 cor-
responds to a threat which needs to have its security risk calculated. Tables
11.1 to 11.12 summarise the corresponding threat target and threat category,
the related DREAD risk metrics, and the resulting overall risk rating.
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Table 11.1: PANA/GSM threat #1
Threat description PAA spoofing via GSM triplet exposure
Threat target PaC (2.0)
Threat category Spoofing identity (S)
Risk Damage potential: 9
Reproducibility: 3
Exploitability: 3
Affected users: 6
Discoverability: 10
Overall rating: 6.2
Comments The target in question is the PaC (2.0), as shown in subthreats
1.1.1 and 1.1.2 (given in Figure 11.11). Reproducibility and
exploitability are low because the only realistic way to exploit
this threat is via a GSM network vulnerability, if the same
SIM credentials are also used for GSM traffic.
Table 11.2: PANA/GSM threat #2
Threat description Permanent GSM user identifier disclosure
Threat target PANA answers (2.0—6.0—1.0)
Threat category Information disclosure (I)
Risk Damage potential: 5
Reproducibility: 9
Exploitability: 8
Affected users: 1
Discoverability: 10
Overall rating: 6.6
Comments The most likely attack would be from a rogue user using a
network protocol analyser (see subthreat 2.1 of Figure 11.12),
which is cheaper (in terms of time, effort, and money) than
adopting an active attack (see subthreats 2.2 and 2.3 of Figure
11.12). After that, the attacker might wait for the PaC to
start a first connection with a given PAA to reveal its identity.
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Table 11.3: PANA/GSM threat #3
Threat description PANA/GSM session key disclosure
Threat target PANA requests (1.0—6.0—2.0) and answers (2.0—6.0—1.0)
Threat category Information disclosure (I)
Risk Damage potential: 10
Reproducibility: 3
Exploitability: 3
Affected users: 10
Discoverability: 10
Overall rating: 7.2
Comments Reproducibility and exploitability are low as long as the
cryptographic functions used are sufficiently robust (see
subthreat 3.3 of Figure 11.13).
Table 11.4: PANA/GSM threat #4
Threat description MitM attacks against PANA/GSM
Threat target PAA (1.0) and PaC (2.0)
Threat category Spoofing identity (S)
Risk Damage potential: 7
Reproducibility: 10
Exploitability: 7
Affected users: 2
Discoverability: 10
Overall rating: 7.2
Comments Care has to be taken to avoid this threat arising when
tunnelling is used with PANA/GSM, or when EAP-SIM is
part of a sequence of EAP methods. Asokan, Niemi and
Nyberg [21] suggest the use of a cryptographic binding (see
subthreat 4.1 of Figure 11.14), thereby reducing both
reproducibility and exploitability.
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Table 11.5: PANA/GSM threat #5
Threat description Service theft attacks against PANA/GSM
Threat target PANA/GSM authentication process (6.0)
Threat category Elevation of privilege (E)
Risk Damage potential: 10
Reproducibility: 5
Exploitability: 5
Affected users: 1
Discoverability: 10
Overall rating: 6.2
Comments An unprivileged rogue user can gain network access because
PANA/GSM does not specify a mechanism for preventing
service theft. The use of IP/MAC address filters or an IPsec
SA can be adopted for this purpose.
Table 11.6: PANA/GSM threat #6
Threat description SIM credential reuse and brute-force attacks
Threat target PaC (2.0)
Threat category Information disclosure (I) and potentially spoofing identity (S)
Risk Damage potential: 8
Reproducibility: 6
Exploitability: 4
Affected users: 2
Discoverability: 10
Overall rating: 6.0
Comments The target is the PaC (2.0), once the GSM network is beyond
the control of our threat analysis. A brute-force search for a
64-bit key (see subthreat 6.2.1 of Figure 11.16) is a non-trivial
task that could not be executed in real time.
Table 11.7: PANA/GSM threat #7
Threat description PANA/GSM signalling traffic tampering
Threat target PANA requests (1.0—6.0—2.0) and answers (2.0—6.0—1.0)
Threat category Tampering with data (T)
Risk Damage potential: 10
Reproducibility: 5
Exploitability: 5
Affected users: 8
Discoverability: 10
Overall rating: 7.6
Comments The attacks derived from this threat can be prevented by
using a PANA/GSM SA, sequence numbers, nonces, MAC
and EAP-SIM attributes.
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Table 11.8: PANA/GSM threat #8
Threat description Bidding down attacks against PANA/GSM
Threat target PaC (2.0)
Threat category Spoofing identity (S)
Risk Damage potential: 5
Reproducibility: 10
Exploitability: 3
Affected users: 1
Discoverability: 10
Overall rating: 5.8
Comments Some protection against this threat can be offered by
repeating the list of supported EAP methods protected with
the PANA/GSM SA, in addition to the use of a distinct
identifier for each authentication method needed. Full
protection is provided if legitimate parties only accept the use
of robust cryptographic techniques.
Table 11.9: PANA/GSM threat #9
Threat description Blind resource consumption DoS attacks against
PANA/GSM
Threat target PANA/GSM authentication process (6.0)
Threat category Denial of service (D)
Risk Damage potential: 9
Reproducibility: 4
Exploitability: 4
Affected users: 8
Discoverability: 10
Overall rating: 7.0
Comments PANA/GSM sequence numbers and cookies provide
protection against this threat.
Table 11.10: PANA/GSM threat #10
Threat description DoS attacks via PANA/GSM termination messages
Threat target PANA requests (1.0—6.0—2.0) and answers (2.0—6.0—1.0)
Threat category Denial of service (D)
Risk Damage potential: 7
Reproducibility: 4
Exploitability: 5
Affected users: 1
Discoverability: 10
Overall rating: 5.4
Comments All messages exchanged during the termination phase need to
be protected with a PANA/GSM-based MAC, which
neutralises this threat.
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Table 11.11: PANA/GSM threat #11
Threat description DoS attacks using false PANA/GSM success or failure
indications
Threat target PANA requests (1.0—6.0—2.0) and answers (2.0—6.0—1.0)
Threat category Denial of service (D)
Risk Damage potential: 7
Reproducibility: 4
Exploitability: 4
Affected users: 3
Discoverability: 10
Overall rating: 5.6
Comments We use PANA/GSM SA, sequence numbers and MAC to
neutralise this threat.
Table 11.12: PANA/GSM threat #12
Threat description IP address depletion attacks against PANA/GSM
Threat target PANA/GSM authentication process (6.0)
Threat category Denial of service (D)
Risk Damage potential: 9
Reproducibility: 3
Exploitability: 3
Affected users: 9
Discoverability: 10
Overall rating: 6.8
Comments This threat can be prevented by deploying secure address
resolution, such as the SEND mechanism (see section 6.2.1.2).
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11.5.2.2 PANA/UMTS and PANA/Liberty Security Risk
Each of the PANA/UMTS and PANA/Liberty threat trees presented in Figures
11.23 to 11.32 corresponds to a threat which needs to have its security risk
calculated. Tables 11.13 to 11.22 summarise the corresponding threat targets
and threat categories, the related DREAD risk metrics, and the resulting overall
risk ratings.
Table 11.13: PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty threat #1
Threat description Permanent UMTS user identifier disclosure
Threat target PANA answers (2.0—6.0—1.0)
Threat category Information disclosure (I)
Risk Damage potential: 5
Reproducibility: 9
Exploitability: 8
Affected users: 1
Discoverability: 10
Overall rating: 6.6
Comments The most likely attack would be from a rogue user using a
network protocol analyser (see subthreat 1.1 of Figure 11.23),
which is cheaper (in terms of time, effort, and money) than
adopting an active attack (see subthreats 1.2 and 1.3 of Figure
11.23). After that, the attacker might wait for the PaC to
start a first connection with a given PAA to reveal its identity.
11.5.2.3 PANA/IKEv2 Security Risk
Each of the PANA/IKEv2 threat trees presented in Figures 11.33 to 11.42 corre-
sponds to a threat which needs to have its security risk calculated. Tables 11.23
to 11.32 summarise the corresponding threat targets and threat categories, the
related DREAD risk metrics, and the resulting overall risk ratings.
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Table 11.14: PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty threat #2
Threat description MitM attacks against PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty
Threat target PAA (1.0) and PaC (2.0)
Threat category Spoofing identity (S)
Risk Damage potential: 7
Reproducibility: 10
Exploitability: 7
Affected users: 2
Discoverability: 10
Overall rating: 7.2
Comments Care has to be taken to avoid this threat arising when
tunnelling is used with PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty, or
when EAP-AKA is part of a sequence of EAP methods.
Asokan, Niemi and Nyberg [21] suggest the use of a
cryptographic binding (see subthreat 2.1 of Figure 11.24),
thereby reducing both reproducibility and exploitability.
Table 11.15: PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty threat #3
Threat description Service theft attacks against PANA/UMTS or
PANA/Liberty
Threat target PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty authentication processes
(6.0)
Threat category Elevation of privilege (E)
Risk Damage potential: 10
Reproducibility: 5
Exploitability: 5
Affected users: 1
Discoverability: 10
Overall rating: 6.2
Comments An unprivileged rogue user can gain network access because
neither PANA/UMTS nor PANA/Liberty specifies a
mechanism for preventing service theft. The use of IP/MAC
address filters or an IPsec SA can be adopted for this purpose.
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Table 11.16: PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty threat #4
Threat description PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty signalling traffic tam-
pering
Threat target PANA requests (1.0—6.0—2.0) and answers (2.0—6.0—1.0)
Threat category Tampering with data (T)
Risk Damage potential: 10
Reproducibility: 1
Exploitability: 1
Affected users: 8
Discoverability: 10
Overall rating: 6.0
Comments The attacks derived from this threat can be prevented by
using a PANA/UMTS or a PANA/Liberty SA, sequence
numbers, nonces, MAC and EAP-AKA attributes (e.g.
AT ENCR DATA, for encrypted data, and AT AUTN, a
network authentication token used for replay protection).
Table 11.17: PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty threat #5
Threat description Bidding down attacks against PANA/UMTS or
PANA/Liberty
Threat target PaC (2.0)
Threat category Spoofing identity (S)
Risk Damage potential: 5
Reproducibility: 10
Exploitability: 3
Affected users: 1
Discoverability: 10
Overall rating: 5.8
Comments Some protection against this threat can be offered by
repeating the list of supported EAP methods protected with
the PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty SA, in addition to the
use of a distinct identifier for each authentication method
needed. Full protection is provided if legitimate parties only
accept the use of robust cryptographic techniques.
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Table 11.18: PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty threat #6
Threat description Blind resource consumption DoS attacks against
PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty
Threat target PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty authentication processes
(6.0)
Threat category Denial of service (D)
Risk Damage potential: 9
Reproducibility: 4
Exploitability: 4
Affected users: 8
Discoverability: 10
Overall rating: 7.0
Comments PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty sequence numbers and
cookies provide protection against this threat.
Table 11.19: PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty threat #7
Threat description DoS attacks using PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty
termination messages
Threat target PANA requests (1.0—6.0—2.0) and answers (2.0—6.0—1.0)
Threat category Denial of service (D)
Risk Damage potential: 7
Reproducibility: 4
Exploitability: 5
Affected users: 1
Discoverability: 10
Overall rating: 5.4
Comments All messages exchanged during the termination phase need to
be protected with a PANA/UMTS-based or a
PANA/Liberty-based MAC, which neutralises this threat.
Table 11.20: PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty threat #8
Threat description DoS attacks via false PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty
success/failure indications
Threat target PANA requests (1.0—6.0—2.0) and answers (2.0—6.0—1.0)
Threat category Denial of service (D)
Risk Damage potential: 7
Reproducibility: 4
Exploitability: 4
Affected users: 3
Discoverability: 10
Overall rating: 5.6
Comments We use PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty SA, sequence
numbers and MAC to neutralise this threat.
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Table 11.21: PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty threat #9
Threat description IP address depletion attacks against PANA/UMTS or
PANA/Liberty
Threat target PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty authentication processes
(6.0)
Threat category Denial of service (D)
Risk Damage potential: 9
Reproducibility: 3
Exploitability: 3
Affected users: 9
Discoverability: 10
Overall rating: 6.8
Comments This threat can be prevented by deploying secure address
resolution, such as the SEND mechanism (see section 6.2.1.2).
Table 11.22: PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty threat #10
Threat description Brute-force attacks against PANA/UMTS or
PANA/Liberty keying material
Threat target PANA requests (1.0—6.0—2.0), answers (2.0—6.0—1.0), and
authentication process (6.0)
Threat category Information disclosure (I)
Risk Damage potential: 8
Reproducibility: 2
Exploitability: 2
Affected users: 2
Discoverability: 10
Overall rating: 4.8
Comments The use of a PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty SA, MAC and
EAP-AKA attributes, in addition to the use of a
pseudo-random function whose output is greater than 128
bits, and also the use of a good source of randomness,
contribute to reduce both reproducibility and exploitability.
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Table 11.23: PANA/IKEv2 threat #1
Threat description MitM attacks against PANA/IKEv2
Threat target PAA (1.0) and PaC (2.0)
Threat category Spoofing identity (S)
Risk Damage potential: 7
Reproducibility: 10
Exploitability: 7
Affected users: 2
Discoverability: 10
Overall rating: 7.2
Comments Care has to be taken to avoid this threat arising when
tunnelling is used with PANA/IKEv2, or when EAP-IKEv2 is
part of a sequence of EAP methods. Asokan, Niemi and
Nyberg [21] suggest the use of a cryptographic binding (see
subthreat 1.1 of Figure 11.33), thereby reducing both
reproducibility and exploitability.
Table 11.24: PANA/IKEv2 threat #2
Threat description PANA/IKEv2 user identifier disclosure
Threat target PANA answers (2.0—6.0—1.0)
Threat category Information disclosure (I)
Risk Damage potential: 1
Reproducibility: 1
Exploitability: 1
Affected users: 1
Discoverability: 10
Overall rating: 2.8
Comments The PaC and PAA identifiers are encrypted and integrity
protected by PANA/IKEv2, which prevents eavesdropping
(see subthreat 2.1 of Figure 11.34). In addition, the identifier
used in the first round trip does not allow to learn the PaC’s
identity (see subthreats 2.2 and 2.3 of Figure 11.34).
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Table 11.25: PANA/IKEv2 threat #3
Threat description Service theft attacks against PANA/IKEv2
Threat target PANA/IKEv2 authentication process (6.0)
Threat category Elevation of privilege (E)
Risk Damage potential: 10
Reproducibility: 5
Exploitability: 5
Affected users: 1
Discoverability: 10
Overall rating: 6.2
Comments An unprivileged rogue user can gain network access because
PANA/IKEv2 does not specify a mechanism for preventing
service theft. The use of IP/MAC address filters or an IPsec
SA can be adopted for this purpose.
Table 11.26: PANA/IKEv2 threat #4
Threat description Brute-force attacks against PANA/IKEv2 keying ma-
terial
Threat target PANA/IKEv2 requests (1.0—6.0—2.0), answers
(2.0—6.0—1.0), and authentication process (6.0)
Threat category Information disclosure (I)
Risk Damage potential: 8
Reproducibility: 1
Exploitability: 1
Affected users: 2
Discoverability: 10
Overall rating: 4.4
Comments The use by PANA/IKEv2 of an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman
exchange with the ‘perfect forward secrecy’ property (see
section 2.1.3.3), in addition to the use of a prf whose output is
equal or greater than 128 bits, and also the use of a good
source of randomness, contribute to reduce both the
reproducibility and exploitability values.
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Table 11.27: PANA/IKEv2 threat #5
Threat description PANA/IKEv2 signalling traffic tampering
Threat target PANA requests (1.0—6.0—2.0) and answers (2.0—6.0—1.0)
Threat category Tampering with data (T)
Risk Damage potential: 10
Reproducibility: 1
Exploitability: 1
Affected users: 8
Discoverability: 10
Overall rating: 6.0
Comments The attacks derived from this threat can be prevented by
using a PANA/IKEv2 SA, sequence numbers, nonces, MAC
and EAP-IKEv2 attributes (e.g. the AUTH payload).
Table 11.28: PANA/IKEv2 threat #6
Threat description Bidding down attacks against PANA/IKEv2
Threat target PaC (2.0)
Threat category Spoofing identity (S)
Risk Damage potential: 5
Reproducibility: 10
Exploitability: 3
Affected users: 1
Discoverability: 10
Overall rating: 5.8
Comments Some protection against this threat can be offered by
repeating the list of supported EAP methods protected with
the PANA/IKEv2 SA, in addition to the use of a distinct
identifier for each authentication method needed. Full
protection is provided if legitimate parties only accept the use
of robust cryptographic techniques.
Table 11.29: PANA/IKEv2 threat #7
Threat description Blind resource consumption DoS attacks against
PANA/IKEv2
Threat target PANA/IKEv2 authentication process (6.0)
Threat category Denial of service (D)
Risk Damage potential: 9
Reproducibility: 4
Exploitability: 4
Affected users: 8
Discoverability: 10
Overall rating: 7.0
Comments PANA/IKEv2 sequence numbers and cookies provide
protection against this threat.
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Table 11.30: PANA/IKEv2 threat #8
Threat description DoS attacks using PANA/IKEv2 termination messages
Threat target PANA requests (1.0—6.0—2.0) and answers (2.0—6.0—1.0)
Threat category Denial of service (D)
Risk Damage potential: 7
Reproducibility: 4
Exploitability: 5
Affected users: 1
Discoverability: 10
Overall rating: 5.4
Comments All messages exchanged during the termination phase need to
be protected with a PANA/IKEv2-based MAC, which
neutralises this threat.
Table 11.31: PANA/IKEv2 threat #9
Threat description DoS attacks using false PANA/IKEv2 success or failure
indications
Threat target PANA requests (1.0—6.0—2.0) and answers (2.0—6.0—1.0)
Threat category Denial of service (D)
Risk Damage potential: 7
Reproducibility: 4
Exploitability: 4
Affected users: 3
Discoverability: 10
Overall rating: 5.6
Comments We use PANA/IKEv2 SA, sequence numbers and MAC to
neutralise this threat.
Table 11.32: PANA/IKEv2 threat #10
Threat description IP address depletion attacks against PANA/IKEv2
Threat target PANA/IKEv2 authentication process (6.0)
Threat category Denial of service (D)
Risk Damage potential: 9
Reproducibility: 3
Exploitability: 3
Affected users: 9
Discoverability: 10
Overall rating: 6.8
Comments This threat can be prevented by deploying secure address
resolution, such as the SEND mechanism (see section 6.2.1.2).
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11.5.2.4 Sorting the Threats
Once we have calculated the overall risk rating of each threat, we can then sort
the threats to each of the proposed authentication techniques in descending
order (i.e. threats with a higher security risk first and lower-risk threats last).
Tables 11.33 to 11.35 summarise and provide an average of the DREAD overall
security risk ratings, which can be used to rank the threats applying to each of
the entity authentication proposals.
Table 11.33: Ranking the PANA/GSM threats by decreasing risk
Rank Threat Threat description Risk
1 7 PANA/GSM signalling traffic tampering. 7.6
2 3 PANA/GSM session key disclosure. 7.2
3 4 MitM attacks against PANA/GSM. 7.2
4 9 Blind resource consumption DoS attacks against
PANA/GSM.
7.0
5 12 IP address depletion attacks against PANA/GSM. 6.8
6 2 Permanent GSM user identifier disclosure. 6.6
7 1 PAA spoofing via GSM triplet exposure. 6.2
8 5 Service theft attacks against PANA/GSM. 6.2
9 6 SIM credential reuse and brute-force attacks. 6.0
10 8 Bidding down attacks against PANA/GSM. 5.8
11 11 DoS attacks via false PANA/GSM success/failure
indications.
5.6
12 10 DoS attacks via PANA/GSM termination messages. 5.4
# # Overall risk rating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.47
11.6 Mitigating the Threats
According to Howard and LeBlanc [81, p106], after determining the security
risk for each of the captured threats in the previous section, the final step of the
formal threat modelling process is to determine how to deal with them. We have
four options when considering threats and how to mitigate them [81, p106-107]:
• doing nothing (which is rarely the correct solution);
375
11. Threat Modelling & Evaluation
Table 11.34: Ranking the PANA/UMTS and PANA/Liberty threats
by decreasing risk
Rank Threat Threat description Risk
1 2 MitM attacks against PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty. 7.2
2 6 Blind resource consumption DoS attacks against
PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty.
7.0
3 9 IP address depletion attacks against PANA/UMTS or
PANA/Liberty.
6.8
4 1 Permanent UMTS user identifier disclosure. 6.6
5 3 Service theft attacks against PANA/UMTS or
PANA/Liberty.
6.2
6 4 PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty signalling traffic
tampering.
6.0
7 5 Bidding down attacks against PANA/UMTS or
PANA/Liberty.
5.8
8 8 DoS attacks via false PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty
success/failure indications.
5.6
9 7 DoS attacks via PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty
termination messages.
5.4
10 10 Brute-force attacks against PANA/UMTS or
PANA/Liberty keying material.
4.8
# # Overall risk rating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.14
• warning the user of the problem, thereby allowing the user to decide
whether to use the feature which is the focus of the threat;
• removing the problem, by removing the feature giving rise to the threat
from the protocol; or
• fixing the problem, by using security techniques (see Chapter 2) — our
chosen option.
In this section, a description of how to select the appropriate techniques to
mitigate the threats is first provided (section 11.6.1). We then map these threat
mitigation techniques to each of the entity authentication proposals, thereby
deducing their mitigation status (section 11.6.2).
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Table 11.35: Ranking the PANA/IKEv2 threats by decreasing risk
Rank Threat Threat description Risk
1 1 MitM attacks against PANA/IKEv2. 7.2
2 7 Blind resource consumption DoS attacks against
PANA/IKEv2.
7.0
3 10 IP address depletion attacks against PANA/IKEv2. 6.8
4 3 Service theft attacks against PANA/IKEv2. 6.2
5 5 PANA/IKEv2 signalling traffic tampering. 6.0
6 6 Bidding down attacks against PANA/IKEv2. 5.8
7 9 DoS attacks via false PANA/IKEv2 success/failure
indications.
5.6
8 8 DoS attacks using PANA/IKEv2 termination messages. 5.4
9 4 Brute-force attacks against PANA/IKEv2 keying
material.
4.4
10 2 PANA/IKEv2 user identifier disclosure. 2.8
# # Overall risk rating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.72
11.6.1 Mitigation Techniques
The first step in determining how to address the threats we have identified
involves choosing the appropriate mitigation methods. As suggested in [81,
p107], we again use the concept of STRIDE (see section 11.4.1). Table 11.36
lists some of the security techniques21 that we could employ to mitigate the
threats, classified according to the STRIDE model.
11.6.2 Mitigation Status
As described in section 11.4.2, we have placed mitigation circles below the least
likely nodes in the threat trees presented in Figures 11.11 to 11.42. These
circles already indicate how the threats are mitigated or, in other words, which
mitigation technique is employed. As discussed in [81, p91], the mitigation
circles have been added later, after the threat modelling process.
Additionally, Tables 11.1 to 11.32, which summarise the STRIDE category
21Many of these security techniques are discussed in Chapter 2, whilst others are described
in [81, p108-118].
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Table 11.36: Partial list of threat mitigation techniques
Threat type Mitigation techniques
Spoofing identity (S) Appropriate authentication mechanisms.
Protect secret data.
Do not store secrets.
Tampering with data (T) Appropriate authorisation mechanisms (e.g. access control
lists, privileges, IP restrictions, and permissions).
Cryptographic hash functions.
Message authentication codes (MACs).
Digital signatures.
Tamper-resistant mechanisms (e.g. use of subscriber’s
smart cards, in the form of GSM SIMs or UMTS USIMs).
Repudiation (R) Digital signatures.
Timestamps.
Audit trails.
Information disclosure (I) Appropriate authorisation mechanisms.
Privacy-enhancing techniques (PETs — a special class of
cryptographic protocols designed to enhance user privacy,
e.g. by supporting anonymity).
Encryption mechanisms.
Protect secrets.
Do not store secrets.
Denial of service (D) Appropriate authentication mechanisms.
Appropriate authorisation mechanisms.
Filtering (i.e. inspecting received data and making a
decision to accept or reject the packet).
Throttling (i.e. limiting the number of requests to the
protocol).
Quality of service (i.e. a set of components which allow the
provision of preferential treatment for specific types of
traffic).
Elevation of privilege (E) Run with least privilege (i.e. always run with just enough
privilege to get the job done, and no more).
and the related DREAD risk metrics for each of the captured threats, also
include a commentary field (called Comments — see section 11.5.2). This field
contains complementary information that indicates the mitigation techniques
adopted to neutralise the threats.
Building on the above observations, and after analysing Tables 11.33 to
11.35, which rank the threats by decreasing risk, we can deduce the mitigation
status22 of the threats. Tables 11.37 to 11.39 summarise the mitigation status
22As noted by Howard and LeBlanc [81, p92], the mitigation status consists of the answer
to the question: ‘has the threat been mitigated’? Valid entries are: ‘Yes’, ‘No’, ‘Somewhat’,
and ‘Needs Investigating’.
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of the threats applying to each of the four proposed protocols.
Table 11.37: Mitigation status of the PANA/GSM threats
# Threat STRIDE Mitigation
status
7 PANA/GSM signalling traffic tampering. T Yes
3 PANA/GSM session key disclosure. I Yes
4 MitM attacks against PANA/GSM. S Yes
9 Blind resource consumption DoS attacks against
PANA/GSM.
D Somewhat
12 IP address depletion attacks against PANA/GSM. D Yes
2 Permanent GSM user identifier disclosure. I Somewhat
1 PAA spoofing via GSM triplet exposure. S Somewhat
5 Service theft attacks against PANA/GSM. E Yes
6 SIM credential reuse and brute-force attacks. I & S Somewhat
8 Bidding down attacks against PANA/GSM. S Yes
11 DoS attacks via false PANA/GSM success/failure
indications.
D Yes
10 DoS attacks via PANA/GSM termination messages. D Yes
11.7 Comparative Analysis
The aim of this section is to assess the four novel Internet authentication schemes
proposed in Chapters 7, 8, 9, and 10 as candidates for a secure access procedure
for heterogeneous network access supporting ubiquitous mobility. In particular,
we make a comparative analysis of the services and properties possessed by
the new authentication techniques, using as a benchmark the required Internet
remote access services and properties established in Chapter 5 (mainly in section
5.3).
These latter services and properties are derived from two main requirement
sets, namely security requirements (discussed in section 5.1) and implementa-
tion requirements (given in section 5.2). These requirement sets are used in
conjunction with the results of the formal threat model (see sections 11.2 to
11.6) to provide a sound basis for the assessment of the candidate protocols.
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Table 11.38: Mitigation status of the PANA/UMTS and
PANA/Liberty threats
# Threat STRIDE Mitigation
status
2 MitM attacks against PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty. S Yes
6 Blind resource consumption DoS attacks against
PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty.
D Somewhat
9 IP address depletion attacks against PANA/UMTS or
PANA/Liberty.
D Yes
1 Permanent UMTS user identifier disclosure. I Somewhat
3 Service theft attacks against PANA/UMTS or
PANA/Liberty.
E Yes
4 PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty signalling traffic
tampering.
T Yes
5 Bidding down attacks against PANA/UMTS or
PANA/Liberty.
S Yes
8 DoS attacks via false PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty
success/failure indications.
D Yes
7 DoS attacks via PANA/UMTS or PANA/Liberty
termination messages.
D Yes
10 Brute-force attacks against PANA/UMTS or
PANA/Liberty keying material.
I Yes
Firstly, in order to evaluate the four protocols against the security require-
ments, we analyse and compare a number of aspects of entity authentication
security for Internet remote access (section 11.7.1). Secondly, to assess the pro-
tocols against the implementation requirements, we analyse and compare fea-
tures such as complexity, flexibility and performance (section 11.7.2). Thirdly,
we assess the candidate protocols against the results of the formal threat model
(section 11.7.3).
The results of the critical analyses made in sections 11.7.1 to 11.7.3 are then
used to give an overall assessment of the four authentication techniques against
the services and properties required of new authentication methods for Internet
access (section 11.7.4).
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Table 11.39: Mitigation status of the PANA/IKEv2 threats
# Threat STRIDE Mitigation
status
1 MitM attacks against PANA/IKEv2. S Yes
7 Blind resource consumption DoS attacks against
PANA/IKEv2.
D Somewhat
10 IP address depletion attacks against PANA/IKEv2. D Yes
3 Service theft attacks against PANA/IKEv2. E Yes
5 PANA/IKEv2 signalling traffic tampering. T Yes
6 Bidding down attacks against PANA/IKEv2. S Yes
9 DoS attacks via false PANA/IKEv2 success/failure
indications.
D Yes
8 DoS attacks using PANA/IKEv2 termination messages. D Yes
4 Brute-force attacks against PANA/IKEv2 keying
material.
I Yes
2 PANA/IKEv2 user identifier disclosure. I Yes
11.7.1 Security Assessment
We first analyse and compare the four authentication schemes against the se-
curity requirements described in section 5.1, examining a number of aspects of
entity authentication security for Internet remote access. We now consider the
security requirements one at a time.
11.7.1.1 Client Authentication
As stated in section 5.1.1, we focus here purely on the authentication and key
establishment processes, and not on subsequent use made of the authenticated
channel and/or keys that may have been established. After examining the
four authentication techniques proposed in this thesis, we observe that they
all equally enable authentication of the client (i.e. the remote device) to the
access network23.
23In each of the four authentication protocols, a client identifier can be authenticated by
verifying the credentials supplied by one of the users of the device, or by the device itself.
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11.7.1.2 Key Establishment
As discussed in section 5.1.2, a key establishment facility enables network remote
access authentication schemes to be linked to an integrity service, to provide
ongoing data origin authentication and integrity. To achieve this, the entity
authentication protocol needs to be integrated with a key establishment mech-
anism, such that a by-product of successful authentication is a session key.
The four proposed authentication techniques all provide this facility, gener-
ating a shared secret session key called MSK . In every case, this session key
is provided to the PaC as part of the EAP key exchange process; in each such
process the PAA can obtain the session key from the EAP server via the AAA
infrastructure.
11.7.1.3 Use of EAP Methods
As discussed in section 5.1.3, since the EAP protocol is very flexible and can
encapsulate arbitrary authentication methods, it is clearly a protocol that sat-
isfies many of the requirements for a variety of authentication scenarios. As a
result, all the Internet remote access authentication schemes proposed in this
thesis make use of a tunnelled authentication mechanism carrying EAP.
11.7.1.4 Mutual Entity Authentication
The authentication client and the network may be able to perform mutual au-
thentication in some Internet remote access schemes. Indeed, only providing
the capability for the network to authenticate the client may not always be
sufficient24.
24As discussed in section 5.1.4, and following [136], we claim that (mutual) entity authen-
tication is not always an essential precursor for the establishment of secure communications.
In some cases, the most important issue is to ensure that the properties of (implicit) key
authentication and key freshness are provided for any established session keys.
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In all four of the authentication techniques proposed in this thesis, the PaC
and the PAA are able to perform mutual authentication.
11.7.1.5 Key Freshness
As discussed in section 5.1.5, key freshness is a property useful in many applica-
tions in the Internet remote access environment. The absence of key freshness
would enable an interceptor to force the verifier to keep re-using an ‘old’ session
key, which might have been compromised. The key establishment processes of
all four of the authentication protocols provide the key freshness requirement.
11.7.1.6 Re-Authentication
As explained in section 5.1.6, authentication protocols provide assurance re-
garding the identity of an entity only at a given instant in time. Thus the
authenticity of the entity can be ascertained just for the instance of the au-
thentication exchange. If continuity of such an assurance is required, use of
additional techniques is necessary. For example, authentication can be repeated
periodically.
The four entity authentication schemes defined in this thesis are capable of
supporting both periodic and on-demand re-authentication.
11.7.1.7 Authorisation, Access Control, and Accounting
As discussed in section 5.1.7, after a PaC is authenticated by Internet remote
access methods, it will be authorised for network access. While a backend
authorisation infrastructure, e.g. RADIUS (see section 3.9.1) or Diameter (see
section 3.9.2), might provide the necessary authorisation information to the
access network, explicit support for authorisation functionality is outside the
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scope of this thesis. Therefore, in assessing the four authentication schemes,
we do not consider the possible need for the access network to provide service
authorisation information to the authenticated PaC.
PaC remote access authentication should be followed by access control, to
make sure only authenticated and authorised clients can send and receive IP
packets via the access network. Although the four authentication schemes iden-
tify PaCs that are authorised to access the network, providing access control
functionality in the network is outside the scope of this thesis.
Finally, as previously stated, issues associated with the transfer and man-
agement of accounting data are also outside the scope of this thesis.
11.7.1.8 AAA Backend
The four Internet remote access protocols support interaction with a backend
AAA infrastructure (i.e. Diameter EAP — see section 3.9.3), but such an in-
teraction is not a requirement for their correct operation. If the access network
does not rely on a specific AAA protocol, e.g. Diameter (see section 3.9.2) or
RADIUS (see section 3.9.1), then the protocols use a proprietary backend sys-
tem, or rely on locally stored information.
The details of the interaction between the access network and the backend
authentication entities are outside the scope of this thesis.
11.7.1.9 Secure Channel
None of the four authentication techniques assume the presence of a secure
channel between the PaC and the PAA (see section 5.1.9). Indeed, as noted
in section 11.4.2, the four schemes are able to provide a secure authentication
service in networks which are not protected against packet eavesdropping and
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spoofing. They also provide protection against replay attacks on both the PaC
and the PAA.
11.7.1.10 Denial-of-Service Attacks
The four entity authentication schemes are designed to be robust against Denial-
of-Service attacks25, in particular against those DoS category threats captured
in section 11.4.2.
11.7.1.11 Client Identity Confidentiality
As explained in section 5.1.11, some remote clients might prefer to hide their
identity from visited access networks for privacy reasons. All four authentication
schemes provide identity confidentiality for remote clients.
In particular, the PANA/IKEv2 scheme protects the privacy of the PaC
and PAA identities against disclosure threats involving both passive and active
attackers. However, in the other three authentication techniques, an active
attacker that impersonates a given PAA in a first connection may learn the
subscriber’s permanent identifier.
However, in these latter authentication protocols, the PaC can refuse to
send the cleartext permanent user identifier to the PAA if it believes that the
visited access network should be able to recognise its pseudonym (as discussed
in section 11.4.2).
11.7.2 Implementation Assessment
We now analyse and compare the four authentication schemes against the im-
plementation requirements described in section 5.2, examining a number of im-
25As stated in section 5.1.10, such attacks could prevent network access by legitimate PaCs.
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plementation features of such protocols.
11.7.2.1 Client Identifiers
Since the four entity authentication schemes all use PANA as the target trans-
portation environment (see Chapter 6), they can support a variety of client
identifier types (e.g. username, Network Access Identifier, etc.), as well as a va-
riety of remote device identifier types (e.g. IP address, link-layer address, port
number of a switch, etc.), in addition to a binding between the client identifier
and the associated device identifier upon successful authentication26.
11.7.2.2 IP Address Assignment
As discussed in section 5.2.2, assigning an IP address to the client of the authen-
tication schemes is outside the scope of this thesis. We simply note here that
the PaC configures an IP address before running each of the proposed entity
authentication methods.
11.7.2.3 EAP Lower Layer Requirements
As stated in section 5.2.3, EAP imposes many requirements on the underly-
ing transport protocol that must be satisfied if EAP is to operate correctly.
RFC 3748 [13] describes the generic transport requirements satisfied by the four
schemes proposed in this thesis, since all of them make use of EAP.
26In order to prevent unauthorised access, all four authentication techniques support the
cryptographic protection of the device identifier. The keying material required for this service
needs to be indexed by the device identifier (see section 5.2.1).
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11.7.2.4 Flexibility
Since all four entity authentication schemes use PANA as the target transporta-
tion environment (see Chapter 6), they can support client devices with multiple
interfaces, and access networks with multiple routers on multi-access links (as
detailed in section 5.2.4).
In particular, the PANA/IKEv2 scheme provides flexibility through the pub-
lic key based authentication option, while the PANA/Liberty technique supports
flexibility by incorporating the Liberty Alliance framework and mechanisms of
the GAA architecture.
11.7.2.5 Performance
All four of the protocols handle the authentication process efficiently in order
to gain network access with minimum latency. For example, since they all use
PANA as the target transportation environment, they all have the ability to
minimise the protocol signalling by creating local security associations. Also
the schemes make use of two types of fast re-authentication, which contributes
to potential gains in performance.
11.7.2.6 Complexity
As discussed in section 5.2.6, in a number of situations it is highly desirable
to minimise the number of round trips needed by the entity authentication
procedure.
By using EAP to carry lightweight authentication methods, it is possible
to create authentication solutions with low complexity at the application layer.
This is particularly true for PANA/GSM, PANA/UMTS and PANA/Liberty,
through the EAP encapsulation of lightweight authentication protocols used in
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existing mobile telecommunications systems.
11.7.2.7 IP Version Independence
Since the four authentication schemes use PANA as the target transportation
environment (see Chapter 6), they can work with both IPv4 and IPv6.
11.7.3 Assessment using Threat Model Results
In this section, the main results of the formal threat modelling process (see
sections 11.2 to 11.6) are combined to give an assessment of the candidate
protocols.
Table 11.40 summarises for each protocol the overall security risk ratings
(calculated in Tables 11.33 to 11.35) and the threat mitigation status (i.e. the
number of threats which have been mitigated, and the number that have not
been fully mitigated)27.
Table 11.40: Threat model main results
# Authentication
scheme
Overall risk
rating
Threats
mitigated
(# Yes)
Threats not
fully mitigated
(# Somewhat)
1 PANA/IKEv2 5.72 9 1
2 PANA/Liberty 6.14 8 2
3 PANA/UMTS 6.14 8 2
4 PANA/GSM 6.47 8 4
27Indicated by the number of answers equal to or different of ‘Yes’, in the mitigation status
entries in Tables 11.37 to 11.39.
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11.7.4 Services and Properties Assessment
In this section, the results of the critical analyses made in sections 11.7.1 to
11.7.2 are first used to provide a combined security and implementation assess-
ment of the four protocols (as defined in section 5.3). This combined assessment
is then used in conjunction with the threat model results (given in the previ-
ous section) to provide an overall assessment of the proposed authentication
schemes.
Table 11.41: Security assessment
Security requirements Security services and properties of the
candidate protocols
Entity authentication service for re-
mote network access.
Service provided by the four candidate
protocols (section 11.7.1.1).
Key establishment services with key
freshness property.
Services provided by the four candidate
protocols (sections 11.7.1.2 and 11.7.1.5).
Use of a tunnelled authentication
mechanism carrying EAP.
Property provided by the four candidate
protocols (section 11.7.1.3).
Mutual authentication services be-
tween the remote client and the ac-
cess network.
Services provided by the four candidate
protocols (section 11.7.1.4).
Use of periodic and on-demand re-
authentication techniques.
Service provided by the four candidate
protocols (section 11.7.1.6).
Possible interaction between the
network and AAA infrastructures.
Property provided by the four candidate
protocols (sections 11.7.1.7 and 11.7.1.8).
Absence of vulnerabilities that can
be exploited over insecure channels.
Property possible in the four candidate
protocols (section 11.7.1.9).
Robustness against DoS attacks. Property provided by the four candidate
protocols (section 11.7.1.10).
Identity confidentiality service for
remote clients.
Service possible in the four candidate
protocols (particularly robust in
PANA/IKEv2; see section 11.7.1.11).
As shown in Tables 11.41 and 11.42, the four candidate protocols have the po-
tential to meet all the identified requirements. In particular, the PANA/IKEv2
protocol provides a robust identity confidentiality service for remote clients (as
given in section 11.7.1.11). On the other hand, PANA/GSM, PANA/UMTS,
and PANA/Liberty possess low complexity in the authentication method (see
section 11.7.2.6), while PANA/IKEv2 and PANA/Liberty provide a greater de-
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gree of flexibility (as discussed in section 11.7.2.4).
Table 11.42: Implementation assessment
Implementation requirements Implementation services and proper-
ties of the candidate protocols
Support for multiple client and de-
vice identifiers.
Service provided by the four candidate
protocols (section 11.7.2.1).
Satisfaction of the EAP transport
requirements.
Property provided by the four candidate
protocols (section 11.7.2.3).
Flexibility. Property provided by the four candidate
protocols (enhanced in PANA/IKEv2 and
PANA/Liberty; see section 11.7.2.4).
Performance. Property provided by the four candidate
protocols (section 11.7.2.5).
Low complexity. Property provided by the four candidate
protocols (mainly by PANA/GSM,
PANA/UMTS and PANA/Liberty; see
section 11.7.2.6).
IP version independence. Property provided by the four candidate
protocols (section 11.7.2.7).
Building on the above observations, and after analysing Table 11.40 which
summarises the overall security risk ratings and threat mitigation status for
each of the candidate protocols, it appears that the PANA/IKEv2 scheme is
the most secure (with a risk rating of 5.72 and just one of the ten threats
not fully mitigated), flexible and scalable method. We suggest further that
PANA/Liberty can be classified in second position in our comparative analysis,
if we consider its threat model results (it possesses a risk rating of 6.14, and two
out of ten threats are not fully mitigated), as well as its low complexity and a
degree of flexibility.
PANA/UMTS occupies third place in our assessment, because of both the
threat model results (with a risk rating of 6.14 and two out of ten threats
not fully mitigated) and the low complexity of the authentication method.
PANA/GSM comes last, because of its threat model results (a risk rating of
6.47 and four out of twelve threats not fully mitigated).
Finally, it is important to note that the choice of PANA as the target trans-
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portation environment for the four authentication protocols contributes signifi-
cantly to the positive assessments of the four schemes in meeting all the identified
security and implementation requirements (as discussed in sections 11.7.1 and
11.7.2).
11.8 Conclusions
As previously discussed, this thesis proposes, evaluates and compares new entity
authentication protocols for Internet remote access. The main challenges ad-
dressed here include the investigation, development, and assessment of unified,
secure and convenient authentication mechanisms that can be used in access
networks of a wide range of types. The primary goal of this chapter has thus
been to discover which of them is the most secure, lightweight, flexible and
scalable Internet authentication method.
In this chapter, we have adopted a formal threat model, i.e. a security-based
analysis that is used to determine the highest level security risks posed to an
application, and how attacks can manifest themselves. The security analysis
of the proposed authentication protocols has been performed using the threat
modelling process described in Chapter 4 of Howard and LeBlanc [81, p69-124],
the steps in which can be summarised as follows:
• formally decompose the protocols;
• determine the threats;
• rank the threats by decreasing risk; and
• employ mitigation techniques.
The main aim of performing this security-based analysis is to determine
which threats to the new authentication techniques require mitigation and how
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to mitigate them, reducing via a formal process of threat modelling the overall
risk to the protocols to an acceptable level. We have also used this model to
conduct a comparative analysis of the four authentication schemes proposed in
Chapters 7, 8, 9, and 10.
Additionally, since these new techniques have been designed to meet the se-
curity and implementation services and properties required of new authentica-
tion methods for Internet access (as established in Chapter 5), we have analysed
and compared the services and properties possessed by the four candidate pro-
tocols against each of those requirements. These security and implementation
requirements were used in conjunction with the threat model results, to provide
an overall assessment of the proposed authentication schemes.
Finally, our comparative analysis suggests that the PANA/IKEv2 technique
is the best Internet authentication method of those proposed in this thesis.
This is closely followed by the PANA/Liberty scheme. The PANA/UMTS and
PANA/GSM protocols were ranked third and fourth.
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The aim of this chapter is to summarise all the work that has been discussed
here, focussing in particular on the original contributions of this thesis. In
addition, suggestions for future work are also provided.
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12.1 Summary and Conclusions
This thesis deals with Internet authentication procedures for remote access. The
main focus has been on the investigation, development and assessment of unified,
secure and convenient authentication mechanisms that can be used in Internet
access networks of a wide range of types, all supporting ubiquitous mobility. A
series of new solutions has been developed by adapting and reinforcing security
techniques arising from a variety of different sources.
Firstly, background on security services and cryptographic techniques, in ad-
dition to a technical overview of entity authentication, was provided. A number
of properties of authentication protocols, such as temporality, implicit key au-
thentication, and the provision of key freshness, have been identified. A general
authentication model was given. We have also distinguished between different
perspectives related to Internet remote access.
We then described a number of possible approaches to constructing authen-
tication protocols, and divided initial authentication for Internet remote access
into two parts. The need for a higher layer authentication procedure for Inter-
net access was then discussed. Possible tunnelled authentication mechanisms
were considered, and a wide range of potential alternatives were reviewed. We
summarised some of the existing authentication protocols relevant to this thesis,
including legacy processes, public key based procedures, and mobile telecommu-
nications methods.
Secondly, the problem domain was defined, a variety of different scenarios
were described, and means to assess authentication protocols against Internet
remote access requirements were developed. Two main sets of requirements,
namely security and implementation requirements, were specified. To establish
the security requirements we analysed potential risks associated with authen-
tication protocols, examining a number of aspects of authentication security
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for Internet access. To obtain the implementation requirements we analysed
features such as complexity, flexibility and performance.
The results of this critical analysis were used to specify the services and
properties needed to address the threats and to achieve the implementation
features required from entity authentication schemes. We then discussed the
selection of the PANA protocol as the target environment for transporting the
new authentication techniques.
Thirdly, we have proposed four novel Internet authentication schemes, de-
signed to meet the established requirements. We have focused on authentication
protocols that can be carried both by the IETF PANA authentication carrier
and the EAP mechanisms, and that make use of an AAA infrastructure. The
core idea has been to adapt authentication protocols used in existing mobile
telecommunications systems to provide security mechanisms for Internet remote
access. A proposal has also been given for Internet access using a public key
based authentication protocol.
We have thus presented four new, IP-compatible, flexible and scalable meth-
ods for authenticating a user to an access network, summarised below:
PANA/GSM. This lightweight method adapts the security techniques used
in the GSM authentication mechanism to the PANA framework. PANA
communicates, via Diameter EAP, with an AAA infrastructure interacting
with an AuC in the GSM mobile network. PANA/GSM uses the EAP-
SIM protocol, which encapsulates GSM parameters in EAP and provides
enhancements such as stronger authentication and key agreement as well
as mutual authentication. The use of ‘triplets’ in PANA/GSM minimises
the necessary trust relationship between operators, thereby increasing the
likelihood of successful use1.
1From the user perspective, the PANA/GSM protocol works with a ‘standard’ GSM SIM
card and requires only an appropriate Internet access device and a SIM card reader.
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PANA/UMTS. This lightweight method adapts the security techniques used
in the UMTS authentication and key agreement mechanism to the PANA
environment. PANA communicates, via EAP, with an AAA infrastructure
interacting with an AuC in the UMTS mobile network. PANA/UMTS
uses EAP-AKA, which allows use of the AKA infrastructure in network
scenarios in which mobile devices are equipped with a USIM. Use of
UMTS authentication vectors minimises the necessary trust relationship
between operators, thereby increasing the likelihood of successful use2.
PANA/Liberty. This lightweight method reuses the cellular network authen-
tication infrastructure deployed in subscriber smart cards, and offers an
open SSO standard service. This protocol is based on the PANA/UMTS
scheme, and incorporates the security techniques used in the UMTS mo-
bile network and the GAA infrastructure into the PANA structure. This
scheme is complemented by the Liberty SSO service, which can be used to
extend a PANA/UMTS initial authentication to all Liberty-enabled SPs,
and create a network identity infrastructure supporting all network access
devices.
PANA/IKEv2. This method, which can employ either symmetric or asym-
metric techniques3, adapts the security procedures used in the IKEv2 pub-
lic key based authentication mechanism to the PANA framework. PANA
communicates, via EAP, with an AAA infrastructure. PANA/IKEv2 uses
EAP-IKEv2, which allows use of the IKEv2 infrastructure defined for In-
ternet key exchange in any scenario using EAP-based authentication.
Next, the four candidate protocols detailed above were evaluated and com-
pared. The primary goal of this evaluation was to discover which of them is the
2From the user perspective, the PANA/UMTS protocol works with a ‘standard’ UMTS
USIM (or even a ‘standard’ CDMA2000 (R)UIM) card and requires only an appropriate
Internet access device and a USIM (or (R)UIM) card reader.
3Whereas the former requires the involvement of the home network during the initial
authentication process between a user and a visited network, the latter allows for architectures
that avoid the on-line involvement of the home network, since authentication may then be
based on public key certificates (see section 10.1).
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most secure, flexible and scalable Internet authentication method. We adopted
a formal threat model, as described by Howard and LeBlanc [81, p69-124]. The
main aim of performing this security-based analysis was to determine which
threats to the new authentication techniques require mitigation and how to
mitigate them, reducing via a formal process of threat modelling the overall
risk to the protocols to an acceptable level. We also used this model to conduct
a comparative analysis of the four authentication techniques.
Additionally, since these techniques were designed to meet the security and
implementation services and properties required of new authentication meth-
ods for Internet access, we analysed and compared the services and properties
possessed by the four candidate protocols against each of these requirements.
Finally, the above referenced requirements were used in conjunction with the
threat model results to provide an overall assessment of the proposed authentica-
tion schemes. Our comparative analysis suggested that the PANA/IKEv2 tech-
nique is the best Internet authentication method of those proposed in this thesis.
This is closely followed by the PANA/Liberty scheme. The PANA/UMTS and
PANA/GSM protocols were ranked third and fourth.
12.2 Suggestions for Future Work
Many research issues remain in the area of Internet authentication for remote
access, and major new problems are likely to emerge with the growth in ubiq-
uitous Internet access, mobile computing and heterogeneity of the networking
environment. Suggestions for future work in this area include the following.
• Authentication and key agreement are fundamental components of a se-
cure procedure for remote access. We have already noted that the session
key derivation mechanism in the current version of PANA/GSM depends
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heavily on the EAP/SIM protocol. In addition, we observed that a mali-
cious user could succeed in learning EAP/SIM keying material that is also
used in the GSM network, as shown in the threat tree for SIM credential
reuse and brute-force attacks (see Figure 11.16)4. Therefore, one inter-
esting alternative might be to adopt one of the unified EAP session key
derivation approaches currently being investigated, instead of adopting
the existing scheme from EAP/SIM. One example of such an approach
is provided by the Salowey-Eronen mechanism (given in section 3.6.6),
which derives cryptographically separate keys for multiple applications
independent of the EAP method in use.
• An analogous scheme to the PANA/GSM authentication technique would
be to specify the General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) security and mo-
bility management authentication protocol (see section 3.5.2) as an EAP
method (e.g. Buckley et al. [31]). This would enable its use with PANA,
in a scheme which we might call PANA/GPRS.
• The solution proposed in section 8.7 incorporates part of the GAA frame-
work into PANA/UMTS, in which the EAP server operates as a gateway
between the Internet AAA network and the UMTS AKA infrastructure,
performing the retrieval of authentication vectors and the GUSS from
the HSS. An analogous scheme could be specified to apply this solution
directly to EAP-AKA, since (as discussed in section 8.7.2) the GAA Zh in-
terface can be used to allow an EAP-AKA server to obtain authentication
vectors from the HSS.
• As discussed in section 9.7.2, there are a variety of schemes that could
potentially be used as the PANA inner authentication protocol instead of
3GPP AKA in the PANA/Liberty technique. In fact, these novel possibil-
ities for PANA inner authentication may represent suggestions for further
4However, performing a brute-force search for a 64-bit key is a non-trivial task that could
not be executed in real time; moreover, as previously stated, it is unlikely to be worth the
effort of performing such a search just to steal network access.
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research. A first alternative scheme that might be used as the PANA in-
ner protocol is an EAP method encapsulating the 3GPP2 CDMA2000 1x
identification and authentication message exchanges (i.e. EAP-CDMA,
proposed in section 9.7.2); we might call this scheme PANA/CDMA.
• A second alternative method for PANA inner authentication is the trans-
port of pre-shared key (PSK) based mechanisms by EAP (i.e. EAP-PSK,
designed by Bersani and Tscho¨fenig — see section 3.6.7) and PANA, into
a scheme which we might call PANA/PSK. As discussed in section 9.7.2,
PANA/PSK would be a good candidate for use instead of PANA/UMTS
as the initial authentication mechanism in the PANA/Liberty technique.
PANA/PSK has the potential to meet the following design goals: sim-
plicity — since EAP-PSK relies on a single cryptographic primitive (i.e.
AES-128 — see section 3.6.7), wide applicability — since EAP-PSK is de-
signed for authentication over insecure networks (such as IEEE 802.11 —
see section 3.6.7), security, and extensibility (see section 1.1 of RFC 4764
[25]).
• A third possibility involves using PANA/IKEv2, instead of PANA/UMTS,
as the PANA/Liberty initial authentication mechanism (see section 9.7.2).
As previously described, PANA/IKEv2 uses the EAP-IKEv2 protocol (due
to Tscho¨fenig, Kroeselberg, Ohba and Bersani — see section 10.4) as the
PANA inner authentication mechanism. EAP-IKEv2 specifies a way of
encapsulating the first phase of the IKEv2 protocol, which supports both
symmetric and asymmetric authentication, within EAP. PANA/IKEv2
is thus a good candidate for use as the PANA/Liberty initial authentica-
tion mechanism. This is because the Liberty SSO service can be used to
extend a PANA/IKEv2 initial authentication to all Liberty-enabled SPs,
and create a network identity infrastructure supporting all network access
devices. Therefore, we could combine the following benefits: the increase
in flexibility provided by the public key based authentication option, the
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gains in security given by the IKEv2 mechanism, and the gains in inter-
operability and scalability by incorporating the Liberty framework.
In parallel with the development of the new security schemes suggested
above, there is a need to further evaluate and compare them with the existing
proposals. This thesis is based on one particular draft of the PANA specification
[65]. The latest version of this draft [66] was published as this thesis was being
completed, and it would therefore be desirable to make any necessary changes
in the schemes described in this thesis to reflect the changes to the PANA text.
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